STARTING POINT OF THE KOOMBANA WRECKAGE DISCOVERIES.

Flotsam washed up (courtesy Flotsam - Marske Beach)

Daily Commercial News and Shipping List (Sydney) 14 May, 1912.

They had taken the specimens

produced in Court at this spot. 

An awning spar and one of the

planks exhibited in Court had

also been discovered in close

proximity. Other articles were

picked up about 20 miles from

that spot.

The 'specimens' referred to were samples of the oily water discovered by Captain Upjohn of the Bullarra.

During the course of this blog I have expressed an opinion that the wreck of Koombana will be found where Captain Upjohn discovered the 'oil patch', the outline of which resembled a steamer. There is, however, a discrepancy between Captain Upjohn's given coordinates, 30 n miles NE of Bedout Island and his estimated distance of 27 to 28 n miles. The deviation error could in part be due to highly magnetic undersea iron ore bodies causing a compass variation of up to 55 degrees and a dip to 33 degrees (Lecky, 1920:30).

Earlier in the course of this blog I decided to plot all Koombana wreckage discoveries relative to the 'oil patch' discovery and an assumed westward trending prevailing current. The above report is highly relevant and describes wreckage not included in existing period data and which, critically, was discovered in close proximity to the 'oil patch'. No wreckage, officially, was discovered to the east of this longitude position.

This enhances rather than detracts from a comprehensive search for Koombana N.E. of Bedout Island. But such searches hinge on the accuracy of Captain Upjohn's estimation which draws our attention back to the Inquiry during which he had this to say:

"It was getting dark and it looked like the outline of a vessel (oil). The Chief Officer said "It must be one of her decks," I said "No, the decks would not look like that." I could see no more. The engines were stopped and we drifted for about 4 miles." 

Captain Upjohn was convinced he had found the site of the wreck which prompted collecting 'two or three dozen bottles of the oily substance'. In order to calculate by dead reckoning an accurate position of the find it seems that he allowed Bullarra to drift for 4 miles which would have established three important factors in his calculation, set = current's direction, drift = current's speed and leeway = wind factor. All of these factors would have assisted in establishing Bullarra's true position. As it 'was getting dark' Captain Upjohn would have been assisted by identifying a specific rise star to further establish his position i.e. celestial navigation. This would have offset compass deviation.

I believe, in conclusion, that Captain Upjohn's 2 to 3 mile uncertainty is compensated by the lengths he went to to establish the position of his find and collect evidence in the form of oily water samples. 

This is a no-brainer, it is time to find Koombana N.E. of Bedout Island!

1. Stateroom door; painting stage; small pieces of board. SS Gorgon

2. Motor launch starboard bow plank (with insignia). SS Bullarra

3. Small wreckage; (life) boat tanks; lifebelts; panel from saloon / smoke room ceiling. SS Bullarra
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)

4. Bottom board from (life) boat; white painted board. Lugger McLennan. 

5. (life) boat mast and small wreckage (rising from bottom). SS Una

6. Miscellaneous wreckage. SS Una   

7. Miscellaneous wreckage. SS Una. 

(see https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/10/captain-rantzau.html)

8. Cabin paneling. Lugger Mina.

9. Smoking room cushion; cabin door. SS Minderoo.

10. Straw envelopes (Leech's fortune). SS Minderoo and SS Gorgon.
(see:  https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)

11. Bottom boards (lifeboat); drawer; small teak panel. SS Minderoo.

courtesy Trove and Google Earth

CAPTAIN RANTZAU AND THE UNA DISCOVERY.

Koombana steamed northward from Port Hedland during the afternoon of Wednesday 20 March, 1912, never to be seen again. Only speculation filled the void of not knowing and people clung to hope until wreckage from the doomed steamer was discovered a fortnight later by crews of a number of vessels involved in the search. 

The most influential of the discoveries was made by Captain Rantzau of the steamer SS Una - declaring that he had found the spot where Koombana had gone down and where significantly wreckage was rising to the surface from the seabed, chillingly, an area swarming with sharks. 

Here are the details of this discovery that changed the perspective on the disaster and where the wreck might have been. The following document outlines Chief Harbour Master, Captain Irvine's plans for the chartered steamer SS Una. It includes the following important statement:

"generally commission the ship for a search that may extend over six weeks and to use every expedition."

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066 

Captain Rantzau, master of the Government chartered steamer SS Una, received the following instructions from the Chief Harbour Master, Captain Irvine, as follows:

"COSSACK

CAPTAIN RANTZAU

"UNA"

WRECKAGE FOUND TWENTY FIVE MILES NORTH BY WEST BEDOUT PROCEED AT ONCE TO THAT ISLAND SEE IF ANY WRECKAGE ABOUT REEF THEN PROCEED TO SPOT WHERE WRECKAGE DISCOVERED AND AFTER SEARCHING VICINITY FOR ONE DAY PUT IN TO HEDLAND REPORT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS THE BULLARRA IS SEARCHING EAST OF TURTLE ISLANDS SHOULD YOU SIGHT HER SIGNAL MASTER RETURN COSSACK AT ONCE FOR ORDERS.

3rd April, 1912"

Contrary to the projected time frame, taking up to 6 weeks, Captain Rantzau was offered very little time flexibility in this prescriptive telegram. 

Rantzau was steaming into the unknown. How could Captain Irvine have anticipated a one day search? Perhaps the very mention of the words 'wreckage discovered' were enough confirmation of the worst fears and no further action required?

These instructions were at odds with the fact that the bulk of wreckage discoveries were yet to be made, reported and in so doing, establish a clearer pattern of what had happened to Koombana, but more importantly, where. 

Costs were a further driving force behind the instructions, but it does seem preemptive and not in keeping with the initial proposal of a six week search.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

The following is Captain Rantzau's report after conducting search as per instructions:

"Fremantle 16th April, 1912

The Chief Harbor Master,
Fremantle.

Dear Sir,

On my arrival at Carnarvon I was instructed by my Owners, Messrs R.J. LYNN LTD, to proceed to Geraldton and on arrival at Geraldton at 6 p.m. on 28th March I received instructions from Harbor Master to bunker coal ex "Ashbridge". After taking on board 125 tons I proceeded in accordance with your wire to Cossack Roads and arrived off Point Sampson at 9.15 p.m. on April 2nd. I then wired you on the morning of 3rd inst and received your wire that wreckage had been found N. by W. 25 miles off Bedout Island. I proceeded direct to Bedout and made a complete search of the Island and the Reefs at low water but failed to find any wreckage. On the 4th inst 7.45 a.m. spoke "Bullarra" off Bedout Island and in accordance with your instructions directed him to proceed direct to Cossack. Friday April 5th proceeded from Bedout steering N.by W and at a distance of about 28 mls picked up a quantity of wreckage. At dinner time Ship stopped in a position 19.7 S. and Longitude 118.53 E. The wreckage at this place seemed to come from the bottom as within the course of fifteen minutes no wreckage would be visible and then it would be seen floating, indicating to me that the ship was lost at about this point. I would also like to state at this particular place there were a large number of sharks to be seen. Being satisfied that nothing further could be done I proceeded to Port Hedland arriving there at 1.30 a.m. on 6th April. Wired you accordingly and on receipt of your telegram left Port Hedland Sunday 7th April 11.30 a.m. for Fremantle direct arriving here Saturday 13th April at 8.30 a.m.

Having a large quantity of coal to discharge I received instructions to bunker the SS "Penguin" and expect to complete this work today 16th April.

Rantzau
Yours faithfully,

The Una wreckage discovery allegedly rising from the sea bottom surrounded by many sharks was as convincing as it could get in favour of this being the site of the Koombana wreck. But if one takes a closer look at the detail a strange picture emerges.

Referring to the image below, there are 3 wreckage positions marked, 1; 2 and 3.

1. 25 miles N by W of Bedout
2  28 miles N by W of Bedout
3  19 7 S, 118 53 E  31 miles bearing 336 degrees from Bedout

The first point to note is that wreckage sites marked 1 and 2 were never included in the overall wreckage discoveries made and if one plots them onto a more complete record of wreckage they enhance rather than detract from the pattern of distribution with the prevailing east to west current; Upjohn's coordinates as the starting point.

The second, important, point to be made refers to the Una setting out on a course N by W, and after discovering wreckage 28 miles from Bedout Island, instead of continuing his course to search for more wreckage in this general direction, he alters his course radically from one bearing 315 degrees from Bedout to 42.5 degrees and after 11.5 miles and +/- 2 hours, presumably by this time noon, he discovers the 'wreckage' which changed everything!

Very very strange.

Note that Rantzau had had an exchange with Upjohn (Bullarra) before he left the vicinity of Bedout, which implies that he knew about the 'oil patch' discovery = shipwreck. He does not mention the details of this discussion in his telegram. If one were to go for a conspiracy theory one could suggest that the significant Una find, wreckage 3, was an intentional attempt to distract from the real scene of the disaster. After all the site marked wreckage 3 was NOT dragged to confirm the presence of a wreck, which would have been the next, logical course of action and Captain Upjohn's discovery pointed to an accident site beyond the reaches of the cyclone and well within the steamer track for Broome.

courtesy Google Earth

 

courtesy Google Earth

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

Wharfinger Gordon sent the bombshell news to the Chief Harbour Master, Irvine as follows:

"Port Hedland.

Chief Harbormaster.

Captain Rantzau Una arrived reports no wreckage Bedout reef picked up mast & life boat gear several cabin panels thirty three miles N N W Bedout wreckage appears be rising from below waiting instructions from you taking water before proceeding further

Gordon Wharfinger.
8.40"

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

Which met with this intriguing, almost panic-stricken response:


"Captain Rantzau, Una, Port Hedland.

Please return direct Fremantle quickly as possible.

H.M.

7/4/12"

After making what was to become the most important wreckage discovery allegedly indicating the location of the Koombana, Una was instructed to leave the scene of the disaster forthwith!!

All a bit dramatic if one considers that the next step would have been to return to the site in question and PROVE that Koombana lay there, by dragging a wire over the area from where wreckage was supposedly rising.

It begs the assumption that by 7 April, H.M. (representing Captain Irvine?) it was well known that Bullarra had discovered an oily patch of water representing the site of the wrecked Koombana. There would have been no further need of Una in the Northwest and certainly NO reason for Captain Rantzau to drag the vicinity of his major wreckage discovery for a ship that was NOT there!!   

Who was 'H.M' ?

Harbour Master. Thanks Annie for the input!

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

The Pilbarra Goldfield News, 11 April, 1912.

He (Captain Rantzau of the Una) considers 

that he has practically located the spot where 

the Koombana. foundered, which is about 

26 miles from Bedout Island, in 40 fathoms 

of water. Nothing definite could be ascertained, 

as the water was very much discolored - Ed J

The depth at the 'official site' is about 43 fathoms, 259 ft. about 31 miles from Bedout.

In this report we are thrown a curved ball in terms of distance from Bedout Island and depth at that location. 26 miles falls short of the official coordinates position reported and I have plotted some positions, 26 miles from Bedout, which match a depth of 40 fathoms; 73 m; 240 ft.. The variability is significant. Furthermore, the water was sediment laden post cyclone giving it a 'pea soup' appearance, which in turn would have made it difficult for Captain Rantzau to accurately determine whether the wreckage discovered was 'coming up from the bottom' or merely drifting, submerged a few feet below the surface.

Given the current trend (south)westward it still stands to reason that the origin of the flotsam (wreck) was to the northeast of Bedout Island.

And yet other reports extended the Una discovery distance from Bedout from 33 to 43 miles!!

The West Australian, Perth, 8 April, 1912.

At a point 33 miles N.N.W. of the

island (Bedout) however, a quantity

of wreckage was found, including a 

mast from one of the ship's boats,

and what appeared to be some cabin

panels. In the opinion of the Una's

master the wreckage seemed to be

floating up from the bottom of the

sea.

The Week, Brisbane, 12 April, 1912.

Forty three miles north-north-west of 

the island he found afloat a ship's

boat mast, and a quantity of wreckage

including what appears to be some 

cabin panels.

Given the variability of distances from Bedout Island presented in the various press reports it is not surprising that ultimately locating the final resting place of Koombana is loaded with challenges. One can only hope that the Captain Upjohn reliability factor and reference to 27 - 28 miles northeast of Bedout Island narrows the search down to a reasonable search block which will finally locate the wreck. 

courtesy Trove and Google Earth.
 estimated from Bedout appeared to be a dodgy business which certainly adds to the challenges of ultimately find the final resting place of Koombana.

THE KOOMBANA MYSTERY EXPLORED.

R.M.S. KOOMBANA

courtesy Trove

In light condition - rudder prominently exposed.

courtesy State Library of Western Australia.

Koombana was a magnificent, bespoke steamer with opulently appointed, well-ventilated, elevated passenger decks, cattle deck, and dedicated cargo holds (incl. refrigeration). But she was flawed; inherently top heavy, with a reduced draught of 20 ft. 8 in. to access harbours such as Port Hedland.

The indication of inherent top heaviness is illustrated by comparison with the similarly sized steamers Yongala and Grantala (greater draughts: 24 ft.) of the same Adelaide Steamship Company. The latter steamers, with significant top hampers, operated with ballast tank capacity of 400 tons, whereas Koombana required 900 tons to steady her.

Yongala and Grantala       3664 tons
Koombana                        3668 tons

Koombana's track record, fully ballasted, gives us the most significant confirmatory clue regarding inherent top heaviness. 8 February, 1910, Koombana allegedly heeled over to 45 degrees in a squall and took a considerable time to recover.

20 March, 1912:

All the signs indicated that Koombana and Bullarra would be departing Port Hedland before noon into unpredictable and potentially dangerous conditions. A period advisory referred to an easterly wind and falling barometer being the warning signs for pearlers to seek shelter. 'At 6 a.m. the barometer had been at 29.50', down from 29.9. Between 4 a.m. and 10 a.m., in normal conditions the barometer readings rise, not fall. The wind, a gale by noon, came from the NE. (some sources claim a half gale from ENE).

'Two or three layers of swiftly racing clouds could frequently be seen through the prevailing mist. It blew with terrific force.'

40 luggers sought shelter in the creek, bringing tidings of a heavy ground swell from the northwest, which in turn, signaled the presence of a significant cyclonic event out at sea.

'Vessels engaged in the pearl-shell fisheries, on the northwestern coast of Australia, run on shore in any available creek, on indications of the approach of a cyclone.' 

Alleged:

"I don't like the glass," was Captain Allen's remark,

But Captain Allen was compelled to depart at 10.20 am, due to pressure of maintaining a tide-dependent schedule; mail contract; cargo delivery and passenger demands. 

Koombana departed Port Hedland carrying:

- 260 tons cargo

- 480 tons coal

- 60 tons stores

= 800 tons

(plus an undisclosed tonnage of residual fresh water in her tanks)

157 souls on board.

260 tons of cargo was only 14.4 % of maximum load - 1800 tons (not 4000 tons as is commonly reported). 85 tons for Broome were stowed in 'tween decks 1 and 2, higher up in hull, raising centre of gravity, reducing stability and 175 tons for Derby in hold 2, low down, improving stability. These units of cargo were loaded and secured at Fremantle for the voyage.

I do not believe there was a significant component of livestock on the cattle deck due to steaming up the coast. Livestock was destined for the markets at Fremantle and required fresh water and fodder at sea. Moreover, Bullarra had been reintroduced on the run that month to bring livestock back from Port Hedland, relieving Koombana of this function. 

Drawing 16 ft. aft and 11 ft. forward (rather than the claimed 19 ft. aft 12 ft. forward), all ballast tanks empty, Koombana's propeller  was not fully submerged (decreased thrust and manoeuvrability) and she displayed 'an ugly list to port' confirming her very light lading and ballast status. 

The depth over the bar was 19 ft. at the time which means Koombana would not have cleared without incident, given the Inquiry's quoted 19 ft. aft figure. Furthermore, a dead weight of 800 tons (cargo in forward holds; empty after-peak and no 6 tank) could not have accounted for a draught 1.75 ft. short of maximum loading, aft.

Why was Koombana in such light, top heavy condition? 

She needed to be!

Captain Allen:

"I might bump that outer bar going out on a sea like this."

"My passengers think they will get to Broome to-morrow (Thursday)," he remarked; "but they will be lucky if they get there by Saturday. I am going to put right out to sea, and as might bump the bar going out I will leave my ballast tanks until I get outside and fill them out there."

It was both risky and laborious to fill tanks at sea, particularly in a heavy ground swell and gale, and it would have taken more than 3 hours (in ideal conditions) to achieve this task and which delayed progress significantly. Two sets of eye witnesses referred to Koombana being in sight for only 2 hours. The tanks were unlikely to have been successfully pressed up during this time frame, which in turn would have created a free surface effect, enhancing the list; reducing what GM there was and impairing heeling recovery.

Why did Captain Allen not take the necessary time to fill all tanks? Quite simply, the Light at Bedout was not functioning and he had to clear the dangerous reef adjacent to the island before dark (6.38 p.m.). 

Captain Allen anticipated and was ultimately confronted by a stiff head wind (gale from NE; ENE) slowing progress. Distance to Broome = 265 n miles. An average of 10 knots (14 knot steamer) or less would miss spring tide access to Broome the following day. Marked pitching would have exposed the propeller periodically, reducing thrust.

Bullarra:

'When we came on deck for the mid-day meal, the Bullara and the Koombana were stern on to each other, and the distance apart being about five miles.'

Koombana had not made much progress by noon due to the attempt to fill tanks.

With a gale and a significant wind catchment factor in the form of towering superstructure and funnel enhancing the existing list, Koombana was presented with challenges from the start. I believe Captain Allen made his decision to pursue the standard course rounding the northern aspect of Bedout Island based on the fact that he could see evidence of the cyclone to the westward on the horizon; not north or northeastward in which directions he was headed; confirmed by a witness account aboard Bullarra heading southwest:

"I noticed away on the starboard bow and 

just above the horizon, a dense mass of 

inky black clouds and from descriptions 

I'd had from old pearlers, I was convinced 

we were in for it."

Therefore, I believe Koombana only ever skirted the outer margin of the cyclone which targeted Balla Balla from the north-northwest, having curved round. The official meteorology report presented at the Inquiry claimed a cyclone diameter of 90 miles, which could not have broached Koombana's intended steamer track. This is further substantiated by evidence of minimal storm impact at Port Hedland and Bedout Island (lighthouse glass not encrusted and no signs of a disturbance).

"Scarcely any damage

was caused by the 

hurricane at Port Hedland."

However, this said, Koombana in her unstable, top heavy condition would have been subjected to broad, deep sea swells; strong winds shifting through NE ---> N ----> NW, further unsettling stability and hindering heeling recovery. Listing heavily, she would have been vulnerable to water ingress via the cattle loading doors or the ventilation ports on the main deck, which would further have contributed to the free surface effect, worsening the list and further diminishing heeling recovery.

Cargo might also have shifted, contributing to the deteriorating situation.

In an attempt to correct the dangerous list, Captain Allen might have elected to pump out one of the longitudinal ballast tank sections on the side of the list, with the resultant catastrophic effect as illustrated by the S.S. Vestris disaster (November, 1928). Captain Carey pumped out tanks in the hope of decreasing a progressive list. Paradoxically, in part due to residual free water in tanks, the list increased dramatically.

Ultimately, when Koombana went over I believe she did so suddenly and violently, not allowing souls successful escape in lifeboats and if a few did, they did not survive to tell the tale.

No cargo or bodies were ever recovered suggesting that she turned turtle trapping both people and cargo within. Absence of bodies and cargo goes against the theory that Koombana was battered to pieces by the cyclone. Damaged pieces of wreckage, ultimately released from the wreck, could have been caused by superstructure striking the seabed or movement of the wreck itself along the seabed. It would also explain why wreckage was only discovered 12 to 14 days after the disaster - rising from the seabed - rather than due to immediate hurricane-force damage.

Insufficient time was allowed for wireless operator Harry Lyon to send out a distress signal via Marconi wireless, if indeed it was still operational. It is important to note that there was a backup wireless unit independent of the ship's electrical supply, but with only a 100 mile range. 

I believe that the oil patch, discovered by Captain Upjohn of the Bullarra and represented on the image below, is Koombana's final resting place. An example of oil marking the spot was used to locate the Clan Ranald wreck, January 1909: 

"direct me to the spot where the wreck was sunk, 

which he said he knew exactly, having seen 

streams of oil rising from her."

This is further borne out by the distribution of the bulk of wreckage, drifting with the predominantly (south)westward trending current which predominates after alongshore cyclones in the Pilbara. This position is within the outer steamer track for Broome. 

Koombana was not off course.

Inquiry (courtesy Koombana Days online site):

"- It was in latitude 19.11 and 119.25 E.

What distance would that be off Bedout Island?

- About 27 or 28 miles - I cannot say which. 

Did you take any samples of this oily substance?

- Yes, two or three dozen bottles.

What depth was there at this place?

- 30 or 35 fathoms. (55 m - 64 m)

Did you see any trace of the vessel at that depth? There would be nothing to indicate that the Koombana or any other vessel would be there?

- It was getting dark and it looked like the outline of a vessel." 

After further analysis, 27.5 miles northeast of Bedout Island coincides with 19 15 51 S, 119 26 48 E (30 fathoms), a position 20 miles from additional wreckage to the west and which, in turn, lay 20 miles to the north of Bedout Island - as referenced by Captain Upjohn.

Although not represented on the graphic below, Captain Upjohn referred to:

They had taken the specimens (of

oily water) produced in Court at 

this spot. An awning spar and one 

of the planks exhibited in Court 

had also been discovered in close

proximity. Other articles were picked

up about 20 miles from that spot.

(marked 2 and 3 on graphic).

1. Stateroom door; painting stage; small pieces of board. SS Gorgon

2. Motor launch starboard bow plank (with insignia). SS Bullarra

3. Small wreckage; (life) boat tanks; lifebelts; panel from saloon / smoke room ceiling. SS Bullarra
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)

4. Bottom board from (life) boat; white painted board. Lugger McLennan. 

5. (life) boat mast and small wreckage (rising from bottom). SS Una

6. Miscellaneous wreckage. SS Una   

7. Miscellaneous wreckage. SS Una. 

(see https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/10/captain-rantzau.html)

8. Cabin paneling. Lugger Mina.

9. Smoking room cushion; cabin door. SS Minderoo.

10. Straw envelopes (Leech's fortune). SS Minderoo and SS Gorgon.
(see:  https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)

11. Bottom boards (lifeboat); drawer; small teak panel. SS Minderoo.

Official cyclone, 90 miles in diameter, as per Meteorological Office. Note that the cyclone approached the coast from the direction of S.S. Moira's position, 8 a.m..
Courtesy Google Earth.

courtesy Trove

this map which appeared in a period newspaper report gives an idea of the route taken by Koombana, 'shaping a course' around the northern aspect of Bedout Island.
(the 'last seen here' annotation is unconfirmed, but could substantiate Koombana being on course this far)

presumed track Port Hedland to Broome

The residents of Hedland had a final say on the matter:

The ship's propeller was showing

when anchored at the jetty, and

raced out of the water as she sailed

over the rolling seas at the harbor's

entrance ; the boat also rolled heavily

when the wind struck her on the

starboard side—so much so that

several who were watching her exclaimed.

"She'll be over directly " !

And a final, cryptic comment:

Sunday Times, Perth, 31 March, 1912.

Therefore, as she has not been found along the 

Ninety-Mile Beach or in La Grange Bay, we are

led to the terrible alternative that she was engulfed 

somewhere north-east of Bedout Island, where 

she was last spoken.

courtesy ANU archives

In this image of Koombana apparently steaming, the main livestock loading door is open, one assumes due to the excessive heat and humidity along the Nor'West coast. Of concern would have been a potential portal of water ingress during heavy seas and rolling.

This detailed post includes previous posts, the purpose of the exercise being to illustrate how complex the Koombana disaster was and how mismatched the steamer for the Nor'West trade.

Returning to why Captain Allen took over command of Koombana from Captain Rees it was never made clear in period reports. Koombana was prestigious, Winfield, a lumbering coal transporter; clearly a downgrade for Captain Rees.

However, the following complex post outlines a possible explanation. Allen had a background of extensive port pilot experience (Adelaide) and it might have been perceived by all parties that he was better able to negotiate (navigate) Koombana in and out of Port Hedland (and Shark Bay) with a measure of superior success. 

One thing does become clear perusing the details, Rees was not given as many grueling schedules as Allen. But as fate would deem, such ambitions were to catch up with Koombana, her owners and Tom Allen who, for all his experience, was not a magician.

Koombana completed almost 37 trips during her time in service. These schedules offer important insights.

Firstly it is helpful to review the tide-dependent access to Port Hedland and Broome:

In order for Koombana to safely access these two ports, entries and exits had to be made as close to spring (King) tide as possible. The 28 day lunar cycle offers 2 alternating spring and neap tides, with intervals of 7 days. 

This presented significant challenges to the Adelaide Steamship Company arranging the schedule for a roughly monthly return voyage to the northern terminus; either Derby or Wyndham.

Port Hedland and Broome were conveniently paired and separated by only a 24 hour voyage - +/- 250 miles. This means that Koombana could make use of the same spring tide for both ports.

courtesy Lonely Planet.

The schedule could be so arranged that Port Hedland and Broome were serviced once during a return trip, allowing the schedule to coincide with a single spring tide. However, this ease of tidal access depended on no unforeseen delays at ports prior to Port Hedland and Broome - in most instances, readily achieved.

The real challenge came when the schedule demanded the tidal ports to be serviced twice in one return trip, forcing the steamer to make it back from Derby within the extended influence of the diminishing spring tide. To facilitate this delicate balancing act, it helped to initially arrive at Port Hedland ahead of the peak spring tide, but at a point allowing enough water over the outer bar to gain access, in order to return on the last gasps of the same spring tide.

Fortunately the return trip to Wyndham took a convenient fortnight, which coincided with the next spring tide.

It is of interest that during Captain Rees' 29 trips in command of Koombana, Port Hedland was visited 15 times (16 including captain Hurrell, one trip). Of all these trips into and out of the dreaded tidal port, John Rees was only ever expected to tackle the challenge twice during one round trip and in this he failed - missing the return access into Port Hedland, May 1910.

Mostly, Captain Rees was only expected to get to the terminus, Derby or Wyndham, via ports and return to Fremantle direct, with only one further call at Port Sampson jetty. This arrangement makes the assumption that livestock for markets at Fremantle was loaded at Port Hedland en-route to the terminus rather than on the way back - additional fodder and water required for the extended trip.

Captain Rees did however tackle Broome twice in a single trip on 3 occasions, all successful. This suggests that Broome was the relatively 'easier' access option beyond a spring tide peak, compared with Port Hedland. It did not have a bar and the spring tide period was extended.

This was indeed the case. Port Hedland only allowed a narrow two days on either side of high water springs to access the port whereas Broome allowed up to 5 days on either side of the high water springs.

When Captain Allen took over command of Koombana, he was 'initiated' gently, if one can call it that, by being given a schedule that although including both Port Hedland and Broome on top of a spring tide, allowed Captain Allen to steam directly back to Fremantle after departing Wyndham without having to include Broome and Port Hedland again. 

Recalling a previous post, Captain Allen could achieve clearance of the outer bar at Port Hedland with 14'8" forward and 18'6" aft. which correlates with what must have been a generous peak spring tide outer bar clearance, 21/09/1911. New moon was in fact 21/09/1911 - would have been about 19.6 ft. over the bar.

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/09/getting-to-grips-with-tanks.html  (below)

However, once 'initiation' was over Captain Allen was then expected to visit Port Hedland twice during the same round trip, October, 1911. This suggests that on the second visit, 31 October, returning from Derby 6 days later, drawing 12'2" forward and 18'8" aft. there was in all probability a bar strike, and Koombana lucky to escape the dreaded port. Broome was not included in this schedule for obvious reasons. The new moon was 21/10/1911 and full moon 06/11/1911, which raises the question how did Captain Allen get Koombana into and out of Port Hedland without 'bumping the bar' even with all tanks empty?? 

Captain Allen was then expected to service both tidal ports twice in one round trip, December, 1911. Theoretically the return from Wyndham should have coincided with a fresh spring tide two weeks later. However, the cautious master was forced to empty at least one aft ballast tank, drawing 13'6" forward and 16'9" aft. (his lowest draft figures to date) and it is alleged that he was lucky to escape Port Hedland just after midnight, Christmas Day, 5 days after the new moon and 3 / 4 days after high water springs . Due to a delay in departure and the grueling schedule Koombana was out of sync with the spring tide cycle.

December, 1911 - Fremantle; Shark Bay; Carnarvon; Onslow; Port Sampson; Depuch Island; Port Hedland; Broome; Derby; Wyndham; Broome; Port Hedland; Port Sampson; Onslow; Carnarvon; Fremantle.

Compare this schedule with Captain Rees' last voyage before handing over to Captain Allen:

June / July 1911 - Fremantle; Port Sampson; Port Hedland; Broome; Derby; Fremantle.

18 January, 1912, 2 days before high water springs (new moon, 19 January) Koombana struck the bar at Port Hedland. If Captain Allen had waited a day, this could have been avoided and stresses how rigorous the schedule and pressures actually were!  It is a great pity that we do not have draft figures for this bar strike as the log was lost with the steamer.

February 1912, the schedule once again included the two ports twice during one round trip - 17/02/1912 and 01/03/1912. New moon, 18/02/1912 and full moon, 03/03/1912. This good timing with high water springs schedule demonstrates that the terminus being Wyndham, there was the consolation of returning to coincide with a fresh spring tide which was achieved ( no reports of a bar strike) and a far more reasonable schedule - only Onslow and Port Sampson prior to Port Hedland.

Although we do not have the full, final schedule for March, 1912, the beleaguered master was expected to perform the enormously challenging feat of servicing Geraldton; Shark Bay; Carnarvon; Onslow and Port Sampson before Port Hedland which translated into being a day late. As if this challenge were not enough Koombana was then scheduled to visit Broome, Derby and, in all probability, return to Broome, catching the tail end of the same spring tide. Why not Port Hedland on the return? For obvious reasons! 

The West Australian, 22 February, 1912.

NOR'-WEST.

ADELAIDE S.S. CO.'S ENTERPRISE.

Residents of the Nor'-West will welcome the 

return of the Bullarra to the Nor'-West trade.

Prior to the advent of the Koombana, the 

Bullarra was well and popularly known on the

trade. She is due from the Eastern States

shortly, and will be despatched on a trip to

Port Hedland via ports on March 8. After her

return from Port Hedland on the trip mentioned 

she will run between Fremantle and Derby

via ports as a cargo and passenger steamer also

carrying stock and mails. By running in conjunction 

with the Koombana additional shipping facilities 

will be provided. This matter has long been the 

subject of agitation on the part of various trade 

associations in representations which have been 

made to the Government to provide further facilities 

along the coast. 

The introduction of Bullarra on the run was intended to relieve Koombana of a second visit to Port Hedland after departing Derby. 

The Geraldton Express, 28 February, 1912.

Koombana leaves Fremantle for

Geraldton and all coastal ports to
Derby, on Tuesday, March 12th, at

11 a.m.

Whether Koombana was expected to return to Broome, 26 March, is not known for absolute certain. There was some confusion as illustrated in the published schedule 25 March, 1912, The Daily News, Perth:

courtesy trove

In this case the terminus was reported as being Wyndham, not Derby. Bullarra was reported as servicing Derby, 28 March, which was not the case, as the 'Old Bull' departed Port Hedland, 20 March, going south, not north.

We know that Captain Allen had deep reservations about departing Port Hedland 20 March, outlined in various Hedland Advocate extracts from the time:

Furthermore, Captain Allen, when

questioned by Mr. Barker as to 

whether he was going to put out, 

said he did not know. "I don't like 

the glass," was Captain Allen's 

remark, "and another 24 hours 

here will not matter."

His decision to put out was only 

announced subsequent to a conversation

which took place on the Koombana

between Captain Allen and Captain

Upjohn of the Bullarra (20 minutes

before departing).

These two paragraphs are loaded in what was said and what was implied. We get a clear impression that Captain Allen was very concerned about the weather conditions out at sea and more specifically the likelihood of a cyclone developing.

He said as much:

"My passengers think they will get

to Broome to-morrow (Thursday)," he

remarked; "but they will be lucky if

they get there by Saturday."

Koombana should have arrived at Broome as per schedule, the following day, Thursday. Saturday implied being significantly delayed at sea, possibly heading as far out as practical to weather a cyclonic event before attempting to make Broome.

The Daily News, 25 March, 1912.

It is evident that she first encountered

the beginning of the blow between

Port Hedland and Bedout Island. - 'If

the wind were favorable it is reasonable 

to suppose that Captain Allen at once 

steered a course for the open sea,

and may have had to run out for

about 200 miles.' As it blows very

strongly after these cyclonic 

disturbances, it is evident that she 

would be a great way out of her 

course before she was able to cut for 

Broome, and that it would take at least 

41/2 days before she reached her 

destination.

Captain Allen made a cryptic comment:

"Another 24 hours here will not matter."

This suggests that contrary to my assumption that Captain Allen was under enormous pressure to make it back to the tidal port of Broome within the scope of the spring tide, this might not have been the case. The suggested delay speaks of only having to make Broome by the Saturday, as claimed, then to Derby and after that a more direct passage back to Fremantle.

This question is answered in more detail at the following post link:

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2021/04/port-hedland-and-bar.html  (below)

But there is another way of looking at this. 24 hours was just that, only one day. By not having to revisit Port Hedland after servicing Broome, Derby, Broome, would allow a day's leeway - in fact 2 - in the schedule.

Then why did the man go against his better judgment and depart after consulting with Captain Upjohn, twenty minutes before departure? 

Captain Allen Koombana: "I do

not like the look of the weather. 

Captain Upjohn; what do you intend 

doing?"

Captain Upjohn (Bullarra): "I have

made up my mind to go out and your

boat is a far better one than mine."

Captain Allen: "Well, if you intend

going out, I do not suppose it will do

for me to stop here."

To say that Captain Allen was under pressure to leave is an understatement! It is interesting to note that these two men referred to each other by their titles and were not on first name terms. Why? Stiff relationship? After all Allen got Koombana and Upjohn after serving on Koombana for 12 months as Chief Officer, got the ageing Bullarra. No guesses then....

All things being equal I believe that Captain Allen was subjected to rigorously challenging tide-dependent schedules and enormous pressure to fulfill these demands, far beyond that expected of his predecessor, Captain Rees (and Upjohn). 

Although he had serious reservations about departing Port Hedland 20 March, his devotion to duty, Captain Upjohn's 'challenge'; cargo delivery; mail contract and passenger expectations, forced him to take a gamble, the odds of which were against him...

It could be further argued that masters were encouraged to face storms out at sea rather than in port. In this case, the material risk of Koombana ending up in the mangroves vs. human life at sea, surviving a potential cyclone in a top heavy steamer.

 

VOYAGE 1: 27/02/1909 - 08/03/1909

MELBOURNE

ADELAIDE

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 2: 12/03/1909 - 15/04/1909

FREMANTLE

GERALDTON

CARNARVON

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 03/04/1909

BROOME 05/04/1909

DERBY 07/04/1909

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 3: 20/04/1909 - 09/05/1909

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

BROOME 28/09/1909

28/04/1909

DERBY 30/04/1909

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 4: 12/05/1909 - 03/06/1909

FREMANTLE

GERALDTON

PORT SAMPSON

BROOME 22/05/1909

DERBY 24/05/1909

GERALDTON

FREMANTLE

V OYAGE 5: 05/06/1909 - 13/06/1909

FREMANTLE

SYDNEY

REPAIRS

VOYAGE 6: 24/07/1909 - 05/08/1909

SYDNEY

FREMANTLE

REPAIRS

VOYAGE 7: 08/08/1909 - 28/08/1909

08/08/1909 - 28/08/1909

FREMANTLE

CARNARVON

DERBY

PORT SAMPSON

CARNARVON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 8: 03/09/1909 - 24/09/1909

FREMANTLE

PORT HEDLAND 12/09/1909

BROOME 14/09/1909

DERBY 16/09/1909

BROOME 18/09/1909

COSSACK

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 9: 29/09/1909 - 25/10/1909

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 05/09/1909

BROOME 07/09/1909

DERBY

WYNDHAM

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 10: 02/11/1909 - 29/11/1909

FREMANTLE

GERALDTON

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 10/11/1909

WYNDHAM 17/11/1909

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 11: 01/12/1909 - 02/01/1910

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

BROOME 14/12/1909

DERBY

WYNDHAM

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 12: 03/01/1910 - 26/01/1910

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

BROOME 15/01/1910

DERBY

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 13: 27/01/1910 - 01/03/1910

FREMANTLE

BUNBURY

FREMANTLE

CARNARVON

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 08/02/1910

BROOME 10/02/1910DERBY

WYNDHAM

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 14: 05/03/1910 - 26/03/1910

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

DERBY

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 15: 27/03/1910 - 29/04/1910

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

WYNDHAM

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 16: 30/04/1910 - 30/05/1910

FREMANTLE

PORT HEDLAND 12/05/1910

BROOME 14/05/1910

DERBY

MISSED PORT HEDLAND

COSSACK

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 17: 31/05/1910 - 22/06/1910

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 10/06/1910

BROOME 12/06/1910

DERBY

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 18: 23/06/1910 - 21/07/1910

VIA BUNBURY

PORT SAMPSON

DEPUCH ISLAND

PORT HEDLAND 08/07/1910

BROOME 10/07/1910

DERBY

BROOME 15/07/1910

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 19: 22/07/1910 - 23/08/1910

FREMANTLE

SYDNEY

FREMANTLE

OVERHAUL

VOYAGE 20: 24/08/1910 - 25/09/1910

VIA BUNBURY

PORT SAMPSON

BROOME 05/09/1910

DERBY

WYNDHAM

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 21: 26/09/1910 - 29/10/1910

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

WYNDHAM

PORT HEDLAND

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 22: 30/10/1910 - 24/11/1910

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

BROOME

DERBY

BROOME 14/11/1910

PORT HEDLAND 16/11/1910

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 23: 25/11/1910 - 24/12/1910

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 03/12/1910

BROOME 05/12/1910

DERBY

WYNDHAM

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 24: 25/12/1910 - 23/01/1911

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 05/01/1911

BROOME 07/01/1911

DERBY

PORT HEDLAND

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 25: 24/01/1911 - 21/02/1911

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 02/02/1911

BROOME 04/02/1911

DERBY

WYNDHAM

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 26: 22/02/1911 - 17/03/1911

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

DERBY

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 27: 18/03/1911 - 18/04/1911

FREMANTLE

CARNARVON

PORT SAMPSON

BROOME

WYNDHAM

CARNARVON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 28: 19/04/1911 - 20/05/1911

FREMANTLE

GERALDTON

CARNARVON

ONSLOW

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 02/05/1911

BROOME 04/05/1911

NEAPED

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 29: 23/05/1911 - 18/06/1911

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 30/05/1911

BROOME 01/06/1911

DERBY

WYNDHAM

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 30: 20/06/1911 - 12/07/1911

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 28/06/1911

BROOME 30/06/1911

DERBY

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 31: 13/07/1911 - 06/09/1911

FREMANTLE

SYDNEY

FREMANTLE

OVERHAUL

MARCONI INSTALLATION

VOYAGE 32: 12/09/1911 - 12/10/1911

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 21/09/1911

BROOME 23/09/1911

DERBY

WYNDHAM

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 33: 13/10/1911 - 08/11/1911

FREMANTLE

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 25/10/1911

DERBY

PORT HEDLAND 31/10/1911

PORT SAMPSON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 34: 30/11/1911 - 03/01/1912

FREMANTLE

SHARK BAY

CARNARVON

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 09/12/1911

BROOME 11/12/1912

DERBY

WYNDHAM

BROOME 22/12/1911

PORT HEDLAND 24/12/1911

PORT SAMPSON

ONSLOW

CARNARVON

SHARK BAY

GERALDTON

FREMANTLE

2 X GROUNDINGS AND DELAYED DEPARTURE PORT HEDLAND ALMOST MISSING LAST OF THE SPRING TIDE

VOYAGE 35: 09/01/1912 - 06/02/1912

SHARK BAY

CARNARVON

ONSLOW

PORT SAMPSON

DEPUCH

PORT HEDLAND 18/01/1912

BROOME 20/01/1912

DERBY

WYNDHAM

FREMANTLE

STRUCK BAR PORT HEDLAND

VOYAGE 36: 08/02/1912 - 07/03/1912

ONSLOW

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 17/02/1912

BROOME 19/02/1912

DERBY

WYNDHAM

BROOME 29/02/1912

PORT HEDLAND 01/03/1912

CARNARVON

FREMANTLE

VOYAGE 37: 12/03/1912 - 20/03/1912

GERALDTON

SHARK BAY

CARNARVON

ONSLOW

PORT SAMPSON

PORT HEDLAND 19/03/1912

Note: 

June, 1910, Koombana stopped at Shark's Bay, Denham, with the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Connolly on board. This is not recorded in the above schedule.

20 October, 1910, Koombana's forward hold was on fire due to wet wool shipped at Shark's Bay igniting. The above quoted schedule for 20 October does not include Denham, Shark's Bay. 

The same applied to December 1910, when message was received that Captain Rees was standing off at Shark's Bay due to the lowness of the tide, en route from Carnarvon. 

Courtesy references from Annie Boyd's outstanding Koombana Days - pages 329 - 334.

This is a complicated, confusing subject and it helps a little to review Captain Upjohn's fuller inquiry transcript at:

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/09/revelations-and-contradictions.html (below)

The Inquiry transcript extracts below reinforce Captain Upjohn's decision not to defend Captain Allen's decision to depart Port Hedland with 'empty tanks'. Captain Upjohn disingenuously suggested that Koombana, with her tanks pressed up, would have had a draught aft of 17 ft. which should have cleared the outer bar, 19 ft. deep, 20 March, 1912. In other words he suggested that Captain Allen could have departed Port Hedland that morning without ANY tanks empty.

But this was NOT the full picture by any stretch of the imagination.

Captain Upjohn contradicted himself and in the course of his session on the witness stand gave draught figures for when Koombana's aft tanks were empty; 16 ft. 6 in. and 13 -14 ft. forward, representing these forward tanks filled.

The above post link fleshes this out in more detail: 

17 ft. (referenced above) equated with just the after peak empty and 16'6 ft. (16.5 ft.) with both after peak and number 6 tank, empty.

Compare these figures with alleged claims made by the Port Hedland harbour master that Koombana departed that fateful morning with draught figures: 16 ft. aft (further reduced from 16.5 ft.) and 11 ft. forward (normally 13.5 ft.). These figures confirm that most, if not all, of Koombana's tanks were empty; further enhanced by minimal cargo (14%) stowed forward. 

It appears that before Captain Allen's tenure the practice was to empty either the after peak or the after peak and number 6 tank for clearing the bar at Port Hedland, leaving the remaining forward tanks full.

In fact Captain Allen copied this trend exactly on Christmas Day, 1911.

Captain Allen was a cautious master who understood Koombana's inherent top heaviness and when he took command, initially preferred to keep all tanks full accessing Port Hedland. However, on numerous occasions Koombana suffered damaging bar strikes in the process.

It stood to reason that by 20 March, Captain Allen had learned lessons too well, deciding to opt for empty tanks, i.e. 16 ft. aft, 11 ft. forward to ensure uncomplicated clearance of the outer bar (19 ft.) during a significant groundswell and gale from the NE, when his tender vessel would be pitching and rolling, requiring at least 3 ft. clearance. But this decision forced him to fill all tanks at sea.

In previous posts I have drawn attention to the fresh water component which was not replenished at ports and potentially created a free surface effect (loose water) in demarcated fresh water tanks. Captain Upjohn explained that in order to reduce the free surface effect (increasing heeling instability) in selected fresh water tanks midships 4 and 5, longitudinally sub-divided (voyage from Geraldton to Port Hedland) this water could be replaced / topped up by water from the after peak tank (see image - most rear tank) which consequently would be 'empty' on arrival at the outer bar reducing aft draught to 17 ft., facilitating clearance of the bar and solving two problems simultaneously. Subsequent to this the afterpeak could be filled with salt water for the remainder of the voyage north.

Captain Upjohn alluded to the 'routine' filling of tanks at sea in the following extract and thus confirmed my assumption that Koombana's aft tanks were routinely empty for departure from Port Hedland.

"As a rule the Engineer would run them (tanks) hard up outside (at sea after departure). When plenty of water inside he may have run the fresh water tanks hard up" presumably consolidating from other partially filled sub-divisions and reducing the free surface effect.

Therefore, it does appear that filling Koombana's tanks at sea was not as uncommon as Captain Upjohn initially tried to implicate.

The tanks were numbered 1 through 6 from front to back (see image below). 

Number 1 did not have a central water tight division and thus had to be either completely full or completely empty, in this instance allegedly completely filled with fresh water.

Number 2 tank had a central water tight division (effectively dividing these tanks into port and starboard separate tanks) and on this occasion was filled with salt water.

Number 3; 4 and 5 had central divisions.

Number 3 contained salt water.

Numbers 4 and 5 contained fresh water.

Number 6 tank did not have a central division and like number 1 either had to be completely full or completely empty. This tank, it is assumed was filled with salt water.

The allegation was therefore true that Koombana's draught was indeed in the region of 16 ft. aft 20 March, all remaining cargo forward in the ship and all tanks empty. With the upper limit of the propeller more accurately approximating 16.5 ft., it makes sense that with an aft draught of 16 ft. it would have been partially exposed i.e. 'flogging the air'. Under normal circumstances with just the after peak empty, drawing 17 ft. (forward tanks full), the propeller would have been submerged.  

Captain Upjohn confirmed that it would take at least 3 hours (usually 3 1/2 hours) to fill the after peak and number 6 tank at sea. But if all tanks required filling and it took 3 hours plus just to fill the after peak and number 6, I do strongly wonder if there were empty or partially empty tanks when Koombana made her run for the north of Bedout Island. Furthermore, we know that Koombana was seen by two sets of witnesses only filling tanks for about 2 hours.

courtesy Annie Boyd.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

The following document illustrates the subdivisions of tanks being used as required for trimming; e.g. fresh water port side subdivision and sea water starboard subdivision. What combinations and how Captain Allen ultimately achieved his goal remains in the realm of speculation.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia; series 2357, cons 006

  The following extracts are drawn from The Australia Pilot, volume 4, published 1920 and the depth figures were compiled after correlating with present day tide data.

Port Hedland (lat. 20 18, long 118 35) - Depths - Port Hedland is a secure harbor about 2 miles in length, and with depths of 5 to 8 fathoms (30 ft. - 48 ft.) over a length of about 1,400 yards by 200 yards in breadth, but the approach has a bar with a depth of only 1 foot at low water springs. This gives a depth of 20 feet at high water springs and 13 feet at high water neaps.

When Koombana departed Port Hedland for the last time, the depth over the bar was 19 ft., 1 ft. short of high water springs. 

There is a lag between full or new moon and high water springs (new moon in this case, 18 March, 1912). Koombana was running a day late and another day's delay would have incurred a further level reduction to 18.6 ft.. Three days after high water springs the level would have dropped significantly to 17.6 ft..

"I don't like the glass,"

was Captain Allen's remark, 

"and another 24 hours 

here will not matter."

The above figures justify this alleged statement made by Captain Allen. The 24 hours in question would have coincided with 18.6 ft. over the bar and if weather conditions had potentially stabilised by then (squall rather than cyclone - see further discussion below) Captain Allen could have departed with just the after-peak empty; comfortably cleared the bar and filled the one tank in calmer waters within a reasonable timeframe. 48 hours, however, would have produced 17.6 ft. and increased the potential for being neaped.

The day before high water springs the level over the bar would have been in the region of 19.6 ft.; two days prior, 18.5 ft. and three days prior, 17 ft. !! Port Hedland, therefore, offered a very narrow window of opportunity for a steamer Koombana's size and the schedule had to be adhered to as far as humanly possible. 

In fact under normal conditions emphasis would have been placed on arriving the day before high water springs and making a smart exit the following day (19.6 ft. and 20 ft. over the bar). Extending this time frame required emptying tanks(s) and hoping for a calm sea at the port's entrance. This must surely have created enormous pressure for Captain Allen and we know that he had his fair share of bar strikes attempting to cross the bar without emptying tanks.

Tides - It is high water in Roebuck Bay, full and change, at 11 h; springs rise 28 feet, neaps 18 feet. The highest tides occur on the second or third days after full and change, and are subject to diurnal inequality. The day tides rise 18 inches (July) higher than the night tides.

Broome on the other hand offered better draft flexibility (max. 28 ft.), almost 5 days on either side of high water springs (down to 18 ft.). However, the tide swing is dramatic, and around high water springs the low tide level was actually a negative figure, minus 3 ft., which translated into Koombana sitting high and dry on the mud with water as far as a mile off. 

Added to this, the daily times for spring tide migrated from about 12 midday through the afternoon to about 4 p.m. during the course of 5 days. This would have impacted arrivals and departures, incurring delays waiting out at sea for high tide and access.

Port Hedland harbour: 

The head, and a considerable breadth of sand mud flats on either side, dry off at low water, and the deep water channel, above 3 fathoms (18 ft.), nowhere exceeds 300 yards across. The entrance between Hunt and Airey Points is 1/3 mile wide, with sand hills on both sides, generally covered with spinifex grass; the land within is low, marshy, and intersected by creeks, mostly dry at low water; they have not been surveyed other than as charted.

18 ft. in the channel could be boosted to as much as 40 ft. during high water springs.

The Bar, 2 miles from the harbor mouth, consisting of rock thinly overlaid with sand, has a least depth of 1 foot at springs, and then generally breaks. There is also an inner bar with 1 fathom (6 ft.) water, 1,500 yards northeastward of Hunt Point. Vessels of 18 feet draft may cross at high water springs, subject to the tide signals shown.

Koombana was reported to have had an aft draft of 19 ft. which, theoretically, would have disqualified her from crossing the bar. As it was, draft did not exceed 16 ft. aft, and for very good reason considering there was a big sea, gale and turbulence over the bar.

Middle Bank Buoy - The Middle Bank, southward of Hunt Point, divides the entrance into two channels, that to the westward being the deeper but more tortuous. Middle Bank is about 800 yards in length, and it dries over a length of about 700 yards and northward and westward of the buoy. Sand and mud flats extend a considerable distance from both shores, reducing the fairways to narrow limits.

An extremely challenging port to negotiate.

Occasional Light - A black spar buoy, with staff and cage, from which an occasional fixed red light is exhibited, is moored on the Middle Bank at about 100 yards within its northern drying edge.

Beacons and Range marks - The channel is marked by red beacons on the starboard hand, black beacons on the port hand.

Tidal signals - tidal signals are shown from the tidal flagstaff, as follows:

A ball is hoisted at the head of the staff when the tide is rising, and a red burgee when the tide falling. One ball on the western yardarm (steel tower) indicates 19 feet or more (over the bar).

Tides - High water interval at Port Hedland is 10 h. 50 m.; mean range 12 feet 3 inches, springs rise 19 feet 3 inches. Equinoctial springs rise 22 to 24 feet.

Tidal currents in the harbor run 3 to 4 knots. The ebb is the strongest and at the highest tides may attain 6 knots. At the anchorage the flood runs westward, ebb eastward, from 2 to 2 1/2 knots an hour.

It is not surprising that Captain Allen insisted that a lugger be removed from the channel before he made his run for open sea. In such light condition with the propeller and rudder not fully submerged (decreased thrust and manoeuverability), contending with a powerful (up to) 6 knot current and narrow channel, this was a dangerous time for the large steamer. 

Jetty - At Mangrove Point there is a jetty about 700 feet long, where two steamers can berth; there are cattle yards within it. Vessels can discharge into railway trucks. At spring tides the currents run strongly past and vessels should securely moor with anchors as well as by shorefasts to the jetty.

Anchorages - Anchorage outside the bar, to await tide for entering, may be had in 3 fathoms (18 ft.), about 3 miles from shore near the line of the range marks. Small vessels may anchor 1/2 mile nearer shore in 2 1/2 fathoms.

It was at this position 3 miles out that Captain Allen attempted to fill ballast tanks. Again, 3 fathoms, 18 ft., translated into as much as 40 ft. during high water springs.

The best anchorage in the harbour is about 800 yards northward of Harriet Point, in 6 fathoms (not possible today), sand; the holding ground is not good above this. Vessels over 200 feet in length should moor head and stern, there being insufficient room to swing. Two vessels can berth alongside the jetty, as before mentioned.

Directions - Within 1/2 hour on either side of high water is the best time to enter or leave; in narrow parts, at half tide, the currents may run 6 knots. An anchor should always be ready. Southward of Hunt Point, the western point of the entrance, the channel westward of Middle Bank has not less than 4 fathoms at low water, and is deep and well marked by the range beacons.

High water was at 10 h 50. Koombana departed at 10 h 20, half an hour before, exactly as instructed.

When there is sufficient water to cross the bar, the passage eastward of Middle Bank, also well marked, may be taken, thus avoiding the sharp turns and oblique tidal currents of the western channel.

The two range beacons for the bar, namely, the tidal signal staff and Lumsden Beacon, in range bearing 203 degrees, lead over the bar, and the conspicuous dark mangrove clump westward of Harriet Point should be steered for when bearing 220 degrees. 

Vessels can only enter at night with thorough local knowledge; a red light is shown from the buoy on Middle Bank when required.  

The following images are an attempt to transpose the instructions onto present day Port Hedland, with limitations acknowledged.

The black circle represents the position of the inner bar as per the extract.
Note the position coincides with the apex of the sand bank as marked and is slightly west of the present day narrow shipping channel.

The black circle indicates the position 3 miles out where Koombana would have filled tanks. The present day shipping channel bears initially northwestward, whereas Koombana would initially have sailed due north.

Western Mail, 20 September, 1902.

A PORT HEDLAND HARBOUR

OBSTRUCTION.

Port Hedland, September 16.

If Port Hedland is to remain a port

for steamers to take shelter in, the sand-

bar at the entrance to the channel will

have to be dredged. The bar is 200yds.

long and 30yds. wide, and it is extending 

rapidly. It is a common occurrence

for steamers to strike on the bar and 

remain aground for 12 hours, or until the

next tide. The s.s. Minilya, on her last

visit here, was fast on the bar for an

hour coming in, and for 12 hours on her

way out. Every vessel that is in the Nor'-

West trade has been aground here. The

dredge Priestman would, in the opinion

of visiting ship masters, do all the work

that would be necessary to make the bar

navigable. The expense of the dredging 

would, it is believed, be of small account 

in proportion to the advantages to

be derived.

The 'bar' as described above.

Kalgoorlie Miner, 21 July, 1908

PORT HEDLAND HARBOUR.

July 20.

The passage into Port Hedland

Harbour is in need of serious 

attention. Every ship captained 

by a man new to the coast or 

unused to local conditions of 

tide, etc., sticks on the inner bar. 

The last boat, the Dilkera, suffered 

some damage on the bar, and had 

to have Lloyds' surveyors to 

report before leaving the harbour.6 ft.; beam 45.3 ft.; draft 21 ft. 8 inches.

SS Dilkera - courtesy Flotilla Australia.
Built 1902
2667 gross tons
length 326 ft.
beam 45 ft. 3 inches
draft 21 ft. 8 inches - excessive for Port Hedland!

14 July, 1912, the following discovery was made:

 'Bullara, on passage from Cossack to Port Hedland, 

passed derelict, appeared to be submerged bilge

of vessel, 15Oft. or 200ft. long, in latitude 20 deg. 

10 min. south and 118 deg. 3 min. east.'

It was thought that the bilge section came from the wrecked Koombana and if so, there is an important inference to be made. Had Koombana sustained significant latent damage to her hull subsequent to the documented bar strikes within the 6 months leading up to the disaster? And if so, had she suffered some form of catastrophic hull failure in the rough seas? Or was it simply a case of damage sustained striking the seabed? Only time will tell if the wreck, once found, gives up her secrets. 

The Pilbarra Goldfields News, Saturday 30 May, 1903.

PORT HEDLAND BAR

Perth, May: 25,

Captain Frank Pitts, of the steamer

Sultan, warmly supports, Mr. Isdell in

his efforts to have the bar at Port 

Hedland removed.

In a conversation with a Herald

reporter, Captain Pitts stated that the

bar was absolutely dangerous and at

ebb tide it was some feet out of the

water. There was a channel alongside

the bar which was less than 60 feet

wide. It was of rock and should a

vessel strike it she would undoubtedly

be lost. None of the shipmasters trading

to Port Hedland cared about using

the channel, and only did so because

they were compelled to. For his part,

he always used another channel, which

was more difficult, but in which there

was a sandy spit and not so much

rock. Now that larger boats were being

employed in the trade, the work of 

removing the bar was rendered more

necessary.

The West Australia, 26 May, 1920.

PORT HEDLAND.

Port Hedland, May 25.

Passengers by the Bambra say that

they had to wait about four hours on

the Broome jetty. When the vessel 

arrived off Port Hedland in the early hours

of this morning there was some difficulty

in getting into the lifeboats to come

ashore. A stiff easterly wind was blowing

and when the boats were returning to the

vessel there was a fair sea. One boat

was able to get within a few hundred

yards of the Bambra when the steamer

lifted her anchor and picked the boat up.

The other boat was picked up by the

steamer about a couple of miles away.

The simple fact of the matter. Missing the spring tide window prevented steamers such as Bambra accessing Port Hedland. 

 this textnecessary.

The West Australian, 10 April, 1918.

A PORT HEDLAND COMPLAINT.

Port Hedland, April 9.

Owing to the steamer Charon not calling

here on her next southward trip, a period

of about seven weeks will elapse between

the last mail and the next. If the Charon

called at Broome, letters could be posted

here to catch the Minderoo on her next

trip north and they could then be sent

on. But it is said that the Charon's first

port of call is Carnarvon.

Enormous pressure!

The Phillips River Times, 3 March, 1906.

Port Hedland

(From our own Correspondent.) .

Our Port Hedland correspondent

writes, under date February 19, as

follows :—

Several very unpleasant dust storms

swept over the town last week, and

another this morning. Eighteen

points of rain were registered.

Last Friday the mail boat Tyrian

arrived in the roads and refused to

approach the jetty, notwithstanding

the tide gauge registered 19ft. of water,

which was signalled to the steamer.

The captain, however, preferred the

delay of sending in two of the ship's 

boats with the passengers and mails.

One boat leaked to such an extent that

on arriving at the jetty it was nearly

half full of water. Much indignation

was shown by the passengers and

shippers towards the action adopted by

the captain without a reasonable cause

as the steamer was only drawing 

15ft. 3in.

There can be no denying the simple fact that Port Hedland was a challenging port to access even if the steamer in question had a comfortable, 3 ft. 9 in. clearance. 

Koombana had a 3 ft. clearance 20 March, 1912.  

This was not comfortable. 

It never was....

courtesy Flotilla Australia

SQUALLS vs. CYCLONES.

Koombana, fully ballasted, was to reveal her weakness during a Nor'West squall, February, 1910.

 'Just before reaching Hedland we struck a squall and the ship lay over at an angle of 45 degrees and was quite a long time before straightening up.'  (Koombana Days - Annie Boyd).

The following extract courtesy the Hathi Trust, Australia Pilot, 1920, describes such squalls:

During the Northwest monsoon, however, strong gales from the northwestward at times blow upon the coast but do not appear to be frequent. The strongest winds at this season are what may be properly termed as hurricane squalls, from between east-southeastward and northeastward; they mostly occur between sunset and sunrise, and rarely last more than a few hours, nor extend over a large area, and generally give ample warning of their approach by a heavy bank of clouds, with much lightening, between northeastward and southeastward. The breeze comes on almost immediately and with considerable violence, accompanied with rain in torrents and a short chopping sea. The rate of progress of these storms on the northwestern coast of Australia is estimated to be from 11 to 14 miles per hour, travelling from northeastward to southwestward, approximately following the coastline. They are always accompanied by abundant rain, with low dense clouds, and electrical discharge. As a rule their approach are indicated by sultry weather and a falling barometer. These signs are followed by the usual ugly and threatening appearance of the weather, which forebodes most storms. The best and surest of all warnings, however, will be found in the barometer. 

If the barometer falls rapidly, or even if the regularity of its diurnal variation be interrupted, danger may be apprehended. 

And so the truth of the matter for squalls or cyclones. 

It might have been that Captain Allen anticipated such a squall and which, theoretically, should have passed in a few hours. His suspicions might even have been confirmed when observing a dense, inky mass of low lying clouds on the western horizon.

In this case, however, it was a cyclone strengthening as it made landfall, Balla Balla. 

7 December, 1908 a cyclone struck Broome, lasted for three days and caused widespread damage with the loss of 20 lives. 250 miles away at Port Hedland the following report reads like a prelude to 20 March, 1912:

Kalgoorlie Miner, 16 December, 1908. 

ANXIETY AT PORT HEDLAND.

FEARS FOR THE STEAMER

SULTAN.

Port Hedland, Dec. 15.

The pearling disaster reported

from Wallal is causing considerable

anxiety here. The steamer Minnie,

well known in Port Hedland, in

charge of her owner (Harry

O'Grady), who had with him two

other white, men and a coloured

cook, left here for Broome, via 

Condon, Wallal, and La Grange Bay,

on the 3rd inst., and was off Condon

the following Monday. This was

the day before the hurricane came,

since when no tidings of her have

been received.

Much anxiety is experienced here

concerning the fate of the steamer

Sultan, which left Port Hedland at

10 a.m. on the 8th inst. in the face

of a strong easterly gale, with a

falling barometer. She was almost

hidden by clouds of dust when 

leaving the harbour. Port Hedland 

was apparently on the edge of the 

disturbance. 

The morning of Tuesday,

the 8th inst., saw the sky overcast,

with heavy clouds. There was a

strong wind from the south-east,

which by 8 o'clock was from the

east, and at 11 o'clock from the

north-east. It was then almost 

impossible for pedestrians to make

headway against it. At 6 p.m. the

wind had gone back to the east, and

lulled somewhat. The lowest 

barometrical record was 29.28 deg.

at 5 p.m. on the 8th. This,

curiously enough, is identical

with the point reached by the

barometer at the Port Hedland

post office during the Wallal blow

last April. No damage was done

at Port Hedland. The rainfall 

locally was 12 points (3mm)

It is extraordinarily similar to the pattern of 20 March and what's more the captain of the Sultan had no hesitation in putting to sea. This was clearly the approach to such conditions along the Nor'West coast!

SS Sultan - courtesy Flotilla Australia

courtesy Google Earth; Hathi Trust, Australia Pilot, 1920, volume 4 and

http://fishing-app.gpsnauticalcharts.com/i-boating-fishing-web-app/fishing-marine-charts-navigation.html?title=Western+Australia+-+Solitary+Island+to+Bedout+Island+boating+app#11/-19.1354/119.4410

https://mooncalendar.astro-seek.com/moon-phases-calendar-april-2021

https://www.tide-forecast.com/locations/Port-Hedland-Australia/tides/latest#:~:text=The%20predicted%20tide%20times%20today,sunset%20is%20at%205%3A48pm.

https://www.tide-forecast.com/locations/Broome-Australia/tides/latest

Squall vs. Cyclone:

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2021/04/squalls.html

Projections for levels of water over the bar were made by correlating with present day data for both Port Hedland and Broome, April, 2021 - see links above. There is variability, but not significant enough to alter the overall pattern and challenges presented to Captain Allen.

The following extract can be found on Annie Boyd's excellent Koombana Days online resource site. 

EXTRACTS. IN THE COURT OF MARINE INQUIRY, WESTERN AUSTRALIA.

IN THE MATTER OF THE NAVIGATION ACT 1904 and IN THE MATTER of an Inquiry into the circumstances attending the loss at sea between Port Hedland and Broome whilst on a voyage from Fremantle to Derby via Ports of the S.S. "KOOMBANA" on or about the 20th March 1912.

April 25th 1912.

BEFORE: E. P. Dowley Esq. R.M. (presiding)

Captain F. L. Parkes ) Assessors.

Captain J. W. W. Yates )

THE CROWN PROSECUTOR (Mr. F. PARKER) appeared to represent the Chief Harbor Master, Captain C. J. Irvine.

MR. MOSS K.C. appeared to represent the Adelaide Steamship Company.

[Upjohn testimony p1]

HARRY UPJOHN, Sworn.

EXAMINED THE CROWN PROSECUTOR.

You are the Master of the s.s. "Bullarra,"? - Yes.

Were you the Master of her on the 18th March last? - Yes.

Did you arrive at Port Hedland on the 18th March? - Yes.

What were the tides then? - Tides were making 19 feet springs.

This figure of 19 ft. played a key roll in the disastrous sequence of events unfolding, 20 March, 1912.

What day did the s.s. "Koombana" arrive at Port Hedland? 

- On the 19th March.

During the time you were in Port Hedland did you have any

conversation with Captain Allen in respect of the weather?
- Yes.

On what date was that? - On the morning of the 20th.

Will you tell the Court what the conversation was? - It took

place on my ship. We had a general conversation and Capt.

Allen said "What do you think about the weather?"

What was your reply? - "Its overcast and a bit dirty but there is nothing in it."

Can you fix the time that this conversation took place? - It was just before breakfast or just after.

That would be about 8 o'clock? - Yes.

What was the state of the weather at this time? - Very nice fresh breeze, overcast and cloudy.

It struck you as being a bit dirty? - Just overcast.

What did you expect from the weather? - I expected the same right through: fine if anything.

Did you have any further conversation with Capt. Allen about the weather? - None.

Was anything said in reference to leaving Port Hedland or not? - No.

There is no doubt that Captain Upjohn attempted to give an impression that the weather was fine and no threat of a cyclone. He blatantly denied a conversation which took place as follows:

Captain Allen Koombana: "I do

not like the look of the weather. 

Captain Upjohn; what do you intend 

doing?"

Captain Upjohn (Bullarra): "I have

made up my mind to go out and your

boat is a far better one than mine."

Captain Allen: "Well, if you intend

going out, I do not suppose it will do

for me to stop here."

Furthermore, Captain Upohn's initial comments to the press were as follows:

'The weather was looking dirty when the 

ship (Bullarra) left Port Hedland on March 

20, but after consultation with the captain 

of the Koombana, which left 20 minutes 

later, we resolved to put out, the Bullara

going south and the Koombana, north.

When about 22 miles from Balla Balla

very bad weather was struck.' 

Dirty weather referred to anticipated storm conditions.

The interesting thing is this; The Board of Trade encouraged masters to face storms out at sea rather than in port where the steamer could be driven ashore and wrecked. Captain Upjohn could have been frank from the start at the Inquiry and stated this well-known 'regulation'. 

However, he knew, as did everyone involved in this farce that Koombana was significantly top heavy; her captain reluctant to depart under such circumstances and tanks to be adequately filled at sea in such conditions, a virtual impossibility.

But Captain Upjohn had encouraged (dared) Captain Allen to depart and this he had to downplay as far as humanly possible.

Fix this text

MR. DOWLEY. He left before you? - Yes.

CROWN

PROSECUTOR. At what time? -

[Upjohn testimony p2]

UPJOHN. About 20 minutes before I did: between 10 and 11 o'clock a.m.

CROWN

PROSECUTOR. Can you tell the Court: did the weather alter between 10 and

11.20 ? - No. (ctd)

What was the reading of the barometer? - I looked at the

barometer at 6 o'clock and it stood at 29.50.

Had there been anything during the night or early morning? -

There was a squall at 4 o'clock that morning.

What was the nature of this squall? - Just a puff.

Again a transparent attempt to play down weather conditions. A 'puff' is about as mild as it can get. Residents of Port Hedland who were battening down in anticipation of a blow and luggers were seeking refuge higher up in the creek.

Did you look at the barometer on account of that? - No: it

was my usual practice to look at the barometer at about 6

o'clock.

It stood then at 29.50? - Yes.

The Pearlers' Association of Broome advised that if the normal barometer reading of 29.90 dropped by 2 tenths, i.e. to 29.70, this should alert pearlers to the imminent threat of a cyclone. 29.50 is 5 tenths.

Did you look at the barometer again before you left Port

Hedland? - I do not recollect.

It is highly unlikely Captain Upjohn would not have consulted his barometer before departing Port Hedland, and remembering such.

A cattleman aboard Bullarra claimed in a press report, 1926:

"I subsequently learnt that the glass was 

extremely low, 28 something."

When Captain Allen spoke about the weather, did he mention

anything about the barometer reading? - Yes he did mention

it but I do not remember what it was.

Again, unlikely and evasive.

Was your glass a high or low one? - Low.

There was nothing whatever said about leaving or not? -

Not a word.

Contrary to this statement, Mr. Barker of Port Hedland had this to say:

"Captain Allen, when questioned 

by Mr. Barker as to whether he was 

going to put out, said he did not know. 

"I don't like the glass," was Captain 

Allen's remark, "and another 

24 hours here will not matter."

'Another 24 hours' referred to delaying departure for a day. It is absolutely crystal clear from this extract that Captain Allen did not want to depart into what he knew would be dangerous conditions for his top heavy steamer. 

Where were you when the "Koombana" left Port Hedland? -- I was on the lower bridge and the Chief Officer was with me.

What were you doing? -- We were just looking at the "Koombana"

Did you notice her trim? -- She was in excellent trim.

Did you notice the draft? -- No. I noticed how well she

behaved and the Chief Officer said the same.

A carefully constructed answer. If Captain Upjohn had confirmed that he knew Koombana's draft he would not have been in a position to claim 'how well she behaved'.

Have you any reason for that remark? - No, but she looked so well.

Did you notice her propeller? - It was well submerged.

We shall return to this thorny issue.

You and the Chief Officer were standing watching her? - Yes.

When she went out of the Harbor, did she roll at all? - No.

With a gale from the NE and heavy ground swell from the NW, it would have been virtually impossible for Koombana, in such light condition, not to have rolled as she crossed the bar.

[Upjohn testimony p3]

CROWN PROSECUTOR (ctd)

When you went out, what length of time did you follow in the

"Koombana's" Course? - I followed out in her course, keeping

leads astern, somewhere about half an hour or three quarters.

The cattleman had this to say:

"hearing the officers in charge of the watch 

remark that we were running out three miles, 

I gleaned that something was expected." 

By 'expected', the cattleman meant severe weather.

And you last saw her? - About two hours after leaving.

By which time Bullarra, which did not have to fill tanks at sea, would have covered at least 13 miles - probably significantly more and been out of sight. So why was Koombana still in sight after 2 hours? Keeping an eye on proceedings, i.e. the filling of tanks in a gale? Or deciding whether to tackle the ominous weather in the west?

Was she proceeding on her ordinary course to Broome? -

On the ordinary course to Bedout.

Was she in good trim? - Yes.

Bert Clarke who watched Koombana for two hours from his vantage point (having given signals as the steamers departed port) commented that Koombana rolled and pitched excessively.

The top of her propellor, according to the plan, is about on

the 18' mark: You say she was well submerged? - Yes.

Captain Upjohn would later contradict this observation. We know that the upper limit of the propeller was 16.5 ft. according to plans, not 18 ft.. As we shall see, Captain Upjohn's estimation of Koombana's draft aft of 16.5 ft. would have allowed for a whopping 1.5 ft. of the propeller not submerged.

From the time you left Port Hedland until the time you lost

sight of the "Koombana", had the wind changed? - No.

Had the velocity altered? - No.

The cattleman had this to say about the conditions:

"there was an overcast sky and half a

gale blowing from the E.N.E."

During that day, when did the direction of the wind change

first? - About 4 p.m.

Where were you bound? - South to Balla Balla.

You were going in the opposite direction to that taken by the

"Koombana"? - Yes.

What time did the wind change its direction first? - Some-

where between 2 o'clock and 4 o'clock. It is very carefully noted

in the log book. The wind was E.N.E at 5 o'clock. Commenced

to flicker and went back again. (portion of log book put in).

Steaming into the system.

When did the wind change? - Between 2 and 4 o'clock.

Coming back to the time you left Port Hedland? - At 6.20am

we commenced swinging, at 10.40 cast off. There was a strong

N.E. wind, cloudy.

Oh, so now it is a 'strong NE wind'. Inconsistencies creeping into Captain Upjohn's testimony.

Mr. DOWLEY. You say the wind changed from E.N.E. From what? - There was a strong breeze which changed from N.E.

Again the cattleman:

"there was an overcast sky and half a

gale blowing from the E.N.E."

Newspaper reports:

'The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port

Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on
March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered
a strong north-east gale on leaving the
harbor.' 

'Between 2 and 4 p.m. the wind changed

from north-east to east-north-east. At 4.20

the engines were slowed, and at 5 p.m. he

altered the Bullarra's course and put to 

sea.'

CROWN

PROSECUTOR. At what time did you lose sight of the "Koombana" - about

12 o'clock? - A little before, when the sea became rough.

The cattleman had this to say:

'When we came on deck for the midday 

meal, the Bullara and the Koombana 

were stern on to each other, and the 

distance apart being about five miles.' 

According to the cattleman Koombana was still well within sight at midday. Captain Upjohn contradicted himself in other statements referring to Koombana being in sight for about 2 hours out at sea - takes the time to roughly 1 p.m.

When did you notice the sea change to rough? When you left it

was a nice pleasant breeze and smooth? - Yes, it

freshened later.

A reminder:

'The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port

Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on

March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered

a strong north-east gale on leaving the

harbor.' 

[Upjohn testimony p4]

When the wind freshened and the sea became rough, was the

Koombana still in sight? - Yes, but I lost sight of her shortly

after.

Did you notice what weather she was making? Did you see her?

- I saw her but could not tell how she was behaving.

Naturally Captain Upjohn played the whole scenario down, fresh breezes replacing gales and nothing about Koombana rolling and pitching. The trend was set. 

The next entry is in regard to the weather? - Heavy N.E. gale,

heavy sea, 4 o'clock.

Some newspaper reports stated that this coincided with 22 miles from Balla Balla. This means that Bullarra had covered 28.5 miles since midday when she was stern on to each other with Koombana i.e. an average of 7 knots which is unrealistic with a gale behind, and not the average of 10 knots (log) quoted by Upjohn at the Inquiry. Something was amiss. If, however, Bullarra finally departed Koombana's company, 5 miles distant, at 1 pm we get an average of 9.5 knots which is far closer to the mark. Was Bullarra holding back in order to be certain that Koombana did not get into trouble, pitching and rolling? It certainly seems that way considering Bullarra held back until as late as 1 pm and Captain Upjohn denied this.

You were still on your course for Balla Balla? - Yes. At 4.20

p.m. I slowed the engines.

This was confirmed by the cattleman who said:

"We were down amongst the cattle again fixing up, 

when at 4.30 p.m. Captain Upjohn called 

out to us to look out as she was going to roll.

As he was going to heave-to, we came up

on deck At 6 p.m."

At 5 o'clock you altered your course from S 50 W to N.E? - Yes.

Bow into the NE gale ---> hurricane.

What other note have you? - Put screens up and tarpaulins in

main weather rigging and round poop, took soundings and found

25 fathoms.

You were then steering out to open sea after doing this? -

Yes.

The next entry? - At 8, heavy gale, high seas, ship laboring

heavily and heavy rain.

At that time what did you think of the weather? - That it was

bad and getting serious. This was between 8 and 10 p.m.

You continued out to sea? - Yes.

Will you tell the Court what the weather was. At midnight

you reported it being a hurricane? - Yes, the ship was rolling

heavily.

Were these entries made afterwards? - The entries were made

roughly in another book and copied afterwards.

At 10.30 the wind went from E.N.E to E.? - Yes, at 11.20

mountainous seas. (log book read).

I notice that the wind after 8 o'clock got to W.S.W. The

wind increased in velocity about midday of the 21st? - Yes.

Was there any alteration in the barometer? - There was no

difference until between 3 and 4 o'clock.

What then? - It dropped a little but not suddenly.

Stressing to the Court that one could not rely on barometer readings. 

Did you keep watch of the barometer? - Yes, later on, every

hour.

[Upjohn testimony p5]

Between 3 and 4 o'clock you did not pay particular attention

but at 10 o'clock, when you realised the weather was bad, you

kept constant watch? - Yes.

I notice you were in the centre of the cyclone between noon

and 4 p.m.? - At 12.30 it was calm.

...

After the blow was over and you had effected temporary repairs,

did you engage in searching for the Koombana? What area did you search? -

(Chart put in and area shown).

[Upjohn testimony p6]

What wreckage did you pick up? - An awning spar, portion

of motor launch, a panel from the ceiling of the smoking

room or music room, some covers of the lifeboats tanks and

a door.

(Wreckage produced).

You examined that carefully? - Yes.

Did you form any opinion as to what had caused the wreckage?

- The force of the wind and sea.

It had clearly become important to reinforce that the hurricane conditions were to blame for the loss of Koombana.

The panel is forced right out with the screws adhering? - Yes.

Have you formed any opinion? Does the Court desire to hear

any opinion? -

MR. DOWLEY. It may be given.

THE CROWN

PROSECUTOR. Have you any doubt as to this being the wreckage of the

"Koombana"? - There is not the slightest doubt. The piece

from the motor launch has the Company's crest on it.

You know the door? - Yes, it belonged to the cabin on port side on the promenade deck.

What door is it? - It is a stateroom door.

During this blow, did the wind shift any of your boats at all? -

Yes. The lee boats. One of the boats had a hole bumped in it.

Were any other boats effected by the wind? - They were

strained and damaged, and chafed in the chocks.

Did you lose any boats? - No.

An interesting fact. Bullarra went through the eye of the cyclone and none of the boats were lost, which should theoretically have applied to the newer Koombana, if she had been subjected to similar circumstances.

Were all the boats damaged? - Yes. They were all lashed down.

...

[Upjohn testimony p7]

...

THE CROWN

PROSECUTOR. You know the "Koombana" well. Where did she carry her

cargo, etc? - Yes, I know her well. She had her bunkers

full and they carry about 580 (480) tons. According to Captain

Williams she had 80 tons of cargo in the lower hold, 150

tons in No. 2 lower, between No. 2 and tween decks - 20 tons.

A total of about 800 tons.

Minimal cargo and dead weight. In this, Captain Upjohn's version, the 80 tons and 150 tons were stowed in lower holds, and only 20 tons higher up. This makes complete sense in terms of improving G.M. (steadying the ship).

However, Matthew John Williams, Marine Superintendent, in his own words stated during interview that the Derby cargo, 175 tons, was stowed forward in number 2 hold and 85 tons for Broome, stowed in the after part of number 1 and 2 'tween deck, higher up. Total, 260 tons (the official Inquiry figure). These units were stowed and secured before departure from Fremantle. 

Perhaps, what Captain Upjohn inadvertently let slip was that these units of cargo were redistributed lower down to improve G.M.; which although a sensible decision might have made the new, temporary placements prone to shifting in heavy weather. 

Also, Captain Upjohn's total was 10 tons short of the official 260 tons.

courtesy Annie Boyd.

Have you known of a case when the "Koombana" has all her

tanks empty at one time? When she was a light ship? - No.

This was a loaded statement referring to allegations that Captain Allen departed Port Hedland with all ballast tanks empty. Captain Upjohn was passing judgment that he had never been on Koombana with all tanks empty; by implication that it was not necessary under any circumstances and not advised. He had entered and departed Port Hedland numerous times as Chief Officer of the Koombana! 

If she had all her tanks empty and only 800 tons on board

her, with coal and everything, what draft would she be? -

She would be 16'6 aft and about 12' forward.

Here we have a far better approximation of the truth. Koombana was in very light condition. It is interesting that no one questioned then the propeller being 18 ft. rather than 16.5 ft. and yet fully submerged!!

Port Hedland Harbourmaster:

'The Harbormaster's assertion

was that she was drawing 11ft. 

forward and 16ft. aft.'

Proof of the Harbourmaster's aft figure can be deduced by using Upjohn's afterpeak and number 6 tank empty figure of 16'6 ft.. This supported the balance of tanks being filled. But if the balance were empty the figure of 16'6 ft. would drop further, most likely to within the region of 16 ft..

The Inquiry was to come to the conclusion that Koombana was drawing 19 ft. aft, which was impossible given the bar clearance of 19 ft.. Even their supplicant witness did not venture a ridiculous aft draft figure like that!!

MR. DOWLEY. The tanks are distributed about the ship? - Yes.

THE CROWN

PROSECUTOR. About how many times did you go into Port Hedland on the

"Koombana"? - About 18 times.

When at spring tides, what empty tanks would you have? -

The after peak tank would be empty: it would be consumed on

the voyage up from Fremantle to fill tanks 4 and 5 - fresh

water.

A very interesting insight into the workings of Koombana. In other words fresh water would be consumed from tanks 4 and 5 midships during the voyage and then replaced by fresh water from the afterpeak which in turn, empty, facilitated access over the bar - very clever!

How would the other tanks be? - All full. Numbers 1, 2, 3,

4 and 5.   No 6 might be pumped out.

The empty tanks were right at the back, i.e. aft. 

With the tanks in this State what draft would she be then? -

About 17' with the after peak tank out.

Koombana's draft with afterpeak empty was 17 ft. which could be further reduced to 16'6 ft. by emptying number 6 as well. With ALL tanks empty, again we have confirmation of the Harbourmaster's assertion of 16 ft. aft.

Could you go into Port Hedland on a spring tide with that? -

Quite easily.

There would be no necessity to empty any tanks? - No.

Now Upjohn was unambiguous in his criticism of Captain Allen. Theoretically, Koombana could comfortably clear the bar, 19 ft., with 17 ft. aft and 12 to 13 ft. forward (std practice) except for one little detail. There was a ground swell over the bar and Koombana needed greater clearance in order not to strike, and strike hard.

Captain Upjohn had 12 months', 18 x voyage experience on Koombana as Chief Officer, and yet Captain Allen was to get command of the flagship while Upjohn was relegated to the ageing Bullarra. There could have been animosity. Also, by criticizing Captain Allen, Upjohn could also have been sending a not so subtle to the employers that if he had commanded Koombana, the disaster might not have happened.

Personally I doubt whether Harry Upjohn could have saved the day.

If there were any tanks empty in Port Hedland, how long

would it take to fill these tanks? - Number 8 (error, 6) would be run out in an hour and the after peak in about an hour and it would then be pumped up.

How long would it take to fill them? - From 3 to 3 1/2 hours.

The implications were serious. It would take a significant period of time to fill tanks, in ideal circumstances, never mind at sea in a gale and ground swell.

3 1/2 hours for two tanks - how long for all tanks!!!

[Upjohn testimony p8]

Have you formed any theory as to what became of the "Koombana"?--

The only thing I can think of is that she was smashed

up by the cyclone.

In what way do you think?-- By the force of the wind and sea.

Could she have turned turtle?-- Impossible.

Given everything we know about Koombana and Captain Upjohn's intimate experience with the ship, such an answer was ridiculous and clearly they were closing ranks against allegations of unseaworthiness. His own ageing steamer had survived the forces of wind and sea!

CROSS EXAMINED

MR. MOSS. Do you consider you were lucky in having escaped? - We escaped by a miracle.

Your boat was in a battered condition? - Yes.

What occurred to your funnel? - It was carried away in the early part of the blow.

You went to Broome to effect temporary repairs and for water? - Yes.

That was before you searched for the "Koombana"? - Yes.

Have you been in cyclonic weather before? - Yes, in the China

Sea, when a ship went down alongside of us.

Was it very bad? - Not so bad as this.

This was absolutely the worst thing you have experienced? - Yes.

And it was only by a miracle you came through? - Yes.

Leading the witness down a path designed to convince those listening that Koombana was doomed in such a system.

...

[Upjohn testimony p9]

... I think when you crossed the bar you felt more wind outside than inside? - Yes. There is always a fresher breeze outside.

Was there any sea on the bar? - No.

You saw the "Koombana" go out. Did she roll much? - I saw

her go, but there was no roll.

What did Harry Upjohn take the Court for and the people of Port Hedland?? A ground swell from the northwest striking the reduced column of water over the bar would have caused much turbulence. There was also a gale blowing from the NE.

There is another report that has been spread, about the

propeller beating the air? - I remarked to the Chief Officer

how well she looked and the propeller was well submerged.

There is no truth in the report then? - None whatever.

But he contradicted himself by stating that the propeller needed 18' to be fully submerged and by his own reckoning Koombana departed Port Hedland with a draft aft of 16'6. But no one challenged this...

By his calculation of draft of 16'6 cleverly Koombana's propeller would have been submerged, but just. By the Harbourmaster's, absolutely NOT, by 6 inches.

MR. DOWLEY. In the papers there was a remark of Captain Allen saying he

would be lucky to get to Broome by Saturday? - I did not

hear him say so.

It would be very surprising if Captain Upjohn admitted to hearing this statement and having to elaborate.

MR. MOSS. How long would it take in the ordinary course? - About 24 or

25 hours.

MR. DOWLEY. He should have got there on Thursday? - Yes.

MR. MOSS. When you were searching for the wreckage of the "Koombana" did you notice any oily substance floating on the surface? - Yes.

Please tell the Court? - It was in latitude 19.11 and 119.25 E.

What distance would that be off Bedout Island? - About 27 or 28

miles - I cannot say which.

Did you take any samples of this oily substance? - Yes. Two or

three dozen bottles.

What depth was there at this place? - 30 or 35 fathoms.

Did you see any trace of the vessel in that depth? There would be nothing to indicate that the Koombana or any other vessel would be there?

Note the choice of negative words insinuating no correlation between the oil and a sunken vessel. 

However:

- It was getting dark and it looked like the outline of a vessel. The Chief Officer said "It must be one of her decks," I said "No, the decks would not look like that." I could see no more.

The engines were stopped and we drifted for about 4 miles.

Why would Captain Upjohn have stopped his engines and drifted for 4 miles? In order to establish the current speed, direction and effect of wind on the drift? Hence to be able to establish the accuracy of the position of the find more accurately in terms of calculated dead reckoning.

What was the stuff in the bottles? - Oily, greasy water.

Have you any idea as to how that came there? - It looked as if

it came from a wreck.

It does not come any plainer than this. Captain Upjohn believed that this was the location of wreck of the RMS Koombana.

see:

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2020/02/coordinates-conclusion.html

[Upjohn testimony p10]

There would be stuff on the ship to make this? - Yes.

Where are those bottles? - At the Company's office.

We will produce these if desired.

There is no reference in the Inquiry transcripts about 'producing' the bottles. Either the Court did not agree with Captain Upjohn or the results were too close to the truth for comfort and presentation.

MR. DOWLEY. You saw this at dusk? - Yes.

MR. MOSS. When you went out from Broome to make this search, was it a

careful search in every way? - Yes.

Did you land anyone on Bedout Island? - Yes, the Chief Officer

and a party.

You searched with every care in the vicinity where you found

this wreckage? - Yes.

Was there any wreckage about then? - Yes, an awning spar and

one of the doors.

What difference in distance did you find any other pieces? -

There was a difference of as much as 20 miles.

Puzzling statement. According to the records Upjohn's wreckage was found in a collection 20 miles north of Bedout and the oil patch and wreckage 20 miles to the east of that point.

...

MR. DOWLEY. ...

You say that this is the "Koombana's" door. Would it have been

possible for it to have been washed off before the boat sank? -

It is quite possible.

...

An interesting question. Mr. Dowley is, again, leading the witness down the path of cyclone hurricane force wind damage rather than a force of solid water as the ship went down.

-:- 1 -:-

HARRY UPJOHN - Recalled.

(Official Log-Book put in).

THE CROWN

PROSECUTOR. This is your official log-book, in use on the 20th March? - Yes.

Whose entry is this: "Strong N.E.Breeze and cloudy"

Mr Crossley's? - Yes.

Is it all in the same writing? - Yes, it is not my writing.

No doubt distancing himself from the entry.

Can you give an explanation of the barometer at noon being

28.83? - The ship is provided with two barometers - one is

more valuable than the other and is kept in the Commander's

room because it is nice room and not too warm. The Chart

room is not a fit place to house this barometer. The other

barometer is in the chart room for the use of the officers.

It is on the low side and not a good instrument. When I said

the reading of the barometer was 29.50 it was the reading

of the barometer in my room which the officers have not access

to. During the cyclone, finding such a difference

between the glasses, I told one of the officers to take my

instrument up to the chart room because this was then the

better place to house it as it might have been smashed to

pieces, my room being on the lower deck.

That reading on the 20th March was by the barometer in the

chart room? - Yes, it is on the low side and an inferior

instrument to mine.

My feeling is that Captain Upjohn was ducking the insinuations that he ignored a barometer warning, cavalierly encouraging a reluctant Captain Allen to do the same. His explanation was elaborate to say the least.

Who can tell us about the instrument in the chart room? - The

Chief Officer.

What difference was there between the barometer in the chart

room and the one in your room? - I do not know. A

tremendous difference.

A contradiction in terms. He 'did not know' but somehow it was a 'tremendous difference'. 

Captain Upjohn was a terrible witness who blurred facts to justify departing Hedland that fateful day, encouraging Captain Allen to do the same; passing criticism about Captain Allen's decision to depart with empty tanks, and yet giving fake evidence that Koombana did not roll going over the bar with propeller well submerged; 'playing along' with the Court's (and owners') efforts to make the cyclone the central causative factor for the disaster; and making no suggestion to the Court to drag the vicinity of the oil patch with a wire to locate the wreck of Koombana, 130 miles from the centre of the cyclone.

It was a whitewash.

...

http://koombanadays.com/ch14/src/ct/kd14ct001.html

courtesy Trove extracts; Australia Pilot, 1920.

For those with an in depth interest in this subject should obtain Annie Boyd's outstanding Koombana Days.