The West Australian, Perth, Friday, 26 April, 1912.
THE KOOMBANA.
COURT OF MARINE INOUIRY.
QUESTION OF STABILITY.
COURT INVITES EVIDENCE FROM
PUBLIC.
S. R. P. Stevens, who was acting divisional
officer of the Commonwealth Weather Bureau
from March 15 to 25, examined by Mr. Parker,
said that each morning he received reports from
Wyndham, Hall's Creek, Broome, Derby, Cossack,
Onslow, and other places in the North-West.
Duplicate reports were sent to the Melbourne
Bureau, and from that office the forecasts, based
on barometer and thermometer readings, were
issued at noon, Eastern time. These forecasts
were received in Perth between 11.30 and 12
noon (Western time). If they were not received
by noon each day the forecast was issued by
the local bureau. If storms were approaching
warnings were issued to all stations in the
vicinity of the storm centre. Later on in the
afternoon forecasts based upon more recent
data were issued by the local bureau. No special
forecast was issued from the Melbourne office
of any storm from March 16 to 21, inclusive.
The Mercury, Wednesday 20 March, 1912.
WEATHER REPORT.
FORECASTS.
WEDNESDAY 20 MARCH.
West Australia.- Fine, cool to moderate
temperatures on the S. coast; warm to hot
elsewhere. Variable winds, chiefly between
S.E. and N.E. Some scattered thunderstorms
in Kimberley.
(The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port
(The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port
Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on
March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered
a strong north-east gale on leaving the
harbor. By 2 p.m. the gale had increased
to a hurricane, and continued till 1 p.m.
next day. - Advertiser Adelaide, 26 March)
The central bureau failed entirely in its duty to assess data and issue appropriate warnings. It was though history repeated itself, highlighting the short-comings of this cumbersome system of sending data to Melbourne and expecting a reasonable outcome; Yongala, one year prior, had steamed into a cyclone that was neither predicted nor identified off the Queensland coast. In the case of Captain Knight of the Yongala, he departed Flat-Top for Townsville into conditions at sea which he believed to be a south-east change system moving up the coast from the south, and which he must have believed could be safely outrun en-route to Townsville. Captain Allen had far more information to make his final decision about whether to depart Hedland or not. Luggers running for shelter; significant ground swell; huge waves crashing onto the beach the previous evening etc.. But at the end of the day these masters relied on guidance from the central weather bureau for expected weather conditions and warnings, which did not come in either case. See the following post which illustrates the degree to which cyclones could be predicted as far back as 1898:
http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/11/there-was-no-cyclone-prediction-or.html
Both coasts, east and northwest, can experience up to 5 cyclones per summer season. It was not as though a cyclone was a rare weather event, difficult to predict and anticipate its path of destruction. From all the anecdotal reports it is clear that experiencing such a phenomenon at sea was horrific to say the least. The central weather bureau were obliged to have their finger on the button anticipating these catastrophic events. Circa 1912, there were more than enough stations on both coasts collating barometer and temperature readings to establish the pattern of a tropical depression.
On March 15 there was a monsoonal depression
which had worked S.S.W. to Port Darwin. By the
18th the storm had reached the neighbourhood
of Derby, but in no cases were high winds recorded,
and the lowest point the barometer recorded was
29.70. A report from Port Hedland on the 20th
stated that the wind force was four miles an
hour, with threatening weather and smooth
seas, and Cossack reported a barometer of
29.69 with wind east blowing at the rate of
19 miles an hour.
Contrary to what appears to have been a blatant untruth, the following extract described conditions at Hedland, 20 March:
It started on Tuesday night with a strong
easterly wind, and the waves thundered on
the beach with indications of heavier and
deadlier surges out at sea. Wednesday
morning saw about forty luggers running
to shelter off Port Hedland, where they
were soon safely anchored. These luggers
had a rough time on Tuesday night near
Turtle Island, and the cutting away of masts
in some cases was seriously contemplated.
The wind increased its velocity, and it
continued for three days and nights. The
waves surged up the harbour's entrance, and
the breakers crashed into the sandy Esplanade,
and washed thousands of tons of it away.
It seems to me that every effort was made at the Inquiry to steer attention away from the glaring truth that Captains Upjohn and Allen were ill-advised to depart Hedland into what was clearly a developed storm system. The luggers had made this point perfectly clear.
On the 20th at 1 p.m. Cossack advised that a
fresh gale was blowing, with high seas and
weather threatening. On the 21st, next morning,
the barometer recorded 29.56, wind 37 miles
an hour, and there were very heavy seas. The
storm, from 15th to 21st March, went in a
south-west direction, and evidently struck the
coast at Cossack and curved. The centre of
the storm passed north of Cossack. There
was nothing to indicate that a cyclone was
approaching.
A fresh gale was hardly what Captain Upjohn described, 22 n miles from Balla Balla, 20 March. Note the discrepancies in barometer readings, quoted:
The steamer Bullara (Koombana's sister ship),
which sailed from Hedland for Cossack, via
Balla Balla, on March 20 at 11 a.m., encountered
a strong north-east gale. By 2 o'clock the gale
had increased to a hurricane, and continued
until 1 p.m. on March 21. At noon the
barometer had fallen to 27.70. At this stage
the hurricane had reached its strongest. On
March 20 the steamer's funnel blew off
from the base and fell across the top deck
with a tremendous crash. Great difficulty was
encountered in lashing the funnel to the
boat, as was also the case with many marine
appliances, which were being blown away.
The Moira account also confirmed the extent of conditions out at sea, not just on land:
Captain Brett Ward, master of the
Moira, which reached Wyndham
yesterday, forwarded the following
cable message, via Broome, to the
Premier :-
"We encountered cyclonic weather at 8 a.m.
on the 20th, in latitude 19-20 deg. south,
and longitude 117 deg. east, 100 miles
north-west of Hedland. The Moira was
run before the storm in a westerly direction
about 150 miles. The storm roughly lasted
21 hours, the wind gradually shifting from
east and north-east to south-westerly.
Cross-examined by Mr. Moss: The cyclone
indicated a sudden development and
unexpected energy.
Tell that to the luggers, particularly the ones almost 'de-masted' and the Moira battling at sea from 8 am, 20 March, some 100 miles northwest of Hedland !! How could this account have been accepted into evidence !!
The forecasts were thoroughly satisfactory,
NO !!
and the only delay in getting them from
Melbourne was the time it took to transmit
the telegrams, which had precedence over
all other matters. Pressed by counsel,
witness admitted that there would be
a saving of time to that extent if the
reports were made by the local bureau.
At last a sensible suggestion which should have been implemented after the loss of the Yongala.
Continuing, witness stated that apparently
the depression struck the coast somewhere
near Cossack, and, being interrupted by the
coastline, and the width of the depression
being narrowed, it resulted in a sudden
storm.
No, it was not sudden.
It would help if the various officers on the
coast exchanged information directly
provided, they understood what it conveyed.
It was raised when Yongala was lost if it would have helped if she had been fitted with wireless to receive warnings and advice from officers both on land and at sea. Koombana had just such a wireless which was of no use whatsoever. Steamers out at sea experiencing the first impact of the cyclone did not have wireless to transmit warnings to Koombana and there were no receivers on land to receive general warnings from shipping.
Postmasters, speaking generally, were very
reliable in the matter of weather reports.
There had been cases of delay in issuing
forecasts from Melbourne. He could not form
any ideas as to the velocity of the cyclone
which wrecked the Koombana. The diameter,
he thought, would extend from Port Hedland
on the north and Cossack on the south. About
90 miles north-east by south-west.
This seems reasonable.
To Mr. Parker: It would be of assistance
to masters if the postmaster at Broome
advised postmasters north and south of
the weather conditions.
Any practical suggestions such as this were better than the existing, useless system. Nothing whatsoever learned from the Yongala disaster.
http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/10/cyclone-data-warning-9-am-23-march.html
 |
| courtesy Google Earth |
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| diameter of cyclone - roughly 100 miles (courtesy Google Earth) |
|
| - probably closer to the truth (courtesy Google Earth) |
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