ASH EJECTOR.

 SS Vestris:

'...water was coming through an ash ejector below the waterline, and several hours later he noticed a distinct list to starboard.'

'According to statements made by the rescued stokers, the first leak in the Vestris came from a cracked sea valve which went down to the ash hopper in the stokehold of the steamer. According to the testimony of the stokers, this sea valve was cracked before the Vestris started her final voyage. [They] said there had been some question before the Vestris sailed as to whether she would sail at all.'

'water coming through the “half door” (also referred to as the “working door” and “coal port”) on the starboard side, about six feet above the normal waterline. The leak grew steadily worse.'

'They said the rubber gaskets that were meant to make the two swinging doors watertight had long ago rotted away and disintegrated, leaving gaps wide enough to admit tons of water.'

'assigned it to a dependable carpenter and carpenter’s mate, who were supposed to have bolted the doors and caulked the cracks. Although the coal ports closed from outside the ship, he admitted that he had not inspected them.'

'Chief Engineer James Adams said the first leak was found about 9:00 a.m. Sunday in the starboard ash ejector. It was plugged by noon after letting twenty tons of water into the stokehold bilge, nearly filling it. At 10:00 a.m., the second leak was discovered in a lavatory, which was caused by the carrying away of a scupper plate on the starboard side. This was also plugged by noon after letting fifteen or twenty tons of water into the engine room bilge, which it almost filled.'


Thayer, G. David. First to Die: The Tragic Loss of the SS Vestris (Kindle Locations 253-255). Rapidsoft Press ®, jointly with Our American Stories ® LLC. Kindle Edition.

The West Australian, 25 June, 1918.

THE S.S. BAMBRA.

FLOODED STOKEHOLD AND CHOKED

PUMPS.

A telegram from Geraldton was recently

published to the effect that the State

steamer Bambra, in her latest trip north

words occupied 60 hours on the voyage

from Fremantle to Geraldton, whereas the

time usually taken is 24. The Colonial

Secretary (Mr. H. P. Colebatch) has re

ceived from the. acting manager of the

State Steamship Service (Mr. Stevens) a re

port on the matter. This shows that the

chief engineer explained that the cause of

the trouble was the flooding of the stoke

hold owing to water having got down the

ash ejector pipes on each side of the ship,

and also through the side doors to the

bunkers. which apparently washed down

coal dust sufficient to fill the bilges and

choke the pumps. The ship was laden

deeply on leaving Fremantle, but was in

every respect in good order, and the trouble

was due to the exceedingly heavy weather

which prevailed, all hands having been kept

busy for 24 hours baling out the water. On

arrival at Geraldton the bilges were pro

perly cleaned out before the ship proceeded

on her voyage. Since leaving Geraldton

no further trouble had been experienced.

Another potentially weak link contributing to the Koombana disaster.

SS Vestris listing
courtesy Wikipedia

ARE WE IN CONTROL OF OUR DESTINIES?

RMS Koombana looking a little battered after her adventures, running aground and generally confronting the harsh realities of the brutal Nor'West run.
courtesy Annie Boyd.

Sunday Times, Perth, 22 September, 1946

AND here's how Fate show-

ed her hand. Over 100

passengers were drawn, like

marionettes on strings, aboard the

Koombana and to their death;

yet there are scores of instances

of men and women who desper-

ately wanted to make the voyage,

but whom Fate prevented.

For instance, meet Harry Swan,

manager of the former de Vant

sheep station at Port Hedland.

The station had recently been

bought by Davis, one of the

State's biggest pearl buyers; and

he was aboard Koombana when

she called at Hedland. He sent

for his manager, Swan.

"You've been working hard.

Swan," said Davis, when the men

met on the wharf. "Go home,

pack your port and come with me

to Broome for a spell."

But Swan shook his head.

"Can't be done, Mr. Davis. Thanks

for the invitation, but we're busy

on the station."

"What rot!" said Davis, "You've

got an overseer. Come on and no

excuses."

Still Swan was obdurate. "I've

got to get those rams to work

while the season's going, sir. I

know it's your station, but it's my

job to see that it's working

smoothly. I appreciate the invita-

tion, and I'll accept it later."

Davis gave it up, walked off

muttering something about all

work and no play . . . walked

aboard ship and to his death,

while Fate smiled as it thought of

the lease of life it had given

Harry Swan.

Davis and Swan-like you and

me-just pawns in the great game.

Let no man, be he prince or paw-

per, think he is anything else.

This is a powerful piece. Harry Swan probably mulled many a long night over how close he had come to death and had his work ethic 'saved him'? But in truth it was just luck that sultry, cyclonic Wednesday in March, 1912. 

I have committed myself during the course of this blog to pointing out where the owners of Koombana frankly created and set up the factors leading to the disaster and escaped any form of censure at the Inquiry through eloquent misinformation and misdirection.

Captain Allen, in my opinion, had very little choice but to depart Port Hedland into the weather risk factor. He was under a great deal of pressure and some on-lookers commented that he looked unwell (stressed) prior to departure. Captain Allen was even alleged to have said:

"I don't like the glass,"

was Captain Allen's remark, 

"and another 24 hours 

here will not matter."

If Captain Allen had done just this all would have been saved; but it was company policy to put out to sea and face storms offshore rather than risk the steamer being wrecked in port - if the cyclone had hit Port Hedland, Koombana could have ended up in the mangroves. It really just came down to property (Koombana) vs. lives.

Mr. Moxon:

His company's rule No. 4 stated that

'No order will be held to excuse the

endangering of the ship.'  

As it turned out history was written that day, destinies foretold ; 157 people confronted by horror, a loss lingering well into the future, trickling down the generations - that sense of never knowing what form the disaster had taken; how quickly had it unfolded; the degree of suffering and where Koombana rests?

Perhaps all we can do in these modern times is doggedly pursue the discovery of the wreck, whatever that might require, however costly and at least offer those wretched souls and history some form of closure.

RIP all 157 souls lost with RMS Koombana 

STARTING POINT OF THE SEQUENCE OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS.

A top heavy, listing Koombana (courtesy Australian National University)

As outlined in previous posts Koombana was fundamentally top heavy requiring 900 tons of ballast water to stabilise her, compared to 400 tons for Yongala (similar dimensions). This was in part due to a not so carefully thought through construction requirement (low draught) enabling Koombana to access tidal ports such as Hedland; clearing the notorious 'bar' (19 ft.) on top of a spring tide. If conditions were rough (20 March), Koombana could only clear the bar with all tanks empty which forced Captain Allen to fill the tanks at sea. This was not only laborious but ill advised, as declared by a period expert at the Waratah Inquiry:

The Sydney Morning Herald, Saturday 17 December, 1910.

'Commander Lyon suggested that if the

tanks of the vessel were filled during a

very heavy swell such as they got in that

part of the world where she was last seen

it would be very dangerous.'

 

And then there was the controversial issue of the Bedout Light not being functional on the day of the disaster, 20 March, bluntly outlined by Mr. Moxon in the following Inquiry extract:

 

Kalgoorie Miner, 27 April, 1912

Mr. Moxon also read a number of

reports from pearlers and others in

the Nor'-West on the state of the

weather. In the reports it was stated

by some (referring to Bedout Island) 

that the light on the island, which

was, a self-attended one, was not

alight on March 13 and 15.

The report received by Mr. Moxon 

from Port Hedland that the light was 

out on March 13 had never reached him

(Captain Irvine). The first advice

concerning the light having been 

extinguished on that date was 

brought under his notice on 

March 26. Immediately on receipt 

of that advice he had wired to all 

the ports a warning regarding the 

light. 'I am of opinion that the ship 

did not  touch Bedout Island, as 

wreckage  would have been found 

there.'

 

So, not only was Captain Allen obliged to depart Port Hedland

with empty tanks commanding a top heavy lightly loaded steamer in order

to clear the infamous bar, he had to fill his tanks at sea, where

he was confronted by a very strong wind (gale) from the NE and a ground

swell (heavy swell) coming in from the NW.

In short he should have taken more than 3 hours to fill tanks,

but as two sets of eye witnesses testified, he only took 2. If he

was intending to 'put right out to sea' and weather the conditions,

time would not have been a factor. If he intended to follow his

standard course around Bedout he had to do it during daylight

hours as he KNEW the light was not functioning. 

But, perhaps, it had simply become untenable and dangerous

to continue attempting the complete filling of tanks in such

conditions, rolling and pitching, which forced him to abandon

the attempt?

Either way, Koombana headed north in very unstable

condition, taking into consideration the free surface effect of

incompletely filled ballast tanks.

Was anyone held accountable for the Bedout Light being out a

week prior (easy to relight during calm conditions); was

anyone held accountable for a steamer that could not clear Port

Hedland 'bar' without empty tanks into disastrous conditions at

sea; was anyone held accountable for any of it or was it simply easier

to 'blame the dead captain'?

The wreck has to be found. 

SS Yongala (courtesy Wikipedia)

KOOMBANA LAST 'SPOKEN' NORTHEAST OF BEDOUT ISLAND.

There is only one period newspaper report that refers to any form of communication with Koombana after she departed Port Hedland and was last seen steaming northward. One does have to take such reports with a pinch of salt, particularly given that it was in isolation and not formally confirmed. 

It reminds me of the report dramatically declaring that Bedout Island was strewn with maimed and dead birds, which was not referred to in official reports compiled by vessel masters Upjohn and Dalziel, who inspected the island after the disaster (see post Rattus Rattus) . But if there is a shred of truth that was not publicised or quashed for whatever reason, it does give us pause for thought.

Sunday Times, Perth, 31 March, 1912.

The ill-fated steamer could not have sought

safety in the open sea, for the cyclone, veered 

round from E.N.E. to S.W., and would thus have 

been more likely to drive her towards the land. 

It would be a miracle if she had escaped seaward. 

Therefore, as she has not been found along the 

Ninety-Mile Beach or in La Grange Bay, we are

led to the terrible alternative that she was engulfed 

somewhere north-east of Bedout Island, where 

she was last spoken.

This map which appeared in newspapers after Koombana went missing highlights two interesting points. The steamer track around the northern aspect of Bedout Island (despite a cyclone targeting Balla Balla) and the cryptic annotation 'Koombana last seen here', north of Bedout Island steaming 'on course'. 
So perhaps the above report and reference to 'spoken to' was not in isolation after all.....mysterious!

Needless to say that I have no doubt that Koombana lies NE of Bedout Island for reasons outlined in great detail in this blog.

The report also refers to the cyclone veering round from the ENE to the SW, which would have driven Koombana towards land. To review, the cyclone (90 miles in diameter) approached Balla Balla from slightly west of north during the course of the day (ref. Moira account), but during its evolution might initially have tracked down the coast a significant distance offshore from the (E)NE. 

This image of the track of cyclone Ilsa illustrates the very strong probability of a similar track followed by the Balla Balla blow, in the latter's case curving round NW of Port Hedland (ground swell from NW reported earlier in the day) and the SS Moira engaging the cyclone 100 miles NW of Port Hedland at 8 a.m. 20th March.

The Balla Balla cyclone, at no stage during late 20th March, presented an immediate and imminent threat directly north of Port Hedland, in which direction Koombana initially steamed before heading NE, rounding Bedout Island en-route for Broome.

The minimal cyclone impact at Bedout Island reported by two independent ship masters confirmed this crucial point.

courtesy: Australian Institute of Marine Science

We know that the system started to make landfall late 20th March (Bullarra steamed into severe conditions between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. less than 20 miles from Balla Balla). It is also conceivable that 130 NE of the centre of the cyclone there could have been a strong wind (gale) from the NW 'driving Koombana towards the land'.

Note the direction of the wind in the NE quadrant of the cyclone - from the NW (to N). Given the separation distance of Koombana NE Bedout from the centre of the cyclone, Balla Balla, such a wind-force could have 'driven Koombana off course towards the land'.
courtesy: Australian Institute of Marine Science.

'Engulfed' is an awful concept.

The radial depiction of the position and extent of the Balla Balla cyclone is accurate in terms of the period metereological report; minimal reported damage at Port Hedland and Bedout Island and of vital significance, Captain Mills of the Minderoo's report that, after inspection, the cyclone did not appear to have extended to the west of Cossack to Cape Preston (case closed).

Let us for a moment immerse ourselves once again in the realm of speculation and reboot what was fact and what was not.

We rely on Captain Upjohn's report and Inquiry testimony in terms of wreckage discovered and the significant oil patch resembling the outline of a sunken steamer; this being between 27 and 28 miles NE Bedout Island, as quoted, and based upon which searches have been conducted for the wreck.

5 April, 1912, Captain Oswald Dalziel of the Muriel submitted a report to Captain Irvine which contradicted Upjohn and casts an entirely different light on the subject of wreckage and distance from Bedout. 

Note the inclusion of a 'lifebelt', which was a highly probable finding after a steamer went down and did not feature in the suite of wreckage discovered over a swathe represented in image below.

If there is truth in the report and Dalziel represented a more accurate account of wreckage discovered by Bullarra, it does rather introduce a potentially vast search area to be surveyed; which does warrant bearing in mind.

Finding lost shipwrecks is never a straight forward business!

"Port Hedland, 5 April, 1912.

Irvine Harbormaster file

Arrived last night , searched from Broome to Rowley Shoals & into Hedland, saw nothing, spoke Moira 31st who reports nothing, spoke Bullarra 3rd who reports picked up quantity of wreckage about sixty miles E.N.E. Bedout. Portion of boat bow with Adelaide 'Company's' badge, bottom board, tanks, lifebelt, and portion of saloon panels. Lighter Una cruising off Bedout. I am leaving Hedland today for Broome, will endeavor to fix Bedout light.

Dalziel."

This report and the previous post raise an important question: 

- what was the truth behind the loss of the Koombana and why would there have been 'misdirection' and 'omissions' or is the simple straight forward answer - Dalziel got his wires crossed.

Dalziel's other reports were meticulous (including the detailed relighting of the Bedout Light) so we are left scratching our heads.......