Mr. Moxon, Adelaide Steamship Company, affirmed that he had been made aware of the fact that the Bedout Light was out 1 week prior to the disaster. Given that Mr. Moxon knew about the Light being out we might assume that the information was passed both to Captain Irvine and Captain Allen (via Mr. Gardiner, manager of the Adelaide Steamship Company at Port Hedland).
Departing Port Hedland that fateful day, Koombana would likely have arrived at a holding position to fill tanks 3 miles (ref. cattleman on board Bullarra) north of Port Hedland by about 11 a.m.. Being aware that the Light was out, Captain Allen had to reach Bedout Island before nightfall - dusk at this time of the year is 6.38 p.m.. To cover the distance of '50 miles' would have taken the steamer, averaging 13.5 knots (operating speed) 3.5 hours, which was well within Koombana's capability in normal conditions. This would have allowed for a more reasonable 4 hours to fill tanks.
on northward, passing Bedout Island, on
which the new lighthouse shows prominently."
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note the minimal deviation, less than 0.3 of a mile, between Irvine's coordinates and the actual coordinates. |
- Headwinds and Speed Reduction: Your estimate of a gale-force headwind reducing Koombana’s speed from 13.5 knots to 10 knots is plausible, especially given Captain Allen’s reported doubt about reaching Broome’s spring tide. The increased travel time to Bedout (4.5+ hours instead of 3.5) aligns with the tight window before dusk (6:38 p.m. on March 20, 1912). This pressure might have rushed the tank-filling process, as you suggest.
- Tank Filling Duration: Captain Upjohn’s estimate of 3 to 3.5 hours for filling tanks under ideal conditions contrasts sharply with the 2-hour visibility reported by Bert Clarke and Upjohn himself. This discrepancy supports your hypothesis that Allen abbreviated the process to depart by around 2 p.m., prioritizing reaching Bedout before dark over fully stabilizing the ship.
- She was overwhelmed by the storm before reaching the island, due to stability issues.
- She misjudged her position without the light and struck a reef or shoal (though no wreckage near Bedout supports this directly).
- Light Malfunction Mechanism: The A.G.A. light’s sun valve, designed to ignite at sunset and extinguish at sunrise, introduces a potential failure point (e.g., gas supply issues or valve malfunction). Are there records of similar lights failing elsewhere due to technical defects?
- Captain Allen’s Decision: If Allen knew the light was out, why not delay departure or alter course (e.g., hugging the coast)? Was his haste driven by schedule pressure or confidence in Koombana’s seaworthiness?
- Wreckage Evidence: The absence of Koombana’s wreck near Bedout challenges a grounding theory. Could the cyclone’s force have dispersed debris far from the sinking point?
- Historical Charts: Comparing 1912 nautical charts with your Google Earth overlay might confirm obstructions and safe distances, refining your 30-degree bearing hypothesis.