"PUT RIGHT OUT TO SEA".

There is some debate as to what Captain Allen decided to do once he had cleared the bar without incident and attempted to fill tanks in a holding position some 3 miles north of Port Hedland. We know that it took at least 3 hours to fill tanks in ideal, port conditions, a time period extended significantly in rough seas with a gale from the NE.

The following is taken from my summary post:

Captain Allen:

"I might bump that outer bar going out on a sea like this."

"My passengers think they will get to Broome to-morrow (Thursday)," he remarked; "but they will be lucky if they get there by Saturday. I am going to put right out to sea, and as might bump the bar going out I will leave my ballast tanks until I get outside and fill them out there."

Two sets of eye witnesses referred to Koombana being in sight for only 2 hours. The tanks were unlikely to have been successfully pressed up during this time frame, which in turn would have created a free surface effect, enhancing the list; reducing what GM there was and impairing heeling recovery.

Why did Captain Allen not take the necessary time to fill all tanks? Quite simply, the Light at Bedout was not functioning and he had to clear the dangerous reef adjacent to the island before dark (6.38 p.m.). 

If in fact Captain Allen was sticking to his original plan of 'putting right out to sea' and anticipating 3 days to get to Broome due to cyclonic conditions, it makes sense to me that he would have taken as long as it was required to completely fill his tanks as this significant increase in stability would likely have fared better in cyclonic conditions.

But he didn't. He 'rushed the job' and headed due north as was standard custom into the unknown.

Why?

A cattleman aboard Bullarra made this comment:

'When we came on deck for the mid-day meal, the Bullara and the Koombana were stern on to each other, and the distance apart being about five miles.'

Visibility, at this stage was still good by all accounts and Bert Clarke, watching from Port Hedland remarked that Koombana was in sight, pitching and rolling for about two hours. This was confirmed by Captain Upjohn of Bullarra at the Inquiry that Koombana was visible for about two hours.

In my opinion the clincher was the comment made by the same cattleman on board Bullarra headed in a southwesterly direction:

"I noticed away on the starboard bow and 

just above the horizon, a dense mass of 

inky black clouds and from descriptions 

I'd had from old pearlers, I was convinced 

we were in for it."

In other words the cyclonic system targeting Balla Balla to the southwest moving in from the northwest (groundswell coming in from NW early in the day) was in a direction frankly opposite to the planned course of Koombana to Broome, via the northern aspect of Bedout Island.

Furthermore:

"In the southern hemisphere, tropical storms revolve clockwise. If the seaman turns to face the wind (in this instance from the NE), the eye of the revolving storm will lie to his left and, moreover, slightly behind him, because the winds spiral inward as they rotate."

And indeed it was, moving towards Balla Balla, not Port Hedland.

The final word goes to Captain Upjohn himself who had this to say in an interview:

There was no cyclone then?

(This was referring to 3 miles outside Port Hedland whilst Koombana filled tanks during a roughly two hour midday period)

"No. The weather was threatening but

nothing to cause alarm. About 5 p.m.,

(when Bullarra was less than 20 miles from Balla Balla, about 35 miles away from Port Hedland)

however I found the conditions had

become so bad that I put out to sea on

the starboard tack."....

It then makes sense why Captain Allen rushed filling tanks and decided to attempt keeping to his schedule given the worst of the cyclonic conditions were concentrated beyond the horizon to the southwest.

He could either pursue the standard course (see below) or even a detour course advised during 'thick weather' (see below).

standard course

In 'thick weather'.
The advisory referred to 20 fathoms west of Bedout which approximates 30 miles, as depicted.

detour route - assumed.

Frankly, in my opinion, there are two significant factors confirming that Koombana made it safely around the northern aspect of Bedout Island:

- Captain Upjohn discovered an oil patch the shape of a sunken steamer, which he documented in terms of coordinates and a rough 27 to 28 miles NE Bedout Island. 

- Secondly, flotsam was discovered by a number of searching steamers a fortnight after Koombana disappeared. The flotsam was found in a pattern (see image below) and which appeared to have originated from the oil patch site, as I have illustrated in previous posts, post cyclone the prevailing current is from east to west. 

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2023/04/cyclone-ilsa.html

If one is going to search for Koombana, it makes sense that a broad area NE Bedout Island needs to be surveyed deploying aerial magnetometers and based on detected, potential targets, these defined sites explored by AUV's. 

The flotsam discoveries plotted 1 through 11 do not include an awning spar and one of Koombana's planks discovered AT the site of the oil patch.

What could have happened, so quickly that Harry Lyon was unable to send out a radio signal for help and no bodies were found afloat wearing lifebelts (not prepared to abandon ship)??

As Koombana rounded Bedout heading for Broome there would have been a large rolling sea coming up behind her, at night,

"Owing to the heavy seas, the gale, and the 

strong currents, together with the fact 

that the vessel was flying very light, the 

Koombana refused to answer her helm, and 

became practically unmanageable. The 

steamer was only drawing 12ft. forward and 17ft. 

aft, and could not be controlled in heavy weather.

During the whole time she was pounding heavily, 

and at intervals of every few minutes her engine 

raced."

It was only a matter of time....

The actual period newspaper extract referred to the 'Cromarty' and I have taken liberties inserting Koombana's name and estimated draughts; but the point being that it is not difficult to imagine the situation being similar on board Koombana leading up to those last frantic moments.

But returning to the possibility that Captain Allen still intended to 'put right out to sea', let us take a closer look:

'It is evident that she first encountered

the beginning of the blow between

Port Hedland and Bedout Island. 'If

the wind were favorable it is reason

able to suppose that Captain Allen at

once steered a course for the open sea,

and may have had to run out for

about 200 miles.' As it blows very

strongly after these cyclonic disturb

ances, it is evident that she would be

a great way out of her course before

she was able to cut for Broome, and

that it would take at 'least 41/2 days be

fore she reached her destination.'

If Captain Allen had run 200 miles out to sea and achieved this goal, would have brought Koombana into the vicinity of Imperieuse Reef, part of the Rowley Shoals. After extensive searches no wreckage was found in this vicinity. See summary post below of the extent of searches after the loss of Koombana.

The most powerful argument against the Koombana being destroyed by the cyclone must surely relate to the discovery of wreckage more than 10 days after the disaster. If the cyclone had been responsible for the destruction of the steamer, surely there would have been plenty of wreckage and cargo immediately apparent after 20 March? As the following post outlines, searches during the initial 10 days were extensive, but FRUITLESS.

The West Australian, 01 April, 1912. 

THE FAILURE OF THE

SHORE SEARCH.

A DEEP SEA MATTER.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. W. E. MOXON.

Mr. Moxon made the following statement:

"Captain Mills has reported that the s.s.

Minderoo from Thursday to Saturday last,

shaped a course taking her on the western

and eastern side of Barrow Island, and the

Montebello Group, and then went round 

Ritchie reef searching thoroughly there. 

Shell and Stewart Islands were visited before 

she proceeded to Cossack via the Dampier 

Archipelago, taking in Mermaid, Rosemary, 

Eaglehawk, Legendre, and Delamori Islands 

en route, without finding any trace of the 

Koombana after a most exhaustive and thorough 

search.

The Bullarra from Sampson to Hedland, 

commencing on Tuesday last, searched the 

Turtle Islands, thence to Bedout Island, where she

landed a search party. Here I might men-

tion they found that the new automatic light

had been extinguished. This is a matter

to which the authorities will give careful con-

sideration. The Amphinome Shoals were

visited, and a course shaped along the Eighty

Mile Beach, taking in La Grange Bay and

Roebuck Bay. This also produced no trace of

the missing liner. Close and wide the

luggers have been searching from Roebuck

Bay round the Amphinone Shoals to Port

Hedland, and we understand that Captain

Parkes' luggers have been searching from

Monte Bellos to Cossack. In addition, lug-

gers have searched Depuch Island, in the

neighbourhood of Cossack and Hedland

without avail. There is no report at present

from the lugger that visited Rowley Shoals,

but this, in view of the Gorgon's report, is

negligible. The Gorgon arrived at Broome

this morning, her instructions having been

to search the Rowley Shoals with Impereiuse,

Clark, and Mermaid reefs. She signalled this

morning that her search had been thorough,

but no trace of the Koombana had been

seen. It will, therefore, be seen that the

whole of the coast from Barrow and Monte

Bello Islands has been searched to Broome

and across from Broome to Rowley Shoals

inclusive. 

The Moira should have passed

down by this time on her trip to Fremantle,

taking in the Lacepede Islands, Rowley

Shoals, and west of Ritchie Reef, but no

report will be received from her, it may be

assumed, unless she has something of an

urgent nature to communicate before her

arrival at Fremantle. It will be remembered

that the Moira encountered the cyclone a

hundred miles to the north-west of Port 

Hedland bound to Wyndham. 

An important reminder that the Moira encountered the cyclone 100 miles NW of Port Hedland at 8 a.m. 20 March. This illustrates that the cyclone, 90 miles in diameter (Inquiry), was to the northwest, not north of Port Hedland on the day of the disaster, and from this position the cyclone moved in a 'southerly' direction (having curved round) towards Balla Balla.

The coast search, it will be seen, has been 

absolutely fruitless, except in so far as the 

reports that no trace of the vessel can be found.

Harbour and Light Department, Western Australia (Fremantle)

Broome: 12 April, 1912.

Addressed to The Chief Harbour Master, Fremantle

Sir,

Report on search for R.M.S. Koombana (note official Royal Mail Ship title). 

At the request of the District Magistrate and in accordance with your cablegram I organised a search for the R.M.S. Koombana.

I chartered the lugger McLlennan and put Captain White in charge with orders to proceed along the coast, searching the 80 Mile Beach and the shoals up to Bedout Island and thence into Port Hedland. I also got the lugger Mina, which with Captain Bennie in charge was ordered to proceed to a point 60 miles north of Bedout Island, then down to the east of the island and into Port Hedland.

I took the schooner Muriel and proceeded to Rowley Shoals and then zigzagged into Port Hedland.

We got away on the evening of March 25th and I reached Mermaid Reef (Rowley Shoals) on March 29th. I proceeded along the south of the Reef and up the East side to the North End and then down to Sandy Island Clarke Reef. Same date I spoke S.S. Gorgon, who reported having searched Impereuse Reef and saw nothing.

I then proceeded across the North of Clarke Reef and down the East side of Impereuse Reef. 

At 2.30 pm on March 31st I spoke S.S. Moira who reported having also searched the shoals and sighted nothing.

I zigzagged down marking 16 mile tacks and picked up Bedout Lighthouse on the forenoon of April 3rd.

I had a flat calm all day and at 4 pm sighted smoke to the N.E.. This turned out to be S.S. Bullarra. I boarded her at 6 pm and Captain Upjohn reported as per my wire from Port Hedland.

I then proceeded to the South of Bedout Island and searched round Turtle Island and thence into Port Hedland arriving there at 9 pm on April 4th.

Captains White and Bennie were in Port Hedland, and being satisfied that we could do nothing further, I instructed them to return to Broome........


Oswald Dalziel.

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357, cons 066

30th March

"Bedout, Amphinome thoroughly scoured luggers resultless."
"Luggers searching coast close and wide. Nothing reported."

SS Bullarra:

"Wednesday (27th) circumnavigation Little Turtle. No trace Koombana."
"Second Officer and party landed Big Turtle. No trace."
"After dark arrive Bedout position by observation."

Thursday:

"Chief Officer and party searched the island and adjacent rocks. No trace whatever."
"Made a detour course to Broome via the beach. Spoke several luggers. No trace whatever."

By 30 March the vast bulk of Koombana wreckage had yet to materialize.

series 2357, cons 066

and the Minderoo's initial comprehensive search as per document:

Report, March 30th (Saturday)

"...anchored at 9 pm (28th, Thursday) at entrance Mary Anne Passage waiting daylight, weighed and proceeded at 5.50 am, 29th and searched the whole of the East side of Barrow Shoals and Island also Monte Bellos Islands and Richie Reef; from there steered 25 miles east and when south to Sholl Island, examined the neighbourhood of Sholl Island and then on to Stewart and Steamboa Islands, around the McLennand bank and anchored for the night off Cape Preston, weighted and proceeded at daylight 30th, and examined all the islands and passages from Cape Preston to Cossack where arrival at 1.45 pm, 30th. During the whole of our search we saw nothing and from the looks of the islands the storm does not appear to have reached that far west."

series 2357, cons 066

Once wreckage became evident, more than 10 days after the disaster, the Bedout Island vicinity was extensively awash with flotsam - some distance from the track and extent of the Balla Balla Cyclone.

Note Captain Mills, Minderoo:

'examined all the islands and passages from Cape Preston to Cossack where arrival at 1.45 pm, 30th. "During the whole of our search we saw nothing and from the looks of the islands the storm does not appear to have reached that far west."

This supports meteorological report that the Balla Balla Cyclone was only about 90 miles in diameter.

The following document outlines in more detail the lugger Mina search:

series 2357, cons 066

The following document outlines in more detail the lugger McLlennan search:

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357. cons 066

27 March, winds were light NW. By 31 March, winds had shifted to SSW; 6 April, SSE and 7 April SE, persisting into 8 April.

Amphinome Shoals surrounded by 'banks' in 2 to 2.5 fathoms - 12-15 ft.; 3.6-4.5 m. Koombana drew 16 ft. plus aft which means that she would have run aground in this vicinity.

There can be no denying the extent of initial discoveries - NOTHING! 

A 'delayed' release of flotsam from a wreck 'breaking up in deep water', rather than battered to pieces by the cyclone.

courtesy 

State Records Office, Western Australia; Google Earth.

Boyd, Annie. Koombana Days (p. 144). Fremantle Press. Kindle Edition. 

IS HYDRUS THE SOLUTION?

  

                                 R.M.S. KOOMBANA 

courtesy Trove

courtesy State Library of Western Australia.

"The Search For SS Koombana"

"The expedition team's next target is the wreck of the luxury passenger steamship SS Koombana, which disappeared off Port Hedland during a tropical cyclone in 1912, with 150 people presumed dead. Despite several deep-water expeditions in the early 2010's, the shipwreck remains undiscovered."

"The use of Hydrus https://dronexl.co/drone-technology/ in this search could potentially lead to the discovery of the long-lost SS Koombana, providing closure to the families of those who perished and shedding light on the ship's tragic fate."

"The discovery of the century-old coal hulk by the underwater drone Hydrus highlights the potential for advanced technology to uncover the countless undiscovered shipwrecks around the world. By making deep ocean exploration more accessible and efficient, Hydrus and similar innovations are paving the way for further discoveries that will help us better understand our maritime history."

courtesy: Haye Kesteloo

https://dronexl.co/2024/04/04/underwater-drone-shipwreck-australia/  

One assumes that Hydrus would be deployed on the basis of mag targets detected by a broader aerial mag survey of the zone of interest NE Bedout Island.

Koombana was a magnificent, bespoke steamer with opulently appointed, well-ventilated, elevated passenger decks, cattle deck, and dedicated cargo holds (incl. refrigeration). But she was flawed; inherently top heavy, with a reduced draught of 20 ft. 8 in. to access harbours such as Port Hedland.

The indication of inherent top heaviness is illustrated by comparison with the similarly sized steamers Yongala and Grantala (greater draughts: 24 ft.) of the same Adelaide Steamship Company. The latter steamers, with significant top hampers, operated with ballast tank capacity of 400 tons, whereas Koombana required 900 tons to steady her.

Yongala and Grantala       3664 tons
Koombana                        3668 tons

Koombana's track record, fully ballasted, gives us the most significant confirmatory clue regarding inherent top heaviness. 8 February, 1910, Koombana allegedly heeled over to 45 degrees in a squall and took a considerable time to recover.

20 March, 1912:

All the signs indicated that Koombana and Bullarra would be departing Port Hedland before noon into unpredictable and potentially dangerous conditions. A period advisory referred to an easterly wind and falling barometer being the warning signs for pearlers to seek shelter. 'At 6 a.m. the barometer had been at 29.50', down from 29.9. Between 4 a.m. and 10 a.m., in normal conditions the barometer readings rise, not fall. The wind, a gale by noon, came from the NE. (some sources claim a half gale from ENE).

'Two or three layers of swiftly racing clouds could frequently be seen through the prevailing mist. It blew with terrific force.'

40 luggers sought shelter in the creek, bringing tidings of a heavy ground swell from the northwest, which in turn, signaled the presence of a significant cyclonic event out at sea.

'Vessels engaged in the pearl-shell fisheries, on the northwestern coast of Australia, run on shore in any available creek, on indications of the approach of a cyclone.' 

Alleged:

"I don't like the glass," was Captain Allen's remark,

But Captain Allen was compelled to depart at 10.20 am, due to pressure of maintaining a tide-dependent schedule; mail contract; cargo delivery and passenger demands. 

Koombana departed Port Hedland carrying:

- 260 tons cargo

- 480 tons coal

- 60 tons stores

= 800 tons

(plus an undisclosed tonnage of residual fresh water in her tanks)

157 souls on board.

260 tons of cargo was only 14.4 % of maximum load - 1800 tons (not 4000 tons as is commonly reported). 85 tons for Broome were stowed in 'tween decks 1 and 2, higher up in hull, raising centre of gravity, reducing stability and 175 tons for Derby in hold 2, low down, improving stability. These units of cargo were loaded and secured at Fremantle for the voyage.

I do not believe there was a significant component of livestock on the cattle deck due to steaming up the coast. Livestock was destined for the markets at Fremantle and required fresh water and fodder at sea. Moreover, Bullarra had been reintroduced on the run that month to bring livestock back from Port Hedland, relieving Koombana of this function. 

Drawing 16 ft. aft and 11 ft. forward (rather than the claimed 19 ft. aft 12 ft. forward), all ballast tanks empty, Koombana's propeller  was not fully submerged (decreased thrust and manoeuvrability) and she displayed 'an ugly list to port' confirming her very light lading and ballast status. 

The depth over the bar was 19 ft. at the time which means Koombana would not have cleared without incident, given the Inquiry's quoted 19 ft. aft figure. Furthermore, a dead weight of 800 tons (cargo in forward holds; empty after-peak and no 6 tank) could not have accounted for a draught 1.75 ft. short of maximum loading, aft.

Why was Koombana in such light, top heavy condition? 

She needed to be!

Captain Allen:

"I might bump that outer bar going out on a sea like this."

"My passengers think they will get to Broome to-morrow (Thursday)," he remarked; "but they will be lucky if they get there by Saturday. I am going to put right out to sea, and as might bump the bar going out I will leave my ballast tanks until I get outside and fill them out there."

It was both risky and laborious to fill tanks at sea, particularly in a heavy ground swell and gale, and it would have taken more than 3 hours (in ideal conditions) to achieve this task and which delayed progress significantly. Two sets of eye witnesses referred to Koombana being in sight for only 2 hours. The tanks were unlikely to have been successfully pressed up during this time frame, which in turn would have created a free surface effect, enhancing the list; reducing what GM there was and impairing heeling recovery.

Why did Captain Allen not take the necessary time to fill all tanks? Quite simply, the Light at Bedout was not functioning and he had to clear the dangerous reef adjacent to the island before dark (6.38 p.m.). 

Captain Allen anticipated and was ultimately confronted by a stiff head wind (gale from NE; ENE) slowing progress. Distance to Broome = 265 n miles. An average of 10 knots (14 knot steamer) or less would miss spring tide access to Broome the following day. Marked pitching would have exposed the propeller periodically, reducing thrust.

Bullarra:

'When we came on deck for the mid-day meal, the Bullara and the Koombana were stern on to each other, and the distance apart being about five miles.'

Koombana had not made much progress by noon due to the attempt to fill tanks.

With a gale and a significant wind catchment factor in the form of towering superstructure and funnel enhancing the existing list, Koombana was presented with challenges from the start. I believe Captain Allen made his decision to pursue the standard course rounding the northern aspect of Bedout Island based on the fact that he could see evidence of the cyclone to the westward on the horizon; not north or northeastward in which directions he was headed; confirmed by a witness account aboard Bullarra heading southwest:

"I noticed away on the starboard bow and 

just above the horizon, a dense mass of 

inky black clouds and from descriptions 

I'd had from old pearlers, I was convinced 

we were in for it."

Therefore, I believe Koombana only ever skirted the outer margin of the cyclone which targeted Balla Balla from the north-northwest, having curved round. The official meteorology report presented at the Inquiry claimed a cyclone diameter of 90 miles, which could not have broached Koombana's intended steamer track. This is further substantiated by evidence of minimal storm impact at Port Hedland and Bedout Island (lighthouse glass not encrusted and no signs of a disturbance).

"Scarcely any damage

was caused by the 

hurricane at Port Hedland."

However, this said, Koombana in her unstable, top heavy condition would have been subjected to broad, deep sea swells; strong winds shifting through NE ---> N ----> NW, further unsettling stability and hindering heeling recovery. Listing heavily, she would have been vulnerable to water ingress via the cattle loading doors or the ventilation ports on the main deck, which would further have contributed to the free surface effect, worsening the list and further diminishing heeling recovery.

Cargo might also have shifted, contributing to the deteriorating situation.

In an attempt to correct the dangerous list, Captain Allen might have elected to pump out one of the longitudinal ballast tank sections on the side of the list, with the resultant catastrophic effect as illustrated by the S.S. Vestris disaster (November, 1928). Captain Carey pumped out tanks in the hope of decreasing a progressive list. Paradoxically, in part due to residual free water in tanks, the list increased dramatically.

Ultimately, when Koombana went over I believe she did so suddenly and violently, not allowing souls successful escape in lifeboats and if a few did, they did not survive to tell the tale.

No cargo or bodies were ever recovered suggesting that she turned turtle trapping both people and cargo within. Absence of bodies and cargo goes against the theory that Koombana was battered to pieces by the cyclone. Damaged pieces of wreckage, ultimately released from the wreck, could have been caused by superstructure striking the seabed or movement of the wreck itself along the seabed. It would also explain why wreckage was only discovered 12 to 14 days after the disaster - rising from the seabed - rather than due to immediate hurricane-force damage.

Insufficient time was allowed for wireless operator Harry Lyon to send out a distress signal via Marconi wireless, if indeed it was still operational. It is important to note that there was a backup wireless unit independent of the ship's electrical supply, but with only a 100 mile range. 

I believe that the oil patch, discovered by Captain Upjohn of the Bullarra and represented on the image below, is Koombana's final resting place. An example of oil marking the spot was used to locate the Clan Ranald wreck, January 1909: 

"direct me to the spot where the wreck was sunk, 

which he said he knew exactly, having seen 

streams of oil rising from her."

This is further borne out by the distribution of the bulk of wreckage, drifting with the predominantly (south)westward trending current which predominates after alongshore cyclones in the Pilbara. This position is within the outer steamer track for Broome. 

Koombana was not off course.

Inquiry (courtesy Koombana Days online site):

"- It was in latitude 19.11 and 119.25 E.

What distance would that be off Bedout Island?

- About 27 or 28 miles - I cannot say which. 

Did you take any samples of this oily substance?

- Yes, two or three dozen bottles.

What depth was there at this place?

- 30 or 35 fathoms. (55 m - 64 m)

Did you see any trace of the vessel at that depth? There would be nothing to indicate that the Koombana or any other vessel would be there?

- It was getting dark and it looked like the outline of a vessel." 

After further analysis, 27.5 miles northeast of Bedout Island coincides with 19 15 51 S, 119 26 48 E (30 fathoms), a position 20 miles from additional wreckage to the west and which, in turn, lay 20 miles to the north of Bedout Island - as referenced by Captain Upjohn.

Although not represented on the graphic below, Captain Upjohn referred to:

They had taken the specimens (of

oily water) produced in Court at 

this spot. An awning spar and one 

of the planks exhibited in Court 

had also been discovered in close

proximity. Other articles were picked

up about 20 miles from that spot.

(marked 2 and 3 on graphic).

1. Stateroom door; painting stage; small pieces of board. SS Gorgon

2. Motor launch starboard bow plank (with insignia). SS Bullarra

3. Small wreckage; (life) boat tanks; lifebelts; panel from saloon / smoke room ceiling. SS Bullarra
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)

4. Bottom board from (life) boat; white painted board. Lugger McLennan. 

5. (life) boat mast and small wreckage (rising from bottom). SS Una

6. Miscellaneous wreckage. SS Una   

7. Miscellaneous wreckage. SS Una. 

(see https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/10/captain-rantzau.html)

8. Cabin paneling. Lugger Mina.

9. Smoking room cushion; cabin door. SS Minderoo.

10. Straw envelopes (Leech's fortune). SS Minderoo and SS Gorgon.
(see:  https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)

11. Bottom boards (lifeboat); drawer; small teak panel. SS Minderoo.

Official cyclone, 90 miles in diameter, as per Meteorological Office. Note that the cyclone approached the coast from the direction of S.S. Moira's position, 8 a.m..
Courtesy Google Earth.

courtesy Trove

this map which appeared in a period newspaper report gives an idea of the route taken by Koombana, 'shaping a course' around the northern aspect of Bedout Island.
(the 'last seen here' annotation is unconfirmed, but could substantiate Koombana being on course this far)

presumed track Port Hedland to Broome

The residents of Hedland had a final say on the matter:

The ship's propeller was showing

when anchored at the jetty, and

raced out of the water as she sailed

over the rolling seas at the harbor's

entrance ; the boat also rolled heavily

when the wind struck her on the

starboard side—so much so that

several who were watching her exclaimed.

"She'll be over directly " !

And a final, cryptic comment:

Sunday Times, Perth, 31 March, 1912.

Therefore, as she has not been found along the 

Ninety-Mile Beach or in La Grange Bay, we are

led to the terrible alternative that she was engulfed 

somewhere north-east of Bedout Island, where 

she was last spoken.

courtesy ANU archives

In this image of Koombana apparently steaming, the main livestock loading door is open, one assumes due to the excessive heat and humidity along the Nor'West coast. Of concern would have been a potential portal of water ingress during heavy seas and rolling.

courtesy Trove extracts; Australia Pilot, 1920.

For those with an in depth interest in this subject should obtain Annie Boyd's well-written Koombana Days.