As outlined in previous posts Koombana was fundamentally top heavy requiring 900 tons of ballast water to stabilise her, compared to 400 tons for Yongala (similar dimensions). This was in part due to a not so carefully thought through construction requirement (low draught) enabling Koombana to access tidal ports such as Hedland; clearing the notorious 'bar' (19 ft.) on top of a spring tide. If conditions were rough (20 March), Koombana could only clear the bar with all tanks empty which forced Captain Allen to fill the tanks at sea. This was not only laborious but ill advised, as declared by a period expert at the Waratah Inquiry:
The Sydney Morning Herald, Saturday 17 December, 1910.'Commander Lyon suggested that if thetanks of the vessel were filled during avery heavy swell such as they got in thatpart of the world where she was last seenit would be very dangerous.'
And then there was the controversial issue of the Bedout Light not being functional on the day of the disaster, 20 March, bluntly outlined by Mr. Moxon in the following Inquiry extract:
Kalgoorie Miner, 27 April, 1912Mr. Moxon also read a number ofreports from pearlers and others inthe Nor'-West on the state of theweather. In the reports it was statedby some (referring to Bedout Island)that the light on the island, whichwas, a self-attended one, was notalight on March 13 and 15.The report received by Mr. Moxonfrom Port Hedland that the light wasout on March 13 had never reached him(Captain Irvine). The first adviceconcerning the light having beenextinguished on that date wasbrought under his notice onMarch 26. Immediately on receiptof that advice he had wired to allthe ports a warning regarding thelight. 'I am of opinion that the shipdid not touch Bedout Island, aswreckage would have been foundthere.'
So, not only was Captain Allen obliged to depart Port Hedlandwith empty tanks commanding a top heavy lightly loaded steamer in orderto clear the infamous bar, he had to fill his tanks at sea, wherehe was confronted by a very strong wind (gale) from the NE and a groundswell (heavy swell) coming in from the NW.In short he should have taken more than 3 hours to fill tanks,but as two sets of eye witnesses testified, he only took 2. If hewas intending to 'put right out to sea' and weather the conditions,time would not have been a factor. If he intended to follow hisstandard course around Bedout he had to do it during daylighthours as he KNEW the light was not functioning.
But, perhaps, it had simply become untenable and dangerousto continue attempting the complete filling of tanks in suchconditions, rolling and pitching, which forced him to abandonthe attempt?Either way, Koombana headed north in very unstablecondition, taking into consideration the free surface effect ofincompletely filled ballast tanks.Was anyone held accountable for the Bedout Light being out aweek prior (easy to relight during calm conditions); wasanyone held accountable for a steamer that could not clear PortHedland 'bar' without empty tanks into disastrous conditions atsea; was anyone held accountable for any of it or was it simply easierto 'blame the dead captain'?The wreck has to be found.
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