HENRY JOHN CLARKE AND THE RALSTON INDICATOR.

Henry John Clarke was intimately acquainted with Koombana - 15 months on the ship.

"Yes. We had a bad doing between Fremantle and Geraldton with a W.N.W. gale on the broadside of the ship."

"The ship at the that time was fully laden ?"

"No, but fairly well. She had a good deal of weight."

"How did she behave ?"

"Very well."

"Did she ship much water ?"

"No. Nothing to speak of."

In this case Koombana 'had a good deal of weight' which implies that she was more G.M. stable.

Koombana had an excellent freeboard clearance factor (8.55 ft. fully laden) and as such would not have shipped much water unless she was heeling over to a significant degree.

Captain Irvine, Chief Harbour Master, was pushing for more:

"Did you have any bad weather on any other passage when the ship was empty or light ?"

"Yes, on one occasion, with a light ship and a strong westerly gale, on the broadside on the passage south."

"On this occasion did it effect the ship much ?"

....with which there is a (crucial) gap in the records at hand.....

However, there is a continuation and extrapolation:

"You would say she was an ordinary safe ship ?"

"She was an exceptionally fine ship in bad weather."

Me thinks he doth protest too much. I cannot believe that Koombana was an 'exceptionally fine ship in bad weather' and certainly not in light condition.

We come to another illuminating extract as follows:

"You were acquainted with the Superintendent of the building yards. Did you at any time hear anything of a scientific instrument determining the G.M. of a ship ?"

G.M. = metacentric height = indicator of relative top heaviness of the vessel. Low = unstable; high = stable (in very simplistic terms).

"No."

"Is Mr. Ralston an eminent man amongst shipbuilders at home ?"

"He is very well known in shipping circles."

"Anything originating from his him, in the way of this instrument, could be relied upon ?"

"Yes."

The Ralston G.M. indicator in question was never available to the crew on Koombana and as such was a 'red herring' in the context of proceedings. It was never validated and should not have been entered into evidence.

Given that Koombana might have heeled over to a dangerous degree within the context of a cyclone:

"Are there any other openings other than the bunker lids along the main deck ?"

"Nothing. The goose-neck ventilators are always covered up."

"If the ship got over on broadside, could water get into the cattle deck ?"

This was a question on the tip of many tongues...

"The openings on the cattle deck on ship's side from main deck are absolutely water tight. Shutters are on the doors."

Again too much protesting and given the very hot, humid conditions that Wednesday morning there might very well have been ventilation hatches open for the few livestock on board.

"There are scuppers ?"

"They can be screwed down."

"If the openings were battened down and the scuppers screwed would water get in ?"

"Very little."

What is so interesting about this exchange is the underlying suggestion that Koombana did at some point end up heeling over dangerously and the question of water ingress ----> foundering. There is no doubt in my mind that this was part of the sequence of events and that the cattle deck ventilation ports and doors, a significant, portal of ingress.

The same reference was made in the final extract:

"The bunkers lids on the deck are kept well covered and care taken to secure same."

"How many are there on each side ?"

"Two."

It is a great pity that a significant number of documents from the Inquiry witness interviews is missing from this collection. However, we get the gist and it was not convincing of a watertight case in favour of an entirely seaworthy vessel.

More on the controversial Ralston Indicator:

The Daily News, Perth, 26 April, 1912. 

THE KOOMBANA

DISASTER

MARINE INQUIRY AT

FREMANTLE

-SECOND DAY'S PROCEEDINGS.

— After our report closed yesterday,

expert evidence as to the stability of

.the Koombana was given by Captain

James Alexander Rankin, acting marine 

superintendent of the Adelaide S.S. Co. 

at Port Adelaide. He mentioned that the 

Ralston stability and trim indicator, as shown 

in court, was used for, among other things, 

showing the ''G.M." the generally accepted 

term for denoting the stability of a vessel. 

It had been designed for the Koombana, 

and he had tested the vessel with it on 

information supplied by Captain John Rees, 

who had previously been in command of the 

ship. 

Let's put this into perspective. The test quoted was a hypothetical one as the Ralston Indicator had never been used in practice on Koombana. The test was also based on 'information supplied by Captain John Rees' not by Captain Allen on the day of the disaster. What possible relevance could this exercise have had?

At that time the Koombana was in the lightest 

possible condition, and the test gave a result of 

plus 1 ft 6 in., which was exceptionally 

good. 

It is difficult to check figures such as this against a frame of reference which does not exist except for an incident when Koombana was caught in a squall, February, 1910, at which time she heeled over to '45' degrees and took a dangerously long time to recover.

However, we can have a closer look at the stability figures for TSS Waratah, another inherently top heavy steamer, to gain a modicum of insight into this tricky subject:

Stability in Various Conditions. 

I. Ship light with stores and fresh water aboard G.M.= 2 1/2 inches (0.21 ft.)

Range of stability=57 degrees. 

II. Light ship, with all coal including reserve, all water, all water ballast except forepeak, and 1,200 tons in bottom of hold G.M.= 6 inches (0.5 ft.)

Range of stability=69 degrees.

III. Ship loaded to disc with cargo at 40 cubic feet per ton in holds, and cargo of 80 cubic feet per ton in 'tween deck, all coal including reserve, F.W., stores, crew, and passengers G.M = 4 1/2 inches (0.375 ft.) 

Range of stability=36 degrees.

It is immediately apparent that the G.M. figure for 'light condition' was a mere 0.21 ft., which is vastly different from 1.6 ft.. Both Koombana and Waratah (see images below) carried significant top hampers which were similar in profile. It is impossible to get such a variance to support Mr. Rankin's claim.

Provided she were fully loaded with 

cargo and bunker coal, and all the tanks 

were full, the Koombana could heel over to 

an angle of 90 per cent., and then have a 

margin for recovery. 

Again extreme exaggeration if one compares the figure of 90% with Waratah's range of stability figures above.

Captain Allen, prior to his departure from 

Fremantle, forwarded to witness, through 

the Western Australian manager of the company 

Mr. W. E. Moxon a report showing the distribution 

of a load of 712 tons. The report gave further the 

particulars of draught and trim.

The witness then gave a demonstration to 

the court of the use of the Ralston instrument. 

The 'G.M.' was plus 2ft, 1 1/2in., and the result 

of the second process almost exactly coincided 

with the late master's figures for the draught

and trim arrived at by ordinary means.

Again hypothetical, made worse by the fact that this was not the cargo component (260 tons; 14% of carrying capacity) when Koombana departed Port Hedland for the last time, with empty tanks!

In reply to Mr. Moss, the witness said the ship 

was in many respects in excess of British 

requirements, and that he placed every reliance on 

the Ralston instrument. A...C. Butcher, resident 

engineer of the Harbor and  Lights Department, 

said that, with Captain Rankin, he  had carried out 

tests, and the curves of stability were  particularly good. 

The stability curves supplied by the builders did not show 

such severe tests as that carried out by witness.

What was sorely missing in  this Inquiry was a document outlining the builders' stability curves for Koombana, whether such tests were severe or not. The Court did not get an opportunity to match these curves to the steamer carrying a mere 260 tons cargo, forward. A farce. 

Before the Court adjourned the chairman said that, as 

rumors had been afloat with regard to the alleged instability 

of the vessel, he desired to announce publicly that the 

court would be pleased to hear any evidence from persons

who had not been subpoenaed, but could give testimony.

Mr. Moss stated that, on behalf of the Adelaide Co., he 

was pleased the R.M. had mentioned the matter, as it

would give those people who had busied themselves in 

spreading false rumors a chance to make a statement in 

the court if they so desired.

How were 'those people' supposed to get from the Nor'West to Fremantle within a couple of days to 'make a statement' ?? Where there is smoke there is generally fire, and the rumours, in my opinion, were very well founded.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia; series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

if anything, Koombana had the greater top hamper...

This image appears to show Koombana steaming with the cattle loading door open. One can understand given the heat and humidity, Nor'West coast, but this would certainly have been a potential portal of water ingress in heavy seas - dangerous!