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| courtesy Trove. In this image Koombana's rudder and propeller were well submerged, appearing suitably ballasted and trimmed - no obvious list. |
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| courtesy: Australian National University and Adelaide Steamship Company Ltd. for this extraordinary Koombana photo. In this image, compared to the one above, it appears that Koombana was in light condition with a list to starboard. The image also suggests that 20 March, 1912, was not the first time Koombana departed / arrived at port, crammed with passengers, in light (top heavy) condition. The Inquiry claimed Koombana departed Port Hedland drawing 19 ft. aft, (a mere 1.7 ft. short of load line). The recorded level of water over the bar measured 19 ft. at 10 a.m.. With a ground swell coming in from the northwest, Koombana could not have cleared the bar without incident. Koombana's tanks were empty and she was carrying 14% of cargo component. It was IMPOSSIBLE that she could have been drawing 19 ft. aft - in point of fact it was observed by an expert that she was drawing 16 ft. aft, plausible by calculation and probably similar to that represented in the image above. The lies had begun... |
Kalgoorlie Miner, 27 April, 1912.
BEDOUT ISLAND LIGHT.
ITS BEARING ON THE CASE.
Perth, April 26.
The inquiry into the loss of the
steamer Koombana opened at
Fremantle Courthouse yesterday,
was continued this morning.
Wm. Ernest Moxon, attorney and
manager in West Australia for the
Adelaide Steamship Co., Ltd., said
that the Koombana was one of the
company's fleet.
Mr. Parker: Before the Koombana
left Fremantle were any instructions
given to Captain Allen to push on?
Witness : No such instructions
were given. The vessel was running
on the time table. I might mention
for the information of the Court
that the time-table for this service
is drawn. up by the company and
approved by the Federal authorities.
Continuing, the witness said that
the vessel had had ample time to
discharge at ports.
Given all we know about the narrow spring tide-dependent access to ports such as Port Hedland, this comment was disingenuous to say the least, and delays at prior ports potentially had a serious knock on effect gaining access to and exiting Port Hedland - in some instances missing the window of opportunity altogether - incurring inconvenience and anger in port communities.
Moreover, it must be remembered that Koombana was an R.M.S. vessel and the contract hinged on timeous delivery of mail to destination ports along the coast of Western Australia. In fact, for every hour delayed, a fine of ￡5 was incurred. To say that Captain Allen was not under schedule pressure was as disingenuous as it can possibly get!
Mr. Moss: You had a certain duty
to perform in regard to the vessel
when it was reported overdue ?
— The company's duty was to make
every endeavour to search for the vessel
in order that the interests of all on
board were preserved.
Mr. Moss : Was that duty carried
out?
Witness : Yes, in its entirety. We
made every endeavour to find the
vessel. A number of boats were
requested to keep a look out for the
vessel along the Nor'-West coast.
The Government also rendered
assistance.
- Have you received any reports
from the company's manager at
Port Hedland?
— Fortunately I have received
reports and it will show that some
of the reports published are incorrect.
Mr. Gardiner in his letter states that
he was with Captain Allen for an
hour on the bridge deck prior to the
departure of the ship, when the
question of 'willy-willies' (cyclones)
did not arise.
Falling barometer, ground swell from the NW, strong winds from the NE all pointed to the very real possibility of a cyclone out at sea, so this statement was clumsy and again disingenuous in the context of it being the season for cyclones along the Nor'West coast.
Only a fortnight previous to that date
the glass had fallen considerably, but
nothing had resulted on that occasion.
Disregarding a barometer 'falling considerably' in an age when this could be the difference between safety and disaster, was hardly a counter argument.
In regard to the reported remarks
by Capt. Allen that he did not think
he would make port before the Saturday
following, Mr. Gardiner states
that what the master of the Koombana
meant was that if he could not get into
port at noon on the due date
with the midday tide he would not
be able to berth till 24 hours later
with the following tide.
Koombana was a powerful steamer capable of 15 knots. Captain Allen's prediction revealed and disclosed that he was not anticipating an average speed of more than 10 knots against gale force winds from the NE and heavy seas (pitching = decreased thrust), confirming concerns about weather conditions.
Mr. Moxon also read a number of
reports from pearlers and others in
the Nor'-West on the state of the
weather. In the reports it was stated
by some (referring to Bedout Island)
that the light on the island, which
was a self -attended one, was not
alight on March 13 and 15.
A FULL WEEK BEFORE THE DISASTER!
- Mr. Moss : The ship was installed
with wireless telegraphy?
- Witness: Yes.
- I understand that some ships
spoke to the Koombana by wireless
on the night of March 19?
— That is so. The Riverina was in
communication with the Koombana on the
night of March 19, the former vessel
being near Albany. The German
Australian steamer Adelaide (Gneisenau)
also reported having been in touch with
her, but no ship appears to have
spoken to the Koombana after that
night.
- Would the Marconi operator be
on special duty on an occasion such
as the time of a hurricane
— An operator would be on special duty.
No one would be able to interfere
with him in duty.
The Marconi operator, Lyon was inexperienced and the set had required attention before departure from Fremantle due to some undisclosed fault. These two factors might have presented challenges during a crisis. Moreover, Marconi operators on board steamers of this era were not employed by the shipping company nor directly accountable to the captain of the vessel regarding shifts. Lyon might already have retired if the disaster occurred late into the night.
The chief harbour master (Captain
C. J. Irvine) was called by Mr. Parker
to give some information to the
court concerning the light on Bedout
Island. Captain Irvine said that he would
tell the court the reason why that
particular class of light had been
placed on Bedout Island. It had
been pointed out to the Government
that a light was required for Bedout
Island, but as the island was very
dangerous, especially in the hurricane
season, the department had received
advice as to the means of securing a
light that would burn for some time
unattended.
The matter was given thorough attention,
and the department had secured an
unattended light, which it was estimated
would burn 12 months without attention.
The light, however, would not be left that
long without being visited. It was first
lighted on December 10, 1909, and up to
the recent fault recorded the lamp had
given entire satisfaction.
The report received by Mr. Moxon from
Port Hedland that the light was out
on March 13 had never reached him
(Captain Irvine).
Unlikely!
The first advice concerning the light
having been extinguished on that date
was brought under his notice on
March 26.
A week after Koombana had gone missing!?!?!?
Immediately on receipt of that advice
he had wired to all the ports a warning
regarding the light.
'I am of opinion that the ship did
not touch Bedout Island, as wreckage
would have been found there,'
continued Captain Irvine.
In fact Irvine was disingenuous about the whole affair and stated in the March gazette that the cyclone was responsible for the light being 'extinguished':
'Western Australia—North-West Coast. NOTICE is hereby given that the hurricane which passed over Bedout Island—lat. 19.35 S. 119.6 E.—on the 22nd inst., extinguished the unattended light established on this island in December, 1909. Further notice will be issued as soon as the lamp has been re-lighted. Charts affected. No. 1055—Bedout Island to Cape Cuvier. No. 1048—Buccaneer Archipelago to Bedout. C. J. IRVINE, Chief Harbour Master. Harbour and Light Department, Fremantle, 30th March, 1912.'
The Inquiry was largely a whitewash and in the course of this blog I have come to the conclusion that the Bedout Light being out was critical in the sequence of events leading to the disaster.
Captain Dalziel of the schooner Muriel had this to say about re-igniting the Bedout Light:
"To gain admittance, I had to remove one of the larger panes of glass in the outer lantern. The lamp inside was apparently in thorough order and the automatic gear working satisfactorily. I put a match to the jets and they lit immediately. I then replaced the pane of glass and made a thorough search of the island but found no trace of wreckage of any description."
The plain truth is that it would have been a simple task to re-ignite the Bedout Light at any time between 13 March and 20 March.
Even though Captain Irvine declined to acknowledge that he knew about the light being extinguished, the port captain and Mr. Gardiner (Adelaide Steamship Company representative at Port Hedland) knew about it and therefore Captain Allen knew.
Captain Allen would then have been pressed for time filling tanks 3 miles off Port Hedland, an operation which normally took about 3.5 hours to complete in ideal port circumstances, not rough seas. Koombana was in sight for only two hours which suggests that her tanks were not completely or adequately filled, compounding instability.
Why would Captain Allen risk this? It could be argued that at night in bad weather he might not have felt confident enough to accurately assess Koombana's course, given the limitations in response to the helm of a top heavy steamer light in heavy seas and strong winds. He might have come to the conclusion that the greater risk was running into the reef off Bedout after dark with no light to warn him.
This issue can be debated on the basis of speculation but a simple irrefutable fact remains; Koombana did not spend a minimum of 3.5 hours filling tanks off Port Hedland. The clincher:
“Normally,” he (Bert Clarke) recalled, “ships going northbound were out of sight within 30 or 45 minutes, but this day as the storm was getting stronger I stayed up there in the tower watching the Koombana pitching and rolling for nearly two hours.” (courtesy Koombana Days, Annie Boyd)
The following extract from Truth (Sydney) dated 5 May, 1912 had a final word of sarcastic wisdom to impart:
The former chief officer of the lost
Koombana, Captain Upjohn, now of
the Bullara, and Captain R. Arundel
surveyor to Lloyd's, say that it was
impossible for the Koombana to turn
turtle, and declare it to be a popular
fallacy that a ship having top hamper
is unsafe — she is merely tender, not
unsafe. These two captains ought to
open a school for teaching landlubbers
the art of sucking eggs, so innocent of
physics are they taken to be.
courtesy Trove and Google Earth.
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