The West Australian, Perth, Wednesday 4 April, 1912.
THE STORM AT PORT HEDLAND.
CONDITIONS OH MARCH 20.
CAPTAIN ALLEN'S FEARS.
Port Hedland, April 3.
As if to palliate the tedium of the scorching,
enervating heat Port Hedland was visited
on March 20 with the tail-end of a willy-willy
which coming with equinoctial tides, did a
fair amount of damage. It was fairly certain
that had it been a full willy willy it would have
spelt disaster to the lowlands of Hedland.
Cyclones along the Nor'west were/are referred to as willy-willies. So far the impression is that the brunt of the cyclone struck Balla Balla which would account for the statement at Port Hedland 'fair amount of damage', rather than extensive damage. (In fact the damage was accounted for by flooding rain rather than hurricane winds.)
It started on Tuesday night with a strong
easterly wind, and the waves thundered on
the beach with indications of heavier and
deadlier surges out at sea. Wednesday
morning saw about forty luggers running
to shelter off Port Hedland, where they
were soon safely anchored. These luggers
had a rough time on Tuesday night near
Turtle Island, and the cutting away of masts
in some cases was seriously contemplated.
The wind increased its velocity, and it
continued for three days and nights. The
waves surged up the harbour's entrance, and
the breakers crashed into the sandy Esplanade,
and washed thousands of tons of it away.
This paragraph is pivotal in the understanding of the sequence of events. Tuesday night, 19 March, was prior to the departure of Koombana from Port Hedland. There is no doubt from the description presented that the captains of Koombana and Bullarra were fully aware of the severity of conditions, which were already so bad that some luggers considered 'cutting away of masts', and during the course of Wednesday morning, 20 March, no less than forty luggers sought shelter at Port Hedland. And yet, Koombana and Bullarra departed into these conditions, which reminds me of Grantala and Yongala departing respective ports into a cyclone off the Queensland coast, March, 1911.
All four steamers were owned by the Adelaide Steamship Company which does beg the question; were these masters placed under excessive pressure to meet schedules?? One can understand the further pressure placed on Captain Allen of the Koombana, who had to make Broome during the window of opportunity provided by high tide, but Bullarra, an ageing steamer of the coastal fleet, could have postponed departure instead of tackling the brunt of the cyclone.
This paragraph is pivotal in the understanding of the sequence of events. Tuesday night, 19 March, was prior to the departure of Koombana from Port Hedland. There is no doubt from the description presented that the captains of Koombana and Bullarra were fully aware of the severity of conditions, which were already so bad that some luggers considered 'cutting away of masts', and during the course of Wednesday morning, 20 March, no less than forty luggers sought shelter at Port Hedland. And yet, Koombana and Bullarra departed into these conditions, which reminds me of Grantala and Yongala departing respective ports into a cyclone off the Queensland coast, March, 1911.
All four steamers were owned by the Adelaide Steamship Company which does beg the question; were these masters placed under excessive pressure to meet schedules?? One can understand the further pressure placed on Captain Allen of the Koombana, who had to make Broome during the window of opportunity provided by high tide, but Bullarra, an ageing steamer of the coastal fleet, could have postponed departure instead of tackling the brunt of the cyclone.
Captain Allen, of the Koombana, seemed
disinclined to go out, and when he decided
to do so he said, "I am going straight out to
sea, and will be lucky if I get to Broome on
Saturday."
This is completely logical. Given the existing conditions and actions of the luggers Captain Allen would have been unhinged not to be 'disinclined to go out'. His plan to 'go straight out to sea' makes sense, and was common practice when anticipating severe storm conditions.
'It is evident that she first encountered
the beginning of the blow between
Port Hedland and Bedout Island. 'If
the wind were favorable it is reason
able to suppose that Captain Allen at
once steered a course for the open sea,
and may have had to run out for
about 200 miles.' As it blows very
strongly after these cyclonic disturb
ances, it is evident that she would be
a great way out of her course before
she was able to cut for Broome, and
that it would take at 'least 41/2 days be
fore she reached her destination.'
She left the port at half-past 10 o'clock on
March 20 with propeller beating out of the
water.
In a previous report it was stated that Bullarra departed Hedland at 11 am, suggesting that Koombana departed half an hour prior.
It makes complete sense that Koombana's propeller was beating out of the water. She had to be in very light condition (near empty ballast tanks) to clear the outer sand bank. This was not a fault of the steamer or her master, it was the reality of negotiating safely in and out of ports along the Nor'west. Could this ultimately be the causative factor responsible for the tragedy? State / ports responsibility?
It makes complete sense that Koombana's propeller was beating out of the water. She had to be in very light condition (near empty ballast tanks) to clear the outer sand bank. This was not a fault of the steamer or her master, it was the reality of negotiating safely in and out of ports along the Nor'west. Could this ultimately be the causative factor responsible for the tragedy? State / ports responsibility?
When passing the entrance to the harbour
she rolled deeply. Captain Allen stated that
he would fill the ballast tanks when he crossed
the outer bank.
Also to be expected, given that waves were 'thundering on the beach'. A light, top heavy, Koombana would have rolled significantly departing the protection of Port Hedland. Note at this stage, Captain Allen intended to 'fill the ballast tanks when he crossed the outer bank'. If Koombana was already 'rolling deeply' how could this have been safely achieved, given that water entering the number of separate ballast tanks would create a destabilising shift in gravity, enhancing a list (created by top heaviness) to a given side. If Koombana was already 'rolling deeply' and conditions were set to deteriorate, I do not believe that it was feasible to fill the ballast tanks in safety and Koombana attempted the voyage IN VERY LIGHT CONDITION (top heavy)!
The ship headed due north, and was followed
about an hour afterwards by the Bullarra going
south.
The damage done to the railway line on
the Causeway will cost a good deal to
repair. The Esplanade suffered most,
being washed away to the allotment
boundaries in several places; in fact,
the Esplanade has disappeared, and
in its place we now have a sloping
sandy beach from the rear of the
Resident "Magistrate's. residence
right round to the jetty. The light tower
and oil house were undermined, while
the roadway connected with the town
bridge was rendered unsafe for vehicular
traffic. One lugger in port anchored too
far in the stream, and drifted on to rocks.
She was only slightly damaged. The
schooner Alto was also damaged at the jetty.
It was a left-handed circular cyclone and
from the directions of the wind it is certain
that the Koombana could not possibly have
avoided getting right into the centre.
Not according to my assessment. It is as though commentary willed Koombana into the centre of the hurricane. I suppose no one wanted to entertain the notion that Koombana might have foundered due to her top heavy status and moderate gale conditions.
The Koombana would be abeam Bedout at 4 p.m.
on Wednesday, but out of course to the south.
The wind was then blowing from the east, but
at 10 p.m. it changed from east to east north-east,
and back in quick succession.
It is unlikely that Koombana was ever near the centre of the cyclone or blown off course to the south of Bedout Island. Koombana was in sight of Port Hedland until at least midday, which implies that she would have been steaming 12.5 knots, an achievement against a gale from the NE. Very unlikely!
from the directions of the wind it is certain
that the Koombana could not possibly have
avoided getting right into the centre.
Not according to my assessment. It is as though commentary willed Koombana into the centre of the hurricane. I suppose no one wanted to entertain the notion that Koombana might have foundered due to her top heavy status and moderate gale conditions.
The Koombana would be abeam Bedout at 4 p.m.
on Wednesday, but out of course to the south.
The wind was then blowing from the east, but
at 10 p.m. it changed from east to east north-east,
and back in quick succession.
It is unlikely that Koombana was ever near the centre of the cyclone or blown off course to the south of Bedout Island. Koombana was in sight of Port Hedland until at least midday, which implies that she would have been steaming 12.5 knots, an achievement against a gale from the NE. Very unlikely!
At 10 a.m. on Thursday it was still blowing
from the east, at noon east-north-east, and
at 1 p.m. in the same direction, with hurricane
force. It shifted at 2 p.m. to north-east, and
remained in that direction till 6 p.m., still
with hurricane force. At 10 p.m. it was
blowing north-north-east, and at midnight
it was north.
This description confirms that once the cyclone made land it stalled causing protracted gales for more than 24 hours.
When Hedland got the worst of the hurricane
on the 22nd, the wind was from the north-north-west
from 4 a.m. till noon.
By this time the cyclone was well inland and had persisted for a full three days!
By this time the cyclone was well inland and had persisted for a full three days!
The general congratulations possessing
people's minds on having escaped the
full force of the willy-willy in Hedland on top
of the equinoctial tides gave place to feelings
of horror when the tidings came that the
Koombana and all aboard were lost, and
that a host of white people had been
drowned at Balla Balla, a disaster to the
whites never before equalled in the history
of willy-willies on the north-west coast. The
gale, or willy-willy, which caused this terrible
calamity is described by experienced seamen
and pearlers as one of the fiercest known on
the coast.
The theatre of its most ferocious attacks appears
to have been that part of the coast between Condon
(50 miles northeast of Hedland) and Cossack
(50 miles southwest of Hedland), and out to sea
from Hedland (nonsensical).
Harper's lugger arrived here on Monday searching
from Broome towards the Rowley Shoals and into
Hedland. She picked up a piece of painted plank six
miles east (west) of Bedout Island, and the Gorgon
picked up a cabin door, undoubtedly from the Koombana,
about 25 miles north (northwest) of the same island.
The theatre of its most ferocious attacks appears
to have been that part of the coast between Condon
(50 miles northeast of Hedland) and Cossack
(50 miles southwest of Hedland), and out to sea
from Hedland (nonsensical).
Harper's lugger arrived here on Monday searching
from Broome towards the Rowley Shoals and into
Hedland. She picked up a piece of painted plank six
miles east (west) of Bedout Island, and the Gorgon
picked up a cabin door, undoubtedly from the Koombana,
about 25 miles north (northwest) of the same island.
The door had been torn off with some force,
the hinges dragging with them the timbers
to which they were screwed. The door was
intact, and little damaged. It appears to be
from a cabin on the second deck, or the
deck above the cattle deck.
Rather than battered to pieces by hurricane winds, the description rather applies to a uniform volume of water 'popping' the door out from its hinges as the steamer rolled over and down into the depths.
Rather than battered to pieces by hurricane winds, the description rather applies to a uniform volume of water 'popping' the door out from its hinges as the steamer rolled over and down into the depths.
Captain Mills, of the Minderoo, to-day
showed a cushion from the smokeroom of
the Koombana, and other wreckage picked
up between 50 and 70 miles north-west of
Bedout Island. Judging from the direction
of the wind during the gale the opinion is
held that the Koombana went down in the
vicinity of Bedout Island.
At last we have a master's opinion that the drift trend was towards the west, which was where the cushion was actually retrieved rather than the other way round as was suggested by the former chief officer, Captain Clark.
(The image below draws an interesting relationship between the oil patch discovered by Captain Upjohn and the cushion and bottom boards / drawer.)
It is thought here that probably the absence of
a light on Bedout Island caused the captain to
At last we have a master's opinion that the drift trend was towards the west, which was where the cushion was actually retrieved rather than the other way round as was suggested by the former chief officer, Captain Clark.
(The image below draws an interesting relationship between the oil patch discovered by Captain Upjohn and the cushion and bottom boards / drawer.)
 |
| courtesy Google Earth |
It is thought here that probably the absence of
a light on Bedout Island caused the captain to
misjudge his position, and strike a reef in the
vicinity, which runs a long way out from the
island, in which case in such weather he
would have immediately turned over and
sunk. No person could have lived in such a
sea for five minutes, and the vicinity is
noted for the existence of myriads of
sharks. Deep feelings of sorrow pervade
the whole community.
the whole community.
'Absence of a light on Bedout Island'?? How was this possible?? We'll need to dig deeper into this one..
It is always appalling to read of sharks, as in the case of both Waratah and Yongala.
So much of the Koombana story mirrors that of the Yongala tragedy. The similarities are almost uncanny. The Adelaide Steamship Company, by all account thus far, had learned nothing from the Yongala disaster almost one year prior, 1911. It will be interesting to find out more about whether any cyclone warnings were issued prior to the departure of Koombana and Bullarra from Port Hedland.
My over-riding impression thus far is that whether there was a cyclone warning or not, both Captains Upjohn and Allen should have stayed put in Hedland. They were confronted with evidence in the form of luggers running for the safety of Port Hedland. There can be no excuses for this unless it was expected practice to meet storms out at sea rather than risk wrecking the steamers in port.
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| pearl luggers, Broome, 1914 - courtesy Pearl Lugger Cruises - History of Pearling in Australia. |
courtesy Trove
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