A DANGEROUS COAST.

Barrier Miner, Thursday 28 March, 1912.

A Dangerous Coast.

The coast along which the Koombana

travels is most dangerous. It is noted

for storms of a sudden and particularly

severe nature There are few lighthouses 

between Port Hedland and Port Darwin 

to guide the mariner, and the course so 

far has been imperfectly surveyed. 

There are numerous hidden obstructions 

which might at any time be responsible for 

a wreck. The toll is heavy already. A network 

exists of shoals, bars, reefs, tides, and currents.

The Ninety-Mile Beach, which forms part of the 

coast, is especially low and sandy. To illustrate 

the variety of the unexpected dangers, it is 

recorded that in one instance, as the result of a 

mischance, a vessel ran aground on the only 

stretch of soft sand in an otherwise rockbound 

island, and was floated off without injury, while 

another ship went on the one flinty ridge in a 

deep water channel and sank. The tidal fall 

of King Sound is one of the largest in the world

its maximum is 42ft. There are innumerable 

maelstroms at the entrance to the harbor, and 

a few of the currents travel at about 12 miles

an hour. An irregular ridge is formed where the 

Fitzroy river pours its flood into the harbor, and 

the various forces set up a terrible fight. 

Numerous islands dot the coast, and ships 

cannot approach near to it. There are but

few ports, and pearling is the chief industry. 

The heat is intense at Port Hedland, which is 

the starting of the recently completed Marble 

Bar Railway. The roofs and chimneys of some

of the houses are anchored with chains.

The flourishing town of Broome has

been created by tho pearling industry.

There the tide runs out as much as 28ft.

and the efflux is remarkably rapid.

courtesy Google Earth

courtesy Trove

PROBATE - CAPTAIN ALLEN.

The Advertiser, Adelaide, Wednesday 7 April, 1912.

COURT CASES.

KOOMBANA WRECK RECALLED

APPLICATIONS FOR PROBATE.

At the Full Court on Tuesday two applications 

for probate were heard which recalled the sad 

fate of the steamer Koombana.

Mr. S. H. Skipper made application on

behalf of Seaborne Robert Cottrell Allen

(executor) that probate be granted in the

estate of the late Thomas Maurice Allen,

master of the steamer Koombana, which

was lost some months ago off the north-

west coast of Western Australia. Mr. Skip

per asked for leave to swear that the death

of the testator had occurred between Port

Hedland and Broome, North-West Australia, 

on or since March 20 last.

The motion was supported by affidavits

by Peter Donaldson Haggart (secretary of

the Adelaide Steamship Company), Walter

Vernon Ray, Robert A. Smith, and Stoddart 

A. Poole. It was mentioned by Mr. Skipper 

that the Koombana left Port Hedland on 

March 20 and on the next morning she 

should have arrived at Broome, 204 miles 

distant. A few hours after the vessel's 

departure there was a terrific cyclone and 

the vessel had not been heard of since.

Although steamers had been sent out in

search of the missing vessel nothing had

since been heard of it, and he believed that

no wreckage had been found. Insurance

had been paid on the vessel as a total loss

The court granted the application.

Consideration was given to a similar 

application in regard to the will of John

Francis Coughlin, who was a steward on

the ill-fated vessel.

Mr.G. W. Dempster, who appeared for

Dennis Fitzgerald, the sole executor, said

the testator had left all his property to his

mother. Affidavits were put in from P. D. 

Haggart and Archibald H. Lewis, a clerk .

in the Perth office of the Adelaide Steamship 

Company. It was stated by the latter that 

he saw the deceased on the Koombana

when the vessel left Fremantle. Mr Dempster 

said the testator left only about £6 in South 

Australia, but he had between £1.000 and 

£1,500 invested in Western Australia.

The Chief Justice -That's a very good

beginning for a steward.

The case was eventually adjourned till a

date to be fixed to enable Mr. Dempster to

supply further evidence. The Chief Justice

said he thought it would be sufficient to

get an affidavit by someone who saw the

deceased on board the Koombana at Port

Hedland.

Captain Thomas Allen (courtesy Daily Telegraph)

courtesy Trove

MISSED CYCLONE WARNING.

The West Australian, Perth, Friday, 26 April, 1912.

THE KOOMBANA.

COURT OF MARINE INOUIRY.

QUESTION OF STABILITY.

COURT INVITES EVIDENCE FROM

PUBLIC.

S. R. P. Stevens, who was acting divisional

officer of the Commonwealth Weather Bureau 

from March 15 to 25, examined by Mr. Parker,

said that each morning he received reports from 

Wyndham, Hall's Creek, Broome, Derby, Cossack, 

Onslow, and other places in the North-West. 

Duplicate reports were sent to the Melbourne 

Bureau, and from that office the forecasts, based 

on barometer and thermometer readings, were

issued at noon, Eastern time. These forecasts 

were received in Perth between 11.30 and 12 

noon (Western time). If they were not received 

by noon each day the forecast was issued by 

the local bureau. If storms were approaching 

warnings were issued to all stations in the 

vicinity of the storm centre. Later on in the 

afternoon forecasts based upon more recent 

data were issued by the local bureau. No special 

forecast was issued from the Melbourne office 

of any storm from March 16 to 21, inclusive. 

The Mercury, Wednesday 20 March, 1912.

WEATHER REPORT.

FORECASTS.

WEDNESDAY 20 MARCH.

Fix this tesignificantxtWEDNESDAY, MARCH 20.

West Australia.- Fine, cool to moderate

temperatures on the S. coast; warm to hot

elsewhere. Variable winds, chiefly between

S.E. and N.E. Some scattered thunderstorms

in Kimberley.

(The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port

Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on

March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered

a strong north-east gale on leaving the

harbor. By 2 p.m. the gale had increased

to a hurricane, and continued till 1 p.m.

next day. - Advertiser Adelaide, 26 March)

The central bureau failed entirely in its duty to assess data and issue appropriate warnings. It was though history repeated itself, highlighting the short-comings of this cumbersome system of sending data to Melbourne and expecting a reasonable outcome; Yongala, one year prior, had steamed into a cyclone that was neither predicted nor identified off the Queensland coast. In the case of Captain Knight of the Yongala, he departed Flat-Top for Townsville into conditions at sea which he believed to be a south-east change system moving up the coast from the south, and which he must have believed could be safely outrun en-route to Townsville. Captain Allen had far more information to make his final decision about whether to depart Hedland or not. Luggers running for shelter; significant ground swell; huge waves crashing onto the beach the previous evening etc.. But at the end of the day these masters relied on guidance from the central weather bureau for expected weather conditions and warnings, which did not come in either case. See the following post which illustrates the degree to which cyclones could be predicted as far back as 1898:

http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/11/there-was-no-cyclone-prediction-or.html

Both coasts, east and northwest, can experience up to 5 cyclones per summer season. It was not as though a cyclone was a rare weather event, difficult to predict and anticipate its path of destruction. From all the anecdotal reports it is clear that experiencing such a phenomenon at sea was horrific to say the least. The central weather bureau were obliged to have their finger on the button anticipating these catastrophic events. Circa 1912, there were more than enough stations on both coasts collating barometer and temperature readings to establish the pattern of a tropical depression.

On March 15 there was a monsoonal depression 

which had worked S.S.W. to Port Darwin. By the 

18th the storm had reached the neighbourhood 

of Derby, but in no cases were high winds recorded, 

and the lowest point the barometer recorded was 

29.70. A report from Port Hedland on the 20th 

stated that the wind force was four miles an 

hour, with threatening weather and smooth 

seas, and Cossack reported a barometer of 

29.69 with wind east blowing at the rate of 

19 miles an hour.

Contrary to what appears to have been a blatant untruth, the following extract described conditions at Hedland, 20 March:

It started on Tuesday night with a strong 

easterly wind, and the waves thundered on 

the beach with indications of heavier and 

deadlier surges out at sea. Wednesday 

morning saw about forty luggers running 

to shelter off Port Hedland, where they 

were soon safely anchored. These luggers 

had a rough time on Tuesday night near 

Turtle Island, and the cutting away of masts 

in some cases was seriously contemplated. 

The wind increased its velocity, and it 

continued for three days and nights. The

waves surged up the harbour's entrance, and

the breakers crashed into the sandy Esplanade, 

and washed thousands of tons of it away.

It seems to me that every effort was made at the Inquiry to steer attention away from the glaring truth that Captains Upjohn and Allen were ill-advised to depart Hedland into what was clearly a developed storm system. The luggers had made this point perfectly clear. 

On the 20th at 1 p.m. Cossack advised that a 

fresh gale was blowing, with high seas and 

weather threatening. On the 21st, next morning, 

the barometer recorded 29.56, wind 37 miles

an hour, and there were very heavy seas. The 

storm, from 15th to 21st March, went in a 

south-west direction, and evidently struck the 

coast at Cossack and curved. The centre of 

the storm passed north of Cossack. There

was nothing to indicate that a cyclone was

approaching.

A fresh gale was hardly what Captain Upjohn described, 22 n miles from Balla Balla, 20 March. Note the discrepancies in barometer readings, quoted:

The steamer Bullara (Koombana's sister ship), 

which sailed from Hedland for Cossack, via 

Balla Balla, on March 20 at 11 a.m., encountered 

a strong north-east gale. By 2 o'clock the gale 

had increased to a hurricane, and continued

until 1 p.m. on March 21. At noon the 

barometer had fallen to 27.70. At this stage

the hurricane had reached its strongest. On

March 20 the steamer's funnel blew off 

from the base and fell across the top deck 

with a tremendous crash. Great difficulty was

encountered in lashing the funnel to the

boat, as was also the case with many marine 

appliances, which were being blown away. 

The Moira account also confirmed the extent of conditions out at sea, not just on land:

Captain Brett Ward, master of the

Moira, which reached Wyndham 

yesterday, forwarded the following 

cable message, via Broome, to the 

Premier :-

"We encountered cyclonic weather at 8 a.m. 

on the 20th, in latitude 19-20 deg. south,

and longitude 117 deg. east, 100 miles 

north-west of Hedland. The Moira was 

run before the storm in a westerly direction

about 150 miles. The storm roughly lasted 

21 hours, the wind gradually shifting from 

east and north-east to south-westerly.

Cross-examined by Mr. Moss: The cyclone

indicated a sudden development and 

unexpected energy. 

Tell that to the luggers, particularly the ones almost 'de-masted' and the Moira battling at sea from 8 am, 20 March, some 100 miles northwest of Hedland !! How could this account have been accepted into evidence !!

The forecasts were thoroughly satisfactory,

NO !!

and the only delay in getting them from 

Melbourne was the time it took to transmit 

the telegrams, which had precedence over 

all other matters. Pressed by counsel, 

witness admitted that there would be 

a saving of time to that extent  if the 

reports were made by the local bureau.

At last a sensible suggestion which should have been implemented after the loss of the Yongala.

Continuing, witness stated that apparently

the depression struck the coast somewhere

near Cossack, and, being interrupted by the

coastline, and the width of the depression

being narrowed, it resulted in a sudden

storm. 

No, it was not sudden.

It would help if the various officers on the 

coast exchanged information directly

provided, they understood what it conveyed.

It was raised when Yongala was lost if it would have helped if she had been fitted with wireless to receive warnings and advice from officers both on land and at sea. Koombana had just such a wireless which was of no use whatsoever. Steamers out at sea experiencing the first impact of the cyclone did not have wireless to transmit warnings to Koombana and there were no receivers on land to receive general warnings from shipping.

Postmasters, speaking generally, were very

reliable in the matter of weather reports.

There had been cases of delay in issuing

forecasts from Melbourne. He could not form

any ideas as to the velocity of the cyclone

which wrecked the Koombana. The diameter, 

he thought, would extend from Port Hedland 

on the north and Cossack on the south. About 

90 miles north-east by south-west.

This seems reasonable. 

To Mr. Parker: It would be of assistance

to masters if the postmaster at Broome 

advised postmasters north and south of 

the weather conditions.

Any practical suggestions such as this were better than the existing, useless system. Nothing whatsoever learned from the Yongala disaster.

http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/10/cyclone-data-warning-9-am-23-march.html

courtesy Google Earth

diameter of cyclone - roughly 100 miles (courtesy Google Earth)

- probably closer to the truth (courtesy Google Earth)

courtesy Trove

KOOMBANA INQUIRY.

The Marine Inquiry was expedited very quickly, one month after the Koombana went missing. Was there enough time for preparation and collation of all the facts and witness accounts, never mind getting witnesses from Northwest Australia to Fremantle ??

The West Australian, Perth, Saturday 11 May, 1912.

KOOMBANA INQUIRY.

FINDING OF THE COURT OF

MARINE.

"VESSEL'S STABILITY UNASSAILABLE". 

"CAPTAIN'S CAREFULNESS AND 

COMPETENCY BEYOND QUESTION"

"A MYSTERY OF THE SEA."

The Court of Marine Inquiry gave their decision 

at the Fremantle Courthouse yesterday regarding

the loss at sea of the s. Koombana on or about 

March 20,1912, between Port Hedland and Broome.

Mr M. L. Moss, K.C., who watched the proceedings 

on behalf of the Adelaide Steamship Co., and 

Mr. W. R. Moxon, attorney and manager for the 

company in this State, were the only persons who 

sat in the body of the Court.

In delivering the decision the President said: In

conformity with the request of the Hon., the 

Colonial Secretary, the Court of Marine Inquiry

investigated at Fremantle the 25th, 26th, and 

29th days of April, 1912, the circumstances 

surrounding the loss at sea of the S S Koombana. 

The difficulties attendant on doing so were 

exceptional, because though in many inquiries 

under the Navigation Act of 1904, the Act under 

which an inquiry is held, evidence can be adduced

from persons who were on board - and who

can depose to the circumstances immediately

attendant on a disaster to a ship, no such

evidence is obtainable in this case owing to

the fact that the ill-fated vessel has totally

disappeared at sea, with all on board of her.

In order, therefore, to account for such a

total disappearance, the inquiry for the most

part must be directed to considerations of

the: Ship's Stability; Equipment; and Sea

worthiness; together with Captain Allen's 

efficiency and carefulness as a shipmaster. 

During the inquiry Mr. Parker, the Crown 

Prosecutor, appeared on behalf of the Chief 

Harbourmaster, and Mr. M. L. Moss, K.C., 

appeared on behalf of the Adelaide S.S. Co., the

owners of the s.s. Koombana. The Court was 

considerably assisted also by the presence 

throughout the inquiry of a large model of the 

Koombana, complete in minute detail, as also 

by various plans, etc., readily produced. 

The SS Koombana was a steel screw steamer of 

3,668 tons gross and 2,182 tons net. - Her length 

was 340ft., breadth 48ft. 2in., and depth 25ft. 8in. 

Her indicated h.p. was 4,000 (3,000), and her 

nominal h.p. 423. She was built by Messrs. Alex. 

Stephen and Son, Ltd., Glasgow, in the year 1908 

from specifications to the Highest Class of British 

Corporation Requirements, which in many 

instances she exceeded. She also held a Marine 

Certificate to August,1912, issued by the Department 

of Navigation of New South Wales, and was last

docked in Sydney on August 15, 1911. 

Interesting to note that Koombana had a depth of hold of 25 ft. 8 in. and a depth of hull of 29.5 ft., which gives us a double bottom containing water ballast tanks of 3.75 ft. slightly more than the equivalently sized Yongala - 3.5 ft.. Yongala had a ballast tank capacity of 400 tons, whereas Koombana had a capacity of 900 tons, which appears to have been contributed to by considerable fore and after peak tanks. At this early juncture it is important to note that Koombana needed a greater ballast to steady her towering decks and relatively low maximum draft. This had significant implications for the sequence of events 20 March, 1912.

The Court heard evidence from Mr. S. R. P.

Stevens, an officer of the Commonwealth

Weather Bureau, Perth; Captain Upjohn,

who is master of the ss. Bullarra, and who

was chief officer of the s.s. Koombana for 12

months; Mr. James Crossley, chief officer of

the s.s. Bullarra; Captain James F. Morrison, 

Inspector of Shipping at the Port of Fremantle, 

who had official knowledge of the s.s. Koombana; 

Captain Matthew John Williams, Marine 

Superintendent of the Adelaide Steamship Co

in Western Australia, Henry John Clarke, assistant 

wharf manager for the Port of Fremantle, and

formerly chief officer of the ss. Koombana

for fifteen months on the North-West coast 

of Western Australia, and also on her maiden 

voyage to Australia from Glasgow; Mr. Alex. Craig, 

the chief engineer of the s.s. Bullarra; Captain 

J. A. Rankin, Acting-Marine Superintendent for

the Adelaide Steamship Company for Australasia - 

who produced to the Court and explained by actual 

test a Ralston stability and trim indicator 

specially made for the s.s Koombana and 

which was not on board the vessel owing 

to its only having recently arrived in Australia.

The Ralston stability and trim indicator was NOT ON BOARD. True GM could not have been established when Koombana departed Port Hedland, 20 March. How convenient for the owners. Bringing up the 'indicator' irrelevant.

Mr. A.C. Butcher engineer-surveyor for the 

Harbour and Light Department at Fremantle,

Mr. W.E. Moxon, attorney and manager in 

Western Australia for the Adelaide Steamship 

Company; Captain Irvine, the Chief Harbour

master for Western Australia ; the Rev. William 

Patrick, who saw the S S Koombana leave Port 

Hedland on her last voyage, and Captain G. 

Cumming, being the only person who 

volunteered evidence in response to an 

invitation from the Court publicly announced 

and published in the daily press.

It is very interesting that the summary referenced Captain Cumming, quoted as the only person to respond to an 'invitation' issued from the Court via the Press. The fact that logistics prevented the majority of residents of Port Hedland (associated with Koombana) from attending, was disingenuous to say the least. 

The Court Finds

that the S S Koombana, official number

122,725, registered in Adelaide, Captain

Thomas Allen master, and owned by the

Adelaide Steamship Company, Ltd., was 

on a voyage from. Fremantle to Derby,via

ports. She sailed from Port Hedland on

March 20, 1912, at about 10.20 o'clock 

a.m, drawing 19ft. aft and about 12ft. 

forward in excellent trim, with her propeller 

well submerged, and shaped a course to round

Bedout Island on her way to Broome. 

Koombana was widely quoted as having a maximum draft of 20 ft. 8 in.. 19 ft. aft is a mere 1 ft. 8 in. short of max. load. This is plain nonsense; Koombana carrying 260 tons of cargo forward (14% max) and empty tanks. The harbour master, accurately, claimed that Koombana was drawing 16 ft. aft and 11 ft. forward, verifying her astonishingly tender condition! Like Yongala, Koombana was notably lighter forward, a factor adjusted in Yongala's case by adding 164 tons of pig iron in hold 2 to increase the draft forward by 6 in.. These two tender steamers required additional ballasting, particularly if cargo component was limited. In fact Captain Rees, 1910, held onto 150 tons of rails in Koombana's bottom to see him through some unsettled, late summer weather. 

It was claimed in a press report that Koombana's 'propeller was beating out of the water' when she departed Hedland. The upper limit of the propeller was in fact 16.5 ft. which proves the Harbourmaster's point. The Inquiry claim sharply contradicted all logic on the matter. The simple fact was this; Captain Allen needed Koombana to be in this condition to clear the inner bar with a heavy ground swell and choppy seas making the crossing dangerous to say the least - bar, 19 ft.. deep at the time. 

At last clarity about the route, shaped round Bedout Island - Captain Allen was on course when Koombana foundered.

The voyage from Port Hedland to Broome is

usually accomplished in about 24 hours. The

Bullarra was at Port Hediand at the same time 

as the s.s. Koombana, and left that port, bound 

southwards, about half an hour or so after the 

S S  Koombana left Bullarra had the Koombana 

in sight until noon. 

This confirms that Koombana was delayed after clearing the bar at Hedland (+/- two hours) due to attempts to fill all her ballast tanks. I do not believe Koombana's tanks could have been adequately pressed up during this time (needed three hours), creating a free surface effect, further destabilising the already top heavy vessel.

At about 6.30 p.m. that day the wind 

increased until it blew a violent hurricane, 

which lasted for several hours, and the 

ill-fated Koombana has never been

seen or heard of since. During the day

of March 20 last, the wind was blowing a

fresh breeze from the north-east, and

weather was a bit overcast and dirty, 

The Inquiry blatantly defied earlier reports, signalling early in its course, the likelihood of a whitewash:

"It started on Tuesday night (before the 

steamers departed Hedland) with a strong 

easterly wind, and the waves thundered on 

the beach with indications of heavier and 

deadlier surges out at sea. Wednesday 

morning saw about forty luggers running 

to shelter off Port Hedland, where they 

were soon safely anchored. These luggers 

had a rough time on Tuesday night near 

Turtle Island, and the cutting away of masts 

in some cases was seriously contemplated."

 'The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port
Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on
March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered
a strong north-east gale on leaving the
harbor.' 

but Captain Upjohn and Captain Allen in 

conversation decided there was nothing 

in it, and neither of them expected to

encounter such a blow as is described

in the S S Bullarra's logbook as a howling

hurricane,

Compare this statement with an earlier  press report:

"Captain Allen, of the Koombana, seemed

disinclined to go out, and when he decided

to do so he said, "I am going straight out to

sea, and will be lucky if I get to Broome on

Saturday."   

a hurricane which apparently has totally

engulfed the S S Koombana, and which, 

according to Captain Upjohn's evidence, 

the S S Bullarra only survived through a

miracle. There was an unattended light

house on Bedout Island, the light in which,

however, was not burning on March 20. 

The S S Koombana should, however, in 

the ordinary course of things, have been 

clear of the inland before the wind became 

a hurricane, i.e., before it was dark that day.

A strange thing for Captain Upjohn to have said. He made it clear that Bullarra steamed into the fringe of the cyclone 22 miles from Balla Balla, roughly 4 p.m. that day. The 'hurricane' was to the southwest, not northeast, in which direction Koombana was headed. Koombana could only clear Bedout Island during daylight hours (Bedout light not functioning) if not more than two hours were allocated to filling tanks.

The only wreckage discovered was picked 

up a distance varying from 20 to 70 miles 

from Bedout Island, and with the exception

of some air tanks it was all picked up at sea, 

the air tanks alone having been found on the 

mainland. 

This confirms that the disaster occurred in the vicinity of Bedout Island with wreckage, naturally, drifting from Koombana's final position somewhere northeast of Bedout Island.

The wreckage consisted of a part of a starboard

bow planking of a motor launch; a state-room

door, and panel from the promenade deck,

two planks for covering tanks of lifeboats, and 

some air tanks . 

Not one word mentioned of the patch of oily water. It's as though the Court, intentionally, did not invite the finality of that particular discovery. Why? Perhaps there was a reluctance to commit to dragging the area of sea for the wreck in the vicinity of the oily water. It would also not have allowed the Court to come to the conclusion outlined in the following paragraph. 

The Court cannot say What actually happened 

to the S S Koombana, but it seems reasonably 

clear that the hurricane of the night of the 20-21 

March last was responsible for her total loss at sea. 

And what if it hadn't???

With regard to her stability, it is known what cargo, 

coal, etc., she had on board when leaving Port

Hedland, and where it was stowed; also the

condition of her ballast tanks: 

She carried a load of 260 tons of cargo; properly 

stowed; 480 tons of coal, 871 tons of water in her

tanks, and of stores she had some 60 tons.

260 tons of cargo was about 14 % of her average, full cargo capacity. Koombana, just on the basis of this component of dead weight was very light indeed (top heavy). I do not for one moment believe the figure of 871 tons of ballast water. She could not clear the outer bank with almost full ballast tank capacity (900 tons) and Captain Upjohn referred in a statement to Captain Allen intending to fill all his ballast tanks once out at sea. 

Such a blatant untruth did not bode at all well for the credibility of this Marine Inquiry. No one could have known to what extent Captain Allen filled his ballast tanks at sea after departing Port Hedland.

She also had on board 76 passengers and a

crew of 74. 

The stability of the vessel with that load was 

tested with Ralston's stability indicator; which

showed she had a G.M. of 2 ft. 71/2 in. plus.

Having examined in detail GM with regard to the SS Waratah, I find this result almost ridiculous in a steamer whose propeller was beating out of the water as she exited Port Hedland and carrying 14 % of total cargo capacity. The testing quoted, was hypothetical, as Koombana did not have this instrument on board, final voyage. What the GM might have been is unanswerable and to what extent Captain Allen was able to fill his tanks at sea, must remain a mystery as strong as the disappearance itself. This did the Court no credit, taking those with an interest in the case, for fools!

Seven other tests were made with 

the indicator under varying conditions

of load, and in each of them her

stability was shown to be entirely 

satisfactory.

Whitewash satisfactory.

If further affirmation of the ship's stability

and seaworthiness be required it is to be

found in the career of the vessel since 

1908 on the Australian coast. 

As in the case of the top heavy Yongala. It took a cyclone to demonstrate in the harshest of terms the limitations of these tender steamers. In the case of Koombana she did not even have to steam into the cyclone to be found wanting.

All the witnesses who have had experience 

in her deposed to her very excellent seagoing 

qualities.

An insistence which belied the true facts.

With regard to the personnel of the vessel, it

was of the highest quality, and both Capt. Allen 

and the chief officer held extra masters'

certificates and both were men of great

experience on the Australian coast. 

Marine Inquiry Yongala de javu.

The Court is satisfied that the S S Koombana, 

in construction, stability, and seaworthiness,

was equal to any vessel of her class in the

Australian coastal trade. 

She wasn't equal to the humble Bullarra which survived the full onslaught of the cyclone.

The Court thinks it desirable that telegrams 

regarding the weather should be exchanged 

every day between stations where observations 

are made along the'north-west coast, that the

information so obtained should be posted for

general information, and that storm signals

should be shown at all ports.

I shall return to this subject in detail, suffice to say that nothing, and I mean nothing, had been learned from the Yongala disaster one year prior.

In conclusion, the Court simply finds, without 

indulging in useless speculation, that the Stability 

and Seaworthiness of the s.s. Koombana were 

unassailable, and the competency and 

carefulness of her master, Capt. Allen, beyond

question and that after being lost sight of at 

sea on the 20th March, 1912, her fate passes 

beyond human knowledge and remains' a mystery

of the sea.

Compare this closing statement with that for the Yongala:

merely conjectures, it is not possible to allow them any consideration; and while it is both gratifying and reassuring that the vessel's stability and seaworthiness remain unassailable, and the competency and carefulness of Captain Knight unimpeachable, the Board, with no desire to indulge in idle speculation, simply find that, after becoming lost to view by the lightkeeper at Dent Island, the fate of the "Yongala" passes beyond human ken into the realms of conjecture, to add one more to the long roll of mysteries of the sea.

Another whitewash wrapped in a conclusion of cliched repetition.

SS Koombana (courtesy Wikimedia Commons)

SS Yongala (courtesy Michael McFadyen's scuba diving website)

courtesy Trove

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