STARTING POINT OF THE SEQUENCE OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS.

A top heavy, listing Koombana (courtesy Australian National University)

As outlined in previous posts Koombana was fundamentally top heavy requiring 900 tons of ballast water to stabilise her, compared to 400 tons for Yongala (similar dimensions). This was in part due to a not so carefully thought through construction requirement (low draught) enabling Koombana to access tidal ports such as Hedland; clearing the notorious 'bar' (19 ft.) on top of a spring tide. If conditions were rough (20 March), Koombana could only clear the bar with all tanks empty which forced Captain Allen to fill the tanks at sea. This was not only laborious but ill advised, as declared by a period expert at the Waratah Inquiry:

The Sydney Morning Herald, Saturday 17 December, 1910.

'Commander Lyon suggested that if the

tanks of the vessel were filled during a

very heavy swell such as they got in that

part of the world where she was last seen

it would be very dangerous.'

 

And then there was the controversial issue of the Bedout Light not being functional on the day of the disaster, 20 March, bluntly outlined by Mr. Moxon in the following Inquiry extract:

 

Kalgoorie Miner, 27 April, 1912

Mr. Moxon also read a number of

reports from pearlers and others in

the Nor'-West on the state of the

weather. In the reports it was stated

by some (referring to Bedout Island) 

that the light on the island, which

was, a self-attended one, was not

alight on March 13 and 15.

The report received by Mr. Moxon 

from Port Hedland that the light was 

out on March 13 had never reached him

(Captain Irvine). The first advice

concerning the light having been 

extinguished on that date was 

brought under his notice on 

March 26. Immediately on receipt 

of that advice he had wired to all 

the ports a warning regarding the 

light. 'I am of opinion that the ship 

did not  touch Bedout Island, as 

wreckage  would have been found 

there.'

 

So, not only was Captain Allen obliged to depart Port Hedland

with empty tanks commanding a top heavy lightly loaded steamer in order

to clear the infamous bar, he had to fill his tanks at sea, where

he was confronted by a very strong wind (gale) from the NE and a ground

swell (heavy swell) coming in from the NW.

In short he should have taken more than 3 hours to fill tanks,

but as two sets of eye witnesses testified, he only took 2. If he

was intending to 'put right out to sea' and weather the conditions,

time would not have been a factor. If he intended to follow his

standard course around Bedout he had to do it during daylight

hours as he KNEW the light was not functioning. 

But, perhaps, it had simply become untenable and dangerous

to continue attempting the complete filling of tanks in such

conditions, rolling and pitching, which forced him to abandon

the attempt?

Either way, Koombana headed north in very unstable

condition, taking into consideration the free surface effect of

incompletely filled ballast tanks.

Was anyone held accountable for the Bedout Light being out a

week prior (easy to relight during calm conditions); was

anyone held accountable for a steamer that could not clear Port

Hedland 'bar' without empty tanks into disastrous conditions at

sea; was anyone held accountable for any of it or was it simply easier

to 'blame the dead captain'?

The wreck has to be found. 

SS Yongala (courtesy Wikipedia)

KOOMBANA LAST 'SPOKEN' NORTHEAST OF BEDOUT ISLAND.

There is only one period newspaper report that refers to any form of communication with Koombana after she departed Port Hedland and was last seen steaming northward. One does have to take such reports with a pinch of salt, particularly given that it was in isolation and not formally confirmed. 

It reminds me of the report dramatically declaring that Bedout Island was strewn with maimed and dead birds, which was not referred to in official reports compiled by vessel masters Upjohn and Dalziel, who inspected the island after the disaster (see post Rattus Rattus) . But if there is a shred of truth that was not publicised or quashed for whatever reason, it does give us pause for thought.

Sunday Times, Perth, 31 March, 1912.

The ill-fated steamer could not have sought

safety in the open sea, for the cyclone, veered 

round from E.N.E. to S.W., and would thus have 

been more likely to drive her towards the land. 

It would be a miracle if she had escaped seaward. 

Therefore, as she has not been found along the 

Ninety-Mile Beach or in La Grange Bay, we are

led to the terrible alternative that she was engulfed 

somewhere north-east of Bedout Island, where 

she was last spoken.

This map which appeared in newspapers after Koombana went missing highlights two interesting points. The steamer track around the northern aspect of Bedout Island (despite a cyclone targeting Balla Balla) and the cryptic annotation 'Koombana last seen here', north of Bedout Island steaming 'on course'. 
So perhaps the above report and reference to 'spoken to' was not in isolation after all.....mysterious!

Needless to say that I have no doubt that Koombana lies NE of Bedout Island for reasons outlined in great detail in this blog.

The report also refers to the cyclone veering round from the ENE to the SW, which would have driven Koombana towards land. To review, the cyclone (90 miles in diameter) approached Balla Balla from slightly west of north during the course of the day (ref. Moira account), but during its evolution might initially have tracked down the coast a significant distance offshore from the (E)NE. 

This image of the track of cyclone Ilsa illustrates the very strong probability of a similar track followed by the Balla Balla blow, in the latter's case curving round NW of Port Hedland (ground swell from NW reported earlier in the day) and the SS Moira engaging the cyclone 100 miles NW of Port Hedland at 8 a.m. 20th March.

The Balla Balla cyclone, at no stage during late 20th March, presented an immediate and imminent threat directly north of Port Hedland, in which direction Koombana initially steamed before heading NE, rounding Bedout Island en-route for Broome.

The minimal cyclone impact at Bedout Island reported by two independent ship masters confirmed this crucial point.

courtesy: Australian Institute of Marine Science

We know that the system started to make landfall late 20th March (Bullarra steamed into severe conditions between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. less than 20 miles from Balla Balla). It is also conceivable that 130 NE of the centre of the cyclone there could have been a strong wind (gale) from the NW 'driving Koombana towards the land'.

Note the direction of the wind in the NE quadrant of the cyclone - from the NW (to N). Given the separation distance of Koombana NE Bedout from the centre of the cyclone, Balla Balla, such a wind-force could have 'driven Koombana off course towards the land'.
courtesy: Australian Institute of Marine Science.

'Engulfed' is an awful concept.

The radial depiction of the position and extent of the Balla Balla cyclone is accurate in terms of the period metereological report; minimal reported damage at Port Hedland and Bedout Island and of vital significance, Captain Mills of the Minderoo's report that, after inspection, the cyclone did not appear to have extended to the west of Cossack to Cape Preston (case closed).

Let us for a moment immerse ourselves once again in the realm of speculation and reboot what was fact and what was not.

We rely on Captain Upjohn's report and Inquiry testimony in terms of wreckage discovered and the significant oil patch resembling the outline of a sunken steamer; this being between 27 and 28 miles NE Bedout Island, as quoted, and based upon which searches have been conducted for the wreck.

5 April, 1912, Captain Oswald Dalziel of the Muriel submitted a report to Captain Irvine which contradicted Upjohn and casts an entirely different light on the subject of wreckage and distance from Bedout. 

Note the inclusion of a 'lifebelt', which was a highly probable finding after a steamer went down and did not feature in the suite of wreckage discovered over a swathe represented in image below.

If there is truth in the report and Dalziel represented a more accurate account of wreckage discovered by Bullarra, it does rather introduce a potentially vast search area to be surveyed; which does warrant bearing in mind.

Finding lost shipwrecks is never a straight forward business!

"Port Hedland, 5 April, 1912.

Irvine Harbormaster file

Arrived last night , searched from Broome to Rowley Shoals & into Hedland, saw nothing, spoke Moira 31st who reports nothing, spoke Bullarra 3rd who reports picked up quantity of wreckage about sixty miles E.N.E. Bedout. Portion of boat bow with Adelaide 'Company's' badge, bottom board, tanks, lifebelt, and portion of saloon panels. Lighter Una cruising off Bedout. I am leaving Hedland today for Broome, will endeavor to fix Bedout light.

Dalziel."

This report and the previous post raise an important question: 

- what was the truth behind the loss of the Koombana and why would there have been 'misdirection' and 'omissions' or is the simple straight forward answer - Dalziel got his wires crossed.

Dalziel's other reports were meticulous (including the detailed relighting of the Bedout Light) so we are left scratching our heads.......

THE SEARCH CONTINUES....

A number of searches for Koombana have been conducted, none successful, but in that process certain search sites have been eliminated in theory, given limitations of various survey methods, narrowing down the potential search area(s) which can be efficiently surveyed deploying airborne magnetometers attached to a fixed wing aircraft.

The Western Australian Museum recently commissioned a social and economic benefit assessment in terms of tourism and other community benefits should the wreck be discovered, particularly if she lies in diveable waters. The report shows that if Koombana is found, dive tourism and the potential for further interpretation of Koombana in Port Hedland would have valuable community benefits. Based on these findings, the WA Museum is in the process of seeking further and in-kind support from the public and private sectors to conduct a wide aerial magnetometer search.

I have copied the first three pages (below) of the impressive 'SS Koombana Community Benefits Assessment' and for those with an interest in the full document (30 pages) I would suggest contacting the Western Australian Museum directly.

Koombana most likely went down somewhere NE Bedout Island within an area defined by Captain Upjohn of the search steamer Bullarra. We have his quoted estimate of 27 to 28 n miles NE Bedout, but many similar historical cases of ship masters accurately defining a precise location at sea have been proven to be way off the mark - many with deviations in excess of 10 n miles; reliance on fallible dead reckoning tools of the era.

A good example is the final SOS call and coordinates coming from Titanic, the wreck of which lies a full 13 miles to the east of this position.

In this post I take a look at the area of interest and try to narrow it down further by introducing the 'fishing factor'. It is widely known that fishermen are the ones who usually stumble upon wrecks (fouled lines and nets) and know where these wrecks lie. We also know the degree of damage caused, including anchors. 

Why has this not been the case with Koombana?

That Koombana could be somewhere to the north of the steamer track does not make sense in the context of the extent of commercial fishing, in particular trap fishing which would likely have stumbled upon the wreck during harvesting over many years. The graphic below illustrates a demarkation zone 'below which' fish trapping may not be conducted and which, in my opinion, narrows down the search block significantly.

In addition to this factor I have looked at a steamer track potentially further south of that assumed. 

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2024/05/reviewing-steamer-track.html 

Captain Allen might have drifted off course even further to the south of the plotted track, which should be factored into the area of search. It is conceivable that 130 miles NE of the centre of the cyclone the wind (gale) could have been coming from the NW or even north according to image below.

Note wind direction NE quadrant of the cyclone.
courtesy: Australian Institute of Marine Science

https://www.dcceew.gov.au/sites/default/files/env/pages/6409c07b-b972-4a58-bb3f-56196caf99e4/files/appendix-1.pdf

https://www.dcceew.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/wa-pilbara-trap-managed-fishery-background-information-2023.pdf

"Fishers in the PTMF use baited traps to target a variety of demersal scalefish species. Fish traps used in the PTMF are rectangular with rounded corners, with dimensions of 1600 × 1600 × 700 mm and a single opening of approximately 150 × 700 mm at the front of the trap (Figure 4-3). Trapped fish are collected by opening a gate at the rear of the trap. Traps are made of 50 × 70 mm galvanised steel mesh. Traps are set individually, each with a single rope and surface float. Traps are retrieved using a winch. Trap fishing occurs in depths of 30 to ~200 m. During fishing trips, anchors are generally only deployed while vessels are resting overnight. Vessels do not anchor while setting and retrieving traps. There is no restriction on the number of traps carried per vessel; however, each licensee is allocated an annual effort quota in 'trap days', i.e. (number of traps) x (number of days fished per trap). Hence, as the number of trap deployments increases, the number of allowable fishing days declines. Trap vessels generally operate with 2-5 fishers on board and set 60-120 traps per day (this is the total number times a trap is set each day, i.e., 20 traps each set 3 times per day equates to 60 trap sets per day), each with a soak time of about 0.5 – 2.5 hours. Trip duration is generally 5-9 days, after which the catch is typically transferred onto trucks for transport to Perth. PTMF fishers are permitted to leave traps on the fishing grounds when they return to port, but they must be unbaited and have doors secured in an open position."

Generally there is very little 'fishing vessel' activity in the zone of interest, observed as stated over an extended period of time courtesy vesselfinder. 

"Charter fishing and recreational fishing are allowed in the marine park, though most people tend to stay a little closer to shore."

https://parksaustralia.gov.au/marine/parks/north-west/eighty-mile-beach/

This broader marine park zone, during many past decades, attracted spear fishermen and pearlers who would surely have stumbled upon Koombana. It seems virtually impossible not to have found the wreck, should she lie there.

Let us pause to take a closer look at the details of the pearling industry in the Pilbara.

Broome:

"By 1910 there were nearly 400 pearl lugger boats and 3,500 people in the industry supplying up to 75% of the world output of MOP. Production reached 2000 tonnes (approx. 2 million individuals) of pearl oyster collected per year (Malone et al., 1988)."

"Pearl oyster fishing grounds are located from the Lacepede Channel, north of Broome down to Exmouth Gulf in the south."

courtesy Wikipedia
note the broad inshore band of pearling.

"Pearl oyster patches in very deep water (>30m) are not fished at all as the safety factor does not allow an economical dive time limit." Present day.

Period (circa 1912) anecdotes:

"The Diver was working in about 19 fathoms of water remaining down 1 hour ."  35 m.

"The powers of the natives in diving, especially the females, are spoken of as something wonderful, they go down to a depth of seven fathoms [c.13m] and remain below a time that astonishes their white employers."

 "The Pearl Oyster Fishery, which targets the Silverlipped Pearl Oyster (Pinctada maxima) 
comprises both wild-caught and hatchery-reared oysters. Diving for pearl oyster wild stock 
occurs mainly along Eighty Mile Beach, ideally in water depths less than 20 m"

A diver is assisted into the water by three deck hands from a pearling lugger. Thursday Island, Australia. 1948. courtesy: Frank de Langhe, facebook

It is highly unlikely, given all of the above that Koombana would likely be south of a hypothetical line east of Bedout Island where water depths equate with 30m and less; without even having to take into consideration the improbability of such a large steamer negotiating the Amphinome Shoals without grounding.

Gas exploration vessels predominate in the area of interest but although activity has been prolific in short bursts (as observed on vesselfinder over an extended period of time) the finding of a wreck or debris field has not been reported by this quarter. One would hope that anomalies found would be shared and explored by marine archeaology experts under the guidance of Dr Anderson.

https://3denergi.com.au/projects/offshore-bedout-wa/

During March (2024) there was a great deal of vessel activity in the zone of interest surrounding Captain Upjohn's coordinates (marked one to thirteen on image). According to 'vesselfinder' these were reported as fishing vessels but after some investigation it appears that these vessels were in fact allegedly connected with the gas and oil industry. 

19 - 24 August

(prior to this, for months, no significant vessel activity in this zone)

Captain Irvine made an interesting comment during the time of the search for Koombana that she was unlikely to be found 'south of' Port Hedland. We can speculate as to the rationale of this statement but given it as it stands there was not a belief that Captain Allen steamed west due to concerns about weather conditions.

Captain Irvine, chief harbormaster, has

been in conference with representatives of

the steamship companies at Fremantle, and

having charts available, is arranging a

course as deemed most advisable. 

Regarding your enquiry as to the search being

made south of Port Hedland, Captain Irvine 

points out that the Bullara passed near the 

coast from Cossack to Port Hedland, also 

that a number of luggers are out. He does 

not think there is any probability of a 

successful search being made south of that 

port.

 

In conclusion, I believe Koombana will ultimately be found NE Bedout, taking into account the factors outlined and dependent on success of an airborne mag search identifying a significantly intact Koombana wreck hull. If Koombana broke up or her hull has collapsed this will be more challenging but within the realm of expert data analysis.

https://www.mmaoffshore.com/mma-news/mma-awarded-department-of-defence-contract

SUDDEN AND CATASTROPHIC?

In a previous post "PUT RIGHT OUT TO SEA', I substituted the "Cromarty" with an hypothetical Koombana; a period article describing the challenges experienced by a 'light' steamer in rough weather conditions, as follows:  

"Owing to the heavy seas, the gale, and the 

strong currents, together with the fact 

that the vessel was flying very light, the 

Koombana refused to answer her helm, and 

became practically unmanageable. The 

steamer was only drawing 12ft. forward and 17ft. 

aft, and could not be controlled in heavy weather.

During the whole time she was pounding heavily, 

and at intervals of every few minutes her engine 

raced."

'Pounding heavily' reminds us of another piece of the evidence puzzle:

Sunday Times, 14 July, 1912.

THE LOST STEAMER KOOMBANA.

Captain Irvine, Chief Harbor-master of Fremantle

(W.A.), received the following telegram from Broome

on Monday : 'Bullara, on passage from Cossack to Port

Hedland, passed derelict, appeared to be submerged bilge

of vessel, 15Oft. or 200ft. long, in latitude 20 deg. 10 min.

south and 118 deg. 3 min. east.'

The general impression amongst shipping men is that

the derelict is portion of the Koombana. 

Fix this tex

97 miles southwest of the oil patch, 13 miles offshore, the submerged 'bilge' was discovered four months after the disaster. This important discovery suggested that Koombana had sustained hull damage.

Given the Bullarra report, as it stands, had Koombana's hull 'snapped or cracked' or the damage sustained when striking the seabed ? The latter was well documented in the case of the Clan Ranald when a diver went down and reported:

"There are several long furrows in the bottom immediately

to the eastward of the ship, as if her starboard

bilge keel had bumped several times before

she finally settled down." 

It must be remembered that Koombana's hull had suffered repeated insults in the form of groundings; striking a rock; bumping the outer bar at Port Hedland; resting on muddy bottom at low tide and a blow from the SS Pilbarra. 

Although repairs were made to overt damage and the keelson reinforced with a steel strap, the latent damage might still have been significant. A steamer's hull could 'snap or crack' under certain certain lading circumstances and wave lengths as outlined in the following extract drawn from Wikipedia:

"Hogging is the stress a ship's hull or keel experiences that causes the center or the keel to bend upward. Sagging is the stress a ship's hull or keel is placed under when a wave is the same length as the ship and the ship is in the trough of two waves. This causes the middle of the ship to bend down slightly, and depending of the level of bend, may cause the hull to snap or crack."

From the description of the "Cromarty', in this case Koombana in light, top heavy condition heading east for Broome with a long period, rolling sea coming up behind (from the southwest) and a gale from the (north)west 'pounding heavily'.

The bulk of wreckage was found to the north and west of Bedout Island significant distances from Port Hedland. Given the time frame of four months this large component of wreckage could theoretically have been drifting steadily further southwestward, a lone survivor of the flotsam flotilla , ultimately destined for the shoreline further down the coast.

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2024/05/put-right-out-to-sea.html