Monday, 29 May 2017

STABILITY EXPLAINED.

Although there is a emphasis on the Waratah in this post, the point is clearly made regarding top heavy steamers.

The West Australian, 13 April, 1912.

STABILITY OF SHIPS AND
LAWS OF STORMS. 
- To the Editor.

"Sir, now I that the missing Koombana
may certainly be listed as lost, like the
Waratah and Yongala, the travelling public
might very well be interested in studying
for themselves the simple proposition of 
stability in ships. This proposition lies buried
in scientific jargon as far as the man in the
Street is concerned, and can easily be 
demonstrated in ordinary language. 

It is a long time since Archimedes proved. 
that a floating body is exactly the same 
weight as the water it displaces. A steamer, 
with whatever cargo or ballast she may 
have in her, is exactly the same weight as 
the water she displaces. The water she 
displaces is what would fill the cavity her 
weight and shape impose below the water 
line or surface of the water. Exactly in the 
centre of this cavity, in which the floating 
ship fits lies the vessel's centre of buoyancy, 
and through this centre there acts an upward 
pressure from the sea in its endeavour to 
become level against the weight of the ship. 

When a steamer is floating upright, this 
centre of buoyancy lies midships in a 
vertical line or plane, dividing the vessel 
in two. If one thinks of  a partition being 
built from stem to stern amidships from 
the keel upward, then in this partition lies 
the centre of buoyancy when the steamer 
stands upright, and it lies nearly half-way 
between the keel. and the water line. 

The water line is a imaginary line or plane 
joining, from side to side through the vessel 
the  surfaces of the surrounding sea. Not any
of the painted lines on the hull often alluded
to as the "water line." When a steamer
heels over; that is lists or rolls from side to
side part of her hull comes out above the
level of the sea on one side and another part
sinks further in on the other side. When
this happens the centre of buoyancy changes
position in the hull while always retaining
its position about the centre of whatever
portion of the hull is immersed. Thus, as
she rolls to starboard, it leaves the assumed
partition amidships, moving to starboard,
returning to partition, and then towards
port as she rolls from starboard, through
upright, and then to port.

As before explained, there is always an
upward pressure from the ocean in a 
straight line perpendicular to its level
surface through this moving centre of 
buoyancy and that line always passes 
through a given point in the midships 
partition above it. This point is termed 
the "meta centre" by experts and it will 
readily be imagined that the centre of 
buoyancy swings from side to side like 
a pendulum suspended from it, when
the vessel is rolling at sea.

There is now the centre of gravity, which
everyone nowadays understands is simply
the centre of weight to be considered as it
must readily be realised that a vessel's
centre of gravity depends upon the amount 
of cargo or ballast she may be carrying and
how such is stowed or disposed in her holds.
But once the cargo or ballast is placed, stowed,
or, disposed in the vessel, the centre of 
gravity remains constant, and does not
shift (unless the cargo shifts), like the centre
of buoyancy. If the vessel be stowed properly 
it will be found somewhere in the assumed 
midships partition and at a point below meta 
centre point. The pressure from the weight of 
the ship is always in the direction of an assumed 
plumb line hanging from the centre of gravity point, 
and as the vessel rolls at sea this plumb line or 
direction of pressure swings from side to side
in harmony with the line of buoyancy, exactly 
coinciding when the vessel is upright, and parallel, 
with an increasing distance between them as the 
vessel rolls to one side. 

The degree of stability- that is safety from capsizing 
- depends on the distance of the meta centre above 
the centre of gravity. This distance is termed the meta 
centric height. (GM). The force downward from the
centre of gravity is exactly equal to the force 
upward exerted by the ocean endeavouring to 
get level; and these two forces tend to right the ship 
when the undulations of the sea swing her away
from the upright. The greater the metacentric 
height which is the same as saying the greater 
the safety from capsizing, the more uncomfortable 
the vessel to travel on. (not so - greater GM equates
with brisker, less comfortable rolling) The more 
leverage the forces of buoyancy and gravity have 
the more quickly they can right the vessel swaying 
on the undulating surface. Too great safety from 
capsizing brings about other dangers. Sailing vessels
with heavy dead-weight cargoes have been
known to lose their masts and strain their
hulls to such an extent, in so rolling, their
masts out, that they have sprung a leak and
foundered. 


Iron and such like heavy cargoes have often to 
be stowed in narrow trunkways or on platforms
especially built in the ship to keep her centre
of gravity higher when loaded. When we hear
people say that such and such a vessel is a 
grand seaboat, etc., etc., such a vessel may 
have been very unsafe on that particular voyage, 
her very unsafety contributing to the comfortable 
travelling. 


It may be taken for granted there is very little
difference in modern cargo vessels when
carrying complete cargoes that nearly fill
them. With like loading they may safely
be expected to behave much the same in
similar storms. The common design for such
vessels provides a breadth equal to about
twice the moulded depth below the main
deck,and as there are no passengers
carried there is very little superstructure
above the main deck. When we consider
passenger steamers, however, the tendency
to build additional decks and keep the 
passengers' accommodation all above the main
deck is most noticeable. Everyone prefers a
nice airy cabin to the stuffy ones which were
once the vogue, and all below the main deck.
Here it is an open question whether we are 
not sacrificing safety for comfort and carrying 
capacity. 

The fact that we have had the Waratah,
Yongala, and Koombana mysteries in these 
latitudes during the last three years is sufficient 
excuse for the public requiring some practical
and expert investigation made on their behalf. 
In the case of the Waratah it seems abundantly 
clear, from the evidence given at the Law Courts 
that this vessel was not considered to have 
sufficient ballasting powers when sailing without 
cargo, to counteract the weight of superstructure
supplying the passenger accommodation. She
was to some extent in the same predicament as 
our famous sailing clippers of last century, which 
needed nearly half a cargo of ballast to go seeking 
for cargoes from one port to another. 

When the Waratah was lost she had nearly a 
full cargo on board and whatever her degree 
of stability was when empty, had surely nothing 
to do with her degree of stability when loaded. 
Yet, as far as  the writer can learn, there was 
little or no evidence forthcoming as to the weight 
and disposal of the cargo she lad when lost.

In the case of the Koombana there is
considerable food for reflection. She was
probably carrying less than 500 tons of
cargo and:appears to have been engulfed
in the centre of a "willy-willy." It the opinion 
of the writer that the Koombana in light trim 
was not fit to encounter a hurricane centre.
The writer has been caught near a cyclone 
centre off Mauritius in a sailing vessel, and 
remembering how that vessel, although in 
ideal load and trim was.smothered under 
almost bare poles with bulwarks under water 
and hatch comings awash, he cannot conceive 
it possible for a steamer like the Koombana 
in light trim, exposing such an area of 
superstructure to such a force of wind, to live 
through it.

The question is, 'Is it a legitimate risk to send
such a vessel in such a trim into hurricane
latitudes in hurricane seasons?" 

It must be remembered that the law of
storms is getting on towards being an exact
science, with barometers to provide indications
of approach; and with means to indicate the 
vessel's position from the centre and to show 
from collected data the most probable path of 
the centre, a good steamer with an experienced 
and expert master should easily avoid being 
caught. It is a matter of vigilance and judgment
just as is the case with a pedestrian avoiding
motor cars. These remarks are applicable.
to cyclones, typhoons, and other well
known and studied storms, but have we
done our duty with regard.to the Nor'-West
"willy-willy" ?? Is there a published hand
book with information; instructions; and
suggestions as is the case in other 
hurricane parts of the,world for the
safety of mariners. If not, is it not a work 
worth taking in hand at once?

'Yours; etc.,
LONGSHOREMAN.'

Fremantle, April.



SS Waratah 


SS Koombana (courtesy wikipedia)
courtesy Trove

Sunday, 18 December 2016

A DANGEROUS COAST.

Barrier Miner, Thursday 28 March, 1912.

A Dangerous Coast.
The coast along which the Koombana
travels is most dangerous. It is noted
for storms of a sudden and particularly
severe nature There are few lighthouse
between Port Hedland and Port Darwin 
to guide the mariner, and the course so 
far has been imperfectly surveyed. 

There are numerous hidden obstructions 
which might at any time be responsible for 
a wreck. The toll is heavy already. A network 
exists of shoals, bars, reefs, tides, and currents.
The Ninety-Mile Beach, which forms part of the 
coast, is especially low and sandy. To illustrate 
the variety of the unexpected dangers, it is 
recorded that in one instance, as the result of a 
mischance, a vessel ran aground on the only 
stretch of soft sand in an otherwise rockbound 
island, and was floated off without injury, while 
another ship went on the one flinty ridge in a 
deep water channel and sank. The tidal fall 
of King Sound is one of the largest in the world
its maximum is 42ft. There are innumerable 
maelstroms at the entrance to the harbor, and 
a few of the currents travel at about 12 miles
an hour. An irregular ridge is formed where the 
Fitzroy river pours its flood into the harbor, and 
the various forces set up a terrible fight. 

Numerous islands dot the coast, and ships 
cannot approach near to it. There are but
few ports, and pearling is the chief industry. 
The heat is intense at Port Hedland, which is 
the starting of the recently completed Marble 
Bar Railway. The roofs and chimneys of some
of the houses are anchored with chains.
The flourishing town of Broome has
been created by tho pearling industry.
There the tide runs out as much as 28ft.
and the efflux is remarkably rapid.


courtesy Google Earth
courtesy Trove

Saturday, 17 December 2016

PROBATE - CAPTAIN ALLEN.

The Advertiser, Adelaide, Wednesday 7 April, 1912.

COURT CASES.
KOOMBANA WRECK RECALLED
APPLICATIONS FOR PROBATE.
At the Full Court on Tuesday two applications 
for probate were heard which recalled the sad 
fate of the steamer Koombana.
Mr. S. H. Skipper made application on
behalf of Seaborne Robert Cottrell Allen
(executor) that probate be granted in the
estate of the late Thomas Maurice Allen,
master of the steamer Koombana, which
was lost some months ago off the north-
west coast of Western Australia. Mr. Skip
per asked for leave to swear that the death
of the testator had occurred between Port
Hedland and Broome, North-West Australia, 
on or since March 20 last.
The motion was supported by affidavits
by Peter Donaldson Haggart (secretary of
the Adelaide Steamship Company), Walter
Vernon Ray, Robert A. Smith, and Stoddart 
A. Poole. It was mentioned by Mr. Skipper 
that the Koombana left Port Hedland on 
March 20 and on the next morning she 
should have arrived at Broome, 204 miles 
distant. A few hours after the vessel's 
departure there was a terrific cyclone and 
the vessel had not been heard of since.
Although steamers had been sent out in
search of the missing vessel nothing had
since been heard of it, and he believed that
no wreckage had been found. Insurance
had been paid on the vessel as a total loss
The court granted the application.
Consideration was given to a similar 
application in regard to the will of John
Francis Coughlin, who was a steward on
the ill-fated vessel.
Mr.G. W. Dempster, who appeared for
Dennis Fitzgerald, the sole executor, said
the testator had left all his property to his
mother. Affidavits were put in from P. D. 
Haggart and Archibald H. Lewis, a clerk .
in the Perth office of the Adelaide Steamship 
Company. It was stated by the latter that 
he saw the deceased on the Koombana
when the vessel left Fremantle. Mr Dempster 
said the testator left only about £6 in South 
Australia, but he had between £1.000 and 
£1,500 invested in Western Australia.
The Chief Justice -That's a very good
beginning for a steward.
The case was eventually adjourned till a
date to be fixed to enable Mr. Dempster to
supply further evidence. The Chief Justice
said he thought it would be sufficient to
get an affidavit by someone who saw the
deceased on board the Koombana at Port
Hedland.


Captain Thomas Allen (courtesy Daily Telegraph)
courtesy Trove

Saturday, 10 December 2016

MISSED CYCLONE WARNING.

The West Australian, Perth, Friday, 26 April, 1912.

THE KOOMBANA.
COURT OF MARINE INOUIRY.
QUESTION OF STABILITY.
COURT INVITES EVIDENCE FROM
PUBLIC.

S. R. P. Stevens, who was acting divisional
officer of the Commonwealth Weather Bureau 
from March 15 to 25, examined by Mr. Parker,
said that each morning he received reports from 
Wyndham, Hall's Creek, Broome, Derby, Cossack, 
Onslow, and other places in the North-West. 
Duplicate reports were sent to the Melbourne 
Bureau, and from that office the forecasts, based 
on barometer and thermometer readings, were
issued at noon, Eastern time. These forecasts 
were received in Perth between 11.30 and 12 
noon (Western time). If they were not received 
by noon each day the forecast was issued by 
the local bureau. If storms were approaching 
warnings were issued to all stations in the 
vicinity of the storm centre. Later on in the 
afternoon forecasts based upon more recent 
data were issued by the local bureau. No special 
forecast was issued from the Melbourne office 
of any storm from March 16 to 21, inclusive

The Mercury, Wednesday 20 March, 1912.

WEATHER REPORT.
FORECASTS.

WEDNESDAY 20 MARCH.

Fix this tesignificantxtWEDNESDAY, MARCH 20.
West Australia.- Fine, cool to moderate
temperatures on the S. coast; warm to hot
elsewhere. Variable winds, chiefly between
S.E. and N.E. Some scattered thunderstorms
in Kimberley.

(The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port
Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on
March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered
a strong north-east gale on leaving the
harbor. By 2 p.m. the gale had increased
to a hurricane, and continued till 1 p.m.
next day. - Advertiser Adelaide, 26 March)

The central bureau failed entirely in its duty to assess data and issue appropriate warnings. It was though history repeated itself, highlighting the short-comings of this cumbersome system of sending data to Melbourne and expecting a reasonable outcome; Yongala, one year prior, had steamed into a cyclone that was neither predicted nor identified off the Queensland coast. In the case of Captain Knight of the Yongala, he departed Flat-Top for Townsville into conditions at sea which he believed to be a south-east change system moving up the coast from the south, and which he must have believed could be safely outrun en-route to Townsville. Captain Allen had far more information to make his final decision about whether to depart Hedland or not. Luggers running for shelter; significant ground swell; huge waves crashing onto the beach the previous evening etc.. But at the end of the day these masters relied on guidance from the central weather bureau for expected weather conditions and warnings, which did not come in either case. See the following post which illustrates the degree to which cyclones could be predicted as far back as 1898:

http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/11/there-was-no-cyclone-prediction-or.html

Both coasts, east and northwest, can experience up to 5 cyclones per summer season. It was not as though a cyclone was a rare weather event, difficult to predict and anticipate its path of destruction. From all the anecdotal reports it is clear that experiencing such a phenomenon at sea was horrific to say the least. The central weather bureau were obliged to have their finger on the button anticipating these catastrophic events. Circa 1912, there were more than enough stations on both coasts collating barometer and temperature readings to establish the pattern of a tropical depression.

On March 15 there was a monsoonal depression 
which had worked S.S.W. to Port Darwin. By the 
18th the storm had reached the neighbourhood 
of Derby, but in no cases were high winds recorded, 
and the lowest point the barometer recorded was 
29.70. report from Port Hedland on the 20th 
stated that the wind force was four miles an 
hour, with threatening weather and smooth 
seasand Cossack reported a barometer of 
29.69 with wind east blowing at the rate of 
19 miles an hour.

Contrary to what appears to have been a blatant untruth, the following extract described conditions at Hedland, 20 March:

It started on Tuesday night with a strong 
easterly wind, and the waves thundered on 
the beach with indications of heavier and 
deadlier surges out at sea. Wednesday 
morning saw about forty luggers running 
to shelter off Port Hedland, where they 
were soon safely anchored. These luggers 
had a rough time on Tuesday night near 
Turtle Island, and the cutting away of masts 
in some cases was seriously contemplated. 
The wind increased its velocity, and it 
continued for three days and nights. The
waves surged up the harbour's entrance, and

the breakers crashed into the sandy Esplanade, 
and washed thousands of tons of it away.

It seems to me that every effort was made at the Inquiry to steer attention away from the glaring truth that Captains Upjohn and Allen were ill-advised to depart Hedland into what was clearly a developed storm system. The luggers had made this point perfectly clear. 

On the 20th at 1 p.m. Cossack advised that a 
fresh gale was blowing, with high seas and 
weather threatening. On the 21st, next morning, 
the barometer recorded 29.56, wind 37 miles
an hour, and there were very heavy seas. The 
storm, from 15th to 21st March, went in 
south-west direction, and evidently struck the 
coast at Cossack and curved. The centre of 
the storm passed north of Cossack. There
was nothing to indicate that a cyclone was
approaching.

A fresh gale was hardly what Captain Upjohn described, 22 n miles from Balla Balla, 20 March. Note the discrepancies in barometer readings, quoted:

The steamer Bullara (Koombana's sister ship), 
which sailed from Hedland for Cossack, via 
Balla Balla, on March 20 at 11 a.m., encountered 
a strong north-east gale. By 2 o'clock the gale 
had increased to a hurricane, and continued
until 1 p.m. on March 21. At noon the 
barometer had fallen to 27.70. At this stage
the hurricane had reached its strongest. On
March 20 the steamer's funnel blew off 
from the base and fell across the top deck 
with a tremendous crash. Great difficulty was
encountered in lashing the funnel to the
boat, as was also the case with many marine 
appliances, which were being blown away. 

The Moira account also confirmed the extent of conditions out at sea, not just on land:

Captain Brett Ward, master of the
Moira, which reached Wyndham 
yesterday, forwarded the following 
cable message, via Broome, to the 
Premier :-

"We encountered cyclonic weather at 8 a.m. 
on the 20th, in latitude 19-20 deg. south,
and longitude 117 deg. east, 100 miles 
north-west of Hedland. The Moira was 
run before the storm in a westerly direction
about 150 miles. The storm roughly lasted 
21 hours, the wind gradually shifting from 
east and north-east to south-westerly.

Cross-examined by Mr. Moss: The cyclone
indicated a sudden development and 
unexpected energy. 

Tell that to the luggers, particularly the ones almost 'de-masted' and the Moira battling at sea from 8 am, 20 March, some 100 miles northwest of Hedland !! How could this account have been accepted into evidence !!

The forecasts were thoroughly satisfactory,

NO !!

and the only delay in getting them from 
Melbourne was the time it took to transmit 
the telegrams, which had precedence over 
all other matters. Pressed by counsel, 
witness admitted that there would be 
a saving of time to that extent  if the 
reports were made by the local bureau.

At last a sensible suggestion which should have been implemented after the loss of the Yongala.

Continuing, witness stated that apparently
the depression struck the coast somewhere
near Cossack, and, being interrupted by the
coastline, and the width of the depression
being narrowed, it resulted in a sudden
storm. 

No, it was not sudden.

It would help if the various officers on the 
coast exchanged information directly
provided, they understood what it conveyed.

It was raised when Yongala was lost if it would have helped if she had been fitted with wireless to receive warnings and advice from officers both on land and at sea. Koombana had just such a wireless which was of no use whatsoever. Steamers out at sea experiencing the first impact of the cyclone did not have wireless to transmit warnings to Koombana and there were no receivers on land to receive general warnings from shipping.

Postmasters, speaking generally, were very
reliable in the matter of weather reports.
There had been cases of delay in issuing
forecasts from Melbourne. He could not form
any ideas as to the velocity of the cyclone
which wrecked the Koombana. The diameter, 
he thought, would extend from Port Hedland 
on the north and Cossack on the south. About 
90 miles north-east by south-west.

This seems reasonable. 

To Mr. Parker: It would be of assistance
to masters if the postmaster at Broome 
advised postmasters north and south of 
the weather conditions.

Any practical suggestions such as this were better than the existing, useless system. Nothing whatsoever learned from the Yongala disaster.


http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/10/cyclone-data-warning-9-am-23-march.html

courtesy Google Earth

diameter of cyclone - roughly 100 miles (courtesy Google Earth)



- probably closer to the truth (courtesy Google Earth)
courtesy Trove