R.M.S. KOOMBANA
 |
| courtesy Trove |
 |
In light condition - rudder prominently exposed. courtesy State Library of Western Australia. |
Koombana was a magnificent, bespoke steamer with opulently appointed, well-ventilated, elevated passenger decks, cattle deck, and dedicated cargo holds (incl. refrigeration). But she was flawed; inherently top heavy, with a reduced draught of 20 ft. 8 in. to access harbours such as Port Hedland.
The indication of inherent top heaviness is illustrated by comparison with the similarly sized steamers Yongala and Grantala (greater draughts: 24 ft.) of the same Adelaide Steamship Company. The latter steamers, with significant top hampers, operated with ballast tank capacity of 400 tons, whereas Koombana required 900 tons to steady her.
Yongala and Grantala 3664 tons
Koombana 3668 tons
Koombana's track record, fully ballasted, gives us the most significant confirmatory clue regarding inherent top heaviness. 8 February, 1910, Koombana allegedly heeled over to 45 degrees in a squall and took a considerable time to recover.
20 March, 1912:
All the signs indicated that Koombana and Bullarra would be departing Port Hedland before noon into unpredictable and potentially dangerous conditions. A period advisory referred to an easterly wind and falling barometer being the warning signs for pearlers to seek shelter. 'At 6 a.m. the barometer had been at 29.50', down from 29.9. Between 4 a.m. and 10 a.m., in normal conditions the barometer readings rise, not fall. The wind, a gale by noon, came from the NE. (some sources claim a half gale from ENE).
'Two or three layers of swiftly racing clouds could frequently be seen through the prevailing mist. It blew with terrific force.'
40 luggers sought shelter in the creek, bringing tidings of a heavy ground swell from the northwest, which in turn, signaled the presence of a significant cyclonic event out at sea.
'Vessels engaged in the pearl-shell fisheries, on the northwestern coast of Australia, run on shore in any available creek, on indications of the approach of a cyclone.'
Alleged:
"I don't like the glass," was Captain Allen's remark,
But Captain Allen was compelled to depart at 10.20 am, due to pressure of maintaining a tide-dependent schedule; mail contract; cargo delivery and passenger demands.
Koombana departed Port Hedland carrying:
- 260 tons cargo
- 480 tons coal
- 60 tons stores
= 800 tons
(plus an undisclosed tonnage of residual fresh water in her tanks)
157 souls on board.
157 souls on board.
260 tons of cargo was only 14.4 % of maximum load - 1800 tons (not 4000 tons as is commonly reported). 85 tons for Broome were stowed in 'tween decks 1 and 2, higher up in hull, raising centre of gravity, reducing stability and 175 tons for Derby in hold 2, low down, improving stability. These units of cargo were loaded and secured at Fremantle for the voyage.
I do not believe there was a significant component of livestock on the cattle deck due to steaming up the coast. Livestock was destined for the markets at Fremantle and required fresh water and fodder at sea. Moreover, Bullarra had been reintroduced on the run that month to bring livestock back from Port Hedland, relieving Koombana of this function.
I do not believe there was a significant component of livestock on the cattle deck due to steaming up the coast. Livestock was destined for the markets at Fremantle and required fresh water and fodder at sea. Moreover, Bullarra had been reintroduced on the run that month to bring livestock back from Port Hedland, relieving Koombana of this function.
Drawing 16 ft. aft and 11 ft. forward (rather than the claimed 19 ft. aft 12 ft. forward), all ballast tanks empty, Koombana's propeller was not fully submerged (decreased thrust and manoeuvrability) and she displayed 'an ugly list to port' confirming her very light lading and ballast status.
The depth over the bar was 19 ft. at the time which means Koombana would not have cleared without incident, given the Inquiry's quoted 19 ft. aft figure. Furthermore, a dead weight of 800 tons (cargo in forward holds; empty after-peak and no 6 tank) could not have accounted for a draught 1.75 ft. short of maximum loading, aft.
Why was Koombana in such light, top heavy condition?
She needed to be!
Captain Allen:
"I might bump that outer bar going out on a sea like this."
"My passengers think they will get to Broome to-morrow (Thursday)," he remarked; "but they will be lucky if they get there by Saturday. I am going to put right out to sea, and as might bump the bar going out I will leave my ballast tanks until I get outside and fill them out there."
It was both risky and laborious to fill tanks at sea, particularly in a heavy ground swell and gale, and it would have taken more than 3 hours (in ideal conditions) to achieve this task and which delayed progress significantly. Two sets of eye witnesses referred to Koombana being in sight for only 2 hours. The tanks were unlikely to have been successfully pressed up during this time frame, which in turn would have created a free surface effect, enhancing the list; reducing what GM there was and impairing heeling recovery.
Why did Captain Allen not take the necessary time to fill all tanks? Quite simply, the Light at Bedout was not functioning and he had to clear the dangerous reef adjacent to the island before dark (6.38 p.m.).
Captain Allen anticipated and was ultimately confronted by a stiff head wind (gale from NE; ENE) slowing progress. Distance to Broome = 265 n miles. An average of 10 knots (14 knot steamer) or less would miss spring tide access to Broome the following day. Marked pitching would have exposed the propeller periodically, reducing thrust.
Why did Captain Allen not take the necessary time to fill all tanks? Quite simply, the Light at Bedout was not functioning and he had to clear the dangerous reef adjacent to the island before dark (6.38 p.m.).
Captain Allen anticipated and was ultimately confronted by a stiff head wind (gale from NE; ENE) slowing progress. Distance to Broome = 265 n miles. An average of 10 knots (14 knot steamer) or less would miss spring tide access to Broome the following day. Marked pitching would have exposed the propeller periodically, reducing thrust.
Bullarra:
'When we came on deck for the mid-day meal, the Bullara and the Koombana were stern on to each other, and the distance apart being about five miles.'
Koombana had not made much progress by noon due to the attempt to fill tanks.
With a gale and a significant wind catchment factor in the form of towering superstructure and funnel enhancing the existing list, Koombana was presented with challenges from the start. I believe Captain Allen made his decision to pursue the standard course rounding the northern aspect of Bedout Island based on the fact that he could see evidence of the cyclone to the westward on the horizon; not north or northeastward in which directions he was headed; confirmed by a witness account aboard Bullarra heading southwest:
"I noticed away on the starboard bow and
just above the horizon, a dense mass of
inky black clouds and from descriptions
I'd had from old pearlers, I was convinced
we were in for it."
Therefore, I believe Koombana only ever skirted the outer margin of the cyclone which targeted Balla Balla from the north-northwest, having curved round. The official meteorology report presented at the Inquiry claimed a cyclone diameter of 90 miles, which could not have broached Koombana's intended steamer track. This is further substantiated by evidence of minimal storm impact at Port Hedland and Bedout Island (lighthouse glass not encrusted and no signs of a disturbance).
"Scarcely any damage
was caused by the
hurricane at Port Hedland."
However, this said, Koombana in her unstable, top heavy condition would have been subjected to broad, deep sea swells; strong winds shifting through NE ---> N ----> NW, further unsettling stability and hindering heeling recovery. Listing heavily, she would have been vulnerable to water ingress via the cattle loading doors or the ventilation ports on the main deck, which would further have contributed to the free surface effect, worsening the list and further diminishing heeling recovery.
Cargo might also have shifted, contributing to the deteriorating situation.
In an attempt to correct the dangerous list, Captain Allen might have elected to pump out one of the longitudinal ballast tank sections on the side of the list, with the resultant catastrophic effect as illustrated by the S.S. Vestris disaster (November, 1928). Captain Carey pumped out tanks in the hope of decreasing a progressive list. Paradoxically, in part due to residual free water in tanks, the list increased dramatically.
Ultimately, when Koombana went over I believe she did so suddenly and violently, not allowing souls successful escape in lifeboats and if a few did, they did not survive to tell the tale.
No cargo or bodies were ever recovered suggesting that she turned turtle trapping both people and cargo within. Absence of bodies and cargo goes against the theory that Koombana was battered to pieces by the cyclone. Damaged pieces of wreckage, ultimately released from the wreck, could have been caused by superstructure striking the seabed or movement of the wreck itself along the seabed. It would also explain why wreckage was only discovered 12 to 14 days after the disaster - rising from the seabed - rather than due to immediate hurricane-force damage.
Insufficient time was allowed for wireless operator Harry Lyon to send out a distress signal via Marconi wireless, if indeed it was still operational. It is important to note that there was a backup wireless unit independent of the ship's electrical supply, but with only a 100 mile range.
I believe that the oil patch, discovered by Captain Upjohn of the Bullarra and represented on the image below, is Koombana's final resting place. An example of oil marking the spot was used to locate the Clan Ranald wreck, January 1909:
"direct me to the spot where the wreck was sunk,
which he said he knew exactly, having seen
streams of oil rising from her."
This is further borne out by the distribution of the bulk of wreckage, drifting with the predominantly (south)westward trending current which predominates after alongshore cyclones in the Pilbara. This position is within the outer steamer track for Broome.
Koombana was not off course.
Inquiry (courtesy Koombana Days online site):
"- It was in latitude 19.11 and 119.25 E.
What distance would that be off Bedout Island?
Did you take any samples of this oily substance?
- Yes, two or three dozen bottles.
What depth was there at this place?
- 30 or 35 fathoms. (55 m - 64 m)
Did you see any trace of the vessel at that depth? There would be nothing to indicate that the Koombana or any other vessel would be there?
- It was getting dark and it looked like the outline of a vessel."
After further analysis, 27.5 miles northeast of Bedout Island coincides with 19 15 51 S, 119 26 48 E (30 fathoms), a position 20 miles from additional wreckage to the west and which, in turn, lay 20 miles to the north of Bedout Island - as referenced by Captain Upjohn.
Although not represented on the graphic below, Captain Upjohn referred to:
They had taken the specimens (of
oily water) produced in Court at
this spot. An awning spar and one
of the planks exhibited in Court
had also been discovered in close
proximity. Other articles were picked
up about 20 miles from that spot.
(marked 2 and 3 on graphic).
1. Stateroom door; painting stage; small pieces of board. SS Gorgon
2. Motor launch starboard bow plank (with insignia). SS Bullarra
3. Small wreckage; (life) boat tanks; lifebelts; panel from saloon / smoke room ceiling. SS Bullarra
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)
4. Bottom board from (life) boat; white painted board. Lugger McLennan.
5. (life) boat mast and small wreckage (rising from bottom). SS Una
6. Miscellaneous wreckage. SS Una
7. Miscellaneous wreckage. SS Una.
8. Cabin paneling. Lugger Mina.
9. Smoking room cushion; cabin door. SS Minderoo.
10. Straw envelopes (Leech's fortune). SS Minderoo and SS Gorgon.
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)
11. Bottom boards (lifeboat); drawer; small teak panel. SS Minderoo.
 |
| Official cyclone, 90 miles in diameter, as per Meteorological Office. Note that the cyclone approached the coast from the direction of S.S. Moira's position, 8 a.m.. Courtesy Google Earth. |
 |
| courtesy Trove |
 |
| this map which appeared in a period newspaper report gives an idea of the route taken by Koombana, 'shaping a course' around the northern aspect of Bedout Island. (the 'last seen here' annotation is unconfirmed, but could substantiate Koombana being on course this far) |
 |
| presumed track Port Hedland to Broome |
The residents of Hedland had a final say on the matter:
The ship's propeller was showing
when anchored at the jetty, and
raced out of the water as she sailed
over the rolling seas at the harbor's
entrance ; the boat also rolled heavily
when the wind struck her on the
starboard side—so much so that
several who were watching her exclaimed.
"She'll be over directly " !
And a final, cryptic comment:
Sunday Times, Perth, 31 March, 1912.
Therefore, as she has not been found along the
Ninety-Mile Beach or in La Grange Bay, we are
led to the terrible alternative that she was engulfed
somewhere north-east of Bedout Island, where
she was last spoken.
 |
| courtesy ANU archives |
 |
| In this image of Koombana apparently steaming, the main livestock loading door is open, one assumes due to the excessive heat and humidity along the Nor'West coast. Of concern would have been a potential portal of water ingress during heavy seas and rolling. |
courtesy Trove extracts; Australia Pilot, 1920.
For those with an in depth interest in this subject should obtain Annie Boyd's outstanding Koombana Days.
