Much has been written about the commander of Koombana, Thomas Allen, none more so than in Annie Boyd's outstanding Koombana Days. One comfortably comes to the conclusion that the man was competent and well respected. He was also cautious, an asset considering the challenges posed by the schedule and port-access along the Nor'West coast.
These remarks were made in the newspapers of the time:
"It speaks well for the personal qualities of Captain
Allen that he is generally recognised as the most
popular master that has ever traded to the
north-west coast."
Captain Allen took up the challenge of the 'jinxed' flagship just 7 months prior to the disaster and immediately made himself popular among regular passengers, who in turn referred to 'travelling by Tom Allen's boat' rather than Koombana by name.
"Captain Allen is a native of South Australia,
and is about 48 years of age. He is a single man,
and when on his holiday resides with his mother
at Port Adelaide."
On the day of the disaster:
"Captain Allen, of the Koombana, seemed
disinclined to go out, and when he decided
to do so he said, "I am going straight out to
sea, and will be lucky if I get to Broome on
Saturday."
But perhaps the most telling of all newspaper extracts referred to a letter written two weeks prior to the disaster by Tom Allen, as follows:
"It was dated March 8, and in it Captain Allen
said that he had got through the worst of
the season as far as the climate was concerned.
"I just kept clear of a blow last trip,"
he added, "but as soon as I got round the
North-West Cape it started, so my luck was
in that time."
We may infer from Captain Allen's comments 'so my luck was in that time' that he had deep concerns about Koombana's stability in a 'blow'.
Reminds me of:
'Just before reaching Hedland we struck a squall and the ship lay over at an angle of 45 degrees and was quite a long time before straightening up.' (ref. Annie Boyd)
Let's return to the primary factor which precipitated the disaster of 20 March, 1912. No, not the cyclone, but the outer bar at Port Hedland, 19 ft. deep on a spring tide, Wednesday morning.
Annie Boyd offers us one of the most important collections of information relating to this tidal port in the form of 6 log entries of Koombana's draft figures departing Port Hedland, September through December, 1911.
These are sequential and give us important clues into Captain Allen's approach to the inherently top heavy steamer.
The entries immediately tell us that Koombana's return trip to Derby to and from Port Hedland took one week and on the occasions that Koombana went up as far as Wyndham, this round trip took two weeks.
Let's start with the draft figures for the first departure from Port Hedland, 22 September, 1911:
14'8"forward 9.30 a.m.
18'6"aft
What is immediately clear is that Captain Allen departed Port Hedland with all tanks full and a sizable consignment of cargo.
Captain Upjohn, referring to his lengthy tenure on Koombana, claimed forward draft figures of 12 - 13 ft., all forward tanks full and 17 ft. aft with one tank empty, when exiting Port Hedland. This implied the routine filling of at least one tank out at sea.
Captain Allen, clearly, was not following this tried and tested recipe, but displayed a cautious approach to the inherently top heavy steamer by maintaining markedly greater, more stable, draft figures. However, such an approach significantly increased the risk of damaging bar strikes.
Also note time of departure, close to the 10 a.m. peak, allowing plenty time to get to Broome by the following day's spring tide access and clearing Bedout Island during daylight hours. With greater draft figures Captain Allen had to depart as close to 10 a.m. as possible.
The schedule for this voyage included one stop at Port Hedland, which allowed the arrival and departure to made as close to the peak of the spring tide as possible.
The second departure, dated 5 October, 1911, is as follows:
13'0"forward 8.40 a.m.
17'8"aft
In this instance the forward reading is within Upjohn's 13 - 14 ft. range, forward tanks full, which in large part could have been due to the significantly reduced cargo consignment compared with the previous trip. The aft figure is still greater than 17 ft. which suggests that the aft tanks were full on this occasion as well.
The cautious master is reluctant to give up his ballast stability and one imagines that he assumes the reduced cargo component factor has sufficiently reduced the draft to clear the bar.
Again he departs early, in fact earlier than the maximum spring tide, allowing for more than adequate time to make Broome by the next day spring tide and clearing Bedout during daylight.
By 25 October, 1911, captain Allen has another go:
14'3"forward 11.25 a.m.
18'0"aft
These figures suggest that Captain Allen was still determined to maintain Koombana's ballast stability at the expense of bar strikes and on this occasion the forward loading has increased compared to the previous trip out of Port Hedland. The later departure time of 11.25 a.m., well after 10 a.m., suggests running 'late' but leaves enough time to clear Bedout in daylight hours, as there are no tanks to fill at sea.
By 1 November, 1911, it looks as though Captain Allen is gaining in confidence keeping all tanks filled, attempting to exit the tidal port with minimal clearance and quite late in the day. What is remarkable is that this departure 1 week after his initial visit to Port Hedland must have been on a relatively low tide volume over the bar. The departure later in the day is because the steamer was heading south and did not have to clear Bedout.
12'2"forward 2.10 p.m.
18'8"aft
From these figures one gets an impression that Captain Allen's luck must have run out, particularly with regard to the aft figure of 18 ft. 8 in. and the very late departure. It is almost certain that he 'bumped' going out. The relatively low forward draft reflects that the bulk of cargo had been discharged on the trip up the coast.
By 10 December we get another perspective on departing the dreaded tidal port:
15'3"forward 12.50 p.m.
17'9"aft
The aft figure of 17 ft. 9 in. reduced almost a foot compared with the previous departure suggests that the bulk of cargo was assigned forward in the ship, increasing forward draft significantly to 15'3". The man is, however, still determined to keep his tanks full and ensure stability at the expense of 'bumping' the bar.
He departs again late well beyond 10 a.m., making the 3.5 hour run to Bedout well within daylight hours. No tanks to fill at sea.
Final voyage for the year, Christmas Day, 1911, he departs Port Hedland at ten to one in the early, dark hours of the morning, 2 hours after the 10 p.m. peak. Remember, the steamer was heading south and did not have to clear Bedout. Although this date is two weeks after his first visit (Wyndham terminus) and should have coincided with a peak spring tide, there is a significant change in Captain Allen's approach to the bar and it's as though the tried and tested recipe referred to by Captain Upjohn is finally winning the day:
13'6"forward 00.50 a.m.
16'9"aft
It is clear from these figures that Captain Allen had finally conceded to that which had gone before him, i.e. emptying at least one tank aft. (after peak or number 6) and keeping forward tanks full, precisely as Captain Upjohn informed the Inquiry had been the approach for 17 of his voyages in and out of Port Hedland aboard Koombana.
We do not have any further entries between the end of December 1911 and the disaster. One assumes that Captain Allen maintained this more judicious approach to exiting Port Hedland with at least one aft tank empty, compromising stability somewhat and incurring the challenge of filling tanks at sea, but a necessity demanded to avoid damaging bar strikes.
Finally, we arrive at the figures on departure from Port Hedland for the last time. I unequivocally accept the figures offered in the Hedland Advocate by Mr. Barker after discussions with Port Hedland's harbour master:
16 ft. aft. 10.20 a.m.
11 ft. forward
Captain Allen leaves as close to 10 a.m. as possible to make the most of the spring tide.
The draft figures illustrate very light condition, which is what we would expect with all tanks empty and the minimal cargo component of 260 tons, forward. Tom Allen said so himself that he would fill all tanks out at sea. Why are these figures so much lower than those above, and in particular, the last entry?
20 March, 1912, 10.20 a.m. there was a gale blowing from the NE and a 'broad, rolling sea'; a ground swell from the NW. Generally conditions off Port Hedland are remarkably calm. But 20 March the beast had been awakened. Some pearlers out on luggers referred to swells of up to 50 ft..
Captain Allen knew that he would need a healthy margin of clearance over the bar (19 ft.) in order not to bump, and bump hard. A violent bar strike could potentially have caused the loss of rudder and subsequently the steamer. Captain Allen knew that his top heavy charge would pitch and roll violently as she broached the outer bar. There could be no room for error; clearance had to be guaranteed.
Naturally, once this feat had been achieved, a new and more deadly challenge arose - the filling of all tanks in gale conditions with a 'big sea'. It is my opinion that the successful pressing up of all tanks in these conditions within a 3 hour time frame window, was not going to be possible.
Captain Allen could not win that day; checkmated by circumstances.
Many years later the following appeared in a newspaper, summing up the truth about Koombana:
The West Australian, Perth, 5 October, 1946
"Although I greatly admired the ship's
(Koombana) appointments. I never
liked her, considering her too top-heavy.
She always had a list, even when tied
up at jetties.
The loss of this fine vessel, and a
the inauguration of the State Shipping
Service, apparently discouraged our
old friends (Adelaide Steamship Co)
and their passenger vessels were shortly
afterwards withdrawn from our
North-West coast."
Courtesy Boyd, Annie. Koombana Days (p. 246). Fremantle Press. Kindle Edition; Trove
