SUDDEN AND CATASTROPHIC?

In a previous post "PUT RIGHT OUT TO SEA', I substituted the "Cromarty" with an hypothetical Koombana; a period article describing the challenges experienced by a 'light' steamer in rough weather conditions, as follows:  

"Owing to the heavy seas, the gale, and the 

strong currents, together with the fact 

that the vessel was flying very light, the 

Koombana refused to answer her helm, and 

became practically unmanageable. The 

steamer was only drawing 12ft. forward and 17ft. 

aft, and could not be controlled in heavy weather.

During the whole time she was pounding heavily, 

and at intervals of every few minutes her engine 

raced."

'Pounding heavily' reminds us of another piece of the evidence puzzle:

Sunday Times, 14 July, 1912.

THE LOST STEAMER KOOMBANA.

Captain Irvine, Chief Harbor-master of Fremantle

(W.A.), received the following telegram from Broome

on Monday : 'Bullara, on passage from Cossack to Port

Hedland, passed derelict, appeared to be submerged bilge

of vessel, 15Oft. or 200ft. long, in latitude 20 deg. 10 min.

south and 118 deg. 3 min. east.'

The general impression amongst shipping men is that

the derelict is portion of the Koombana. 

Fix this tex

97 miles southwest of the oil patch, 13 miles offshore, the submerged 'bilge' was discovered four months after the disaster. This important discovery suggested that Koombana had sustained hull damage.

Given the Bullarra report, as it stands, had Koombana's hull 'snapped or cracked' or the damage sustained when striking the seabed ? The latter was well documented in the case of the Clan Ranald when a diver went down and reported:

"There are several long furrows in the bottom immediately

to the eastward of the ship, as if her starboard

bilge keel had bumped several times before

she finally settled down." 

It must be remembered that Koombana's hull had suffered repeated insults in the form of groundings; striking a rock; bumping the outer bar at Port Hedland; resting on muddy bottom at low tide and a blow from the SS Pilbarra. 

Although repairs were made to overt damage and the keelson reinforced with a steel strap, the latent damage might still have been significant. A steamer's hull could 'snap or crack' under certain certain lading circumstances and wave lengths as outlined in the following extract drawn from Wikipedia:

"Hogging is the stress a ship's hull or keel experiences that causes the center or the keel to bend upward. Sagging is the stress a ship's hull or keel is placed under when a wave is the same length as the ship and the ship is in the trough of two waves. This causes the middle of the ship to bend down slightly, and depending of the level of bend, may cause the hull to snap or crack."

From the description of the "Cromarty', in this case Koombana in light, top heavy condition heading east for Broome with a long period, rolling sea coming up behind (from the southwest) and a gale from the (north)west 'pounding heavily'.

The bulk of wreckage was found to the north and west of Bedout Island significant distances from Port Hedland. Given the time frame of four months this large component of wreckage could theoretically have been drifting steadily further southwestward, a lone survivor of the flotsam flotilla , ultimately destined for the shoreline further down the coast.

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2024/05/put-right-out-to-sea.html

A VITAL PIECE OF THE PUZZLE.

If we are to assume that Koombana steamed further and further 'into trouble' that fateful Wednesday, it simply does not make sense that Harry Lyon would not have communicated problems to other vessels carrying wireless. The following article outlines two salient factors. 

- Lyon was able to communicate with a steamer some 800 miles distant while Koombana lay in Port Hedland on the day of the disaster.

- The wireless system was functional and although a 'novice' Lyon was capable of successfully operating it and communicating effectively with another vessel at great distance.

The Mercury, Hobart, Tuesday 26 March, 1912.

NO RESPONSE TO WIRELESS .

INQUIRIES.

FREMANTLE, March 25.

Grave anxiety for the safety of the

steamer Koombana, which left Port

Hedland for Broome on Wednesday

last, is now entertained.

The vessel is now four days overdue,

and it is feared that she has met with

disaster, or has been disabled. The

Koombana is fitted with wireless 

telegraphy, and the German mail steamer

Gneisenau, which arrived this morning,

reported having spoken to her on 

Wednesday last, when she was lying at

Port Hedland. The vessels were then

800 miles distant. 

To-day the Gneisenau endeavoured to

get into communication with the

Koombana, but met with no response.

It is quite possible, however, that the

Koombana's wireless apparatus has

been disabled.

It does not make sense that Harry Lyon did not communicate a deteriorating situation to a steamer such as the Gneisenau. It substantiates to a degree that Koombana was on course and the disaster was sudden. If nothing else Lyon would have communicated a potential and significant delay in Koombana's arrival at Broome due to running 200 miles out to sea to ride out the cyclone.

However, there are a few question marks raised in the following detailed and fascinating period article:

The Daily News, Perth, 27 March, 1912

WHERE IS 'M.Z.P.?'

THE UNANSWERED CALL. -

THE KOOMBANA'S WIRELESS.

INTERESTING THEORY EXPLAINED.

- 'M.Z.P.! Zip, zip, z-z-z-z, zip!

M.Z.P.!'

All around the coasts of Australia,

and far into the Indian Ocean the

aerials of the wireless-equipped vessels

have been sending off Hertzian waves

with the above inquiry.

'M.Z.P.!' 'M.Z.P.!' - with tireless

energy the inquiry is being made, for

those letters represent the wireless

designation of the steamer Koombana

and along the western, southern, and

even eastern coasts of Australia, are

countless instruments seeking to get

in touch with 'M.Z.P.' and to 'receive'

an 'answer', even if it be the dreaded

distress signals, 'S.O.S.' or 'C.Q.D.'

So far  no reply has been received,

and although from a hundred-and-one

different points the blue sparks have

flashed from the instruments, and the.

continuous snapping of the message

has been followed with tense eagerness 

by a listening at the detector for

a reply, ever so faint, the Koombana's

instruments have remained silent, and

her whereabouts remains a mystery.

From many a high power and low

power instrument has the monotonous

signal gone forth, but nowhere, as far

as can be learnt, has there been picked

up a reply. This fact led a 'Daily News' 

reporter to make some inquiry as to the 

wireless installation on the Koombana

and some interesting particulars were

gleaned, particulars which lead to the

hope that after all the vessel may be 

safe, yet particulars also which have 

their grave side.

When the Koombana was at Fremantle 

last, it was found that some slight mishap 

had occurred to her wireless and an expert 

late at night had to motor to the port in order 

to fix matters up. This was successfully

accomplished and tests made proved

that the instruments were in good order.

The wireless unit had experienced problems before departure from Fremantle, fixed by an expert (not Lyon) and which, theoretically, could have malfunctioned again shortly after departure from Port Hedland. The fact that it was working fine shortly before departure makes this one a long shot...

Here it may be explained that the Koombana

is fitted with a standard power installation 

enabling her to send messages up to 250

miles in the day time, and considerably 

further at night time, according to the state 

of the atmosphere. In addition to this, she has 

an emergency plant, which is worked, not 

with a dynamo, but on the dry cell principle.

This will only allow of messages being

sent up to 100 miles, and would, with

use, work itself out in about 40 hours.

Few are aware that Koombana carried a backup wireless system, albeit the range considerably less and dependent on vessels carrying wireless at closer range.

Some vessels, too, carry three aerials

— that is, the wires stretched from

mast to mast to receive messages —

but the Koombana had but two. 

In gale force conditions that might have been a problem but if the wires were blown off, whether there were two or three is moot.

In charge of the wireless on the steamer

Mr. Lyon, was  a young operator from

one of the Commonwealth post offices,

who had been recently broken in to

wireless and whose first trip in charge

this was.

It is important to note that Lyon was inexperienced and alone on Koombana which are factors to be taken into consideration. The man simply could not have been on duty 24/7 and if Koombana headed into the northeast and late into the night, at some point Lyon would have sought sleep and been caught off guard in a sudden, catastrophic situation.

In conversation with a wireless expert 

our representative was given an

interesting theory of what may have

happened to the Koombana to explain

why she had not been heard of per

wireless. Said the expert: 'You see,

in a big storm such as raged up there

it is quite possible that the Koombana 

may have had her aerials carried

away, one or both of them. This

would necessitate a considerable delay,

more or less in extent, according to

the damage done. There is material

aboard the steamer for the repairing

of the wireless, but probably, with the

little experience, Lyon has had this

work would take longer than usual.

Quite possible, but there again in such deteriorating conditions I have no doubt that Lyon would have communicated this fact to the outside world via listening steamers.

Again, supposing the Koombana 

shipped some very heavy seas, and 

the water found its way down to the

machine room, this would have the 

effect of putting out of action the high

power portion of the installation, and

from that time the Koombana although

able to receive from all over the place 

messages through her 'detector',

would be quite unable, except

with the 100-miler, to send any or to

answer. 

This is absolutely a feasible explanation and given that Koombana was top heavy and unstable with partially filled tanks a list could very possibly have created portals of water ingress.

Thus, we may say, the position 

may be that the steamer is disabled 

somewhere, and is effecting repairs, 

and. all the time hearing the 'M.Z.P.' 

signal all day and all night long, and 

perfectly unable to reply.

Appalling if true.

For, of course, by this time, she would

have exhausted the dry-cell machine,

and even if that were not the case it

is not likely that there are any steamers 

fitted with wireless within 100 miles of 

the Koombana to pick up her

message's.''

"How would the atmospheric conditions 

affect the sending and receiving of 

messages?"

"That is a very important point. You

must know, you see, that for some

obscure reason or other it is easier to

transmit messages east and west than

it is to send them north and south.

So there, you see the messages being

sent out for the Koombana are nearly

all going north and south. 

There are, doubtless, operators on 

the other side making a chance of 

picking up the vessel. They may through 

some extraordinary, favorable circumstances,

succeed— if the steamer is afloat —but

the odds are against, owing to the

great extent of land to be passed over.

Another important point raised - a steamer within range to receive messages given the above limitations.

The atmosphere has a wonderful lot

of influence in the sending of messages. 

This is, of course, only natural, seeing 

that the messages are sent through the 

air. But it is a wonderful thing, but a fact, 

that by means of 'the' detectors attached 

to the wireless instruments — so sensitive 

are they— atmospheric disturbances, 

thunderstorms, etc., can be registered 

long before the barometer registers their 

approach.

According to this pivotal paragraph Lyon would theoretically have been aware, ahead of Captain Allen of the dangers in the conditions they were headed into and he would probably have warned Allen to take appropriate measures, instead of proceeding along the standard track. But if so he did not relay these concerns to the outside world!!

And in the Nor'-West, at this time of 

the year, the air is, so to speak, full

of electrical atmospherical disturbances, 

all of which militate against successful 

long-distance wireless." 

"Usually you receive quicker replies

when calling up a vessel?"

"Yes. - As a matter of fact, I know

myself of an instance where a steamer,

and quite recently too, just leaving

Adelaide, sent out a certain urgent

call, and within half an hour  received

no fewer than 22 replies. All day

long and all night long messages are

being snapped out across the water,

and one gets tremendous surprises at

times, in messages being heard which are

being sent from all sorts of unthought of

places. 

A very important comment that if Lyon had sent out a message expressing concerns there would have been a strong likelihood of that message being received. 

Yes, if the Koombana is above 

water — and I fancy she is, for

she is a splendid sea boat — I think she

has had a mishap to her machinery,

which has prevented her from steaming

and consequently put out of gear

her wireless."

And still through the air, calling,

calling, calling, travels the vibrations

of the *'M.Z.P.,' zip 'zip, z-z-z-z, zip,

'M.Z.P.' message — unseen fingers

searching and prying into every hook

where ether is, and still no answer

and no message. Where is 'M.Z.P.'?

My conclusion is that Koombana was on track for Broome when the disaster struck suddenly, catching all off guard. Lyon had not sent out any messages warning of deteriorating conditions and significant delays reaching Broome. 

If indeed there were grave concerns on board that the steamer was in mortal danger, passengers would have been advised to don lifebelts and as such floating bodies would surely have washed up on beaches, even if just a handful.

No, I believe Koombana went down NE Bedout not far from the steamer track selected and will be found there.

Titanic's wireless room.

Afterthought:

If Lyon had been desperately seasick due to the rough conditions, there would have been no one operating the wireless system from the get go.....

THE IMPACT OF HURRICANES AND EARTHQUAKES ON SHIPWRECKS.

Koombana, in my opinion, went down NE of Bedout Island as described in detail in this blog. It is assumed that the wreck lies somewhere in relation to the so-called 'oil patch' dependent on accuracy of a plotted position (Captain Upjohn of the Bullarra). It is also assumed that the wreck is largely intact, enduring more than a decade (112 years) and as such has remained 'in one position'.

The following link describes in detail the powerful impact hurricanes can wreak on wrecks, causing destruction and movement. We also know that the broader Pilbara has been ravaged by a number of destructive hurricanes since 1912.

https://www.scubadiving.com/how-hurricane-irma-radically-shifted-south-florida-wrecks

Furthermore, there has been significant seizmic activity NE of Bedout Island which, theoretically, could have caused further, significant wreck damage. In searching for the wreck of Koombana she may no longer be an intact hull; a single mag target; magnitude equating with +/- 3000 tons.

"Biggest earthquake recorded in Western Australia:The 4.9 magnitude earthquake recorded in Broome isn't the biggest earthquake Western Australia and Broome have felt. In 2019, a magnitude 6.6 earthquake struck approximately 200km west-southwest of Broome on July, 14th at a depth of 10km."

REVIEWING THE STEAMER TRACK.

 The steamer Albany, 1898:

"At noon on Friday Bedout Island was passed about 6 miles out."

If we are to return to speculation, it is generally assumed that if Captain Allen had decided to follow the standard course rounding the northern aspect of Bedout Island, given the gale force winds and long rolling seas coming up from the southwest, he would likely have given the island a sensible 10 mile plus clearance (some say about 9.5 miles).

But what if visibility was still good and the worst of the cyclone was bearing down towards Balla Balla some 100 miles to the southwest, he might have done what was described by the extract above, passing Bedout Island '6 miles' out. The risk factor vs. getting as far away from the cyclone conditions as fast as possible, if you will...

If this hypothetical case is true we might need to review the trajectory from a 6 mile clearance point heading towards Gantheaume Light (Broome). An interesting picture emerges of the steamer track Koombana would have followed before disaster suddenly overtook her.

The revised Upjohn quote "27 or 28 miles" could be a significant, 8 miles 'south' of his given coordinates. This is a bearing of 52.26 degrees from Bedout and equates with 53m as per navigation chart.

If this hypothesis has merit, we are looking at a potential search block significantly further south of the original coordinates - some 8 miles, in 53-63m water, depending on tidal variations.

In fact, the wreck might lie significantly to the south of the presumed track and should be factored into future searches.

In the quest to find Koombana NE of Bedout one must also not lose sight of the possible coordinates deviation factor (James Martin, 10.5 miles further out).

All factors considered one hopes that ultimately a broad airborne magnetometer survey will reveal Koombana's final resting place whether she be intact or a significant debris field.

"PUT RIGHT OUT TO SEA".

There is some debate as to what Captain Allen decided to do once he had cleared the bar without incident and attempted to fill tanks in a holding position some 3 miles north of Port Hedland. We know that it took at least 3 hours to fill tanks in ideal, port conditions, a time period extended significantly in rough seas with a gale from the NE.

The following is taken from my summary post:

Captain Allen:

"I might bump that outer bar going out on a sea like this."

"My passengers think they will get to Broome to-morrow (Thursday)," he remarked; "but they will be lucky if they get there by Saturday. I am going to put right out to sea, and as might bump the bar going out I will leave my ballast tanks until I get outside and fill them out there."

Two sets of eye witnesses referred to Koombana being in sight for only 2 hours. The tanks were unlikely to have been successfully pressed up during this time frame, which in turn would have created a free surface effect, enhancing the list; reducing what GM there was and impairing heeling recovery.

Why did Captain Allen not take the necessary time to fill all tanks? Quite simply, the Light at Bedout was not functioning and he had to clear the dangerous reef adjacent to the island before dark (6.38 p.m.). 

If in fact Captain Allen was sticking to his original plan of 'putting right out to sea' and anticipating 3 days to get to Broome due to cyclonic conditions, it makes sense to me that he would have taken as long as it was required to completely fill his tanks as this significant increase in stability would likely have fared better in cyclonic conditions.

But he didn't. He 'rushed the job' and headed due north as was standard custom into the unknown.

Why?

A cattleman aboard Bullarra made this comment:

'When we came on deck for the mid-day meal, the Bullara and the Koombana were stern on to each other, and the distance apart being about five miles.'

Visibility, at this stage was still good by all accounts and Bert Clarke, watching from Port Hedland remarked that Koombana was in sight, pitching and rolling for about two hours. This was confirmed by Captain Upjohn of Bullarra at the Inquiry that Koombana was visible for about two hours.

In my opinion the clincher was the comment made by the same cattleman on board Bullarra headed in a southwesterly direction:

"I noticed away on the starboard bow and 

just above the horizon, a dense mass of 

inky black clouds and from descriptions 

I'd had from old pearlers, I was convinced 

we were in for it."

In other words the cyclonic system targeting Balla Balla to the southwest moving in from the northwest (groundswell coming in from NW early in the day) was in a direction frankly opposite to the planned course of Koombana to Broome, via the northern aspect of Bedout Island.

Furthermore:

"In the southern hemisphere, tropical storms revolve clockwise. If the seaman turns to face the wind (in this instance from the NE), the eye of the revolving storm will lie to his left and, moreover, slightly behind him, because the winds spiral inward as they rotate."

And indeed it was, moving towards Balla Balla, not Port Hedland.

The final word goes to Captain Upjohn himself who had this to say in an interview:

There was no cyclone then?

(This was referring to 3 miles outside Port Hedland whilst Koombana filled tanks during a roughly two hour midday period)

"No. The weather was threatening but

nothing to cause alarm. About 5 p.m.,

(when Bullarra was less than 20 miles from Balla Balla, about 35 miles away from Port Hedland)

however I found the conditions had

become so bad that I put out to sea on

the starboard tack."....

It then makes sense why Captain Allen rushed filling tanks and decided to attempt keeping to his schedule given the worst of the cyclonic conditions were concentrated beyond the horizon to the southwest.

He could either pursue the standard course (see below) or even a detour course advised during 'thick weather' (see below).

standard course

In 'thick weather'.
The advisory referred to 20 fathoms west of Bedout which approximates 30 miles, as depicted.

detour route - assumed.

Frankly, in my opinion, there are two significant factors confirming that Koombana made it safely around the northern aspect of Bedout Island:

- Captain Upjohn discovered an oil patch the shape of a sunken steamer, which he documented in terms of coordinates and a rough 27 to 28 miles NE Bedout Island. 

- Secondly, flotsam was discovered by a number of searching steamers a fortnight after Koombana disappeared. The flotsam was found in a pattern (see image below) and which appeared to have originated from the oil patch site, as I have illustrated in previous posts, post cyclone the prevailing current is from east to west. 

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2023/04/cyclone-ilsa.html

If one is going to search for Koombana, it makes sense that a broad area NE Bedout Island needs to be surveyed deploying aerial magnetometers and based on detected, potential targets, these defined sites explored by AUV's. 

The flotsam discoveries plotted 1 through 11 do not include an awning spar and one of Koombana's planks discovered AT the site of the oil patch.

What could have happened, so quickly that Harry Lyon was unable to send out a radio signal for help and no bodies were found afloat wearing lifebelts (not prepared to abandon ship)??

As Koombana rounded Bedout heading for Broome there would have been a large rolling sea coming up behind her, at night,

"Owing to the heavy seas, the gale, and the 

strong currents, together with the fact 

that the vessel was flying very light, the 

Koombana refused to answer her helm, and 

became practically unmanageable. The 

steamer was only drawing 12ft. forward and 17ft. 

aft, and could not be controlled in heavy weather.

During the whole time she was pounding heavily, 

and at intervals of every few minutes her engine 

raced."

It was only a matter of time....

The actual period newspaper extract referred to the 'Cromarty' and I have taken liberties inserting Koombana's name and estimated draughts; but the point being that it is not difficult to imagine the situation being similar on board Koombana leading up to those last frantic moments.

But returning to the possibility that Captain Allen still intended to 'put right out to sea', let us take a closer look:

'It is evident that she first encountered

the beginning of the blow between

Port Hedland and Bedout Island. 'If

the wind were favorable it is reason

able to suppose that Captain Allen at

once steered a course for the open sea,

and may have had to run out for

about 200 miles.' As it blows very

strongly after these cyclonic disturb

ances, it is evident that she would be

a great way out of her course before

she was able to cut for Broome, and

that it would take at 'least 41/2 days be

fore she reached her destination.'

If Captain Allen had run 200 miles out to sea and achieved this goal, would have brought Koombana into the vicinity of Imperieuse Reef, part of the Rowley Shoals. After extensive searches no wreckage was found in this vicinity. See summary post below of the extent of searches after the loss of Koombana.

The most powerful argument against the Koombana being destroyed by the cyclone must surely relate to the discovery of wreckage more than 10 days after the disaster. If the cyclone had been responsible for the destruction of the steamer, surely there would have been plenty of wreckage and cargo immediately apparent after 20 March? As the following post outlines, searches during the initial 10 days were extensive, but FRUITLESS.

The West Australian, 01 April, 1912. 

THE FAILURE OF THE

SHORE SEARCH.

A DEEP SEA MATTER.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. W. E. MOXON.

Mr. Moxon made the following statement:

"Captain Mills has reported that the s.s.

Minderoo from Thursday to Saturday last,

shaped a course taking her on the western

and eastern side of Barrow Island, and the

Montebello Group, and then went round 

Ritchie reef searching thoroughly there. 

Shell and Stewart Islands were visited before 

she proceeded to Cossack via the Dampier 

Archipelago, taking in Mermaid, Rosemary, 

Eaglehawk, Legendre, and Delamori Islands 

en route, without finding any trace of the 

Koombana after a most exhaustive and thorough 

search.

The Bullarra from Sampson to Hedland, 

commencing on Tuesday last, searched the 

Turtle Islands, thence to Bedout Island, where she

landed a search party. Here I might men-

tion they found that the new automatic light

had been extinguished. This is a matter

to which the authorities will give careful con-

sideration. The Amphinome Shoals were

visited, and a course shaped along the Eighty

Mile Beach, taking in La Grange Bay and

Roebuck Bay. This also produced no trace of

the missing liner. Close and wide the

luggers have been searching from Roebuck

Bay round the Amphinone Shoals to Port

Hedland, and we understand that Captain

Parkes' luggers have been searching from

Monte Bellos to Cossack. In addition, lug-

gers have searched Depuch Island, in the

neighbourhood of Cossack and Hedland

without avail. There is no report at present

from the lugger that visited Rowley Shoals,

but this, in view of the Gorgon's report, is

negligible. The Gorgon arrived at Broome

this morning, her instructions having been

to search the Rowley Shoals with Impereiuse,

Clark, and Mermaid reefs. She signalled this

morning that her search had been thorough,

but no trace of the Koombana had been

seen. It will, therefore, be seen that the

whole of the coast from Barrow and Monte

Bello Islands has been searched to Broome

and across from Broome to Rowley Shoals

inclusive. 

The Moira should have passed

down by this time on her trip to Fremantle,

taking in the Lacepede Islands, Rowley

Shoals, and west of Ritchie Reef, but no

report will be received from her, it may be

assumed, unless she has something of an

urgent nature to communicate before her

arrival at Fremantle. It will be remembered

that the Moira encountered the cyclone a

hundred miles to the north-west of Port 

Hedland bound to Wyndham. 

An important reminder that the Moira encountered the cyclone 100 miles NW of Port Hedland at 8 a.m. 20 March. This illustrates that the cyclone, 90 miles in diameter (Inquiry), was to the northwest, not north of Port Hedland on the day of the disaster, and from this position the cyclone moved in a 'southerly' direction (having curved round) towards Balla Balla.

The coast search, it will be seen, has been 

absolutely fruitless, except in so far as the 

reports that no trace of the vessel can be found.

Harbour and Light Department, Western Australia (Fremantle)

Broome: 12 April, 1912.

Addressed to The Chief Harbour Master, Fremantle

Sir,

Report on search for R.M.S. Koombana (note official Royal Mail Ship title). 

At the request of the District Magistrate and in accordance with your cablegram I organised a search for the R.M.S. Koombana.

I chartered the lugger McLlennan and put Captain White in charge with orders to proceed along the coast, searching the 80 Mile Beach and the shoals up to Bedout Island and thence into Port Hedland. I also got the lugger Mina, which with Captain Bennie in charge was ordered to proceed to a point 60 miles north of Bedout Island, then down to the east of the island and into Port Hedland.

I took the schooner Muriel and proceeded to Rowley Shoals and then zigzagged into Port Hedland.

We got away on the evening of March 25th and I reached Mermaid Reef (Rowley Shoals) on March 29th. I proceeded along the south of the Reef and up the East side to the North End and then down to Sandy Island Clarke Reef. Same date I spoke S.S. Gorgon, who reported having searched Impereuse Reef and saw nothing.

I then proceeded across the North of Clarke Reef and down the East side of Impereuse Reef. 

At 2.30 pm on March 31st I spoke S.S. Moira who reported having also searched the shoals and sighted nothing.

I zigzagged down marking 16 mile tacks and picked up Bedout Lighthouse on the forenoon of April 3rd.

I had a flat calm all day and at 4 pm sighted smoke to the N.E.. This turned out to be S.S. Bullarra. I boarded her at 6 pm and Captain Upjohn reported as per my wire from Port Hedland.

I then proceeded to the South of Bedout Island and searched round Turtle Island and thence into Port Hedland arriving there at 9 pm on April 4th.

Captains White and Bennie were in Port Hedland, and being satisfied that we could do nothing further, I instructed them to return to Broome........


Oswald Dalziel.

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357, cons 066

30th March

"Bedout, Amphinome thoroughly scoured luggers resultless."
"Luggers searching coast close and wide. Nothing reported."

SS Bullarra:

"Wednesday (27th) circumnavigation Little Turtle. No trace Koombana."
"Second Officer and party landed Big Turtle. No trace."
"After dark arrive Bedout position by observation."

Thursday:

"Chief Officer and party searched the island and adjacent rocks. No trace whatever."
"Made a detour course to Broome via the beach. Spoke several luggers. No trace whatever."

By 30 March the vast bulk of Koombana wreckage had yet to materialize.

series 2357, cons 066

and the Minderoo's initial comprehensive search as per document:

Report, March 30th (Saturday)

"...anchored at 9 pm (28th, Thursday) at entrance Mary Anne Passage waiting daylight, weighed and proceeded at 5.50 am, 29th and searched the whole of the East side of Barrow Shoals and Island also Monte Bellos Islands and Richie Reef; from there steered 25 miles east and when south to Sholl Island, examined the neighbourhood of Sholl Island and then on to Stewart and Steamboa Islands, around the McLennand bank and anchored for the night off Cape Preston, weighted and proceeded at daylight 30th, and examined all the islands and passages from Cape Preston to Cossack where arrival at 1.45 pm, 30th. During the whole of our search we saw nothing and from the looks of the islands the storm does not appear to have reached that far west."

series 2357, cons 066

Once wreckage became evident, more than 10 days after the disaster, the Bedout Island vicinity was extensively awash with flotsam - some distance from the track and extent of the Balla Balla Cyclone.

Note Captain Mills, Minderoo:

'examined all the islands and passages from Cape Preston to Cossack where arrival at 1.45 pm, 30th. "During the whole of our search we saw nothing and from the looks of the islands the storm does not appear to have reached that far west."

This supports meteorological report that the Balla Balla Cyclone was only about 90 miles in diameter.

The following document outlines in more detail the lugger Mina search:

series 2357, cons 066

The following document outlines in more detail the lugger McLlennan search:

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357. cons 066

27 March, winds were light NW. By 31 March, winds had shifted to SSW; 6 April, SSE and 7 April SE, persisting into 8 April.

Amphinome Shoals surrounded by 'banks' in 2 to 2.5 fathoms - 12-15 ft.; 3.6-4.5 m. Koombana drew 16 ft. plus aft which means that she would have run aground in this vicinity.

There can be no denying the extent of initial discoveries - NOTHING! 

A 'delayed' release of flotsam from a wreck 'breaking up in deep water', rather than battered to pieces by the cyclone.

courtesy 

State Records Office, Western Australia; Google Earth.

Boyd, Annie. Koombana Days (p. 144). Fremantle Press. Kindle Edition.