UNA FIND.

This is a particularly precious document. The telegram is dated 6 April, 1912, and details the find that precipitated numerous future searches. It is transcribed as follows:

"Port Hedland 47 3/4 collect Chief Harbourmaster 7

Captain Rantzau, Una, arrived, reports no wreckage Bedout reef, picked up mast & life boat gear, several cabin panels, thirty three miles N N W Bedout, wreckage appears be rising from below, waiting instructions from you, taking water before proceeding further.

Gordon wharfinger
8.40
signature

33 n miles NNW of Bedout Island is:

19 06 S
118 52 E

The official coordinates for this position are:

19 07 S
118 53 E

The difference is 2.2 miles (see image below).

The mast was clearly linked with life boat gear and NOT one of Koombana's main masts.

If the wreckage appeared to be rising from below what other explanation can be offered which excludes this being the wreck site?

It suggests to me that as wreckage rose from the seabed it was caught in the prevailing current which in this region is from east to west. The wreckage in question did not rise completely to the surface and as such came up at a position 33 miles NNW of Bedout Island.

This rationale would also support a model where wreckage only came to the surface some time after setting out on its journey with the prevailing current, precluding earlier discoveries, which was indeed the case.

Or, if conspiracy theories are to be considered, the discovery could have been a hoax to redirect attention away from the Bullarra oil patch find.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy Google Earth

HAS NOT REACHED HER DESTINATION.

It is unclear who the author of the following document was or the date. But it is clear that it must have been written shortly after Koombana failed to arrive at Broome.

The following is a transcription:

"I have to report that the N.W. mail steamer "Koombana" left Port Hedland on the 20th inst, at 11 a.m. bound for Broome but has not reached her destination. Up to the present nothing has been heard of her but she was observed by the Master of the "Bullarra" for two hours after leaving Port Hedland to be steaming in a N.E. direction, a gale blowing from the E.N.E. at the time. At 4 p.m. on the same day the "Bullarra" being 50 miles to the westward of Port Hedland encountered a cyclone and stood out to sea for 70 miles, reports referring to which have appeared in the press. At noon on the 21st inst. the "Bullarra" reports that the centre of the cyclone passed in her vicinity and on the 23rd she put into Cossack Roads in distress, where she has been lying affecting temporary repairs."

It is interesting that this early in the sequence of events Koombana was reported as having left Port Hedland at 11 a.m. not 10.20 a.m., which implies that Bullarra would have followed at 11.20 a.m.. which was clearly impossible given that Bullarra was 5 miles from Koombana by noon, having followed her out to 3 miles offshore - total of 8 miles steaming in 40 minutes. Bullarra was a 10 - 11.5 knot steamer, certainly not averaging 12 knots from the get go. I think this unlikelihood confirms that Koombana sailed at 10.20 a.m..

In this report the gale was blowing from the E.N.E. which differs from later accounts referring to N.E.. This might be a matter of semantics but is important in two respects:

- it WAS a gale, which would have made the filling of ballast tanks extremely challenging and quite possibly not entirely successful.

- Koombana steamed initially northward which means that she would have had the gale on her starboard, creating challenges from the get-go.

50 miles west of Port Hedland is in the vicinity of Balla Balla where the brunt of the cyclone made landfall. For Bullarra to have achieved this feat, from a position 5 miles to the west of Koombana at noon, by 4 p.m., she would have to have averaged 11.25 knots, which was possible with a gale behind her, but unlikely.  Log recorded Bullarra steaming 10 knots during this time frame. In fact other references refer to slowing engine and standing out to sea 22 miles from Balla Balla at 4.20 p.m..

Details in reports varied and it is our task to scrutinise each and every one in order to approximate the most plausible scenario(s).

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

PAYING ATTENTION?

It is extraordinary that after all that - the Inquiry process - this is what was produced.

"I have to report that the SS 'Koombana' was on a voyage from Fremantle to Derby calling at Ports en route with cargo and passengers. Port Hedland was reached on the 19th March, 1912, and after discharging cargo and landing passengers, she sailed on the 20th, at 10.40 a.m. for Broome. At this time the weather appeared to be a little unsettled but there were no indications of anything unusual, the wind at this time being easterly, fresh, and the barometer standing at 29.50. The ship was in good sea-going condition and the propellers well immersed. She was last seen by the Master of the 'Bullarra' at 1 p.m. who left Port Hedland 20 minutes later than the 'Koombana'. Both ships at this time were steaming in a northerly direction. After sunset the weather conditions deteriorated into a cyclone shortly after midnight."

There aren't an abundance of facts in this extract which contains a number of errors, intentional or otherwise.

1. 'The weather appeared to be a little unsettled...no indications of anything unusual...wind easterly, fresh... barometer 29.50.'

'Fresh' is 5 on the Beaufort Scale, a wind of 19-24 miles per hour. This is in sharp contrast with the following version:

' The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port

 Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on

 March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered

 a strong north-east gale on leaving the

 harbor.'

A 'strong north-east gale' is 9 on the Beaufort scale, 47-54 miles per hour, which is significantly different from 5. In fact by 4 p.m. it had evolved into a heavy N.E. gale, which is presumably a 'whole gale' or 10 on the Beaufort scale, equating with uprooted trees and structural damage; all of this a mere 22 miles from Balla Balla.

The barometer stood at 29.50. However, a cattleman on Bullarra reported something quite different and significant in terms of anticipating a cyclonic event:

"I subsequently learnt that the glass was 

extremely low, 28 something." 

2. 'The ship was in good sea-going condition and the propellers well immersed.' 

With all ballast tanks empty, a mere 260 tons of dead weight cargo, Koombana was in very light condition when she sailed; which would not have qualified her, in my opinion, for being in 'good sea-going condition'. The Court could only assume to what extent and how successfully the ballast tanks were filled and pressed up out at sea. 

Furthermore, Koombana had only ONE propeller, which was unlikely to have been 'well immersed'.

3. She was last seen by the Master of the 'Bullarra' at 1 p.m. who left Port Hedland 20 minutes later than the 'Koombana'.

In fact, if Koombana had started to make significant progress to the north while attempting to fill tanks this would not have been the case. The fact that Bullarra was still in sight of Koombana by 1 p.m. implies that Captain Upjohn was holding back for some reason; either keeping an eye on Koombana rolling and pitching or simply that Bullarra stopped while crew ate lunch midday

4. 'Both ships at this time were steaming in a northerly direction.'

Initially this was the case as far as 3 miles from shore, then Bullarra headed towards the west. The comment made is somewhat bizarre. Had the Court experienced a loss of direction ??

Some might argue that they had, period !

courtesy State Office Records, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

HENRY JOHN CLARKE AND THE RALSTON INDICATOR.

Henry John Clarke was intimately acquainted with Koombana - 15 months on the ship.

"Yes. We had a bad doing between Fremantle and Geraldton with a W.N.W. gale on the broadside of the ship."

"The ship at the that time was fully laden ?"

"No, but fairly well. She had a good deal of weight."

"How did she behave ?"

"Very well."

"Did she ship much water ?"

"No. Nothing to speak of."

In this case Koombana 'had a good deal of weight' which implies that she was more G.M. stable.

Koombana had an excellent freeboard clearance factor (8.55 ft. fully laden) and as such would not have shipped much water unless she was heeling over to a significant degree.

Captain Irvine, Chief Harbour Master, was pushing for more:

"Did you have any bad weather on any other passage when the ship was empty or light ?"

"Yes, on one occasion, with a light ship and a strong westerly gale, on the broadside on the passage south."

"On this occasion did it effect the ship much ?"

....with which there is a (crucial) gap in the records at hand.....

However, there is a continuation and extrapolation:

"You would say she was an ordinary safe ship ?"

"She was an exceptionally fine ship in bad weather."

Me thinks he doth protest too much. I cannot believe that Koombana was an 'exceptionally fine ship in bad weather' and certainly not in light condition.

We come to another illuminating extract as follows:

"You were acquainted with the Superintendent of the building yards. Did you at any time hear anything of a scientific instrument determining the G.M. of a ship ?"

G.M. = metacentric height = indicator of relative top heaviness of the vessel. Low = unstable; high = stable (in very simplistic terms).

"No."

"Is Mr. Ralston an eminent man amongst shipbuilders at home ?"

"He is very well known in shipping circles."

"Anything originating from his him, in the way of this instrument, could be relied upon ?"

"Yes."

The Ralston G.M. indicator in question was never available to the crew on Koombana and as such was a 'red herring' in the context of proceedings. It was never validated and should not have been entered into evidence.

Given that Koombana might have heeled over to a dangerous degree within the context of a cyclone:

"Are there any other openings other than the bunker lids along the main deck ?"

"Nothing. The goose-neck ventilators are always covered up."

"If the ship got over on broadside, could water get into the cattle deck ?"

This was a question on the tip of many tongues...

"The openings on the cattle deck on ship's side from main deck are absolutely water tight. Shutters are on the doors."

Again too much protesting and given the very hot, humid conditions that Wednesday morning there might very well have been ventilation hatches open for the few livestock on board.

"There are scuppers ?"

"They can be screwed down."

"If the openings were battened down and the scuppers screwed would water get in ?"

"Very little."

What is so interesting about this exchange is the underlying suggestion that Koombana did at some point end up heeling over dangerously and the question of water ingress ----> foundering. There is no doubt in my mind that this was part of the sequence of events and that the cattle deck ventilation ports and doors, a significant, portal of ingress.

The same reference was made in the final extract:

"The bunkers lids on the deck are kept well covered and care taken to secure same."

"How many are there on each side ?"

"Two."

It is a great pity that a significant number of documents from the Inquiry witness interviews is missing from this collection. However, we get the gist and it was not convincing of a watertight case in favour of an entirely seaworthy vessel.

More on the controversial Ralston Indicator:

The Daily News, Perth, 26 April, 1912. 

THE KOOMBANA

DISASTER

MARINE INQUIRY AT

FREMANTLE

-SECOND DAY'S PROCEEDINGS.

— After our report closed yesterday,

expert evidence as to the stability of

.the Koombana was given by Captain

James Alexander Rankin, acting marine 

superintendent of the Adelaide S.S. Co. 

at Port Adelaide. He mentioned that the 

Ralston stability and trim indicator, as shown 

in court, was used for, among other things, 

showing the ''G.M." the generally accepted 

term for denoting the stability of a vessel. 

It had been designed for the Koombana, 

and he had tested the vessel with it on 

information supplied by Captain John Rees, 

who had previously been in command of the 

ship. 

Let's put this into perspective. The test quoted was a hypothetical one as the Ralston Indicator had never been used in practice on Koombana. The test was also based on 'information supplied by Captain John Rees' not by Captain Allen on the day of the disaster. What possible relevance could this exercise have had?

At that time the Koombana was in the lightest 

possible condition, and the test gave a result of 

plus 1 ft 6 in., which was exceptionally 

good. 

It is difficult to check figures such as this against a frame of reference which does not exist except for an incident when Koombana was caught in a squall, February, 1910, at which time she heeled over to '45' degrees and took a dangerously long time to recover.

However, we can have a closer look at the stability figures for TSS Waratah, another inherently top heavy steamer, to gain a modicum of insight into this tricky subject:

Stability in Various Conditions. 

I. Ship light with stores and fresh water aboard G.M.= 2 1/2 inches (0.21 ft.)

Range of stability=57 degrees. 

II. Light ship, with all coal including reserve, all water, all water ballast except forepeak, and 1,200 tons in bottom of hold G.M.= 6 inches (0.5 ft.)

Range of stability=69 degrees.

III. Ship loaded to disc with cargo at 40 cubic feet per ton in holds, and cargo of 80 cubic feet per ton in 'tween deck, all coal including reserve, F.W., stores, crew, and passengers G.M = 4 1/2 inches (0.375 ft.) 

Range of stability=36 degrees.

It is immediately apparent that the G.M. figure for 'light condition' was a mere 0.21 ft., which is vastly different from 1.6 ft.. Both Koombana and Waratah (see images below) carried significant top hampers which were similar in profile. It is impossible to get such a variance to support Mr. Rankin's claim.

Provided she were fully loaded with 

cargo and bunker coal, and all the tanks 

were full, the Koombana could heel over to 

an angle of 90 per cent., and then have a 

margin for recovery. 

Again extreme exaggeration if one compares the figure of 90% with Waratah's range of stability figures above.

Captain Allen, prior to his departure from 

Fremantle, forwarded to witness, through 

the Western Australian manager of the company 

Mr. W. E. Moxon a report showing the distribution 

of a load of 712 tons. The report gave further the 

particulars of draught and trim.

The witness then gave a demonstration to 

the court of the use of the Ralston instrument. 

The 'G.M.' was plus 2ft, 1 1/2in., and the result 

of the second process almost exactly coincided 

with the late master's figures for the draught

and trim arrived at by ordinary means.

Again hypothetical, made worse by the fact that this was not the cargo component (260 tons; 14% of carrying capacity) when Koombana departed Port Hedland for the last time, with empty tanks!

In reply to Mr. Moss, the witness said the ship 

was in many respects in excess of British 

requirements, and that he placed every reliance on 

the Ralston instrument. A...C. Butcher, resident 

engineer of the Harbor and  Lights Department, 

said that, with Captain Rankin, he  had carried out 

tests, and the curves of stability were  particularly good. 

The stability curves supplied by the builders did not show 

such severe tests as that carried out by witness.

What was sorely missing in  this Inquiry was a document outlining the builders' stability curves for Koombana, whether such tests were severe or not. The Court did not get an opportunity to match these curves to the steamer carrying a mere 260 tons cargo, forward. A farce. 

Before the Court adjourned the chairman said that, as 

rumors had been afloat with regard to the alleged instability 

of the vessel, he desired to announce publicly that the 

court would be pleased to hear any evidence from persons

who had not been subpoenaed, but could give testimony.

Mr. Moss stated that, on behalf of the Adelaide Co., he 

was pleased the R.M. had mentioned the matter, as it

would give those people who had busied themselves in 

spreading false rumors a chance to make a statement in 

the court if they so desired.

How were 'those people' supposed to get from the Nor'West to Fremantle within a couple of days to 'make a statement' ?? Where there is smoke there is generally fire, and the rumours, in my opinion, were very well founded.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia; series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

if anything, Koombana had the greater top hamper...

This image appears to show Koombana steaming with the cattle loading door open. One can understand given the heat and humidity, Nor'West coast, but this would certainly have been a potential portal of water ingress in heavy seas - dangerous!

MOXON.

William Ernest Moxon spearheaded the Koombana project, in effect inspiring a flawed steamer destined for disaster.

Koombana had to have an unreasonably low draught in order to operate in and out of tidal ports such as Port Hedland.

Koombana, in light condition, was significantly top heavy, which in turn made her highly vulnerable in certain conditions, namely those of 20 March, 1912.

Mr. Moxon did everything in his power to distance himself from potential culpability and in the process 'threw Captain Allen under the bus'. The following extract from the Inquiry illustrates his approach and justifies my harsh opinion.

I have transcribed the document as follows (C.H.M. = Chief Harbour Master Irvine) :

WILLIAM ERNEST MOXON, sworn, saith:

I am Attorney and Manager in Western Australia for the Adelaide Steamship Company.

C.H.M. The SS 'Koombana' was one of a fleet of vessels owned by your company ?

Ans. Yes, and as manager for W.A. this vessel was under my direct supervision.

C.H.M. The loading of this vessel and the distribution of cargo was attended to by the Marine Superintendent in consultation with the Chief Officer acting for the Master.

Ans. Yes.

C.H.M. The Company has laid down rules and regulations for the guidance of Masters and ships?

Ans. Yes, I have the rule book here.
                   
                             (rule book put it in)

C.H.M. In connection with the last voyage of the 'Koombana', were any special instructions given to the Captain to push on or make up any lost time ?

Ans. She was running to time on a liberal time table.

C.H.M. The Captain was not directed to hurry up in any way ?

Ans. As a matter of fact the 'Bullarra' had just preceded her and had lightened her work at intermediate ports so that she had everything well in hand. The ship was not late and had nothing to pick up but a very small cargo at Port Hedland.

C.H.M. The movements of the ship when in Port Hedland were entirely in the hands of the Captain ?

Ans. Yes. Once a steamer leaves Fremantle on the north west trade matters are left practically to the master.

C.H.M. It was left to the discretion of Captain Allen when to sail or stay in port ?

                        (regulation number 4 read)

...Captain Allen would not let his judgment be interfered with by any one. He was a man of strong character.


The first point to note is that Captain Irvine, Chief Harbour Master, questioning Mr. Moxon, was almost leading his witness down the path of exculpation - "The movements of the ship when at Port Hedland were entirely in the hands of the captain ?"

This certainly gives an initial impression that the shipowner and authorities were closing ranks.

Mr. Moxon referred to Koombana 'running on time on a liberal time table'. 

Nothing could be further from the truth. Annie Boyd offers an eloquent explanation in Koombana Days illustrating how challenging it was for Koombana to make spring tides at Hedland and Broome within the 28 day cycle, including return trips from Derby or as far afield as Wyndham, via ports. 

Being caught or 'neaped' at Hedland could cost up to a week's delay and throw the entire schedule out. Koombana was a subsidized mail ship which if running late for 'not good enough reason' could be fined £ 5 per hour delayed. This was significant, never mind passenger and cargo demands. 

To say that it was a 'liberal time table' was being disingenuous and taking people on the Northwest for fools.

Mr. Moxon went further to claim that 'once the steamer leaves Fremantle on the north west trade matters are left practically to the Master.' and 'it was left to the discretion of Capt. Allen when to sail or stay in port.' 

In one blunt sweep Captain Allen was 'thrown under a bus', a man who could never defend himself and his actions; and who had gone to a watery grave with his complement of 157 innocent souls.

Whether Captain Allen had made an error of judgement as regards emptying and filling tanks, one will unlikely know. All that we do know is that he had little choice to leave Port Hedland that Wednesday morning with these words emphasizing his predicament:

"My passengers think they will get to Broome to-morrow (Thursday)," he remarked; "but they will be lucky if they get there by Saturday. I am going to put right out to sea, and as might bump the bar going out I will leave my ballast tanks until I get outside and fill them out there."  

Finally, the Company's rule No 4 was as follows:

The company's rule No. 4 stated that "No

order will be held to excuse the endangering

of the ship." 

Passing the buck ! Captain Allen could not win that day. He was damned if he stayed and damned if he sailed.

Note that there is no mention of lives, only that of the Company asset, the ship.

"Captain Allen would not let his judgment be interfered with by any one. He was a man of strong character."

Moxon in effect used this ploy to dispute the conversation alleged to have taken place between Captains Allen and Upjohn; in which Captain Upjohn claimed that he was going to 'take his chances at sea in the older vessel', to which Captain Allen replied that if Bullarra was going out, it wouldn't do for him to remain in Port Hedland for an additional 24 hours. In other words that he could be swayed by the more junior master.

Case closed.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

RICHARD ERNEST ARUNDEL.

Richard Ernest Arundel, surveyor to Lloyd's Register, had some interesting thoughts on what became of Koombana.

"I have come to the conclusion that, after leaving Port Hedland, making for Bedout, he (the captain) met the wind northerly so strong that it prevented him from getting to the north to go round Bedout; then finding it impossible to heave to on his port tack, which is the proper tack in a semi-circle on account of Bedout and Shoals under his lee, he must have adopted one of two courses; either to heave to on the starboard tack or attempt to run across to the open water to the westward in the face of the disturbance. In my opinion the disturbance was making almost direct into the coast."

".... in my opinion the disturbance was travelling very slowly."

"Your opinion is that the disturbance came down in a S.S.E. direction?"

"Yes, and that the "Koombana" before she reached Bedout, experiencing a wind, direction north & east, was obliged to heave to on the starboard tack on westward and in running west would get into the centre of the cyclone. My theory is that the heavy seas caused by the cyclone completely overwhelmed the vessel. The finding of wreckage to the westward confirms my opinion that she ran out to the westward."

I suspect that many present day searches followed this advice, to no avail.

I completely agree that the wind would have shifted from N.E. at the entrance to Port Hedland through North as referenced, approaching Bedout Island, confirming that the cyclone was moving 'almost direct into the coast' - vicinity of Balla Balla, 100 miles from Bedout. 

By the admission of S.R.P. Stevens, acting divisional officer of the Commonwealth Weather Bureau during the time of the disaster, the cyclone had a diameter of 90 miles. This implies that the fringe of the cyclone did not impact Bedout and the winds would have shifted through N and N.W. from N.E. as Koombana rounded the northern aspect of the island. 

Given the diameter as claimed, I don't agree that Koombana would not have been able to get to the north of the island. There were no hurricane conditions in this vicinity and furthermore, Koombana was an extremely powerful steamer for her size (3,000 ihp).

Mr. Arundel failed to explain how the bulk of wreckage was discovered to the north of Bedout if Koombana had been driven to the west.....  

The discovery of the wreck will prove this point one way or the other, definitively. 

One last and crucial point made was that the cyclone approached Balla Balla from the N.N.W. (heading S.S.E.). Given this simple and elegant confirmation of the path of the cyclone (further confirmed by the Moira account) the fringe could not possibly have impacted Bedout Island, 20 March!!! 

This simple fact was further confirmed by a cattleman on board SS Bullarra who commented that at noon, 20 March, he could see the cyclonic system to the west in the form of a dark, inky cloud formation (not north or northeast) off Bullarra's starboard bow - the steamer heading southwestward. 

State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357; cons 066

State Records Office, Western Australia; series 2357; cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia; series 2357; cons 066

courtesy Google Earth

Mr. Arundel made a highly enlightening comment:

"I have formed the opinion that she was a tender vessel when light but perfectly seaworthy."

What does this mean?

A tender vessel is a top heavy one and in Mr. Arundel's opinion this was the case when Koombana was in light condition; in other words the condition when Koombana carried minimal dead weight cargo in her lower holds which was precisely Koombana's status when she departed Hedland for the last time. 

'Perfectly seaworthy' might be a leap too far in this context. 

The final word on this sensitive subject is encapsulated in Mr. Arundel's final statements (document extract below):

"There is a popular fallacy that a ship having her top hampered is unsafe. If you have great weight in the bottom of a ship that gives stiffness and if you have not that great weight there is what is called tenderness. You do not think that a ship with top hampered, properly stowed, it would interfere with her stability at all?"

"No, the question in every case is a proper distribution of weight."

And there you have it. 

Koombana in light condition with a mere 260 tons of cargo forward in the ship - NOT aft and therefore not 'properly distributed' - was far from having adequate 'stiffness'; made worse by difficulties filling ballast tanks at sea, 20 March. 

There had been a scare, February 1910, when Koombana heeled over to a dangerous degree (45 degrees) and took too long to recover. She was carrying rails in her holds at the time and Captain Rees held onto them for no other reason than to give the ship extra dead weight lowest down in order to help stabilise her. 

The incident strongly suggested that Koombana should have been furnished with additional, permanent ballasting in the form of cement; lead concentrates; pig iron or some such countermeasure to offset the top hampering referred to....

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia; series 2357, cons 066

MATTHEW JOHN WILLIAMS.

Matthew John Williams, Marine Superintendent to the Adelaide Steamship Company in Western Australia.

Despite the consistently biased witness accounts from those associated with the ASSCo in favour of Koombana two interesting points were made.

1. Cargo was well secured in sections; 85 tons for Broome and 175 tons for Derby as per diagram below. 

In terms of this cargo component Koombana was in very light condition when she departed Hedland for the last time. Furthermore, the Broome cargo was higher up in the hull, raising centre of gravity and diminishing GM stability - i.e. top heaviness.

courtesy Annie Boyd.

2. Captain Williams referred to coal stowed on the main deck which was in effect the cattle deck above the Broome cargo labeled above. 

This could be construed as irresponsible in an inherently top heavy vessel, particularly when there was adequate stowage space in demarcated coal bunkers below this level. 

However, we know that no coal was stowed on the main deck according to Captain Upjohn at Hedland and he was there - Captain Williams was not. 

Captain Williams referred to two ballast tanks filled with salt water, both port and starboard subdivisions. Captain Upjohn referred specifically to tanks number 2 and number 3 used for salt water. 

However, Captain Upjohn also alluded to the afterpeak being a fresh water 'tank' as well. 

Reference was made to flexibility filling tanks: 

"the tanks used in trimming. If the ship had a list with the fresh water in one side on No 2, could they fill the other side with salt water?"

"The sub-divisions are totally independent of each other with separate connections for fresh and salt water."

In other words,    

"yes"

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia. Series 2357, cons 066