"LOST IN TRANSLATION".

The Mercury, Hobart, 6 April, 1912.

Captain Allen, seemed disinclined to

leave Port Hedland, and when, he 

decided to do so said, "I am going

straight out to sea, and will be lucky

if I get back to Broome on Saturday."

To date all the Trove newspaper reports refer to Captain Allen asserting that "he would be lucky to get to Broome by Saturday." This has always struck me as odd given that Saturday was 3 days from Wednesday, the day of departure from Port Hedland. The distance is about 260 miles, and Koombana averaging 13.5 knots should have covered this comfortably in 19.5 hours, making the Thursday spring tide access to Broome by +/- 9.30 a.m.. 

Predicting a delay of two days suggests anticipating a storm of Biblical proportions - a very bad idea to have sailed from Port Hedland, 20 March. In fact:

The Daily News, 25 March, 1912.

It is evident that she first encountered

the beginning of the blow between

Port Hedland and Bedout Island. - 'If

the wind were favorable it is reasonable 

to suppose that Captain Allen at

once steered a course for the open sea,

and may have had to run out for about 

200 miles.' As it blows very strongly after 

these cyclonic disturbances, it is evident 

that she would be a great way out of her 

course before she was able to cut for Broome, 

and that it would take at least 41/2 days 

before she reached her destination.

If, however, we accept the turn of phrase offered in this, rare, report, we get a different sequence of events. 

Under normal circumstances Koombana would have docked at Broome by 9.30 a.m., 21 March; offloaded and shipped cargo and passengers, departing for Derby on the late morning spring tide, a 200 mile run comfortably achieved by the morning of Friday, 22 March. Repeat same process and Koombana should have been able to return to Broome by Saturday. 

Any hitches, such as steaming into a stiff headwind (gale) and reducing speed significantly could have unraveled this tight schedule.

There is one piece of evidence against this assumption:

 25/10/11 11.25: 14'3"frd 18'0"aft 

01/11/11 14.10: 12'2"frd 18'8"aft

The above draft figures according to Koombana's log refer to the Derby return trip departures from Port Hedland i.e. 1 week interval. The Wyndham return trip required a two week interval. 

If we extrapolate from this scenario, Koombana should theoretically have departed Port Hedland again Wednesday 27 March, not Sunday, 24 March and Broome reached the day before, Tuesday 26 March.

It does seem more compelling that Captain Allen was literally concerned about getting to Broome within 3 days, which certainly, if true, highlights how serious he viewed circumstances at sea, 20 March.

One could come to the conclusion that Captain Allen understood the gravity of conditions out at sea that fateful Wednesday morning, before departing. All the signs were there!!

200 n miles.
courtesy Google Earth

courtesy Trove and Boyd, Annie. Koombana Days (p. 246). Fremantle Press. Kindle Edition.  

THE REEF, NOT THE CYCLONE.

LOSS OF K00MBANA.

Daily Post, Hobart, 6 April, 1912

LOSS OF KOOMBANA

MORE WRECKAGE FOUND

ILL-FATED SKIPPER'S FEARS.

PERTH, Friday,

The captain of the steamer Minderoo,

which was engaged in the Koombana 

search, has found in the vicinity of

Bedout Island, a smokingroom

cushion, portion of a cabin drawer,

the bottom of a boat and a small 

teak panel. The captain considers

the ship was lost in the vicinity of

Bedout Island. 

Reports from Port Hedland show

that the captain of the Koombana

was for some time disinclined to put

to sea on March 20 and eventually 

said, "I'm going straight out to sea,

and will be lucky if I get to Broome

by Saturday."

The opinion is held in Port Hedland

that owing to the automatic light on 

Bedout Island going out, the captain

of the Koombana misjudged his

position, and getting onto one of

the reefs, was at the mercy of the 

elements.

It is important to note the time frame; 15 days after Koombana failed to arrive at Broome. Wreckage had finally been discovered removing all doubt as to what had befallen the steamer. Full details of the extent of the Balla Balla Cyclone were known, and yet, the opinion held in Port Hedland was NOT one of the steamer being destroyed by the cyclone but rather striking the reef off Bedout Island, placing Captain Irvine, Chief Harbour Master at Fremantle in an awkward spot. The light had been out for one week prior to the disaster, reports submitted to Fremantle, but no official warning issued to shipping. 



courtesy Trove

FAILED CYCLONE FORECASTING.

Barrier Miner, 6 April, 1912.

THE LOSS OF THE KOOMBANA

After a long suspense the worst

has been realised in connection

the Koombana. It is an appalling

thing that a modern steamer (built

about four years ago), of about 3,600

tons, should be totally lost together

with about 130 people on board. The

gale which the steamer encountered 

was one of the most severe which has 

been recorded on that coast. 

When the weather forecasts for West 

Australia were issued by the Perth 

Observatory, warnings were given when 

there were indications that one of these 

storms was approaching, and shipping 

remained in port or made preparations 

for it. Since the forecasts have been 

prepared by the Meteorological Bureau 

in Melbourne, this plan has not been 

followed. When the meteorological work 

was being undertaken by the Federal 

authorities, Mr. W. E. Cooke, the Government 

astronomer at Perth pointed out that it 

would be impossible to predict the

weather for the whole of Australia from 

Melbourne as accurately as it could be done

from Perth. 

The forecasting of these gales in the northwest 

was among several things which he said, West 

Australia would lose by the change. But many 

people do attach much value to weather forecasts 

- that is people who are not directly concerned - 

and they complained of the cost of getting 

telegrams, giving the necessary data, from the 

telegraph stations.

At the Inquiry the following was recommended:

"It would help if the various officers on the 

coast exchanged information direct,

provided they understood what it conveyed.

Postmasters, speaking generally, were very
reliable in the matter of weather reports."

The gale in which the Koombana and other

shipping was lost was not predicted, and 

these disasters recall with some emphasis

the statement made by Mr. Cooke several

years ago. It is scarcely fair to blame the

Commonwealth Meteorologist (Mr. Hunt)

for not having predicted the storm, as the

data that he is able to receive from that

quarter is limited. It is more a fault in the

system of endeavoring to forecast for

the whole of Australia from Melbourne.

That is what Mr. Cooke pointed out at the

time. As in other things connected with 

the government and administration, the

central system has its disadvantages in

this. 

Those who do not understand or

appreciate the work of weather

forecasting complain of the cost, and

insist on cutting down expense.

When Mr. Wragge was doing such

excellent work as Government astronomer

in Queensland some years ago, he was 

subjected to the same kind of annoyances,

and eventually is work was so handicapped

by the shortage of funds that he gave it

up altogether. It is rather interesting to 

notice that these two States which did

not appreciate the forecasts have 

experienced two of the worst ship

wrecks ever recorded in Australian

waters, quite recently the Yongala,

in Queensland waters, and the 

Koombana off the coast of West

Australia. 

The shipping people as always appreciated 

the storm warnings, and were guided by 

them. But there is still a large number of 

people who put more confidence in the 

indications given of change in the weather 

by a corn or gouty foot than in scientific 

information. The unfortunate thing is these 

quacks have a good deal to do with the 

management of things. They are to be 

found in parliaments and  even Ministries. 

It is these, with their silly ideas and ignorance 

of value of proper information, who have 

been responsible for the refusal of money 

for carrying on the observatories in a proper

way.

A scathing condemnation.

The wreck of the Koombana

and the Yongala might have been

prevented had warning been given

of approaching gales. In all probability

this would have been done had the

system once in use not been destroyed 

by the refusal of a reasonable sum of 

money to keep up the stations. Of

course these are not the only results

of the change, but they are emphatic

examples. 

Australia has from time to time given 

handsome amounts of money for 

Antarctic exploration, one of the objects 

of which was said to be the securing 

of information in that region that would 

be of use in  foretelling weather. The 

South Pole has now been reached and 

a good deal is hinted at concerning the 

valuable scientific information that

has been obtained. That has been the

case after the return of each expedition,

and the excuse for not publishing details

at the time is that it will need some months

to prepare it.  But is is never disclosed, and

the only sensible conclusion to arrive at is

that no information of any special value 

has been obtained from that quarter. What

information, scientific or otherwise, has ever

been obtained from the polar regions, Arctic

or Antarctic, that has been put to any practical

use?

No beating about the bush.

It is evident that the information that is

wanted for weather forecasting in Australia

is to be obtained much nearer home. If

storms are to be foretold with useful

consequences it will be necessary to 

have the records of the scientific

instruments over the whole country

recorded with as much pains as when

each State had supervision over its own.

The perils of the sea cannot be altogether

guarded against, but the dangers can be

reduced by proper precautions to meet

the weather conditions. For the rest, 

protection will have to be sought in another

quarter. There have been too many 

mysterious disappearances at sea during

the last few years. 

The modern passenger steamer should 

not depend for her safety on luck in not 

meeting with storms. She should be able 

to live through them whatever their fury, 

and not be greatly retarded in her progress 

by an adverse gale. But it is the modern 

steamer that provides the most sensational 

disasters. Both the Bullarra and the Koombana 

were in the recent gale, and the old Bullarra

weathered it, certainly after after a very

severe buffeting. The recent disasters

make one doubtful whether, after all, 

whether the iron or steel vessel can 

stand the storms that the old wooden

sailing vessels encountered, many of

them standing for half a century. They

did not rely upon dodging storms, but

upon living through them.

A parting shot, 'the old Bullarra weathered it'....

Cairns Post, 11 April, 1912. 

The Lost Koombana

.

What Wragge Says

(By Telegraph.)

PERTH, Wednesday.-. In connection 

with the loss off Port Headland, on the 

north-west coast, of the Adelaide 

Steamship Company's fine steamer 

Koombana, Mr. Clement Wragge, who 

at one time was in charge of the 

Queensland Meteorological Department, 

has written to the papers on storm 

forecasting.

Mr. Wragge, in effect, states that

if the Central Weather Bureau in

Brisbane were in existence now,

three days' warning, at least, would 

have been given of the recent cyclone 

which caused such destruction and loss 

of life, and the wrecking of the Koombana.

There is much discussion and comment

here on the subject matter of Mr. Wragge's

letter.

STORM WARNINGS.

To the Editor.

Sir-.Just allow me to say in simple justice 

that if the Central Weather Bureau,

Brisbane, had been in existence, the 

annual vote for which did not exceed £1,500

per annum, three days warning at least

would .have been given of the recent cyclone 

off the north-west coast of Australia.

-I am. etc,

CLEMENT L. WRAGGE.

Chiltern, Victoria, March 29, 1912.

These reports pointed to a very serious issue and failure of the federal system which could, possibly, have prevented the two disasters. The following link explores this issue in the context of the Yongala disaster and illustrates just how successfully the regional system operated in the late 1800's.

https://yongalarevisited.blogspot.com/2016/11/there-was-no-cyclone-prediction-or.html

The following extracts reveal that there was a very real physical reason for the failed predictions on the Nor'West coast:

The Telegraph, Brisbane, 20 April, 1912.

WILLY-WILLIES;

'Terrors' of North-west.

The loss of the steamer Koombana has

increased the desire of the Commonwealth

meteorologist (Mr. Hunt) to learn more

of the dreaded willy-willies that visit the

northwestern coast of Australia between

December and April, and cause such wide

spread disaster. "He purposes, with the

consent of the Minister for Home Affairs

(Mr.' O'Malley), to visit that portion of

Australia this year, and endeavour to

gather all the information possible with

respect to willy-willies, so that he may

collate the information, with a view to

arriving at a more satisfactory means of

anticipating disturbances and of warning

vessels.

"The data regarding willy-willies," said

Mr. Hunt to a Melbourne "Argus" reporter, 

"do not extend back more than 12 years, 

and another disadvantage is that

anemometers and other instruments with

which the Federal Government equipped

the whole of the north-west coast have

been destroyed by the willy-willys, the

velocity of which they had been placed

there to register. They were not blown

away, but were destroyed by flying debris.

courtesy Trove.

    

WAGES

Sunday Times, Perth, 21 April, 1912.

WRECK OF THE KOOMBANA

Wages of the Drowned Crew

The letter below from the Shipping 

Master at Fremantle to Mr. W. E. 

Moxon, manager of the Adelaide

Steamship Co, will be read with 

interest, and those who may be entitled

to receive any of the wages referred

to may apply to the Shipping Master,

Fremantle. The steamer was apparently 

lost about March 21, but the company 

decided to pay wages up to March 31. 

The letter is as follows :-

Harbor & Light Department,

Shipping Master's Office.

Fremantle, W.A., 18/4/'12.

W. E. Moxon, Esq,

(Mgr. The Adelaide S.S. Co)

Fremantle.

Dear Sir,-I am in receipt of

your letter of the 17th inst, and

have to acknowledge with thanks

receipt of your cheque for £461

4s, wages, for crew of late s.s.

Koombana which will be paid in

accordance with the Merchant

Shipping Act.

I am very pleased to find that

your Company has been so 

generous in paying the full month's

wages for March, and shall be

glad to receive the receipts for

the wages which you are paying,

and which are not included in the

cheque,

-Yours faithfully.

THOS. W. SMITH.

Shipping Master.

Many of the crew referred to were sole bread winners, leaving behind widows and orphans. It is almost insulting, viewed from the perspective of the modern era, that an additional 10 days' wages would be viewed in such favourable light. 

What about thereafter????