R.M.S. KOOMBANA
 |
| courtesy Trove |
 |
In light condition - rudder prominently exposed. courtesy State Library of Western Australia. |
Koombana was a magnificent, bespoke steamer with opulently appointed, well-ventilated, elevated passenger decks, cattle deck, and dedicated cargo holds (incl. refrigeration). But she was flawed; inherently top heavy, with a reduced draught of 20 ft. 8 in. to access harbours such as Port Hedland.
The indication of inherent top heaviness is illustrated by comparison with the similarly sized steamers Yongala and Grantala (greater draughts: 24 ft.) of the same Adelaide Steamship Company. The latter steamers, with significant top hampers, operated with ballast tank capacity of 400 tons, whereas Koombana required 900 tons to steady her.
Yongala and Grantala 3664 tons
Koombana 3668 tons
Koombana's track record, fully ballasted, gives us the most significant confirmatory clue regarding inherent top heaviness. 8 February, 1910, Koombana allegedly heeled over to 45 degrees in a squall and took a considerable time to recover.
20 March, 1912:
All the signs indicated that Koombana and Bullarra would be departing Port Hedland before noon into unpredictable and potentially dangerous conditions. A period advisory referred to an easterly wind and falling barometer being the warning signs for pearlers to seek shelter. 'At 6 a.m. the barometer had been at 29.50', down from 29.9. Between 4 a.m. and 10 a.m., in normal conditions the barometer readings rise, not fall. The wind, a gale by noon, came from the NE. (some sources claim a half gale from ENE).
'Two or three layers of swiftly racing clouds could frequently be seen through the prevailing mist. It blew with terrific force.'
40 luggers sought shelter in the creek, bringing tidings of a heavy ground swell from the northwest, which in turn, signaled the presence of a significant cyclonic event out at sea.
'Vessels engaged in the pearl-shell fisheries, on the northwestern coast of Australia, run on shore in any available creek, on indications of the approach of a cyclone.'
Alleged:
"I don't like the glass," was Captain Allen's remark,
But Captain Allen was compelled to depart at 10.20 am, due to pressure of maintaining a tide-dependent schedule; mail contract; cargo delivery and passenger demands.
Koombana departed Port Hedland carrying:
- 260 tons cargo
- 480 tons coal
- 60 tons stores
= 800 tons
(plus an undisclosed tonnage of residual fresh water in her tanks)
157 souls on board.
157 souls on board.
260 tons of cargo was only 14.4 % of maximum load - 1800 tons (not 4000 tons as is commonly reported). 85 tons for Broome were stowed in 'tween decks 1 and 2, higher up in hull, raising centre of gravity, reducing stability and 175 tons for Derby in hold 2, low down, improving stability. These units of cargo were loaded and secured at Fremantle for the voyage.
I do not believe there was a significant component of livestock on the cattle deck due to steaming up the coast. Livestock was destined for the markets at Fremantle and required fresh water and fodder at sea. Moreover, Bullarra had been reintroduced on the run that month to bring livestock back from Port Hedland, relieving Koombana of this function.
I do not believe there was a significant component of livestock on the cattle deck due to steaming up the coast. Livestock was destined for the markets at Fremantle and required fresh water and fodder at sea. Moreover, Bullarra had been reintroduced on the run that month to bring livestock back from Port Hedland, relieving Koombana of this function.
Drawing 16 ft. aft and 11 ft. forward (rather than the claimed 19 ft. aft 12 ft. forward), all ballast tanks empty, Koombana's propeller was not fully submerged (decreased thrust and manoeuvrability) and she displayed 'an ugly list to port' confirming her very light lading and ballast status.
The depth over the bar was 19 ft. at the time which means Koombana would not have cleared without incident, given the Inquiry's quoted 19 ft. aft figure. Furthermore, a dead weight of 800 tons (cargo in forward holds; empty after-peak and no 6 tank) could not have accounted for a draught 1.75 ft. short of maximum loading, aft.
Why was Koombana in such light, top heavy condition?
She needed to be!
Captain Allen:
"I might bump that outer bar going out on a sea like this."
"My passengers think they will get to Broome to-morrow (Thursday)," he remarked; "but they will be lucky if they get there by Saturday. I am going to put right out to sea, and as might bump the bar going out I will leave my ballast tanks until I get outside and fill them out there."
It was both risky and laborious to fill tanks at sea, particularly in a heavy ground swell and gale, and it would have taken more than 3 hours (in ideal conditions) to achieve this task and which delayed progress significantly. Two sets of eye witnesses referred to Koombana being in sight for only 2 hours. The tanks were unlikely to have been successfully pressed up during this time frame, which in turn would have created a free surface effect, enhancing the list; reducing what GM there was and impairing heeling recovery.
Why did Captain Allen not take the necessary time to fill all tanks? Quite simply, the Light at Bedout was not functioning and he had to clear the dangerous reef adjacent to the island before dark (6.38 p.m.).
Captain Allen anticipated and was ultimately confronted by a stiff head wind (gale from NE; ENE) slowing progress. Distance to Broome = 265 n miles. An average of 10 knots (14 knot steamer) or less would miss spring tide access to Broome the following day. Marked pitching would have exposed the propeller periodically, reducing thrust.
Why did Captain Allen not take the necessary time to fill all tanks? Quite simply, the Light at Bedout was not functioning and he had to clear the dangerous reef adjacent to the island before dark (6.38 p.m.).
Captain Allen anticipated and was ultimately confronted by a stiff head wind (gale from NE; ENE) slowing progress. Distance to Broome = 265 n miles. An average of 10 knots (14 knot steamer) or less would miss spring tide access to Broome the following day. Marked pitching would have exposed the propeller periodically, reducing thrust.
Bullarra:
'When we came on deck for the mid-day meal, the Bullara and the Koombana were stern on to each other, and the distance apart being about five miles.'
Koombana had not made much progress by noon due to the attempt to fill tanks.
With a gale and a significant wind catchment factor in the form of towering superstructure and funnel enhancing the existing list, Koombana was presented with challenges from the start. I believe Captain Allen made his decision to pursue the standard course rounding the northern aspect of Bedout Island based on the fact that he could see evidence of the cyclone to the westward on the horizon; not north or northeastward in which directions he was headed; confirmed by a witness account aboard Bullarra heading southwest:
"I noticed away on the starboard bow and
just above the horizon, a dense mass of
inky black clouds and from descriptions
I'd had from old pearlers, I was convinced
we were in for it."
Therefore, I believe Koombana only ever skirted the outer margin of the cyclone which targeted Balla Balla from the north-northwest, having curved round. The official meteorology report presented at the Inquiry claimed a cyclone diameter of 90 miles, which could not have broached Koombana's intended steamer track. This is further substantiated by evidence of minimal storm impact at Port Hedland and Bedout Island (lighthouse glass not encrusted and no signs of a disturbance).
"Scarcely any damage
was caused by the
hurricane at Port Hedland."
However, this said, Koombana in her unstable, top heavy condition would have been subjected to broad, deep sea swells; strong winds shifting through NE ---> N ----> NW, further unsettling stability and hindering heeling recovery. Listing heavily, she would have been vulnerable to water ingress via the cattle loading doors or the ventilation ports on the main deck, which would further have contributed to the free surface effect, worsening the list and further diminishing heeling recovery.
Cargo might also have shifted, contributing to the deteriorating situation.
In an attempt to correct the dangerous list, Captain Allen might have elected to pump out one of the longitudinal ballast tank sections on the side of the list, with the resultant catastrophic effect as illustrated by the S.S. Vestris disaster (November, 1928). Captain Carey pumped out tanks in the hope of decreasing a progressive list. Paradoxically, in part due to residual free water in tanks, the list increased dramatically.
Ultimately, when Koombana went over I believe she did so suddenly and violently, not allowing souls successful escape in lifeboats and if a few did, they did not survive to tell the tale.
No cargo or bodies were ever recovered suggesting that she turned turtle trapping both people and cargo within. Absence of bodies and cargo goes against the theory that Koombana was battered to pieces by the cyclone. Damaged pieces of wreckage, ultimately released from the wreck, could have been caused by superstructure striking the seabed or movement of the wreck itself along the seabed. It would also explain why wreckage was only discovered 12 to 14 days after the disaster - rising from the seabed - rather than due to immediate hurricane-force damage.
Insufficient time was allowed for wireless operator Harry Lyon to send out a distress signal via Marconi wireless, if indeed it was still operational. It is important to note that there was a backup wireless unit independent of the ship's electrical supply, but with only a 100 mile range.
I believe that the oil patch, discovered by Captain Upjohn of the Bullarra and represented on the image below, is Koombana's final resting place. An example of oil marking the spot was used to locate the Clan Ranald wreck, January 1909:
"direct me to the spot where the wreck was sunk,
which he said he knew exactly, having seen
streams of oil rising from her."
This is further borne out by the distribution of the bulk of wreckage, drifting with the predominantly (south)westward trending current which predominates after alongshore cyclones in the Pilbara. This position is within the outer steamer track for Broome.
Koombana was not off course.
Inquiry (courtesy Koombana Days online site):
"- It was in latitude 19.11 and 119.25 E.
What distance would that be off Bedout Island?
Did you take any samples of this oily substance?
- Yes, two or three dozen bottles.
What depth was there at this place?
- 30 or 35 fathoms. (55 m - 64 m)
Did you see any trace of the vessel at that depth? There would be nothing to indicate that the Koombana or any other vessel would be there?
- It was getting dark and it looked like the outline of a vessel."
After further analysis, 27.5 miles northeast of Bedout Island coincides with 19 15 51 S, 119 26 48 E (30 fathoms), a position 20 miles from additional wreckage to the west and which, in turn, lay 20 miles to the north of Bedout Island - as referenced by Captain Upjohn.
Although not represented on the graphic below, Captain Upjohn referred to:
They had taken the specimens (of
oily water) produced in Court at
this spot. An awning spar and one
of the planks exhibited in Court
had also been discovered in close
proximity. Other articles were picked
up about 20 miles from that spot.
(marked 2 and 3 on graphic).
1. Stateroom door; painting stage; small pieces of board. SS Gorgon
2. Motor launch starboard bow plank (with insignia). SS Bullarra
3. Small wreckage; (life) boat tanks; lifebelts; panel from saloon / smoke room ceiling. SS Bullarra
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)
4. Bottom board from (life) boat; white painted board. Lugger McLennan.
5. (life) boat mast and small wreckage (rising from bottom). SS Una
6. Miscellaneous wreckage. SS Una
7. Miscellaneous wreckage. SS Una.
8. Cabin paneling. Lugger Mina.
9. Smoking room cushion; cabin door. SS Minderoo.
10. Straw envelopes (Leech's fortune). SS Minderoo and SS Gorgon.
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)
(see: https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/11/sufficient-warning.html)
11. Bottom boards (lifeboat); drawer; small teak panel. SS Minderoo.
 |
| Official cyclone, 90 miles in diameter, as per Meteorological Office. Note that the cyclone approached the coast from the direction of S.S. Moira's position, 8 a.m.. Courtesy Google Earth. |
 |
| courtesy Trove |
 |
| this map which appeared in a period newspaper report gives an idea of the route taken by Koombana, 'shaping a course' around the northern aspect of Bedout Island. (the 'last seen here' annotation is unconfirmed, but could substantiate Koombana being on course this far) |
 |
| presumed track Port Hedland to Broome |
The residents of Hedland had a final say on the matter:
The ship's propeller was showing
when anchored at the jetty, and
raced out of the water as she sailed
over the rolling seas at the harbor's
entrance ; the boat also rolled heavily
when the wind struck her on the
starboard side—so much so that
several who were watching her exclaimed.
"She'll be over directly " !
And a final, cryptic comment:
Sunday Times, Perth, 31 March, 1912.
Therefore, as she has not been found along the
Ninety-Mile Beach or in La Grange Bay, we are
led to the terrible alternative that she was engulfed
somewhere north-east of Bedout Island, where
she was last spoken.
 |
| courtesy ANU archives |
 |
| In this image of Koombana apparently steaming, the main livestock loading door is open, one assumes due to the excessive heat and humidity along the Nor'West coast. Of concern would have been a potential portal of water ingress during heavy seas and rolling. |
This detailed post includes previous posts, the purpose of the exercise being to illustrate how complex the Koombana disaster was and how mismatched the steamer for the Nor'West trade.
Returning to why Captain Allen took over command of Koombana from Captain Rees it was never made clear in period reports. Koombana was prestigious, Winfield, a lumbering coal transporter; clearly a downgrade for Captain Rees.
However, the following complex post outlines a possible explanation. Allen had a background of extensive port pilot experience (Adelaide) and it might have been perceived by all parties that he was better able to negotiate (navigate) Koombana in and out of Port Hedland (and Shark Bay) with a measure of superior success.
One thing does become clear perusing the details, Rees was not given as many grueling schedules as Allen. But as fate would deem, such ambitions were to catch up with Koombana, her owners and Tom Allen who, for all his experience, was not a magician.
Koombana completed almost 37 trips during her time in service. These schedules offer important insights.
Firstly it is helpful to review the tide-dependent access to Port Hedland and Broome:
In order for Koombana to safely access these two ports, entries and exits had to be made as close to spring (King) tide as possible. The 28 day lunar cycle offers 2 alternating spring and neap tides, with intervals of 7 days.
This presented significant challenges to the Adelaide Steamship Company arranging the schedule for a roughly monthly return voyage to the northern terminus; either Derby or Wyndham.
Port Hedland and Broome were conveniently paired and separated by only a 24 hour voyage - +/- 250 miles. This means that Koombana could make use of the same spring tide for both ports.
The schedule could be so arranged that Port Hedland and Broome were serviced once during a return trip, allowing the schedule to coincide with a single spring tide. However, this ease of tidal access depended on no unforeseen delays at ports prior to Port Hedland and Broome - in most instances, readily achieved.
The real challenge came when the schedule demanded the tidal ports to be serviced twice in one return trip, forcing the steamer to make it back from Derby within the extended influence of the diminishing spring tide. To facilitate this delicate balancing act, it helped to initially arrive at Port Hedland ahead of the peak spring tide, but at a point allowing enough water over the outer bar to gain access, in order to return on the last gasps of the same spring tide.
Fortunately the return trip to Wyndham took a convenient fortnight, which coincided with the next spring tide.
It is of interest that during Captain Rees' 29 trips in command of Koombana, Port Hedland was visited 15 times (16 including captain Hurrell, one trip). Of all these trips into and out of the dreaded tidal port, John Rees was only ever expected to tackle the challenge twice during one round trip and in this he failed - missing the return access into Port Hedland, May 1910.
Mostly, Captain Rees was only expected to get to the terminus, Derby or Wyndham, via ports and return to Fremantle direct, with only one further call at Port Sampson jetty. This arrangement makes the assumption that livestock for markets at Fremantle was loaded at Port Hedland en-route to the terminus rather than on the way back - additional fodder and water required for the extended trip.
Captain Rees did however tackle Broome twice in a single trip on 3 occasions, all successful. This suggests that Broome was the relatively 'easier' access option beyond a spring tide peak, compared with Port Hedland. It did not have a bar and the spring tide period was extended.
Firstly it is helpful to review the tide-dependent access to Port Hedland and Broome:
In order for Koombana to safely access these two ports, entries and exits had to be made as close to spring (King) tide as possible. The 28 day lunar cycle offers 2 alternating spring and neap tides, with intervals of 7 days.
This presented significant challenges to the Adelaide Steamship Company arranging the schedule for a roughly monthly return voyage to the northern terminus; either Derby or Wyndham.
Port Hedland and Broome were conveniently paired and separated by only a 24 hour voyage - +/- 250 miles. This means that Koombana could make use of the same spring tide for both ports.
 |
| courtesy Lonely Planet. |
The schedule could be so arranged that Port Hedland and Broome were serviced once during a return trip, allowing the schedule to coincide with a single spring tide. However, this ease of tidal access depended on no unforeseen delays at ports prior to Port Hedland and Broome - in most instances, readily achieved.
The real challenge came when the schedule demanded the tidal ports to be serviced twice in one return trip, forcing the steamer to make it back from Derby within the extended influence of the diminishing spring tide. To facilitate this delicate balancing act, it helped to initially arrive at Port Hedland ahead of the peak spring tide, but at a point allowing enough water over the outer bar to gain access, in order to return on the last gasps of the same spring tide.
Fortunately the return trip to Wyndham took a convenient fortnight, which coincided with the next spring tide.
It is of interest that during Captain Rees' 29 trips in command of Koombana, Port Hedland was visited 15 times (16 including captain Hurrell, one trip). Of all these trips into and out of the dreaded tidal port, John Rees was only ever expected to tackle the challenge twice during one round trip and in this he failed - missing the return access into Port Hedland, May 1910.
Mostly, Captain Rees was only expected to get to the terminus, Derby or Wyndham, via ports and return to Fremantle direct, with only one further call at Port Sampson jetty. This arrangement makes the assumption that livestock for markets at Fremantle was loaded at Port Hedland en-route to the terminus rather than on the way back - additional fodder and water required for the extended trip.
Captain Rees did however tackle Broome twice in a single trip on 3 occasions, all successful. This suggests that Broome was the relatively 'easier' access option beyond a spring tide peak, compared with Port Hedland. It did not have a bar and the spring tide period was extended.
This was indeed the case. Port Hedland only allowed a narrow two days on either side of high water springs to access the port whereas Broome allowed up to 5 days on either side of the high water springs.
When Captain Allen took over command of Koombana, he was 'initiated' gently, if one can call it that, by being given a schedule that although including both Port Hedland and Broome on top of a spring tide, allowed Captain Allen to steam directly back to Fremantle after departing Wyndham without having to include Broome and Port Hedland again.
Recalling a previous post, Captain Allen could achieve clearance of the outer bar at Port Hedland with 14'8" forward and 18'6" aft. which correlates with what must have been a generous peak spring tide outer bar clearance, 21/09/1911. New moon was in fact 21/09/1911 - would have been about 19.6 ft. over the bar.
When Captain Allen took over command of Koombana, he was 'initiated' gently, if one can call it that, by being given a schedule that although including both Port Hedland and Broome on top of a spring tide, allowed Captain Allen to steam directly back to Fremantle after departing Wyndham without having to include Broome and Port Hedland again.
Recalling a previous post, Captain Allen could achieve clearance of the outer bar at Port Hedland with 14'8" forward and 18'6" aft. which correlates with what must have been a generous peak spring tide outer bar clearance, 21/09/1911. New moon was in fact 21/09/1911 - would have been about 19.6 ft. over the bar.
https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/09/getting-to-grips-with-tanks.html (below)
However, once 'initiation' was over Captain Allen was then expected to visit Port Hedland twice during the same round trip, October, 1911. This suggests that on the second visit, 31 October, returning from Derby 6 days later, drawing 12'2" forward and 18'8" aft. there was in all probability a bar strike, and Koombana lucky to escape the dreaded port. Broome was not included in this schedule for obvious reasons. The new moon was 21/10/1911 and full moon 06/11/1911, which raises the question how did Captain Allen get Koombana into and out of Port Hedland without 'bumping the bar' even with all tanks empty??
Captain Allen was then expected to service both tidal ports twice in one round trip, December, 1911. Theoretically the return from Wyndham should have coincided with a fresh spring tide two weeks later. However, the cautious master was forced to empty at least one aft ballast tank, drawing 13'6" forward and 16'9" aft. (his lowest draft figures to date) and it is alleged that he was lucky to escape Port Hedland just after midnight, Christmas Day, 5 days after the new moon and 3 / 4 days after high water springs . Due to a delay in departure and the grueling schedule Koombana was out of sync with the spring tide cycle.
December, 1911 - Fremantle; Shark Bay; Carnarvon; Onslow; Port Sampson; Depuch Island; Port Hedland; Broome; Derby; Wyndham; Broome; Port Hedland; Port Sampson; Onslow; Carnarvon; Fremantle.
Compare this schedule with Captain Rees' last voyage before handing over to Captain Allen:
June / July 1911 - Fremantle; Port Sampson; Port Hedland; Broome; Derby; Fremantle.
18 January, 1912, 2 days before high water springs (new moon, 19 January) Koombana struck the bar at Port Hedland. If Captain Allen had waited a day, this could have been avoided and stresses how rigorous the schedule and pressures actually were! It is a great pity that we do not have draft figures for this bar strike as the log was lost with the steamer.
February 1912, the schedule once again included the two ports twice during one round trip - 17/02/1912 and 01/03/1912. New moon, 18/02/1912 and full moon, 03/03/1912. This good timing with high water springs schedule demonstrates that the terminus being Wyndham, there was the consolation of returning to coincide with a fresh spring tide which was achieved ( no reports of a bar strike) and a far more reasonable schedule - only Onslow and Port Sampson prior to Port Hedland.
Although we do not have the full, final schedule for March, 1912, the beleaguered master was expected to perform the enormously challenging feat of servicing Geraldton; Shark Bay; Carnarvon; Onslow and Port Sampson before Port Hedland which translated into being a day late. As if this challenge were not enough Koombana was then scheduled to visit Broome, Derby and, in all probability, return to Broome, catching the tail end of the same spring tide. Why not Port Hedland on the return? For obvious reasons!
The introduction of Bullarra on the run was intended to relieve Koombana of a second visit to Port Hedland after departing Derby.
Derby, on Tuesday, March 12th, at
Whether Koombana was expected to return to Broome, 26 March, is not known for absolute certain. There was some confusion as illustrated in the published schedule 25 March, 1912, The Daily News, Perth:
In this case the terminus was reported as being Wyndham, not Derby. Bullarra was reported as servicing Derby, 28 March, which was not the case, as the 'Old Bull' departed Port Hedland, 20 March, going south, not north.
We know that Captain Allen had deep reservations about departing Port Hedland 20 March, outlined in various Hedland Advocate extracts from the time:
These two paragraphs are loaded in what was said and what was implied. We get a clear impression that Captain Allen was very concerned about the weather conditions out at sea and more specifically the likelihood of a cyclone developing.
He said as much:
Koombana should have arrived at Broome as per schedule, the following day, Thursday. Saturday implied being significantly delayed at sea, possibly heading as far out as practical to weather a cyclonic event before attempting to make Broome.
Captain Allen made a cryptic comment:
"Another 24 hours here will not matter."
This suggests that contrary to my assumption that Captain Allen was under enormous pressure to make it back to the tidal port of Broome within the scope of the spring tide, this might not have been the case. The suggested delay speaks of only having to make Broome by the Saturday, as claimed, then to Derby and after that a more direct passage back to Fremantle.
However, once 'initiation' was over Captain Allen was then expected to visit Port Hedland twice during the same round trip, October, 1911. This suggests that on the second visit, 31 October, returning from Derby 6 days later, drawing 12'2" forward and 18'8" aft. there was in all probability a bar strike, and Koombana lucky to escape the dreaded port. Broome was not included in this schedule for obvious reasons. The new moon was 21/10/1911 and full moon 06/11/1911, which raises the question how did Captain Allen get Koombana into and out of Port Hedland without 'bumping the bar' even with all tanks empty??
Captain Allen was then expected to service both tidal ports twice in one round trip, December, 1911. Theoretically the return from Wyndham should have coincided with a fresh spring tide two weeks later. However, the cautious master was forced to empty at least one aft ballast tank, drawing 13'6" forward and 16'9" aft. (his lowest draft figures to date) and it is alleged that he was lucky to escape Port Hedland just after midnight, Christmas Day, 5 days after the new moon and 3 / 4 days after high water springs . Due to a delay in departure and the grueling schedule Koombana was out of sync with the spring tide cycle.
December, 1911 - Fremantle; Shark Bay; Carnarvon; Onslow; Port Sampson; Depuch Island; Port Hedland; Broome; Derby; Wyndham; Broome; Port Hedland; Port Sampson; Onslow; Carnarvon; Fremantle.
Compare this schedule with Captain Rees' last voyage before handing over to Captain Allen:
June / July 1911 - Fremantle; Port Sampson; Port Hedland; Broome; Derby; Fremantle.
18 January, 1912, 2 days before high water springs (new moon, 19 January) Koombana struck the bar at Port Hedland. If Captain Allen had waited a day, this could have been avoided and stresses how rigorous the schedule and pressures actually were! It is a great pity that we do not have draft figures for this bar strike as the log was lost with the steamer.
February 1912, the schedule once again included the two ports twice during one round trip - 17/02/1912 and 01/03/1912. New moon, 18/02/1912 and full moon, 03/03/1912. This good timing with high water springs schedule demonstrates that the terminus being Wyndham, there was the consolation of returning to coincide with a fresh spring tide which was achieved ( no reports of a bar strike) and a far more reasonable schedule - only Onslow and Port Sampson prior to Port Hedland.
Although we do not have the full, final schedule for March, 1912, the beleaguered master was expected to perform the enormously challenging feat of servicing Geraldton; Shark Bay; Carnarvon; Onslow and Port Sampson before Port Hedland which translated into being a day late. As if this challenge were not enough Koombana was then scheduled to visit Broome, Derby and, in all probability, return to Broome, catching the tail end of the same spring tide. Why not Port Hedland on the return? For obvious reasons!
The West Australian, 22 February, 1912.
NOR'-WEST.
ADELAIDE S.S. CO.'S ENTERPRISE.
Residents of the Nor'-West will welcome the
return of the Bullarra to the Nor'-West trade.
Prior to the advent of the Koombana, the
Bullarra was well and popularly known on the
trade. She is due from the Eastern States
shortly, and will be despatched on a trip to
Port Hedland via ports on March 8. After her
return from Port Hedland on the trip mentioned
she will run between Fremantle and Derby
via ports as a cargo and passenger steamer also
carrying stock and mails. By running in conjunction
with the Koombana additional shipping facilities
will be provided. This matter has long been the
subject of agitation on the part of various trade
associations in representations which have been
made to the Government to provide further facilities
along the coast.
The Geraldton Express, 28 February, 1912.
Koombana leaves Fremantle for
Geraldton and all coastal ports toDerby, on Tuesday, March 12th, at
11 a.m.
 |
| courtesy trove |
In this case the terminus was reported as being Wyndham, not Derby. Bullarra was reported as servicing Derby, 28 March, which was not the case, as the 'Old Bull' departed Port Hedland, 20 March, going south, not north.
We know that Captain Allen had deep reservations about departing Port Hedland 20 March, outlined in various Hedland Advocate extracts from the time:
Furthermore, Captain Allen, when
questioned by Mr. Barker as to
whether he was going to put out,
said he did not know. "I don't like
the glass," was Captain Allen's
remark, "and another 24 hours
here will not matter."
His decision to put out was only
announced subsequent to a conversation
which took place on the Koombana
between Captain Allen and Captain
Upjohn of the Bullarra (20 minutes
before departing).
He said as much:
"My passengers think they will get
to Broome to-morrow (Thursday)," he
remarked; "but they will be lucky if
they get there by Saturday."
Koombana should have arrived at Broome as per schedule, the following day, Thursday. Saturday implied being significantly delayed at sea, possibly heading as far out as practical to weather a cyclonic event before attempting to make Broome.
The Daily News, 25 March, 1912.
It is evident that she first encountered
the beginning of the blow between
Port Hedland and Bedout Island. - 'If
the wind were favorable it is reasonable
to suppose that Captain Allen at once
steered a course for the open sea,
and may have had to run out for
about 200 miles.' As it blows very
strongly after these cyclonic
disturbances, it is evident that she
would be a great way out of her
course before she was able to cut for
Broome, and that it would take at least
41/2 days before she reached her
destination.
"Another 24 hours here will not matter."
This suggests that contrary to my assumption that Captain Allen was under enormous pressure to make it back to the tidal port of Broome within the scope of the spring tide, this might not have been the case. The suggested delay speaks of only having to make Broome by the Saturday, as claimed, then to Derby and after that a more direct passage back to Fremantle.
This question is answered in more detail at the following post link:
https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2021/04/port-hedland-and-bar.html (below)
But there is another way of looking at this. 24 hours was just that, only one day. By not having to revisit Port Hedland after servicing Broome, Derby, Broome, would allow a day's leeway - in fact 2 - in the schedule.
Then why did the man go against his better judgment and depart after consulting with Captain Upjohn, twenty minutes before departure?
To say that Captain Allen was under pressure to leave is an understatement! It is interesting to note that these two men referred to each other by their titles and were not on first name terms. Why? Stiff relationship? After all Allen got Koombana and Upjohn after serving on Koombana for 12 months as Chief Officer, got the ageing Bullarra. No guesses then....
All things being equal I believe that Captain Allen was subjected to rigorously challenging tide-dependent schedules and enormous pressure to fulfill these demands, far beyond that expected of his predecessor, Captain Rees (and Upjohn).
Although he had serious reservations about departing Port Hedland 20 March, his devotion to duty, Captain Upjohn's 'challenge'; cargo delivery; mail contract and passenger expectations, forced him to take a gamble, the odds of which were against him...
But there is another way of looking at this. 24 hours was just that, only one day. By not having to revisit Port Hedland after servicing Broome, Derby, Broome, would allow a day's leeway - in fact 2 - in the schedule.
Then why did the man go against his better judgment and depart after consulting with Captain Upjohn, twenty minutes before departure?
Captain Allen Koombana: "I do
not like the look of the weather.
Captain Upjohn; what do you intend
doing?"
Captain Upjohn (Bullarra): "I have
made up my mind to go out and your
boat is a far better one than mine."
Captain Allen: "Well, if you intend
going out, I do not suppose it will do
for me to stop here."
To say that Captain Allen was under pressure to leave is an understatement! It is interesting to note that these two men referred to each other by their titles and were not on first name terms. Why? Stiff relationship? After all Allen got Koombana and Upjohn after serving on Koombana for 12 months as Chief Officer, got the ageing Bullarra. No guesses then....
All things being equal I believe that Captain Allen was subjected to rigorously challenging tide-dependent schedules and enormous pressure to fulfill these demands, far beyond that expected of his predecessor, Captain Rees (and Upjohn).
Although he had serious reservations about departing Port Hedland 20 March, his devotion to duty, Captain Upjohn's 'challenge'; cargo delivery; mail contract and passenger expectations, forced him to take a gamble, the odds of which were against him...
It could be further argued that masters were encouraged to face storms out at sea rather than in port. In this case, the material risk of Koombana ending up in the mangroves vs. human life at sea, surviving a potential cyclone in a top heavy steamer.
June, 1910, Koombana stopped at Shark's Bay, Denham, with the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Connolly on board. This is not recorded in the above schedule.
20 October, 1910, Koombana's forward hold was on fire due to wet wool shipped at Shark's Bay igniting. The above quoted schedule for 20 October does not include Denham, Shark's Bay.
The same applied to December 1910, when message was received that Captain Rees was standing off at Shark's Bay due to the lowness of the tide, en route from Carnarvon.
Courtesy references from Annie Boyd's outstanding Koombana Days - pages 329 - 334.
| VOYAGE 1: 27/02/1909 - 08/03/1909 | MELBOURNE | ADELAIDE | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 2: 12/03/1909 - 15/04/1909 | FREMANTLE | GERALDTON | CARNARVON | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 03/04/1909 | BROOME 05/04/1909 | DERBY 07/04/1909 | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 3: 20/04/1909 - 09/05/1909 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | BROOME 28/09/1909 | 28/04/1909 | DERBY 30/04/1909 | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 4: 12/05/1909 - 03/06/1909 | FREMANTLE | GERALDTON | PORT SAMPSON | BROOME 22/05/1909 | DERBY 24/05/1909 | GERALDTON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| V OYAGE 5: 05/06/1909 - 13/06/1909 | FREMANTLE | SYDNEY | REPAIRS | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 6: 24/07/1909 - 05/08/1909 | SYDNEY | FREMANTLE | REPAIRS | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 7: 08/08/1909 - 28/08/1909 | 08/08/1909 - 28/08/1909 | FREMANTLE | CARNARVON | DERBY | PORT SAMPSON | CARNARVON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 8: 03/09/1909 - 24/09/1909 | FREMANTLE | PORT HEDLAND 12/09/1909 | BROOME 14/09/1909 | DERBY 16/09/1909 | BROOME 18/09/1909 | COSSACK | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 9: 29/09/1909 - 25/10/1909 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 05/09/1909 | BROOME 07/09/1909 | DERBY | WYNDHAM | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 10: 02/11/1909 - 29/11/1909 | FREMANTLE | GERALDTON | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 10/11/1909 | WYNDHAM 17/11/1909 | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 11: 01/12/1909 - 02/01/1910 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | BROOME 14/12/1909 | DERBY | WYNDHAM | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 12: 03/01/1910 - 26/01/1910 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | BROOME 15/01/1910 | DERBY | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 13: 27/01/1910 - 01/03/1910 | FREMANTLE | BUNBURY | FREMANTLE | CARNARVON | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 08/02/1910 | BROOME 10/02/1910DERBY | WYNDHAM | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 14: 05/03/1910 - 26/03/1910 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | DERBY | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 15: 27/03/1910 - 29/04/1910 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | WYNDHAM | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 16: 30/04/1910 - 30/05/1910 | FREMANTLE | PORT HEDLAND 12/05/1910 | BROOME 14/05/1910 | DERBY | MISSED PORT HEDLAND | COSSACK | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 17: 31/05/1910 - 22/06/1910 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 10/06/1910 | BROOME 12/06/1910 | DERBY | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 18: 23/06/1910 - 21/07/1910 | VIA BUNBURY | PORT SAMPSON | DEPUCH ISLAND | PORT HEDLAND 08/07/1910 | BROOME 10/07/1910 | DERBY | BROOME 15/07/1910 | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 19: 22/07/1910 - 23/08/1910 | FREMANTLE | SYDNEY | FREMANTLE | OVERHAUL | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 20: 24/08/1910 - 25/09/1910 | VIA BUNBURY | PORT SAMPSON | BROOME 05/09/1910 | DERBY | WYNDHAM | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 21: 26/09/1910 - 29/10/1910 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | WYNDHAM | PORT HEDLAND | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 22: 30/10/1910 - 24/11/1910 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | BROOME | DERBY | BROOME 14/11/1910 | PORT HEDLAND 16/11/1910 | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 23: 25/11/1910 - 24/12/1910 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 03/12/1910 | BROOME 05/12/1910 | DERBY | WYNDHAM | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 24: 25/12/1910 - 23/01/1911 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 05/01/1911 | BROOME 07/01/1911 | DERBY | PORT HEDLAND | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 25: 24/01/1911 - 21/02/1911 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 02/02/1911 | BROOME 04/02/1911 | DERBY | WYNDHAM | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 26: 22/02/1911 - 17/03/1911 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | DERBY | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 27: 18/03/1911 - 18/04/1911 | FREMANTLE | CARNARVON | PORT SAMPSON | BROOME | WYNDHAM | CARNARVON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 28: 19/04/1911 - 20/05/1911 | FREMANTLE | GERALDTON | CARNARVON | ONSLOW | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 02/05/1911 | BROOME 04/05/1911 | NEAPED | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 29: 23/05/1911 - 18/06/1911 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 30/05/1911 | BROOME 01/06/1911 | DERBY | WYNDHAM | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 30: 20/06/1911 - 12/07/1911 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 28/06/1911 | BROOME 30/06/1911 | DERBY | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 31: 13/07/1911 - 06/09/1911 | FREMANTLE | SYDNEY | FREMANTLE | OVERHAUL | MARCONI INSTALLATION | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 32: 12/09/1911 - 12/10/1911 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 21/09/1911 | BROOME 23/09/1911 | DERBY | WYNDHAM | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 33: 13/10/1911 - 08/11/1911 | FREMANTLE | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 25/10/1911 | DERBY | PORT HEDLAND 31/10/1911 | PORT SAMPSON | FREMANTLE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 34: 30/11/1911 - 03/01/1912 | FREMANTLE | SHARK BAY | CARNARVON | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 09/12/1911 | BROOME 11/12/1912 | DERBY | WYNDHAM | BROOME 22/12/1911 | PORT HEDLAND 24/12/1911 | PORT SAMPSON | ONSLOW | CARNARVON | SHARK BAY | GERALDTON | FREMANTLE | |||||||||||||||||||
| 2 X GROUNDINGS AND DELAYED DEPARTURE PORT HEDLAND ALMOST MISSING LAST OF THE SPRING TIDE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 35: 09/01/1912 - 06/02/1912 | SHARK BAY | CARNARVON | ONSLOW | PORT SAMPSON | DEPUCH | PORT HEDLAND 18/01/1912 | BROOME 20/01/1912 | DERBY | WYNDHAM | FREMANTLE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| STRUCK BAR PORT HEDLAND | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 36: 08/02/1912 - 07/03/1912 | ONSLOW | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 17/02/1912 | BROOME 19/02/1912 | DERBY | WYNDHAM | BROOME 29/02/1912 | PORT HEDLAND 01/03/1912 | CARNARVON | FREMANTLE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| VOYAGE 37: 12/03/1912 - 20/03/1912 | GERALDTON | SHARK BAY | CARNARVON | ONSLOW | PORT SAMPSON | PORT HEDLAND 19/03/1912 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Note:
June, 1910, Koombana stopped at Shark's Bay, Denham, with the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Connolly on board. This is not recorded in the above schedule.
20 October, 1910, Koombana's forward hold was on fire due to wet wool shipped at Shark's Bay igniting. The above quoted schedule for 20 October does not include Denham, Shark's Bay.
The same applied to December 1910, when message was received that Captain Rees was standing off at Shark's Bay due to the lowness of the tide, en route from Carnarvon.
Courtesy references from Annie Boyd's outstanding Koombana Days - pages 329 - 334.
This is a complicated, confusing subject and it helps a little to review Captain Upjohn's fuller inquiry transcript at:
https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/09/revelations-and-contradictions.html (below)
The Inquiry transcript extracts below reinforce Captain Upjohn's decision not to defend Captain Allen's decision to depart Port Hedland with 'empty tanks'. Captain Upjohn disingenuously suggested that Koombana, with her tanks pressed up, would have had a draught aft of 17 ft. which should have cleared the outer bar, 19 ft. deep, 20 March, 1912. In other words he suggested that Captain Allen could have departed Port Hedland that morning without ANY tanks empty.
The following document illustrates the subdivisions of tanks being used as required for trimming; e.g. fresh water port side subdivision and sea water starboard subdivision. What combinations and how Captain Allen ultimately achieved his goal remains in the realm of speculation.
The following extracts are drawn from The Australia Pilot, volume 4, published 1920 and the depth figures were compiled after correlating with present day tide data.
https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/09/revelations-and-contradictions.html (below)
The Inquiry transcript extracts below reinforce Captain Upjohn's decision not to defend Captain Allen's decision to depart Port Hedland with 'empty tanks'. Captain Upjohn disingenuously suggested that Koombana, with her tanks pressed up, would have had a draught aft of 17 ft. which should have cleared the outer bar, 19 ft. deep, 20 March, 1912. In other words he suggested that Captain Allen could have departed Port Hedland that morning without ANY tanks empty.
But this was NOT the full picture by any stretch of the imagination.
Captain Upjohn contradicted himself and in the course of his session on the witness stand gave draught figures for when Koombana's aft tanks were empty; 16 ft. 6 in. and 13 -14 ft. forward, representing these forward tanks filled.
The above post link fleshes this out in more detail:
17 ft. (referenced above) equated with just the after peak empty and 16'6 ft. (16.5 ft.) with both after peak and number 6 tank, empty.
Compare these figures with alleged claims made by the Port Hedland harbour master that Koombana departed that fateful morning with draught figures: 16 ft. aft (further reduced from 16.5 ft.) and 11 ft. forward (normally 13.5 ft.). These figures confirm that most, if not all, of Koombana's tanks were empty; further enhanced by minimal cargo (14%) stowed forward.
It appears that before Captain Allen's tenure the practice was to empty either the after peak or the after peak and number 6 tank for clearing the bar at Port Hedland, leaving the remaining forward tanks full.
In fact Captain Allen copied this trend exactly on Christmas Day, 1911.
Captain Allen was a cautious master who understood Koombana's inherent top heaviness and when he took command, initially preferred to keep all tanks full accessing Port Hedland. However, on numerous occasions Koombana suffered damaging bar strikes in the process.
It stood to reason that by 20 March, Captain Allen had learned lessons too well, deciding to opt for empty tanks, i.e. 16 ft. aft, 11 ft. forward to ensure uncomplicated clearance of the outer bar (19 ft.) during a significant groundswell and gale from the NE, when his tender vessel would be pitching and rolling, requiring at least 3 ft. clearance. But this decision forced him to fill all tanks at sea.
In previous posts I have drawn attention to the fresh water component which was not replenished at ports and potentially created a free surface effect (loose water) in demarcated fresh water tanks. Captain Upjohn explained that in order to reduce the free surface effect (increasing heeling instability) in selected fresh water tanks midships 4 and 5, longitudinally sub-divided (voyage from Geraldton to Port Hedland) this water could be replaced / topped up by water from the after peak tank (see image - most rear tank) which consequently would be 'empty' on arrival at the outer bar reducing aft draught to 17 ft., facilitating clearance of the bar and solving two problems simultaneously. Subsequent to this the afterpeak could be filled with salt water for the remainder of the voyage north.
Captain Upjohn contradicted himself and in the course of his session on the witness stand gave draught figures for when Koombana's aft tanks were empty; 16 ft. 6 in. and 13 -14 ft. forward, representing these forward tanks filled.
The above post link fleshes this out in more detail:
17 ft. (referenced above) equated with just the after peak empty and 16'6 ft. (16.5 ft.) with both after peak and number 6 tank, empty.
Compare these figures with alleged claims made by the Port Hedland harbour master that Koombana departed that fateful morning with draught figures: 16 ft. aft (further reduced from 16.5 ft.) and 11 ft. forward (normally 13.5 ft.). These figures confirm that most, if not all, of Koombana's tanks were empty; further enhanced by minimal cargo (14%) stowed forward.
It appears that before Captain Allen's tenure the practice was to empty either the after peak or the after peak and number 6 tank for clearing the bar at Port Hedland, leaving the remaining forward tanks full.
In fact Captain Allen copied this trend exactly on Christmas Day, 1911.
Captain Allen was a cautious master who understood Koombana's inherent top heaviness and when he took command, initially preferred to keep all tanks full accessing Port Hedland. However, on numerous occasions Koombana suffered damaging bar strikes in the process.
It stood to reason that by 20 March, Captain Allen had learned lessons too well, deciding to opt for empty tanks, i.e. 16 ft. aft, 11 ft. forward to ensure uncomplicated clearance of the outer bar (19 ft.) during a significant groundswell and gale from the NE, when his tender vessel would be pitching and rolling, requiring at least 3 ft. clearance. But this decision forced him to fill all tanks at sea.
In previous posts I have drawn attention to the fresh water component which was not replenished at ports and potentially created a free surface effect (loose water) in demarcated fresh water tanks. Captain Upjohn explained that in order to reduce the free surface effect (increasing heeling instability) in selected fresh water tanks midships 4 and 5, longitudinally sub-divided (voyage from Geraldton to Port Hedland) this water could be replaced / topped up by water from the after peak tank (see image - most rear tank) which consequently would be 'empty' on arrival at the outer bar reducing aft draught to 17 ft., facilitating clearance of the bar and solving two problems simultaneously. Subsequent to this the afterpeak could be filled with salt water for the remainder of the voyage north.
Captain Upjohn alluded to the 'routine' filling of tanks at sea in the following extract and thus confirmed my assumption that Koombana's aft tanks were routinely empty for departure from Port Hedland.
"As a rule the Engineer would run them (tanks) hard up outside (at sea after departure). When plenty of water inside he may have run the fresh water tanks hard up" presumably consolidating from other partially filled sub-divisions and reducing the free surface effect.
Therefore, it does appear that filling Koombana's tanks at sea was not as uncommon as Captain Upjohn initially tried to implicate.
The tanks were numbered 1 through 6 from front to back (see image below).
Number 1 did not have a central water tight division and thus had to be either completely full or completely empty, in this instance allegedly completely filled with fresh water.
Number 2 tank had a central water tight division (effectively dividing these tanks into port and starboard separate tanks) and on this occasion was filled with salt water.
Number 3; 4 and 5 had central divisions.
Number 3 contained salt water.
Numbers 4 and 5 contained fresh water.
Number 6 tank did not have a central division and like number 1 either had to be completely full or completely empty. This tank, it is assumed was filled with salt water.
The allegation was therefore true that Koombana's draught was indeed in the region of 16 ft. aft 20 March, all remaining cargo forward in the ship and all tanks empty. With the upper limit of the propeller more accurately approximating 16.5 ft., it makes sense that with an aft draught of 16 ft. it would have been partially exposed i.e. 'flogging the air'. Under normal circumstances with just the after peak empty, drawing 17 ft. (forward tanks full), the propeller would have been submerged.
Captain Upjohn confirmed that it would take at least 3 hours (usually 3 1/2 hours) to fill the after peak and number 6 tank at sea. But if all tanks required filling and it took 3 hours plus just to fill the after peak and number 6, I do strongly wonder if there were empty or partially empty tanks when Koombana made her run for the north of Bedout Island. Furthermore, we know that Koombana was seen by two sets of witnesses only filling tanks for about 2 hours.
 |
| courtesy Annie Boyd. |
 |
| courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066 |
 |
| courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066 |
The following document illustrates the subdivisions of tanks being used as required for trimming; e.g. fresh water port side subdivision and sea water starboard subdivision. What combinations and how Captain Allen ultimately achieved his goal remains in the realm of speculation.
 |
| courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia; series 2357, cons 006 |
When Koombana departed Port Hedland for the last time, the depth over the bar was 19 ft., 1 ft. short of high water springs.
There is a lag between full or new moon and high water springs (new moon in this case, 18 March, 1912). Koombana was running a day late and another day's delay would have incurred a further level reduction to 18.6 ft.. Three days after high water springs the level would have dropped significantly to 17.6 ft..
"I don't like the glass,"
was Captain Allen's remark,
"and another 24 hours
here will not matter."
The above figures justify this alleged statement made by Captain Allen. The 24 hours in question would have coincided with 18.6 ft. over the bar and if weather conditions had potentially stabilised by then (squall rather than cyclone - see further discussion below) Captain Allen could have departed with just the after-peak empty; comfortably cleared the bar and filled the one tank in calmer waters within a reasonable timeframe. 48 hours, however, would have produced 17.6 ft. and increased the potential for being neaped.
The day before high water springs the level over the bar would have been in the region of 19.6 ft.; two days prior, 18.5 ft. and three days prior, 17 ft. !! Port Hedland, therefore, offered a very narrow window of opportunity for a steamer Koombana's size and the schedule had to be adhered to as far as humanly possible.
In fact under normal conditions emphasis would have been placed on arriving the day before high water springs and making a smart exit the following day (19.6 ft. and 20 ft. over the bar). Extending this time frame required emptying tanks(s) and hoping for a calm sea at the port's entrance. This must surely have created enormous pressure for Captain Allen and we know that he had his fair share of bar strikes attempting to cross the bar without emptying tanks.
Tides - It is high water in Roebuck Bay, full and change, at 11 h; springs rise 28 feet, neaps 18 feet. The highest tides occur on the second or third days after full and change, and are subject to diurnal inequality. The day tides rise 18 inches (July) higher than the night tides.
Broome on the other hand offered better draft flexibility (max. 28 ft.), almost 5 days on either side of high water springs (down to 18 ft.). However, the tide swing is dramatic, and around high water springs the low tide level was actually a negative figure, minus 3 ft., which translated into Koombana sitting high and dry on the mud with water as far as a mile off.
Added to this, the daily times for spring tide migrated from about 12 midday through the afternoon to about 4 p.m. during the course of 5 days. This would have impacted arrivals and departures, incurring delays waiting out at sea for high tide and access.
Port Hedland harbour:
The head, and a considerable breadth of sand mud flats on either side, dry off at low water, and the deep water channel, above 3 fathoms (18 ft.), nowhere exceeds 300 yards across. The entrance between Hunt and Airey Points is 1/3 mile wide, with sand hills on both sides, generally covered with spinifex grass; the land within is low, marshy, and intersected by creeks, mostly dry at low water; they have not been surveyed other than as charted.
18 ft. in the channel could be boosted to as much as 40 ft. during high water springs.
The Bar, 2 miles from the harbor mouth, consisting of rock thinly overlaid with sand, has a least depth of 1 foot at springs, and then generally breaks. There is also an inner bar with 1 fathom (6 ft.) water, 1,500 yards northeastward of Hunt Point. Vessels of 18 feet draft may cross at high water springs, subject to the tide signals shown.
Koombana was reported to have had an aft draft of 19 ft. which, theoretically, would have disqualified her from crossing the bar. As it was, draft did not exceed 16 ft. aft, and for very good reason considering there was a big sea, gale and turbulence over the bar.
Middle Bank Buoy - The Middle Bank, southward of Hunt Point, divides the entrance into two channels, that to the westward being the deeper but more tortuous. Middle Bank is about 800 yards in length, and it dries over a length of about 700 yards and northward and westward of the buoy. Sand and mud flats extend a considerable distance from both shores, reducing the fairways to narrow limits.
An extremely challenging port to negotiate.
Occasional Light - A black spar buoy, with staff and cage, from which an occasional fixed red light is exhibited, is moored on the Middle Bank at about 100 yards within its northern drying edge.
Beacons and Range marks - The channel is marked by red beacons on the starboard hand, black beacons on the port hand.
Tidal signals - tidal signals are shown from the tidal flagstaff, as follows:
A ball is hoisted at the head of the staff when the tide is rising, and a red burgee when the tide falling. One ball on the western yardarm (steel tower) indicates 19 feet or more (over the bar).
Tides - High water interval at Port Hedland is 10 h. 50 m.; mean range 12 feet 3 inches, springs rise 19 feet 3 inches. Equinoctial springs rise 22 to 24 feet.
Tidal currents in the harbor run 3 to 4 knots. The ebb is the strongest and at the highest tides may attain 6 knots. At the anchorage the flood runs westward, ebb eastward, from 2 to 2 1/2 knots an hour.
It is not surprising that Captain Allen insisted that a lugger be removed from the channel before he made his run for open sea. In such light condition with the propeller and rudder not fully submerged (decreased thrust and manoeuverability), contending with a powerful (up to) 6 knot current and narrow channel, this was a dangerous time for the large steamer.
Jetty - At Mangrove Point there is a jetty about 700 feet long, where two steamers can berth; there are cattle yards within it. Vessels can discharge into railway trucks. At spring tides the currents run strongly past and vessels should securely moor with anchors as well as by shorefasts to the jetty.
Anchorages - Anchorage outside the bar, to await tide for entering, may be had in 3 fathoms (18 ft.), about 3 miles from shore near the line of the range marks. Small vessels may anchor 1/2 mile nearer shore in 2 1/2 fathoms.
It was at this position 3 miles out that Captain Allen attempted to fill ballast tanks. Again, 3 fathoms, 18 ft., translated into as much as 40 ft. during high water springs.
The best anchorage in the harbour is about 800 yards northward of Harriet Point, in 6 fathoms (not possible today), sand; the holding ground is not good above this. Vessels over 200 feet in length should moor head and stern, there being insufficient room to swing. Two vessels can berth alongside the jetty, as before mentioned.
Directions - Within 1/2 hour on either side of high water is the best time to enter or leave; in narrow parts, at half tide, the currents may run 6 knots. An anchor should always be ready. Southward of Hunt Point, the western point of the entrance, the channel westward of Middle Bank has not less than 4 fathoms at low water, and is deep and well marked by the range beacons.
High water was at 10 h 50. Koombana departed at 10 h 20, half an hour before, exactly as instructed.
When there is sufficient water to cross the bar, the passage eastward of Middle Bank, also well marked, may be taken, thus avoiding the sharp turns and oblique tidal currents of the western channel.
The two range beacons for the bar, namely, the tidal signal staff and Lumsden Beacon, in range bearing 203 degrees, lead over the bar, and the conspicuous dark mangrove clump westward of Harriet Point should be steered for when bearing 220 degrees.
Vessels can only enter at night with thorough local knowledge; a red light is shown from the buoy on Middle Bank when required.
The following images are an attempt to transpose the instructions onto present day Port Hedland, with limitations acknowledged.
 |
| The black circle represents the position of the inner bar as per the extract. Note the position coincides with the apex of the sand bank as marked and is slightly west of the present day narrow shipping channel. |
 |
| The black circle indicates the position 3 miles out where Koombana would have filled tanks. The present day shipping channel bears initially northwestward, whereas Koombana would initially have sailed due north. |
Western Mail, 20 September, 1902.
A PORT HEDLAND HARBOUR
OBSTRUCTION.
Port Hedland, September 16.
If Port Hedland is to remain a port
for steamers to take shelter in, the sand-
bar at the entrance to the channel will
have to be dredged. The bar is 200yds.
long and 30yds. wide, and it is extending
rapidly. It is a common occurrence
for steamers to strike on the bar and
remain aground for 12 hours, or until the
next tide. The s.s. Minilya, on her last
visit here, was fast on the bar for an
hour coming in, and for 12 hours on her
way out. Every vessel that is in the Nor'-
West trade has been aground here. The
dredge Priestman would, in the opinion
of visiting ship masters, do all the work
that would be necessary to make the bar
navigable. The expense of the dredging
would, it is believed, be of small account
in proportion to the advantages to
be derived.
 |
| The 'bar' as described above. |
Kalgoorlie Miner, 21 July, 1908
PORT HEDLAND HARBOUR.
July 20.
The passage into Port Hedland
Harbour is in need of serious
attention. Every ship captained
by a man new to the coast or
unused to local conditions of
tide, etc., sticks on the inner bar.
The last boat, the Dilkera, suffered
some damage on the bar, and had
to have Lloyds' surveyors to
report before leaving the harbour.
 |
| SS Dilkera - courtesy Flotilla Australia. Built 1902 2667 gross tons length 326 ft. beam 45 ft. 3 inches draft 21 ft. 8 inches - excessive for Port Hedland! |
14 July, 1912, the following discovery was made:
'Bullara, on passage from Cossack to Port Hedland,
passed derelict, appeared to be submerged bilge
of vessel, 15Oft. or 200ft. long, in latitude 20 deg.
10 min. south and 118 deg. 3 min. east.'
It was thought that the bilge section came from the wrecked Koombana and if so, there is an important inference to be made. Had Koombana sustained significant latent damage to her hull subsequent to the documented bar strikes within the 6 months leading up to the disaster? And if so, had she suffered some form of catastrophic hull failure in the rough seas? Or was it simply a case of damage sustained striking the seabed? Only time will tell if the wreck, once found, gives up her secrets.
The Pilbarra Goldfields News, Saturday 30 May, 1903.
PORT HEDLAND BAR
Perth, May: 25,
Captain Frank Pitts, of the steamer
Sultan, warmly supports, Mr. Isdell in
his efforts to have the bar at Port
Hedland removed.
In a conversation with a Herald
reporter, Captain Pitts stated that the
bar was absolutely dangerous and at
ebb tide it was some feet out of the
water. There was a channel alongside
the bar which was less than 60 feet
wide. It was of rock and should a
vessel strike it she would undoubtedly
be lost. None of the shipmasters trading
to Port Hedland cared about using
the channel, and only did so because
they were compelled to. For his part,
he always used another channel, which
was more difficult, but in which there
was a sandy spit and not so much
rock. Now that larger boats were being
employed in the trade, the work of
removing the bar was rendered more
necessary.
The West Australia, 26 May, 1920.
PORT HEDLAND.
Port Hedland, May 25.
Passengers by the Bambra say that
they had to wait about four hours on
the Broome jetty. When the vessel
arrived off Port Hedland in the early hours
of this morning there was some difficulty
in getting into the lifeboats to come
ashore. A stiff easterly wind was blowing
and when the boats were returning to the
vessel there was a fair sea. One boat
was able to get within a few hundred
yards of the Bambra when the steamer
lifted her anchor and picked the boat up.
The other boat was picked up by the
steamer about a couple of miles away.
The simple fact of the matter. Missing the spring tide window prevented steamers such as Bambra accessing Port Hedland.
The West Australian, 10 April, 1918.
A PORT HEDLAND COMPLAINT.
Port Hedland, April 9.
Owing to the steamer Charon not calling
here on her next southward trip, a period
of about seven weeks will elapse between
the last mail and the next. If the Charon
called at Broome, letters could be posted
here to catch the Minderoo on her next
trip north and they could then be sent
on. But it is said that the Charon's first
port of call is Carnarvon.
Enormous pressure!
The Phillips River Times, 3 March, 1906.
Port Hedland
(From our own Correspondent.) .
Our Port Hedland correspondent
writes, under date February 19, as
follows :—
Several very unpleasant dust storms
swept over the town last week, and
another this morning. Eighteen
points of rain were registered.
Last Friday the mail boat Tyrian
arrived in the roads and refused to
approach the jetty, notwithstanding
the tide gauge registered 19ft. of water,
which was signalled to the steamer.
The captain, however, preferred the
delay of sending in two of the ship's
boats with the passengers and mails.
One boat leaked to such an extent that
on arriving at the jetty it was nearly
half full of water. Much indignation
was shown by the passengers and
shippers towards the action adopted by
the captain without a reasonable cause
as the steamer was only drawing
15ft. 3in.
There can be no denying the simple fact that Port Hedland was a challenging port to access even if the steamer in question had a comfortable, 3 ft. 9 in. clearance.
Koombana had a 3 ft. clearance 20 March, 1912.
This was not comfortable.
It never was....
 |
| courtesy Flotilla Australia |
SQUALLS vs. CYCLONES.
Koombana, fully ballasted, was to reveal her weakness during a Nor'West squall, February, 1910.
'Just before reaching Hedland we struck a squall and the ship lay over at an angle of 45 degrees and was quite a long time before straightening up.' (Koombana Days - Annie Boyd).
The following extract courtesy the Hathi Trust, Australia Pilot, 1920, describes such squalls:
During the Northwest monsoon, however, strong gales from the northwestward at times blow upon the coast but do not appear to be frequent. The strongest winds at this season are what may be properly termed as hurricane squalls, from between east-southeastward and northeastward; they mostly occur between sunset and sunrise, and rarely last more than a few hours, nor extend over a large area, and generally give ample warning of their approach by a heavy bank of clouds, with much lightening, between northeastward and southeastward. The breeze comes on almost immediately and with considerable violence, accompanied with rain in torrents and a short chopping sea. The rate of progress of these storms on the northwestern coast of Australia is estimated to be from 11 to 14 miles per hour, travelling from northeastward to southwestward, approximately following the coastline. They are always accompanied by abundant rain, with low dense clouds, and electrical discharge. As a rule their approach are indicated by sultry weather and a falling barometer. These signs are followed by the usual ugly and threatening appearance of the weather, which forebodes most storms. The best and surest of all warnings, however, will be found in the barometer.
If the barometer falls rapidly, or even if the regularity of its diurnal variation be interrupted, danger may be apprehended.
And so the truth of the matter for squalls or cyclones.
It might have been that Captain Allen anticipated such a squall and which, theoretically, should have passed in a few hours. His suspicions might even have been confirmed when observing a dense, inky mass of low lying clouds on the western horizon.
In this case, however, it was a cyclone strengthening as it made landfall, Balla Balla.
7 December, 1908 a cyclone struck Broome, lasted for three days and caused widespread damage with the loss of 20 lives. 250 miles away at Port Hedland the following report reads like a prelude to 20 March, 1912:
Kalgoorlie Miner, 16 December, 1908.
ANXIETY AT PORT HEDLAND.
FEARS FOR THE STEAMER
SULTAN.
Port Hedland, Dec. 15.
The pearling disaster reported
from Wallal is causing considerable
anxiety here. The steamer Minnie,
well known in Port Hedland, in
charge of her owner (Harry
O'Grady), who had with him two
other white, men and a coloured
cook, left here for Broome, via
Condon, Wallal, and La Grange Bay,
on the 3rd inst., and was off Condon
the following Monday. This was
the day before the hurricane came,
since when no tidings of her have
been received.
Much anxiety is experienced here
concerning the fate of the steamer
Sultan, which left Port Hedland at
10 a.m. on the 8th inst. in the face
of a strong easterly gale, with a
falling barometer. She was almost
hidden by clouds of dust when
leaving the harbour. Port Hedland
was apparently on the edge of the
disturbance.
The morning of Tuesday,
the 8th inst., saw the sky overcast,
with heavy clouds. There was a
strong wind from the south-east,
which by 8 o'clock was from the
east, and at 11 o'clock from the
north-east. It was then almost
impossible for pedestrians to make
headway against it. At 6 p.m. the
wind had gone back to the east, and
lulled somewhat. The lowest
barometrical record was 29.28 deg.
at 5 p.m. on the 8th. This,
curiously enough, is identical
with the point reached by the
barometer at the Port Hedland
post office during the Wallal blow
last April. No damage was done
at Port Hedland. The rainfall
locally was 12 points (3mm)
It is extraordinarily similar to the pattern of 20 March and what's more the captain of the Sultan had no hesitation in putting to sea. This was clearly the approach to such conditions along the Nor'West coast!
 |
| SS Sultan - courtesy Flotilla Australia |
courtesy Google Earth; Hathi Trust, Australia Pilot, 1920, volume 4 and
http://fishing-app.gpsnauticalcharts.com/i-boating-fishing-web-app/fishing-marine-charts-navigation.html?title=Western+Australia+-+Solitary+Island+to+Bedout+Island+boating+app#11/-19.1354/119.4410
https://mooncalendar.astro-seek.com/moon-phases-calendar-april-2021
https://www.tide-forecast.com/locations/Port-Hedland-Australia/tides/latest#:~:text=The%20predicted%20tide%20times%20today,sunset%20is%20at%205%3A48pm.
https://www.tide-forecast.com/locations/Broome-Australia/tides/latest
Squall vs. Cyclone:
https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2021/04/squalls.html
Projections for levels of water over the bar were made by correlating with present day data for both Port Hedland and Broome, April, 2021 - see links above. There is variability, but not significant enough to alter the overall pattern and challenges presented to Captain Allen.
The following extract can be found on Annie Boyd's excellent Koombana Days online resource site.
EXTRACTS. IN THE COURT OF MARINE INQUIRY, WESTERN AUSTRALIA.
IN THE MATTER OF THE NAVIGATION ACT 1904 and IN THE MATTER of an Inquiry into the circumstances attending the loss at sea between Port Hedland and Broome whilst on a voyage from Fremantle to Derby via Ports of the S.S. "KOOMBANA" on or about the 20th March 1912.
April 25th 1912.
BEFORE: E. P. Dowley Esq. R.M. (presiding)
Captain F. L. Parkes ) Assessors.
Captain J. W. W. Yates )
THE CROWN PROSECUTOR (Mr. F. PARKER) appeared to represent the Chief Harbor Master, Captain C. J. Irvine.
MR. MOSS K.C. appeared to represent the Adelaide Steamship Company.
[Upjohn testimony p1]
HARRY UPJOHN, Sworn.
EXAMINED THE CROWN PROSECUTOR.
You are the Master of the s.s. "Bullarra,"? - Yes.
Were you the Master of her on the 18th March last? - Yes.
Did you arrive at Port Hedland on the 18th March? - Yes.
What were the tides then? - Tides were making 19 feet springs.
This figure of 19 ft. played a key roll in the disastrous sequence of events unfolding, 20 March, 1912.
What day did the s.s. "Koombana" arrive at Port Hedland?
- On the 19th March.
During the time you were in Port Hedland did you have any
conversation with Captain Allen in respect of the weather?
- Yes.
- Yes.
On what date was that? - On the morning of the 20th.
Will you tell the Court what the conversation was? - It took
place on my ship. We had a general conversation and Capt.
Allen said "What do you think about the weather?"
What was your reply? - "Its overcast and a bit dirty but there is nothing in it."
Can you fix the time that this conversation took place? - It was just before breakfast or just after.
That would be about 8 o'clock? - Yes.
What was the state of the weather at this time? - Very nice fresh breeze, overcast and cloudy.
It struck you as being a bit dirty? - Just overcast.
What did you expect from the weather? - I expected the same right through: fine if anything.
Did you have any further conversation with Capt. Allen about the weather? - None.
Was anything said in reference to leaving Port Hedland or not? - No.
Captain Allen Koombana: "I do
not like the look of the weather.
Captain Upjohn; what do you intend
doing?"
Captain Upjohn (Bullarra): "I have
made up my mind to go out and your
boat is a far better one than mine."
Captain Allen: "Well, if you intend
going out, I do not suppose it will do
for me to stop here."
Furthermore, Captain Upohn's initial comments to the press were as follows:
'The weather was looking dirty when the
ship (Bullarra) left Port Hedland on March
20, but after consultation with the captain
of the Koombana, which left 20 minutes
later, we resolved to put out, the Bullara
going south and the Koombana, north.
When about 22 miles from Balla Balla
very bad weather was struck.'
The interesting thing is this; The Board of Trade encouraged masters to face storms out at sea rather than in port where the steamer could be driven ashore and wrecked. Captain Upjohn could have been frank from the start at the Inquiry and stated this well-known 'regulation'.
However, he knew, as did everyone involved in this farce that Koombana was significantly top heavy; her captain reluctant to depart under such circumstances and tanks to be adequately filled at sea in such conditions, a virtual impossibility.
But Captain Upjohn had encouraged (dared) Captain Allen to depart and this he had to downplay as far as humanly possible.
MR. DOWLEY. He left before you? - Yes.
CROWN
PROSECUTOR. At what time? -
[Upjohn testimony p2]
UPJOHN. About 20 minutes before I did: between 10 and 11 o'clock a.m.
CROWN
PROSECUTOR. Can you tell the Court: did the weather alter between 10 and
11.20 ? - No. (ctd)
What was the reading of the barometer? - I looked at the
barometer at 6 o'clock and it stood at 29.50.
Had there been anything during the night or early morning? -
There was a squall at 4 o'clock that morning.
What was the nature of this squall? - Just a puff.
Did you look at the barometer on account of that? - No: it
was my usual practice to look at the barometer at about 6
o'clock.
It stood then at 29.50? - Yes.
Did you look at the barometer again before you left Port
Hedland? - I do not recollect.
"I subsequently learnt that the glass was
extremely low, 28 something."
When Captain Allen spoke about the weather, did he mention
anything about the barometer reading? - Yes he did mention
it but I do not remember what it was.
Was your glass a high or low one? - Low.
There was nothing whatever said about leaving or not? -
Not a word.
"Captain Allen, when questioned
by Mr. Barker as to whether he was
going to put out, said he did not know.
"I don't like the glass," was Captain
Allen's remark, "and another
24 hours here will not matter."
'Another 24 hours' referred to delaying departure for a day. It is absolutely crystal clear from this extract that Captain Allen did not want to depart into what he knew would be dangerous conditions for his top heavy steamer.
Where were you when the "Koombana" left Port Hedland? -- I was on the lower bridge and the Chief Officer was with me.
What were you doing? -- We were just looking at the "Koombana"
Did you notice her trim? -- She was in excellent trim.
Did you notice the draft? -- No. I noticed how well she
behaved and the Chief Officer said the same.
Have you any reason for that remark? - No, but she looked so well.
Did you notice her propeller? - It was well submerged.
You and the Chief Officer were standing watching her? - Yes.
When she went out of the Harbor, did she roll at all? - No.
[Upjohn testimony p3]
CROWN PROSECUTOR (ctd)
When you went out, what length of time did you follow in the
"Koombana's" Course? - I followed out in her course, keeping
leads astern, somewhere about half an hour or three quarters.
"hearing the officers in charge of the watch
remark that we were running out three miles,
I gleaned that something was expected."
By 'expected', the cattleman meant severe weather.
And you last saw her? - About two hours after leaving.
Was she proceeding on her ordinary course to Broome? -
On the ordinary course to Bedout.
Was she in good trim? - Yes.
The top of her propellor, according to the plan, is about on
the 18' mark: You say she was well submerged? - Yes.
From the time you left Port Hedland until the time you lost
sight of the "Koombana", had the wind changed? - No.
Had the velocity altered? - No.
"there was an overcast sky and half a
gale blowing from the E.N.E."
During that day, when did the direction of the wind change
first? - About 4 p.m.
Where were you bound? - South to Balla Balla.
You were going in the opposite direction to that taken by the
"Koombana"? - Yes.
What time did the wind change its direction first? - Some-
where between 2 o'clock and 4 o'clock. It is very carefully noted
in the log book. The wind was E.N.E at 5 o'clock. Commenced
to flicker and went back again. (portion of log book put in).
When did the wind change? - Between 2 and 4 o'clock.
Coming back to the time you left Port Hedland? - At 6.20am
we commenced swinging, at 10.40 cast off. There was a strong
N.E. wind, cloudy.
Mr. DOWLEY. You say the wind changed from E.N.E. From what? - There was a strong breeze which changed from N.E.
"there was an overcast sky and half a
gale blowing from the E.N.E."
Newspaper reports:
'The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port
Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla onMarch 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered
a strong north-east gale on leaving the
harbor.'
'Between 2 and 4 p.m. the wind changed
from north-east to east-north-east. At 4.20
the engines were slowed, and at 5 p.m. he
altered the Bullarra's course and put to
sea.'
CROWN
PROSECUTOR. At what time did you lose sight of the "Koombana" - about
12 o'clock? - A little before, when the sea became rough.
'When we came on deck for the midday
meal, the Bullara and the Koombana
were stern on to each other, and the
distance apart being about five miles.'
According to the cattleman Koombana was still well within sight at midday. Captain Upjohn contradicted himself in other statements referring to Koombana being in sight for about 2 hours out at sea - takes the time to roughly 1 p.m.
When did you notice the sea change to rough? When you left it
was a nice pleasant breeze and smooth? - Yes, it
freshened later.
'The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port
Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on
March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered
a strong north-east gale on leaving the
harbor.'
[Upjohn testimony p4]
When the wind freshened and the sea became rough, was the
Koombana still in sight? - Yes, but I lost sight of her shortly
after.
Did you notice what weather she was making? Did you see her?
- I saw her but could not tell how she was behaving.
- I saw her but could not tell how she was behaving.
The next entry is in regard to the weather? - Heavy N.E. gale,
heavy sea, 4 o'clock.
You were still on your course for Balla Balla? - Yes. At 4.20
p.m. I slowed the engines.
"We were down amongst the cattle again fixing up,
when at 4.30 p.m. Captain Upjohn called
out to us to look out as she was going to roll.
As he was going to heave-to, we came up
on deck At 6 p.m."
At 5 o'clock you altered your course from S 50 W to N.E? - Yes.
What other note have you? - Put screens up and tarpaulins in
main weather rigging and round poop, took soundings and found
25 fathoms.
You were then steering out to open sea after doing this? -
Yes.
The next entry? - At 8, heavy gale, high seas, ship laboring
heavily and heavy rain.
At that time what did you think of the weather? - That it was
bad and getting serious. This was between 8 and 10 p.m.
You continued out to sea? - Yes.
Will you tell the Court what the weather was. At midnight
you reported it being a hurricane? - Yes, the ship was rolling
heavily.
Were these entries made afterwards? - The entries were made
roughly in another book and copied afterwards.
At 10.30 the wind went from E.N.E to E.? - Yes, at 11.20
mountainous seas. (log book read).
I notice that the wind after 8 o'clock got to W.S.W. The
wind increased in velocity about midday of the 21st? - Yes.
Was there any alteration in the barometer? - There was no
difference until between 3 and 4 o'clock.
What then? - It dropped a little but not suddenly.
Did you keep watch of the barometer? - Yes, later on, every
hour.
[Upjohn testimony p5]
Between 3 and 4 o'clock you did not pay particular attention
but at 10 o'clock, when you realised the weather was bad, you
kept constant watch? - Yes.
I notice you were in the centre of the cyclone between noon
and 4 p.m.? - At 12.30 it was calm.
...
After the blow was over and you had effected temporary repairs,
did you engage in searching for the Koombana? What area did you search? -
(Chart put in and area shown).
[Upjohn testimony p6]
What wreckage did you pick up? - An awning spar, portion
of motor launch, a panel from the ceiling of the smoking
room or music room, some covers of the lifeboats tanks and
a door.
(Wreckage produced).
You examined that carefully? - Yes.
Did you form any opinion as to what had caused the wreckage?
- The force of the wind and sea.
- The force of the wind and sea.
The panel is forced right out with the screws adhering? - Yes.
Have you formed any opinion? Does the Court desire to hear
any opinion? -
MR. DOWLEY. It may be given.
THE CROWN
PROSECUTOR. Have you any doubt as to this being the wreckage of the
"Koombana"? - There is not the slightest doubt. The piece
from the motor launch has the Company's crest on it.
You know the door? - Yes, it belonged to the cabin on port side on the promenade deck.
What door is it? - It is a stateroom door.
During this blow, did the wind shift any of your boats at all? -
Yes. The lee boats. One of the boats had a hole bumped in it.
Were any other boats effected by the wind? - They were
strained and damaged, and chafed in the chocks.
Did you lose any boats? - No.
Were all the boats damaged? - Yes. They were all lashed down.
...
[Upjohn testimony p7]
...
THE CROWN
PROSECUTOR. You know the "Koombana" well. Where did she carry her
cargo, etc? - Yes, I know her well. She had her bunkers
full and they carry about 580 (480) tons. According to Captain
Williams she had 80 tons of cargo in the lower hold, 150
tons in No. 2 lower, between No. 2 and tween decks - 20 tons.
A total of about 800 tons.
However, Matthew John Williams, Marine Superintendent, in his own words stated during interview that the Derby cargo, 175 tons, was stowed forward in number 2 hold and 85 tons for Broome, stowed in the after part of number 1 and 2 'tween deck, higher up. Total, 260 tons (the official Inquiry figure). These units were stowed and secured before departure from Fremantle.
Perhaps, what Captain Upjohn inadvertently let slip was that these units of cargo were redistributed lower down to improve G.M.; which although a sensible decision might have made the new, temporary placements prone to shifting in heavy weather.
Also, Captain Upjohn's total was 10 tons short of the official 260 tons.
 |
| courtesy Annie Boyd. |
Have you known of a case when the "Koombana" has all her
tanks empty at one time? When she was a light ship? - No.
If she had all her tanks empty and only 800 tons on board
her, with coal and everything, what draft would she be? -
She would be 16'6 aft and about 12' forward.
'The Harbormaster's assertion
was that she was drawing 11ft.
forward and 16ft. aft.'
The Inquiry was to come to the conclusion that Koombana was drawing 19 ft. aft, which was impossible given the bar clearance of 19 ft.. Even their supplicant witness did not venture a ridiculous aft draft figure like that!!
MR. DOWLEY. The tanks are distributed about the ship? - Yes.
THE CROWN
PROSECUTOR. About how many times did you go into Port Hedland on the
"Koombana"? - About 18 times.
When at spring tides, what empty tanks would you have? -
The after peak tank would be empty: it would be consumed on
the voyage up from Fremantle to fill tanks 4 and 5 - fresh
water.
How would the other tanks be? - All full. Numbers 1, 2, 3,
4 and 5. No 6 might be pumped out.
With the tanks in this State what draft would she be then? -
About 17' with the after peak tank out.
Could you go into Port Hedland on a spring tide with that? -
Quite easily.
There would be no necessity to empty any tanks? - No.
Captain Upjohn had 12 months', 18 x voyage experience on Koombana as Chief Officer, and yet Captain Allen was to get command of the flagship while Upjohn was relegated to the ageing Bullarra. There could have been animosity. Also, by criticizing Captain Allen, Upjohn could also have been sending a not so subtle to the employers that if he had commanded Koombana, the disaster might not have happened.
Personally I doubt whether Harry Upjohn could have saved the day.
If there were any tanks empty in Port Hedland, how long
would it take to fill these tanks? - Number 8 (error, 6) would be run out in an hour and the after peak in about an hour and it would then be pumped up.
How long would it take to fill them? - From 3 to 3 1/2 hours.
3 1/2 hours for two tanks - how long for all tanks!!!
[Upjohn testimony p8]
Have you formed any theory as to what became of the "Koombana"?--
The only thing I can think of is that she was smashed
up by the cyclone.
In what way do you think?-- By the force of the wind and sea.
Could she have turned turtle?-- Impossible.
CROSS EXAMINED
MR. MOSS. Do you consider you were lucky in having escaped? - We escaped by a miracle.
Your boat was in a battered condition? - Yes.
What occurred to your funnel? - It was carried away in the early part of the blow.
You went to Broome to effect temporary repairs and for water? - Yes.
That was before you searched for the "Koombana"? - Yes.
Have you been in cyclonic weather before? - Yes, in the China
Sea, when a ship went down alongside of us.
Was it very bad? - Not so bad as this.
This was absolutely the worst thing you have experienced? - Yes.
And it was only by a miracle you came through? - Yes.
...
[Upjohn testimony p9]
... I think when you crossed the bar you felt more wind outside than inside? - Yes. There is always a fresher breeze outside.
Was there any sea on the bar? - No.
You saw the "Koombana" go out. Did she roll much? - I saw
her go, but there was no roll.
There is another report that has been spread, about the
propeller beating the air? - I remarked to the Chief Officer
how well she looked and the propeller was well submerged.
There is no truth in the report then? - None whatever.
By his calculation of draft of 16'6 cleverly Koombana's propeller would have been submerged, but just. By the Harbourmaster's, absolutely NOT, by 6 inches.
MR. DOWLEY. In the papers there was a remark of Captain Allen saying he
would be lucky to get to Broome by Saturday? - I did not
hear him say so.
MR. MOSS. How long would it take in the ordinary course? - About 24 or
25 hours.
MR. DOWLEY. He should have got there on Thursday? - Yes.
MR. MOSS. When you were searching for the wreckage of the "Koombana" did you notice any oily substance floating on the surface? - Yes.
Please tell the Court? - It was in latitude 19.11 and 119.25 E.
What distance would that be off Bedout Island? - About 27 or 28
miles - I cannot say which.
Did you take any samples of this oily substance? - Yes. Two or
three dozen bottles.
What depth was there at this place? - 30 or 35 fathoms.
Did you see any trace of the vessel in that depth? There would be nothing to indicate that the Koombana or any other vessel would be there?
However:
The engines were stopped and we drifted for about 4 miles.
What was the stuff in the bottles? - Oily, greasy water.
Have you any idea as to how that came there? - It looked as if
it came from a wreck.
see:
https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2020/02/coordinates-conclusion.html
[Upjohn testimony p10]
There would be stuff on the ship to make this? - Yes.
Where are those bottles? - At the Company's office.
We will produce these if desired.
MR. DOWLEY. You saw this at dusk? - Yes.
MR. MOSS. When you went out from Broome to make this search, was it a
careful search in every way? - Yes.
Did you land anyone on Bedout Island? - Yes, the Chief Officer
and a party.
You searched with every care in the vicinity where you found
this wreckage? - Yes.
Was there any wreckage about then? - Yes, an awning spar and
one of the doors.
What difference in distance did you find any other pieces? -
There was a difference of as much as 20 miles.
...
MR. DOWLEY. ...
You say that this is the "Koombana's" door. Would it have been
possible for it to have been washed off before the boat sank? -
It is quite possible.
...
-:- 1 -:-
HARRY UPJOHN - Recalled.
(Official Log-Book put in).
THE CROWN
PROSECUTOR. This is your official log-book, in use on the 20th March? - Yes.
Whose entry is this: "Strong N.E.Breeze and cloudy"
Mr Crossley's? - Yes.
Is it all in the same writing? - Yes, it is not my writing.
Can you give an explanation of the barometer at noon being
28.83? - The ship is provided with two barometers - one is
more valuable than the other and is kept in the Commander's
room because it is nice room and not too warm. The Chart
room is not a fit place to house this barometer. The other
barometer is in the chart room for the use of the officers.
It is on the low side and not a good instrument. When I said
the reading of the barometer was 29.50 it was the reading
of the barometer in my room which the officers have not access
to. During the cyclone, finding such a difference
between the glasses, I told one of the officers to take my
instrument up to the chart room because this was then the
better place to house it as it might have been smashed to
pieces, my room being on the lower deck.
That reading on the 20th March was by the barometer in the
chart room? - Yes, it is on the low side and an inferior
instrument to mine.
Who can tell us about the instrument in the chart room? - The
Chief Officer.
What difference was there between the barometer in the chart
room and the one in your room? - I do not know. A
tremendous difference.
Captain Upjohn was a terrible witness who blurred facts to justify departing Hedland that fateful day, encouraging Captain Allen to do the same; passing criticism about Captain Allen's decision to depart with empty tanks, and yet giving fake evidence that Koombana did not roll going over the bar with propeller well submerged; 'playing along' with the Court's (and owners') efforts to make the cyclone the central causative factor for the disaster; and making no suggestion to the Court to drag the vicinity of the oil patch with a wire to locate the wreck of Koombana, 130 miles from the centre of the cyclone.
It was a whitewash.
courtesy Trove extracts; Australia Pilot, 1920.
For those with an in depth interest in this subject should obtain Annie Boyd's outstanding Koombana Days.
