INQUIRY REPORT, 1909.

Unique ID:	19774
Description:	BOT Wreck Report for 'Koombana', 1909
Creator:	Board of Trade
Date:	1909
Copyright:	Out of copyright
Partner:	SCC Libraries
Partner ID:	Unknown

Transcription

(No. 7298.)

KOOMBANA"(S.S.).

FINDING Of a Court of Marine Inquiry held at Fremantle on the 6th and 7th days of August, 1909, to investigate the circumstances attending the damage sustained by the s.s "KOOMBANA" through striking an obstacle off Gantheaume Point, North-West Coast of Australia, on 28th April, 1909.

Finding of the Court.

In coming to a decision on this matter, I must be guided entirely by the evidence before me, and I do not purpose to go outside that evidence, and assume anything that is not warranted by it.

The evidence establishes the fact that the s.s. "Koombana," with Captain Rees in command of her, left the port of Broome for Derby about 8 p.m on the night of 28th April, 1909, the captain being on the bridge. A course was steered in line of the leading lights astern until Entrance Point was bearing N. 10 W., when the course was then set N. 46 W., to bring her through the Roebuck Deep. On that course she continued until Gantheaume Light bore East, distant one mile or thereabouts. The evidence is that she then and there struck an obstruction, damaging her bottom on the port side forward, and there is no evidence that she struck an obstruction in any other position. No obstruction is shown to exist in such a position on the Admiralty chart produced, being the chart by which the vessel was navigated on that occasion. An uncharted rock has since been found in the locality, some half mile from the ship's position on the occasion of her striking. There is no evidence before the Court that any other course was steered, after the course was set off Entrance Point, until she struck an obstruction, and the evidence establishes the fact that such course, the captain being guided by the chart, was perfectly safe, through the Roebuck Deep.

It is regrettable that, as the vessel did strike an obstruction, the notebook of the officer of the watch, and also the bridge book, were not preserved and made available on this inquiry. In my opinion, such books should have been kept for reference.

In my opinion, there is no evidence establishing the charge of laxity in navigating the s.s. "Koombana" on the part of Captain Rees. I think, therefore, that this charge must be dismissed, and Captain Rees exonerated. I therefore return him his certificate.

E. P. DOWLEY,

Magistrate of the Local Court,

Fremantle.

We concur in the above Finding.

THOS. E. CUTLER,

JOHN FOXWORTHY,

Nautical Assessors.

(Issued in London by the Board of Trade on the 8th day of October, 1909.)

The Argus, Melbourne, Monday 9 August, 1909.

KOOMBANA'S MISHAP.

SUPPOSED SUNKEN ROCK.

PERTH, Sunday - Following the preliminary

inquiry by the chief harbourmaster (Mr Irvine) 

into the circumstances surrounding the mishap 

to the steamer Koombana outside Broome on 

April 28 the Marine Court, consisting of Mr Dooley,

resident magistrate, and Captains Cuttle and

Foxworthy, investigated the charge preferred 

against Captain Rees the master of the vessel, 

of laxity in navigation when leaving Broome. 

Captain Rees described the course steered 

when leaving port and said that he was confident 

of the vessel's position, although no bearings 

were taken he suggested that the vessel struck a 

coral pinnacle which was snapped off, leaving the 

stern clear to pass over it. The chart which he had 

used was drawn in 1883 and during the last two months 

H. M. S. Fantome had found an additional rock which 

at extreme low tide, when the Koombana struck, would

be nearly awash, as at neap tide it was 14ft below the 

surface The board exonerated Captain Rees from all 

blame in connection with the mishap.

The Mercury, Hobart, 29 November, 1911

The Fantome has just completed a 

survey of the N.W. Coast of' West 

Australia. During her visit to those 

waters an area of 700 square miles 

has been sounded, 350 miles of

coastline examined, and charts 

corrected

It does appear to be the case that lenience was exercised by Mr. Dowley. 

If one takes a closer look at the image below, it is apparent that Captain Rees could not have set a course N 46 W as claimed in order to arrive at the rock in question, 0.5 n miles west of Gantheaume Lighthouse. He would have run aground long before. 

Western Australia-North-West Coast. 2187/09. IT is hereby notified that an uncharted reef or submerged derelict is reported with less than 16 feet water at 3/4 ebb dead neap tide, Gantheaume Point bearing East distance 3/4 of a mile Lat. 17.58 S., Long. 122.10 East (position approximate.) Charts affected. No. 1048.-Buccaneer Archipelago to Bedout Island. No. 858.-Roebuck Bay. C. J. IRVINE, Chief Harbour Master. Department of Harbour and Lights, Fremantle, 14th May, 1909. 

Western Astralia-North-West Coast. Gantheaume Point. 2187/09. WITH reference to Notice to Mariners dated 14th May, 1909: Further notice is hereby given that a thorough search has been made for the alleged uncharted danger, and no obstacle discovered in position given, but a rock with three feet over it at L.W.O.S. was found by H.M.S. , "Fantome" with Gantheaume Point Lighthouse bearing North 88 East, 5 cables, and Riddell Point South 47 East (bearings Magnetic). Charts affected. No. 1048.-Buccaneer Archipelago to Bedout Island. No. 858.-Roebuck Bay. C. .J. IRVINE, Chief Harbour Master. Department of Harbour and Lights, Fremantle, 20th July, 1909.

Captain Rees claimed the obstacle was 1 mile distant from Gantheaume Lighthouse - a blatant untruth. The rock in question would have been 1/2 a mile closer to shore, suggesting that Koombana had wandered off course bearing N 40 W, rather than N 46 W. What's more, Koombana struck on her port side suggesting that she was seriously off course.

Conveniently the 'notebook' and 'bridgebook' were missing which made the senior crew look more guilty.Captain Rees admitted not taking bearings, compounded by the incident taking place at night. A coral pinnacle was a transparent 'clutching at straws'.

Why was Dowley so lenient?

The answer to this reverts to speculation: I believe that the crew and steamers servicing the 'work in progress' Nor'-West coast were subjected to almost unreasonable challenges in the form of the tidal ports such as Broome and Port Hedland + the extremely hazardous sand banks and narrow channel off Denham, Shark Bay. There should have been dedicated port pilots to guide steamers through these hazards, as were provided on the east coast. It was almost as though too much was expected from masters such as Captain Rees. Dowley recognised this and in order to avoid too much negative attention being directed at the limitations of the port services and access, let Captain Rees off the hook. From a cynical perspective if Captain Rees had lost his licence for say 6 months, who would have taken command of the challenging Koombana and met the stringent Nor'-West coast demands??

Perhaps the most intriguing comment made in the above extracts refers to the outdated chart used - circa 1893. Although the Fantome survey was completed by late 1911, it was claimed at the Inquiry into the loss of the Koombana, that the chart was inaccurate, yet to be updated and the coast in question, poorly surveyed. This claim is legitimized by the reference to 1893, 19 years prior. We know that the coordinates for Bedout Island, circa James Martin survey, 1865, were 10.5 n miles deviated to the southwestward. 

courtesy Google Earth

courtesy Google Earth

"a number of highly magnetic undersea iron ore bodies."

"These ore bodies are of such magnitude that when the survey vessel HMS Penguin reexamined 19th-century survey reports from HMS Meda, it experienced compass variation of up to 55° and dip to 33° (Lecky, 1920: 30)."

(The Searches for SS Koombana, Kerry Thom) 

courtesy Trove.

A DECIDEDLY UNSATISFACTORY INQUIRY.

Sunday Times, 19 May, 1912

WRECK OF THE KOOMBANA

A Decidedly Unsatisfactory Inquiry

Port Hedland Journalist's Important Statement - 

A Last Interview with Captain Allen -

The Koombana Had an Ugly List to Port -

And Her Propeller Was at Times Out of the Water

When She Left Port Hedland

It cannot be said that the inquiry

into the loss of the steamer Koom-

bana was satisfactory to the public.

It was certainly satisfactory to the

Adelaide Steamship Company, which,

by the finding, escapes any compen-

satory liability to the widows and or-

phans and other dependents of the

150 victims who went down in the

vessel; but that isn't what we mean.

In the first place, the evidence was

all one-sided. No attempt whatever

was made to produce independent

expert evidence as to the stability of

the steamer, and by that we mean, her

ability to live in a cyclone, and not her

constructional strength. Mr. M'Donald,

who supervised her building at Glasgow, 

was asked with regard to her

stability, and he replied--"She was a

magnificent vessel, strongly built."

But that was not the import of the

question, which should have been as

to her resistance to a great storm.

A steamer may be a "magnificent vessel" 

in ordinary ocean conditions, but

what we want to know is, was she

fit to face extraordinary conditions?

In the case of the Koombana, the

answer is that she went down the

first time she met extraordinary 

conditions, and took her living freight

with her. There was no evidence to

show that she had ever been in a

cyclone before, but there is the 

appalling fact that she did not survive

the first big storm she encountered,

duced at the inquiry. One ex-sea-

faring man, on looking at the model,

said she was a conventional design of

modern marine architecture, but 

admitted that if she got into holts with

a cyclone she might be heeled over by

the gale, and if a sea came along before 

she could right herself she might

turn turtle and go to the bottom. On

points like this the inquiry was silent.

Certain witnesses said she could not

capsize, but they were not subjected

to expert cross-examination. It

should be noted, however, that many

of the witnesses are in the employ of 

the Adelaide and other coastal 

steamship companies. What we should 

have liked to hear was the evidence of 

a dozen or  more observant persons who 

had  travelled in the Koombana and who 

knew more about her than theoretical 

salts.

The last comment might have been drawn from the number of passengers and crew called as witnesses to the Inquiry into the loss of TSS Waratah, 1909. 

There are many other points which

should have been elucidated, such as

the statement that the propeller was

only submerged six or eight inches,

which would be really no submergement

to a tossing or heavy sea, because for

a great portion of the time the propeller 

would necessarily be yards out of the 

water. We have indicated a few of the 

defects in this unsatisfactory inqulry, 

and in our opinion the Federal 

Government should hold an inquiry 

on its own account.

BROOME, Saturday.

Mr. Barker, editor and proprietor of

the "Port Hedland Advocate," who

yesterday read the finding of the

Koombana Inquiry Board for the first

time, says that the statement that the

steamer when she left Port Hedland

was drawing 19ft. aft is not in 

accordance with what the Harbormaster 

told him and said he was prepared to 

adhere to when the vessel was reported

missing. The Harbormaster's assertion

was that she was drawing 11ft. forward 

and 16ft. aft.

For the record I believe these latter figures are accurate and tally with Koombana carrying a total weight of 1,671 tons minus ballast water 871 tons = 800 tons when she departed Port Hedland. Ballast tanks filled at sea. 

As to the statement that there was

no particular evidence of bad weather,

Mr. Barker says that for some hours

before the Koombana sailed from Port

Hedland the people were battening

down, preparing for the gale. Further, 

that 40 pearling luggers had run

into the creek from outside for shelter;

and that many divers had reported an

almost infallible sign of a blow--

that is, a heavy ground swell in 

various parts of the ocean bed where they

had been working. Also other evidence

and an erratic barometer made it patent 

that a big disturbance was on hand.

Furthermore, Captain Allen, when

questioned by Mr. Barker as to 

whether he was going to put out, 

said he did not know. "I don't like the glass,"

was Captain Allen's remark, "and another 

24 hours here will not matter."

His decision to put out was only 

announced subsequent to a conversation

which took place on the Koombana

between Captain Allen and Captain

Upjohn of the Bullarra.

Captain Allen was new to the Koombana and run (barely > 6 months) and Captain Harry Upjohn of the Bullarra, a number of years on the Nor'-West coast. One imagines that Captain Upjohn applied a certain amount of pressure to depart. Schedule pressure dominated decision-making? Also Captain Upjohn made a challenge of sorts asserting that Koombana was a better boat than his, the ageing Bullarra.

Upon deciding to go out Captain Allen 

asked the Harbormaster to have

certain luggers that were obstructing

the channel out of Port Hedland 

Harbor removed, and when one still 

remained said he would not go out 

unless it was removed. 

He was palpably uneasy and disinclined to go.

It does not get more disturbing than this observation! Why insist that all the luggers be removed from the channel? In such light condition Koombana would have been difficult to control and collision a potential consequence. Captain Allen would rather have waited another 24 hours, a window of opportunity which would still have allowed Koombana to clear the bar, but should the cyclone have hit Port Hedland, he would have been responsible for any damage to the Koombana - the policy being to confront storms at sea - lives 'disposable'.

"My passengers think they will get

to Broome to-morrow (Thursday)," he

remarked; "but they will be lucky if

they get there by Saturday. I am 

going to put right out to sea, and as I

might bump the bar going out I will

leave my ballast tanks until I get 

outside and fill them out there."

As the Koombana went out a choppy

sea was rolling through the harbor 

entrance. Mr. Barker watched the vessel 

from his house on the foreshore,

and she had an ugly list to port. She

was rolling heavily, her propeller at

times being out of the water.

For anyone with more than a passing interest in the disaster, this period report makes for sobering reading. One can only imagine how those residents of Port Hedland with friends and family on board Koombana must have felt knowing what they did and having to accept the whitewash Inquiry outcome, arrogantly dismissing any form of culpability on the part of the Adelaide Steamship Company.

It goes without saying that a heavily rolling Koombana with ugly list to port, battling in a choppy sea and pitching such that her propeller was at times out of the water, would have been a very poor candidate for safe and efficient filling of ballast tanks. We know that an attempt was made due to the length of time (2 hours) Koombana rolled heavily and pitched in view of the Bullarra crew. But to what degree this endeavour was successful will never be known beyond my own speculation that it could not have been entirely successfully achieved. 

It was only a matter of time, skirting the outer margin of the cyclone that the inherently top heavy steamer in significantly light condition was going to falter and roll over as predicted. 

Captain Allen's fear was realised.

courtesy Trove.

SUFFICIENT FRESH WATER AND CARGO SHIFTING

The Register, Adelaide, 27 April, 1912.

Matthew John Williams, marine superintendent 

in Western Australia of the Adelaide Steamship Co., 

in his evidence stated that he had superintended the 

loading of the ship before she left Fremantle. He

gave particulars of the cargo shipped, and was of 

opinion that it would not shift. The vessel took 

sufficient water at Fremantle to last her for the

round trip.

This short extract is very important in two respects:

1. Koombana did not replenish water at Port Hedland which means that the fresh water tanks would have not been pressed up = free water effect = contributing to a list to port or starboard. The Inquiry made one of its false claims with a clue attached. 871 tons of water in Koombana's ballast tanks when she departed Port Hedland was an untruth. Captain Allen could not clear the outer bar with his tanks full. He in fact said that he would go straight out to sea and fill his tanks there. However, this said, the shortfall of 29 tons to make up a maximum capacity of 900 tons applies surely to the fresh water component utilized up to and including departure from Port Hedland. The fresh water tanks were 4 and 5, midships.

2. 260 tons of cargo is 14.4 % of total potential 1800 tons cargo carrying capacity (800 tons refrigeration and 1000 tons general cargo). The term 'rattling about' comes to mind and I would have liked one of the experts from the era to explain how this small component was secured in order that it could NOT shift. Without the deployment of skids, temporary partitions etc, I remain skeptical.

courtesy Trove.

'LUCK IN THAT TIME.'

The West Australian, 11 April, 1912

THE KOOMBANA.

CAPTAIN'S LAST LETTER.

Captain Egan, of the Howard Smith Line,

who was schoolmate with Captain Allen, of

the ill-fated steamer Koombana, now missing

on the North-West coast of Australia, has,

says the "Sun" (Sydney), received what is

apparently the last letter written by the

latter to any of his friends in Sydney. It

was dated March 8, and in it Captain Allen

said that he had got through the worst of

the season as far as the climate was concerned. 

"I just kept clear of a blow last trip,"

he added, "but as soon as I got round the

North-West Cape it started, so my luck was

in that time."

This is a tragic revelation in three important respects:

1. Captain Allen acknowledged in writing his patent concern regarding Koombana being caught in a 'blow'.

2. Captain Allen knew that his luck would ultimately run out: 'so my luck was in that time'.

3. The end of March was the tail end of the cyclone season and he and his steamer 'almost' escaped harm.

The extracts are poignant, predictive and utterly saddening.

8 March, the date of the letter, was roughly two weeks before the disaster, written after the 'near miss'. Moxon and Co claimed at the Inquiry that the barometer had fallen two weeks before the disaster, but that 'there was nothing in it'. If Captain Allen's letter is anything to go by, there certainly was something in it! 

A Blow!

courtesy Trove.

"NEAPED" REALITY

The West Australian, 29 March, 1913

STEAMERS HELD UP,

THE BULLARRA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA.

Owing to the severe weather on the north

west coast, both the State steamer Western

Australia, and the Adelaide Company's

cattle carrier Bullarra are held up near

Port Hedland. No information regarding

the Bullarra's arrival at Hedland appeared

on the shipping board at the Port yesterday, 

but from other sources it was learned

that the vessel reached that port at 1 a.m.

on the 27th inst., and anchored outside the

harbour. The local office of the Adelaide

Company at noon yesterday received a wire

stating that both vessels were still held up,

but as the weather was then showing signs

of abating, it was thought that they would

be able to leave for Cossack last evening.

The Bullarra is probably anchored a few

miles out of the port. whilst the State

steamer is tied up at the jetty, where she

has been since her arrival on Wednesday

morning last. Her position is a perfectly

safe one, although it is more than probable

that she will be "neaped' unless the weather

allowed her to get away last night. This

would mean that the vessel would be tied up

for six days, and as water supply, for stock

purposes is not too plentiful at the port,

and the steamer has a big consignment of

cattle aboard, which would have to be landed, 

the position of being "neaped" means a

considerable inconvenience in many 
respects. The Builarra also is anchored 
in a perfectly safe position as long as the 
storm remains non-cyclonic.

Fix this text

Another, of many examples, illustrating the pressure Captain Allen was under to depart Hedland, 20 March, 1912.

courtesy Trove.