Daily Commercial News, 14 May, 1912.
KOOMBANA INQUIRY.The Verdict.At the inquiry into the loss of theill-fated steamer Koombana held atFremantle, Mr. E. P. Dowley presided,and with him as assessors wereCaptains J. W. W. Yates and F. L. Parkes.Mr. Frank Parker (Crown Prosecutor)appeared on behalf of the Chief HarborMaster, whilst Mr. M. L. Moss, K.C.,watched the proceedings on behalf ofthe Adelaide S.S. Company, owners of .the Koombana.After explaining that the usual MarineCourt Inquiry was held to decidesome set out charge made by the ChiefHarbor Master against a captain andor officers of a vessel and that at thepreliminary Inquiry held on the 22ndApril no such charges had been made,Mr. Parker remarked that, in view ofthe serious loss of life that had occur-red through the loss of the Koombanathe Court had been called upon topublicly investigate the loss of the ship,and to decide whether any blame couldbe attributed to any of the Company'sofficials ashore.Mr. Moss was alleged to have 'commended' Mr. Parker 'for bringing about a public investigation'. A devious move given that the emphasis on the public inquiry would be looking for fault with the owners, whom he represented. Mr. Moss, in effect hinted that the Adelaide Steamship Company would be exonerated; an outcome foretold.Mr. Stevens, Acting Divisional Officer ofthe Commonwealth Weather Bureau fromMarch 15th to 25th, during which time theKoombana disappeared, was the first witnessexamined.He said that each morning he receivedreports from Wyndham, Hall's Creek,Broome, Derby, Cossack, Onslow, andother places in' the North-West. Duplicatereports were sent to the Melbourne Bureau,and from that office the forecasts, basedon barometer and thermometer readings,were issued at noon, Eastern time.These forecasts were received in Perthbetween 11.30 and 12 noon (Western time).If they were not received by noon each daythe forecast was issued by the local bureau.If storms were approaching warningswere issued to all stations in the vicinityof the storm centre. Later, on in the afternoonforecasts based upon more recent data wereissued by the local bureau.No special forecast was issued from theMelbourne office of any storm from March16th to 21st, inclusive. On March 15th therewas a monsoonal depression which had workedS.S.W. to Port Darwin. By the 18th the stormhad reached the neighbourhood of Derby, butin no cases were high winds recorded, and thelowest point the barometer recorded was 29.70.This was an embarrassing admission given the scale of the Balla Balla blow.Monday, 18 March, Captain Richardson of the steamer Paroo anchored at Depuch Island, noted that there was a heavy swell coming in from the NE, associated with an increase in ambient temperature and falling barometer readings. There could be no doubt in mariners' minds that a cyclone was brewing somewhere in the NE. Surely the data submitted from Cossack, 30 miles away, should have alerted the Bureau to the possibility of a storm developing?A report from Port Hedland on the20th stated that the wind force wasfour miles an hour, with threateningweather and smooth seas, and Cossackreported a barometer of 29.69 with windeach blowing at the rate of 19 miles anhour.It is hard to reconcile the Port Hedland report with a half to full gale from the NE and a ground swell from the NW when Bullarra departed port, 20th March. 'Smooth seas' suggests misinformation or miscommunication. Either way the reporting system was flawed.On the 20th at 1 p.m. Cossackadvised that a fresh gale was blowing,with high seas and weather threatening.On the 21st, next morning, the barometerrecorded 29.56, wind 37 miles an hour,and there were very heavy seas.So why then were 'no storm' warnings issued for this location and date, given the acknowledged data?By the 21st, there was 'a howling hurricane' 30 miles away at Balla Balla.The storm, from 15th to 21st March,went in a south-west direction,and evidently struck the coast at Cossackand curved. The centre of the stormpassed north of Cossack. Therewas nothing to indicate that a cyclonewas approaching.Captain Richardson of the Paroo reported otherwise.To Mr. Moss: The forecasts were thoroughlysatisfactory, and the only delay in gettingthem from Melbourne was the time it took totransmit the telegrams, which had precedenceover all other matters.Pressed by Mr. Moss he admitted there wouldbe a saving of time if the reports weremade by the local bureau.This statement does not make sense. Time delay was minimal given the speed of telegram transmissions. The local bureaus were the agencies submitting the data in the first place. Perhaps the problem lay in collation of data and compiling forecasts?Very strange that the forecasting system was claimed to be 'thoroughly satisfactory' when a cyclone battered Balla Balla and surrounds and no storm was predicted or reported for this time period!Continuing, he stated that apparently: thedepression struck the coast somewherenear Cossack, and, being interrupted by thecoastline, and the width of the depressionbeing narrowed, it resulted in a sudden storm.It would help if the various officers of the coastexchanged information direct, provided theyunderstood what it conveyed. Postmasters,speaking generally, were very reliable in thematter of weather reports.Postmasters were certainly better than the existing system which failed to forecast and acknowledge a full blown cyclone during the time period, 20 and 21 March. Referring to a 'sudden storm' does not correlate with the Paroo account; Moira and Bullarra logs.
There had been cases of delay in issuingforecasts from Melbourne. He could notform any ideas as to the velocity of thecyclone which wrecked the Koombana.The diameter, he thought, would extendfrom Port Hedland on the north and Cossackon the south, or about 90 miles north-east by .south-west.
courtesy Google Earth Captain Upjohn, who had charge ofs.s. Bullarra, one of the vessels thathad a trying time in the hurricane, wasnext called.Examined by Mr. Parker, he stated hisvessel arrived at Port. Hedland on the18th March, and the Koombana enteredport next day. Both vessels left on the 20th.About 8 a.m. on the 20th Captain Allenboarded the Bullarra, and in the courseof a general conversation, said'What do you think of the, weather?'He replied that it would be dirty; but he didn'tknow if there would be anything in it. Heexpected similar weather, or even finer,on the voyage.The 'dirty weather' reference is intriguing. Dirty weather, generally, refers to storm conditions. Captain Upjohn hedged his bets by claiming that he did not know if the anticipated storm would be severe - 'anything in it' - or not. Adding a gambling element to the statement he suggested that the weather could be better than anticipated, thus justifying departure. A passing squall is a possible explanation for weather improving, but does not account for the groundswell from the northwest.My feeling is that both captains, given all the indicators, suspected there was a cyclone brewing along the coast, but where, how extensive and in what direction it was heading, were the unknown factors. Part of the cyclone-gamble equation must surely have included discussions whether it would be better to confront such a system in port or out at sea?It is said that the trend was to 'evacuate' the port ahead of a cyclone, which makes sense in the context of a vessel being wrecked on shore, in port. However, and this is important, Captain Allen expressed reservations about departing, stating that 24 hours would not make much difference. He was disinclined to put out to sea and with good reason - lives vs. material ship.It is interesting to note that rule 4 for captains employed by the Adelaide Steamship Company referred to not 'endangering the ship', which staying in port might imply. Nothing in said rule book about lives.It is also interesting to note that Captain Upjohn could simply have acknowledged the indicators heralding a cyclone, but justified departure on the grounds that it would be safer to confront a cyclone at sea than in port.Why didn't he opt for the more accepted approach?Koombana was inherently top heavy and vulnerable in storm (cyclone) conditions; far wiser to remain in port - they all knew it and Captain Upjohn did everything to mitigate responsibility for encouraging Captain Allen to depart.He had no discussion on the question ofleaving port or otherwise.In this one sentence Captain Upjohn defied common sense, the most important issue requiring discussion and in so doing, telegraphed to the Court that he was not going to give up the truth easily.The Koombana sailed between 20 and 30minutes earlier than the Bullarra. When thelatter left port the Koombana was in sightand was to be observed for about two hours.This statement was confirmed by a cattleman on board Bullarra who claimed that the two steamers were 5 miles distant, stern on to each other, at midday and Bert Clarke who watched the steamer from a tower near the port entrance. This also confirms that Koombana must have been relatively stationary, bow heading into the gale, while tanks were being filled, for this scenario to have been fulfilled.He noticed how well the Koombanabehaved, and either he or the chief officer,who was on the bridge with him, remarkedthat she appeared in good trim. The propellerwas well submerged, and she did not roll atall in crossing the bar.Captain Upjohn made his position clear to the Court that he was willing to abandon the truth to protect the reputation of the owners' top heavy steamer. The upper limit of the propeller was 16.5 ft. (as per plans) and with a draft aft. of 16 ft. (Port Hedland Harbour Master's claim), the propeller could not have been fully submerged.Even if one generously uses the erroneous claim by Captain Upjohn that Koombana's aft. draft was 17 ft. and the incorrect figure quoted for the upper limit of the propeller, 18 ft. plus, one still gets an exposed blade. Either way the propeller could not have been fully submerged.It would have been an impossibility for a top heavy steamer not to roll crossing the bar with a ground swell coming in from the NW and a gale from the NE.When they parted the Koombana wasproceeding on her ordinary course forBroome. Between 2 and 4 p.m. the windchanged from northeast to east-north-east.A cattleman on board Bullarra observed that the inky, dark cloud mass indicating the position of the cyclone lay on the western horizon, in which direction they were headed. What is interesting about the changing wind directions is that it strongly suggests Bullarra steamed into the inferior aspect of the cyclone tracking towards Balla Balla from the north-northwest.At 4.20 the engines were slowed, and at 5 p.m.he altered the Bullarra's course and stood outto sea.And in so doing steamed into the centre of the system.At 6 a.m. the barometer had been at29.50, and it then began to fall gradually,though it did not flicker. Between 8 and10 p.m. a heavy gale was blowing andthe sea running high. The ship began tolabour heavily, and things were gettingserious. He did not take, any particularnotice of the barometer until about 10 p.m.He did not have to consult the barometer to know what was happening.He had been chief officer of the Koombanafor about 12 months, and during that timehad experienced some very heavy weatherwhen she was lightly laden. She was a magnificentship, and a splendid seaboat.What is most interesting about this statement is protesting Koombana's virtues and stressing that 'when lightly laden' Koombana was stable in 'very heavy weather'. This, after all, was the very core of contention and the most likely cause of the disaster; an issue that this employee of the Adelaide Steamship Company was determined to protest and defend in order to avoid reparations.He had searched for the Koombana andfound portion of a motor launch, etc., whichhe was certain belonged to her. All theBullarra's boats had been damaged.The only explanation of the loss of theKoombana he could offer was that shewas smashed up by the force of thecyclone. He considered it impossiblefor her to have 'turned turtle.'And there we have it. Impossible to 'turn turtle' was the very thing most likely to explain the steamer's loss. Using the word 'impossible' was ridiculous. The fact that Koombana steamed away from the cyclone, not into it, was neatly dodged by all participants of this farce.It was the worst cyclone he hadexperienced, and it was a miracle that theBullarra lived through it.But the ageing steamer had survived the cyclone.Mr. Moss now handed in a telegramsent from Port Hedland on March 20th,and was signed 'Upjohn' and 'Allen.'It referred to the painting of buoys,the matter Captains Upjohn and Allenhad under discussion. Proceeding,Captain Upjohn stated it was untruethat he and Captain Allen had had aconference about the weather.What was taboo about discussing the weather and changes already observed? It was the most likely topic of discussion, in addition to the buoys of course. Denying the obvious did not make sense and confirmed that Captain Upjohn was not a reliable witness.He was sure Captain Allen did not state he'would be lucky to get to Broome,'which he was credited with saying.Omitting the word 'by' Saturday, convenient to introduce an element of doubt in Hedland Advocate reporting. How could be be sure about a statement if he was not, at all times, in Captain Allen's company?Going back to the question of thesearch for the Koombana the witnessremarked that in latitude 19.11, longitude119.25, about 27 to 37 miles fromBedout Island, one evening they sawwhat looked like a portion of the deckof a vessel, but it proved to be theshape of a ship outlined by an oilysubstance such as would rise from asunken vessel, floating on the sea. Theyhad taken the specimens produced incourt as this spot. An awning sparand one of the planks exhibited inCourt had also been discovered in closeproximity. Other article were pickedup about 20 miles from that spot.Extraordinary that the 'oily substance such as would rise from a sunken vessel' was never pursued then and now. 27 to 37 miles was an error - 27 to 28 miles.Chief officer James Crossley, of theBullarra, corroborated Captain Upjohn'sevidence, and to Mr. Parker stated thatwhen the Koombana went on her coursehe didn't see her propeller rising out of thewater.Closing ranks.Answering Mr. Moss, Crossley stated thatthe light on Bedout Island was outwhen he went there.An issue and implication which should have been fleshed out in cross-examination.It was the worst storm he had experiencedin 15 years at sea, and he should have,thought it impossible for any ship to live in suchweather.Except an old steamer like the Bullarra...J. F. Morrison, a pilot, then gaveevidence as to the Koombana'sequipment. Her boats and applianceswere examined in January, and were ingood order and condition. He hadknown Captain Allen 25 years. Hewas a sound and careful navigator,who took-no risks.This character reference was crucial testimony. Captain Allen was experienced, good at what he did, and careful. He echoed this judgment when stating that he 'was disinclined to go out due to the glass' (barometer). We know that he adopted a very cautious approach to keeping ballast tanks full when crossing the bar - stability vs. bar strikes. He, therefore, must have been extremely unhappy about departing Port Hedland that day with all tanks empty; but if he were to depart, he had no choice. A damaging bar strike could have been catastrophic.Why was Captain Allen then coerced by Captain Upjohn to depart Port Hedland, 20 March, when it went against his better judgment?One can only surmise that there was a degree of schedule pressure, but perhaps more significantly, Captain Upjohn had challenged Captain Allen by claiming that Koombana was the far better steamer and he had decided to depart in the more inferior Bullarra. It was directly after this that Captain Allen decided to go:Captain Allen Koombana: "I donot like the look of the weather.Captain Upjohn; what do you intenddoing?"Captain Upjohn (Bullarra): "I havemade up my mind to go out and yourboat is a far better one than mine."Captain Allen: "Well, if you intendgoing out, I do not suppose it will dofor me to stop here."On her first, trip from the North-Westshe came into port with a list. Speakingto Captain Rees, the then master, helearned that the cattle deck was filled withcattle, and one of the tanks wasempty, the latter being due to the factthat the engineers had not the proper'hang' of the tanks.One could almost view this statement as breaking ranks and cheekily confirming that Koombana had top heaviness issues when all ballast tanks were not filled and weight concentrated high up in the hull - i.e. the cattle deck.The Koombana was a well-built ship,and such weather might never beexperienced again in a lifetime.Cyclones / willy willies were well known on the Nor'West coast in the summer season. It was a bizarre implication that Koombana was not designed to survive significant cyclonic events - occurring 'once in a lifetime'.M. J. Williams, Marine Superintendentfor the Adelaide S.S. Companyin Western Australia, gave evidenceas to the loading of the Koombana,and all particulars of cargo shipped.He was of the opinion that the cargohad not shifted.H. J. Clarke, one of the Company'swharf managers at Fremantle, inanswer to Mr. Parker, stated that forfifteen months he occupied the positionof chief officer of the Koombana.He came out from Glasgow with her,and had gone in her from Fremantleto Geraldton in the teeth of a howlinggale, and she behaved very well indeed.He had also been in her on the NewSouth Wales coast when the windwas right on her beam, and only herballast tanks were full. They droveright through it, but it was blowingso hard that they could not go up tothe wharf and had to lay in stream atWatson's Bay with both anchors down.As to her end, he was pf the belief thatshe had been battered to pieces. Hebelieved that she went through thestorm but was so knocked about thatshe foundered. He didn't think it waspossible for the vessel to be blownabsolutely over.A common theme among Adelaide Steamship Company employees denying the obvious and protesting the steamer's virtues.Answering Mr. Moss, witness said thestability and trim indicator in Court wasthe invention of Mr. Ralston, the headdraughtsman at the yards where theKoombana was built, and a man withone of the best reputations in suchmatters in the United Kingdom.Praising a designer and design which was not present on board when Koombana departed Port Hedland for the last time. Irrelevant to the case.To Mr. Parker: Sometimes he hadbeen asked to empty one of the tanksso as to produce a list in order thatthat coaling could be facilitated.And in this one statement the truth revealed. The inherently top heavy steamer could be induced into a list by the simple act of emptying just one of her tanks. There you have it!Chief Engineer Craig, of the s.s.Bullarra, under cross-examination byMr. Moss, stated the Koombana'spropeller was under water fully six oreight inches at Port Hedland, and hehad heard nothing about the propeller'flogging the air.'A pointless exercise interviewing biased employees. In this case one can deduce that the Chief Engineer was referring to a draft aft. of 17 ft. or marginally greater - which was the incorrect figure supplied by Captain Upjohn. Note that this would not have applied to the erroneous propeller figure of 18 inches.
Captain Upjohn and Mr. Crossley,of the Bullarra, were now recalled toexplain a statement of the formerregarding the barometer reading at noonon March 21st. The Captain had saidthe reading was 29.80, while the entryin the log was 28.83. It was explainedthat the latter reading was from thechart-room glass, which was a low-setinstrument, with a 'fine weather' readingof 28.90, and the captain's readingwas taken from the commander'sglass, which was hung in his owncabin.In reply to a question by Mr. Dowley,he said he did not know if the lighton Bedout Island had failed priorto the cyclone.The Bedout Light was out from a week prior to the disaster. To say that these men did not know about it either speaks of gross negligence on the part of the Port Hedland port authority not notifying such; or a lapse in the chain of communication between Mr. Moxon, Adelaide Steamship Co, who acknowledged he had received the notification 1 week prior, and the Chief Harbour Master at Fremantle, Captain Irvine, who was then in turn obligated to issue a warning to all shipping in the region.In fact Captain Irvine was disingenuous as regards the Bedout light and published this statement in the March Gazette:'Western Australia—North-West Coast. NOTICE is hereby given that the hurricane which passed over Bedout Island—lat. 19.35 S. 119.6 E.—on the 22nd inst., extinguished the unattended light established on this island in December, 1909. Further notice will be issued as soon as the lamp has been re-lighted. Charts affected. No. 1055—Bedout Island to Cape Cuvier. No. 1048—Buccaneer Archipelago to Bedout. C. J. IRVINE, Chief Harbour Master. Harbour and Light Department, Fremantle, 30th March, 1912.'The cyclone was NOT responsible for extinguishing the light!Mr. Clark was now recalled andquestioned by Mr. Parker regardingrumours 'prevalent in Fremantle.' anddeposed that no rails had been putinto the vessel as ballast, a reply whichelicited from Mr. Moss: ''Anotherpavement expert's opinion exploded.'In February 1910 Koombana heeled over to an alarming degree in a squall and took a long time to straighten up. Captain Rees decided that he would keep 150 tons of rails in the hold to assist ballasting and stability. These rails were not 'put in' but rather 'kept in'. Semantics exploited by the dramatic Mr. Moss.The Court now had the evidencegiven at the preliminary inquiry byR. H. Arundel, Surveyor to Lloyd'sRegister and the Marine Underwriters,read. In effect the witness had cometo the conclusion that after leavingPort Hedland making for Bedout, thecaptain of the Koombana met the windnortherly so strong that it preventedhim from getting to the north to goround about; then finding it impossibleto heave-to on his port tack, which wasthe proper tack, he must have adoptedone of two courses: either to heave-toon the starboard tack or attempt to runacross to the open water to the westwardin the face of the disturbance. Witness wasof opinion that the disturbance cameover from a S.S.E. direction, and thatthe Koombana before she reachedBedout, experiencing a wind direction N.and E., was obliged to heave-to onthe starboard tack on the westward,and in running west would get into thecentre of the cyclone. The finding ofwreckage to the westward confirmedhis opinion that she ran out to westward.A large portion of wreckage was found to the north of Bedout Island, not to the west. The cyclone coming in from the SSE was a crazy claim. The entire statement was intensely flawed.He had formed the opinion theKoombana was a 'tender' ship whenlight, but perfectly seaworthy.At least one of the 'experts' had the decency to state the obvious. 'Perfectly seaworthy' was pushing it, though.On the question of top-hamper he thought ifcargo was properly stowed and distributed itwould not interfere with a vessel's stability.Captain J. A. Rankin, Acting MarineSuperintendent for the Adelaide S.S.Company, deposed he was stationed atAdelaide, and referring to the Ralstonstability and trim indicator in Court,he said it was used for, among otherthings, determining the 'G.M.' thegenerally accepted term for denotingthe stability of a vessel. The instrumentcould only be used for the vesselit was designed for, and he had, whenhe received it, tested the Koombanaon information supplied by CaptainRees, when the vessel was in the lightestpossible condition. The test gavea result of plus 1ft. 6in., which wasexceptionally good. If the vessel werefully loaded with cargo, and coal andall tanks were full, she could heel overto an angle of 90 per cent, and eventhen have a margin for recovery.Like the cyclone coming in from the SSE, there is an element of fantasy. 1 ft. 6 inches was simply not possible in the 'lightest condition possible'.Before Captain Allen's departure fromFremantle on his last trip he had senthim (witness) a report showing thedistribution of a load of 712 tons, andshowing also particulars of draughtand trim. He asked the Court to makethe test from these particulars on thestability and trim indicator in Court.Captain Rankin then gave ademonstration with the indicator, whichwas closely watched by the Court andCounsel. He distributed the weights overthe plan in the indicator. The 'G.M.'was plus 2ft. 1 1/2 in., and the result ofthe second process almost exactlyagreed with the late captain's figuresfor the draught and trim arrived atby ordinary means.Answering Mr. Moss, the witness statedthe Koombana was in many respects inexcess of British requirements.No other experts called to challenge the wildly optimistic GM figure.Mr. A. C. Butcher, engineer forharbour and lights in Western Australia,was next examined, and he saidthat, in conjunction with Captain Rankin,he carried out tests, and thecurves of stability were particularlygood. The stability curves suppliedby the builders did not show suchsevere tests as those carried out bywitness.These curves should have been submitted to the Court as evidence as was done at the Inquiry into the loss of the Waratah and which could have been open to scrutiny.
The President of the Court thenannounced that he would be pleased totake any evidence anybody might wishto bring forward. Mr. Moss thereuponremarked the Company was pleased atthe general invitation extended to thepublic, as it would give any person whohad been circulating rumours concerningthe ship a chance to show just what theyknew of the matter.Mr. Moss was a shrewd operator. Potential witnesses presented as 'circulating rumours' rather than making valid contributions; and 'showing just what they knew of the matter' implying that it was not likely to amount to much once he was done with them. The residents of Port Hedland must have been incensed at his attitude, and rightly so.Before the proceedings commencedon the second day Mr. Moss drewattention to the fact that CaptainUpjohn had, in his evidence, stated theKoombana's propeller was wellsubmerged when leaving Port Hedland,instead of 'not' submerged, as hadbeen reported and published.A Freudian slip?Mr. W. E. Moxon, Manager in WesternAustralia for the Adelaide S.S. Company,was then examined by Mr. Moss. He saidthe Koombana came under his supervision,and no special instructions were given tothe late Captain Allen to push on, as thevessel ran on a time-table.Referring to the previous post was not Mr. Moxon embarrassed to make this statement to the Court? The 'time-table' was grueling and tide-dependent. Any delays had serious knock-on effects.She carried a particularly small cargo upto Port Hedland, and the captain had plentyof time to discharge cargo and do any otherwork necessary.A 'particularly small cargo' and empty ballast tanks reinforces the fact that Koombana departed Port Hedland, 20 March, in very light condition, drawing 16 ft. aft and 11 ft. forward. What 'other work' did Mr. Moxon have in mind?In the North-West trade the captains were'peculiarly responsible,' the company leftmatters very largely in their hands.In other words, Mr. Moxon washed his hands of any direct responsibility for decisions, good or bad, taken by Captain Allen.
His company's rule No. 4 stated that'No order will be held to excuse theendangering of the ship.'Again distancing himself from any form of culpability. Because the ship had disappeared without trace and known cause, a catch-22 situation was created. Neither Captain Allen posthumously nor the Company could be held accountable for the disaster. No reparations.If Koombana had been wrecked in Port Hedland due to a direct hit by the cyclone, there would have been no 'excuse' and the main reason why Captain Allen decided to go out. Damned either way but honouring his commitment to the Company rules.Everything humanly possible had beendone, by the company to find traces ofthe vessel and for succouring of anypossible survivors.An empty echo of humanitarianism.With reference to the reportpublished - in the 'West Australian'from its Port Hedland correspondenton April 4, he had received a letterfrom the company's manager denyingthat the ship rolled as she crossed thebar, that the propeller was out of thewater, and that Captain Allen had saidhe would ' be lucky if he got toBroome.' ...by Saturday.Given the employees' collective testimony, the Company manager would say that, wouldn't he.He (the local manager) wason board the Koombana in the lasthour before she left Port Hedland, andhe was not aware that Captains Upjohnand Allen had any conversationwith reference to the weather. Theglass was not more than 10 pointsbelow normal.A fortnight before there had been a fallof 60 points and nothing followed.Captain Allen wrote a letter home, a date coinciding with the above statement:"It was dated March 8, and in it Captain Allensaid that he had got through the worst ofthe season as far as the climate was concerned."I just kept clear of a blow last trip,"he added, "but as soon as I got round theNorth-West Cape it started, so my luck wasin that time."'Nothing followed' is not consistent with 'kept clear of a blow' (blow = storm)They had discussed the question of the vesselleaving port on the top of the equinoctialspring tides, but the question of 'willy willies'did not arise during the conversation.This was the very crux of the Koombana dilemma. She was too large for ready access to Port Hedland; unless during the narrow window of opportunity provided by high water springs.Captain Allen had remarked that withthe stiff head wind blowing he wouldhave no hope of reaching Broome intime to catch the following day's tide,and he would not be surprised if hewere a day late, as he was notparticularly keen on going into Broomeat night time.What a gem. Finally we have a senior employee of the Adelaide Steamship Company admitting to the Court that Captain Allen did not believe that he would make Broome by the next day for no other reason than weather-related conditions - 'a stiff head wind'. Koombana was a very powerful steamer and capable of more than 14 knots. This statement acknowledged that she would not be making 10 knots or less.
Why?Because the headwind in question was a gale not a 'fresh breeze', as claimed by Captain Upjohn at this Inquiry; a gale buffeting the significant top hamper (resistance) of a top heavy steamer; a gale from the NE associated with a groundswell from the northwest, signaling the presence of a cyclone.Proof acknowledged!Reference to a 'day late' refers back to the pressure of the tight tide-dependent schedule and a narrow window of access to these ports.'Not particularly keen on going into Broome at night time' confirms that Captain Allen was cautious and not a risk taker. There should have been port pilots in ideal circumstances which the Nor-West certainly was not!The pearling luggers had come into port,but only on account of the dirty water causedby the north-easterly blowing.Disingenuous and flouting the truth and risk presented. If it were simply a matter of dirty water surely some would have remained at sea until the sea cleared?The pearlers said that by doing so theyhad escaped the greatest disaster intheir history, as they did not expectany hurricane.The man was shameless in his misrepresentations of the truth.Captain Challoner, a pearler in theNorth-West, had reported that on March19 he was six miles from Bezout in adead calm sea and glorious sunshine.Bezout is not Bedout; two islands a considerable distance apart - 124 n miles. Again, taking the Court for fools.From midnight the wind increased, andat 5 a.m. there was a big sea. From 2.30to 6 p.m. on the 21st there was a fiercehurricane, which was worse than the 'willywillies' of 1908 and 1910. From otherreports received from the North-Westwitness continued, it appeared that thehurricane was one of the worst that hadever been experienced.And yet it escaped the attention of the Meteorological Bureau.Captain Dingle made a special trip inthe Koombana in connection with hisduties as marine superintendent, andsaid to witness on his return that henever wished to step on a betterseaboat in his life, and he (Captain Dingle)considered on that trip she had beentested up to an extreme limit.The biased protests became quite boring in the scheme of things... How could Koombana have been tested to the 'extreme limit' if an extreme weather event was not encountered on that particular voyage?The company had received a reportfrom a magistrate at Broome that astatement had been made by a drovernamed Olive, that on the night of March20, when he was at Boyer's Camp,30 miles north of Condon, at about8 or 9 p.m. he saw two rockets go upin the direction of N.W. There was ahurricane blowing at the time.This was 82 miles to the northeast of Port Hedland which did not sustain any hurricane-force damage; the cyclone targeting Balla Balla 60 miles further to the southwest. Therefore it was unlikely that a 'hurricane was blowing'. It is an interesting report, though, and one that strongly suggested, if true, that either the disaster took place between Bedout Island and the coast or a lifeboat made it to this location.A report had also been received froma cattle station near Condon that copperair chambers had been picked up on thebeach at Solitary Island.These were from one of the lifeboats and Solitary Island is near Condon.When a ship went to the North-West shegenerally took a very large supply of freshwater in her tanks, as well as salt water, asthe former was very expensive at ports.By deduction one can assume that this factor could have contributed to a free surface effect in incompletely filled fresh water tanks; in turn contributing to a 'dangerous' list.
The Koombana was last spoken to bywireless on the night of March 19.Actually it was the morning of 20 March, and the communication was with the Gneisenau, some 800 miles distant. This implies that had the communication system and operator been functional during the disaster, a distress call could theoretically have been picked up by the Gneisenau. This not being the case, points strongly to a sudden catastrophic event.So far as he knew none of the internalfittings had been found. All the wreckagefound so far had been from the upperdeck, and debris of boats.The surprising thing is that no cargo was discovered. If the ship had been battered to pieces as had Yongala a year before, one would expect contents from the holds to have formed part of the wreckage discovered.The ship would be reported 'missing' byLloyd's. He would not like to expressany opinion as to whether there wasany material difference in the constructionof the Bullarra, and Koombana.Naturally he wouldn't. The new one foundered and the old workhorse survived. Bullarra did not have towering superstructure and ballast issues accessing Port Hedland.Witness then referred to the importanceof an efficient system of signalling beinginstituted on the Nor'-West coast, and wasof the opinion that postmasters shouldexchange information every morning, andit should be available for shipmasters.A sensible suggestion, given the failings of the centralised meteorological bureau.He then stated that the Company hadbeen informed that the Bedout light wasextinguished on March 13, and wasobserved to be still extinguished on the14th and 15th. It was hard to say whatbearing the absence of this light wouldhave on the disaster. Their experience was thatself-attended lights were not to bedepended on.Extraordinary statement! 'Bearing'? The ship striking the reef at night, which jutted 3 miles out from the island, for starters...Koombana would have to have averaged more than 10 knots to clear Bedout by dusk. With the headwind described this might not have been possible.The Chief Harbormaster (CaptainIrvine) said inquiries had been madein England and America as to the bestunattended light available, and eventuallya Birmingham firm supplied the Bedoutlight, which was arranged to burn for12 months without attention, compressedacetylene being used. It started on December10, 1909, and up to the time of the recent failurehad given entire satisfaction. It had neverbeen left for 12 months without attention,and when visited was alwaysfound to be burning satisfactorily. Thefirst intimation he had of its failurewas on March 26, and telegrams weresent to all ports advising them thatthe light was out.As I have remarked, Moxon knew of the light being out from 13 March, but Captain Irvine only heard of it a fortnight later? Not likely. As I see it the problem was not with the unattended light but the monitoring of such.The notices to ship masters stated thatthe light was unwatched, and they werewarned not to place too much reliance uponit.Then why bother to have it there in the first place if masters couldn't rely upon it? Ridiculous!Continuing, Mr. Moxon said that inhis opinion the vessel did not strikeBedout Island, as, if she did, wreckagewould be found. It was possible thatshe struck it and foundered elsewhere.I agree with this statement.Mr. Parker hereupon asked for anadjournment in order to secure awitness from Port Hedland. After somediscussion, during which Mr. Mossreferred to the necessity for a limitationbeing placed on the adjournments; butstated the Company was not desirousof shutting out any material facts, Mr.Dowley adjourned the Court till thefollowing afternoon.Nice try Mr. Moxon. If there was nothing to fear and the alleged 'busybodies' just that, there should have been no objection at all.When the inquiry was resumed Mr.Moxon; who was recalled by Mr. Moss,read extracts from Interviews withMessrs. McDonald and Fisher. Mr. McDonald was for a time the chief engineerof the Koombana, and was sent toEngland to superintend the erectionof her engines, after which he came toAustralia in her, and Mr. Fisher wasfor a time her third officer. Both gentlemenreferred to her stability in laudatory terms.Mr. Moxon handed in to the Court a chartshowing the location of the wreckage fromthe Koombana picked up by steamers andluggers.Parading Company 'yes' men.
The witness from Port Hedland, WilliamPatrick, clerk in holy orders, anda member of the Church of England,was then called by Mr. Parker. Witnessstated that he was at Port Hedland fromMarch 18 to March 25. He saw theKoombana arrive in Port Hedland onMarch 19, which was a very clear dayand exceptionally hot. He saw thevessel leave Port Hedland on the 20th,but did not take particular notice of herpropeller. The sky was very cloudy, theclouds were low, and there was a fairlystrong breeze blowing. It was an easterlywind blowing, just a little stronger thanusual. At the post office he heard peopleremark that the glass was steady and nottoo low. He had a conversation with CaptainPearson, who was a passenger forDerby, and who did not expect anything in the shape of abnormal weather.Witness did not think there was theslightest truth in the statement thatCaptain Allen had discussed the weather.Was the clerk of the church psychic as well? How could he attest to the fact that 'there was not the slightest truth in the statement that Captain Allen had discussed the weather'? He proved, without a fraction of doubt, that he was biased in favour of the Company, for whatever reason. But he did give important clues in the form of notable heat and wind from the east.Captain Allen appeared to be alittle anxious, and seemed unwell, ashe was suffering from the heat.Again, the clerk was not a doctor. How could he know if Captain Allen's anxiety and look of 'unwell' was heat or other related?Witness regarded Mr. Gardener, Managerof the Adelaide S.S. Company at Port Hedland,as a very honourable man, whose reportscould be thoroughly relied upon.Again, bias confirmed and strengthened.
Mr. Moss then addressed the Court.He said that it had been shownthat the Koombana left Port Hedlandat half-past ten in the morning on thetop of the equinoxial spring tides. Shehad her loading of 1,671 tons welldistributed, a fact which had been wellproved.What proof?The evidence showed that shewas in good trim, and that the propellerwas submerged.There was no 'evidence' to this effect.It had also been clearly demonstratedthat there was neither coal nor cattle ondeck,Again, what evidence....Chief officer Crossley, of the s.s. Bullarrahad said that, from the barometer,there was no indication of a stormuntil it was upon them.Not likely.Towards midnight the cyclonic conditionsdeveloped, the Bullarra then being on theway to Balla Balla.Balla Balla was a mere 55 miles from Port Hedland. Bullarra was 22 miles from Balla Balla at 4.30 p.m., 20 March. Midnight was another 7 1/2 hours later. What was this man thinking! I know what he was trying to suggest, though.Mr. Crossley had expressed the opinionthat it was a miracle that theBullarra had come though at all, butthen the Bullarra did not experience thesame force of the cyclone as theKoombana must have encountered.Bullarra went through the blooming middle of the cyclone; how much more force was he talking about? Koombana was steaming away from the cyclone. There were no limits to the extremes this man was prepared to go to protect the Company.It was stated that neither Captain Upjohnnor Mr. Crossley had experienced in thecourse of their lives such a gale. He thoughtthat, in the interests of the public, somethingshould be said regarding the system offorecasting the weather. It could beimproved on in a simple and inexpensiveway. What was the use of sending outmessages of warning to ship masters whohad sailed the previous day? He wouldagree, however, that it was quite probablethat it would have been impossible to sendout warning on this particular occasion,because the storm broke so soon. Itdeveloped suddenly with an altogetherunexpected energy.A useful suggestion spoiled by references to a storm 'which developed suddenly with an altogether unexpected energy.' There were plenty of indicators.He ventured to say that there could beno doubt in the mind of the Court but thatthe Koombana was a strongly-built ship.The evidence showed that she wassuperstrong. The Koombana had beensubjected to seven severe tests, and ithad been demonstrated that, had sheheeled over to an angle of 90 degrees,she must have righted herself (waterpouring in via every orifice). Thetests proved that even in extraordinaryweather she was a vessel as stableas any that had been built. They hadhad evidence to the effect that it wasimpossible to capsize the vessel. Therewas the testimony of the witnessesUpjohn, Crosley, Clarke, Rankin, Craig,and Butcher. He wished to direct specialattention to the evidence of Mr. Clarke,who had travelled from Glasgow in theKoombana and who was free from all .bias.'Free from all bias' says two things; he was aware of the accusation and that there was in fact bias. 'Impossible to capsize the vessel' says it all - whitewash!Mr. Clarke had said that he wason board the steamer during a trip toGeraldton in the teeth of a strongnorth-westerly gale. She behavedsplendidly. What caused the disaster?In his opinion, the cause of the disasterwould be as great a mystery at the endof the inquiry as it was at the beginning.Convenient.There were many surmises whichmight be put forward, such as, Did shegraze Bedout Island or strike some hiddendanger? In this connection, he woulddirect attention to the fact that the chartwas not reliable, because that part of thecoast had been imperfectly surveyed.Clutching at excuses.He contended that the wreckage foundnegatived the idea that theKoombana had been suddenly overwhelmed, but it did suggest that thevessel had been subjected to a fearfulbattering.Devoid of common sense.It was also stated in the evidence thatthe Bedout light was out from March 13,and the question that suggested itselfwas that, in view of the condition of thecoast, should an unattended light be sofar from supervision? He cast no reflectionon the Harbour and Lights Department,but were the port authorities satisfied thatthe unattended light at Bedout wassafe? Should it not be attended tomore frequently?Brave criticizing his strongest ally in this farce, Captain Irvine.The firm who supplied the light said that itwas necessary. It was possible that the vesselmight have lost her rudder or propeller; but hewas not inclined to that belief, seeing that evidencedisclosed that they were 20 per cent, aboverequirements.Had a breakdown occurred in the engine-room,then there would have been very little chance ofthe vessel surviving such terrible conditions asthe Koombana must have experienced.It was the duty of the Court, from a public pointof view, to see whether all that was possible hadbeen done by those directly concerned to traceany wreckage and succour any people whomight be out on the sea.It was the 'duty of the Court, from a public point of view' to establish that Koombana needed to be in too tender a condition to clear the bar at Port Hedland that day and that filling tanks at sea in gale force conditions was less than ideal, verging on dangerous.
He did not think such a charge couldbe made against the Adelaide S SCompany. They had made almost superhumanefforts, and the Government was deservingof the greatest commendation for the partit had taken in the search for the missingvessel, and in which not only the Bullarra,but the Una, Gorgon, Moonta, Minderoo, andfour luggers were engaged. He did notknow what the finding would be, buthis suggestion was that the Koombana wasa steamer of the highest class and ofproved stability, encountered a hurricane ofphenomenal violence, of which no warningwas given, in a dangerous position, and wastotally lost. The Admiralty said that no reliancewas to be placed on the chart, and, in thecircumstances, it was impossible to saywhat caused the loss of the vessel.Self congratulation on a scale such as this surely could not have gone down well with those who had lost loved ones with the ship.On Friday, the Court delivered itsfinding, which stated, inter alia withregard to the personnel of the vessel,that it was of the highest quality, andboth Captain Allen and the chief officerheld extra masters' certificates, andboth were men of great experience onthe Australian cost. The Court wassatisfied that the Koombana inconstruction, stability, and seaworthinesswas equal to any vessel of her class inthe Australian coastal trade.The Court thinks it desirable thattelegrams regarding the weather shouldbe exchanged every day between stationswhile observations are made along thenorth-west coast; that information soobtained should be posted for generalinformation; and that storm signals shouldbe shown at all ports.The Court simply finds, without indulgingin useless speculation, that the stabilityand seaworthiness of the s.s. Koombanawere unassailable, and thecompetency and carefulness of her master(Capt. Allen) beyond question; that afterbeing lost sight of at sea on March 20,1912, her fate passes beyond humanknowledge, and remains a mystery ofthe sea.Whitewash complete!!courtesy Trove andhttps://www.slp.wa.gov.au/gazette/gazette.nsf/gazlist/6205E4E859C7A3E548257C1D0015457F/$file/gg023.pdf
