Monday 15 July 2024

STARTING POINT OF THE SEQUENCE OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS.

A top heavy, listing Koombana (courtesy Australian National University)


As outlined in previous posts Koombana was fundamentally top heavy requiring 900 tons of ballast water to stabilise her, compared to 400 tons for Yongala (similar dimensions). This was in part due to a not so carefully thought through construction requirement (low draught) enabling Koombana to access tidal ports such as Hedland; clearing the notorious 'bar' (19 ft.) on top of a spring tide. If conditions were rough (20 March), Koombana could only clear the bar with all tanks empty which forced Captain Allen to fill the tanks at sea. This was not only laborious but ill advised, as declared by a period expert at the Waratah Inquiry:



The Sydney Morning Herald, Saturday 17 December, 1910.

'Commander Lyon suggested that if the
tanks of the vessel were filled during a
very heavy swell such as they got in that
part of the world where she was last seen
it would be very dangerous.'

 

And then there was the controversial issue of the Bedout Light not being functional on the day of the disaster, 20 March, bluntly outlined by Mr. Moxon in the following Inquiry extract:

 



Kalgoorie Miner, 27 April, 1912

Mr. Moxon also read a number of
reports from pearlers and others in
the Nor'-West on the state of the
weather. In the reports it was stated
by some (referring to Bedout Island) 
that the light on the island, which
was, a self-attended one, was not
alight on March 13 and 15.

The report received by Mr. Moxon 
from Port Hedland that the light was 
out on March 13 had never reached him
(Captain Irvine). The first advice
concerning the light having been 
extinguished on that date was 
brought under his notice on 
March 26. Immediately on receipt 
of that advice he had wired to all 
the ports a warning regarding the 
light. 'I am of opinion that the ship 
did not  touch Bedout Island, as 
wreckage  would have been found 
there.'

 

So, not only was Captain Allen obliged to depart Port Hedland
with empty tanks commanding a top heavy lightly loaded steamer in order
to clear the infamous bar, he had to fill his tanks at sea, where
he was confronted by a very strong wind (gale) from the NE and a ground
swell (heavy swell) coming in from the NW.

In short he should have taken more than 3 hours to fill tanks,
but as two sets of eye witnesses testified, he only took 2. If he
was intending to 'put right out to sea' and weather the conditions,
time would not have been a factor. If he intended to follow his
standard course around Bedout he had to do it during daylight
hours as he KNEW the light was not functioning. 

But, perhaps, it had simply become untenable and dangerous
to continue attempting the complete filling of tanks in such
conditions, rolling and pitching, which forced him to abandon
the attempt?

Either way, Koombana headed north in very unstable
condition, taking into consideration the free surface effect of
incompletely filled ballast tanks.

Was anyone held accountable for the Bedout Light being out a
week prior (easy to relight during calm conditions); was
anyone held accountable for a steamer that could not clear Port
Hedland 'bar' without empty tanks into disastrous conditions at
sea; was anyone held accountable for any of it or was it simply easier
to 'blame the dead captain'?

The wreck has to be found. 


SS Yongala (courtesy Wikipedia)




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