If one comes to the conclusion that stability was Koombana's weak link, the primary problem was to be found at the outer bar, Port Hedland. 20 March, 1912. It was spring tide and the bar was merely 19 ft. deep, which meant that Koombana (draught, 20 ft. 8 in.) had to be in light condition to clear the bar without 'bumping' or grounding.
Furthermore, with a heavy ground swell and gale at sea on that day, there would have been significant fluctuations over the bar, implying that Captain Allen was obliged to depart Port Hedland with draught figures of 16 ft. aft, 11 ft. forward, and attempt filling ballast tanks at sea.
We know that given the conditions and Bert Clarke's observations that Koombana pitched and rolled while filling tanks, the task may not have been carried out adequately, resulting in a free surface effect in tanks contributing to heeling instability.
Due to pressure of maintaining schedules and making spring tides at Hedland and Broome, Captain Allen was obliged to proceed to disaster.
The only solution, as I see it, given Koombana's size, would have been to create anchorage outside Port Hedland and Broome; relying on lighters to ferry passengers, cargo and livestock to and from the port.
On the east coast, relatively large steamers Yongala and Grantala (same size as Koombana) could not access Mackay, for the same reason, and relied on lighters to and from anchorage outside the port.
So why did the Adelaide Steamship Company simply not implement this system to avoid delays (neaping up to a week) and unnecessary, unreasonable pressure on their masters?
Finances, I would imagine!
Koombana had, after all, been purposely designed to obviate the lighter system; but the figures were marginal, to say the least, in terms of hull clearance, ballasting and safety.
Yes, I believe the disaster could have been averted, but when Moxon signed off on the Koombana he was gambling and ultimately the Adelaide Steamship Company lost and paid the price.
Mr. Moxon, in my opinion, ultimately passed the buck at the Court of Inquiry, saying:
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Furthermore, with a heavy ground swell and gale at sea on that day, there would have been significant fluctuations over the bar, implying that Captain Allen was obliged to depart Port Hedland with draught figures of 16 ft. aft, 11 ft. forward, and attempt filling ballast tanks at sea.
We know that given the conditions and Bert Clarke's observations that Koombana pitched and rolled while filling tanks, the task may not have been carried out adequately, resulting in a free surface effect in tanks contributing to heeling instability.
Due to pressure of maintaining schedules and making spring tides at Hedland and Broome, Captain Allen was obliged to proceed to disaster.
The only solution, as I see it, given Koombana's size, would have been to create anchorage outside Port Hedland and Broome; relying on lighters to ferry passengers, cargo and livestock to and from the port.
On the east coast, relatively large steamers Yongala and Grantala (same size as Koombana) could not access Mackay, for the same reason, and relied on lighters to and from anchorage outside the port.
So why did the Adelaide Steamship Company simply not implement this system to avoid delays (neaping up to a week) and unnecessary, unreasonable pressure on their masters?
Finances, I would imagine!
Koombana had, after all, been purposely designed to obviate the lighter system; but the figures were marginal, to say the least, in terms of hull clearance, ballasting and safety.
Yes, I believe the disaster could have been averted, but when Moxon signed off on the Koombana he was gambling and ultimately the Adelaide Steamship Company lost and paid the price.
Mr. Moxon, in my opinion, ultimately passed the buck at the Court of Inquiry, saying:
"In the North West trade the captains
were peculiarly responsible, the company
left matters very largely in their hands.
His company's rule No. 4 stated that
'No order will be held to excuse the
endangering of the ship.'
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