PORT HEDLAND; THE INNER BAR AND SQUALLS.

The following extracts are drawn from The Australia Pilot, volume 4, published 1920 and the depth figures were compiled after correlating with present day tide data.

Port Hedland (lat. 20 18, long 118 35) - Depths - Port Hedland is a secure harbor about 2 miles in length, and with depths of 5 to 8 fathoms (30 ft. - 48 ft.) over a length of about 1,400 yards by 200 yards in breadth, but the approach has a bar with a depth of only 1 foot at low water springs. This gives a depth of 20 feet at high water springs and 13 feet at high water neaps.

When Koombana departed Port Hedland for the last time, the depth over the bar was 19 ft., 1 ft. short of high water springs. 

There is a lag between full or new moon and high water springs (new moon in this case, 18 March, 1912). Koombana was running a day late and another day's delay would have incurred a further level reduction to 18.6 ft.. Three days after high water springs the level would have dropped significantly to 17.6 ft..

"I don't like the glass,"

was Captain Allen's remark, 

"and another 24 hours 

here will not matter."

The above figures justify this alleged statement made by Captain Allen. The 24 hours in question would have coincided with 18.6 ft. over the bar and if weather conditions had potentially stabilised by then (squall rather than cyclone - see further discussion below) Captain Allen could have departed with just the after-peak empty; comfortably cleared the bar and filled the one tank in calmer waters within a reasonable timeframe. 48 hours, however, would have produced 17.6 ft. and increased the potential for being neaped.

The day before high water springs the level over the bar would have been in the region of 19.6 ft.; two days prior, 18.5 ft. and three days prior, 17 ft. !! Port Hedland, therefore, offered a very narrow window of opportunity for a steamer Koombana's size and the schedule had to be adhered to as far as humanly possible. 

In fact under normal conditions emphasis would have been placed on arriving the day before high water springs and making a smart exit the following day (19.6 ft. and 20 ft. over the bar). Extending this time frame required emptying tanks(s) and hoping for a calm sea at the port's entrance. This must surely have created enormous pressure for Captain Allen and we know that he had his fair share of bar strikes attempting to cross the bar without emptying tanks.

Tides - It is high water in Roebuck Bay, full and change, at 11 h; springs rise 28 feet, neaps 18 feet. The highest tides occur on the second or third days after full and change, and are subject to diurnal inequality. The day tides rise 18 inches (July) higher than the night tides.

Broome on the other hand offered better draft flexibility (max. 28 ft.), almost 5 days on either side of high water springs (down to 18 ft.). However, the tide swing is dramatic, and around high water springs the low tide level was actually a negative figure, minus 3 ft., which translated into Koombana sitting high and dry on the mud with water as far as a mile off. 

Added to this, the daily times for spring tide migrated from about 12 midday through the afternoon to about 4 p.m. during the course of 5 days. This would have impacted arrivals and departures, incurring delays waiting out at sea for high tide and access.

Port Hedland harbour: 

The head, and a considerable breadth of sand mud flats on either side, dry off at low water, and the deep water channel, above 3 fathoms (18 ft.), nowhere exceeds 300 yards across. The entrance between Hunt and Airey Points is 1/3 mile wide, with sand hills on both sides, generally covered with spinifex grass; the land within is low, marshy, and intersected by creeks, mostly dry at low water; they have not been surveyed other than as charted.

18 ft. in the channel could be boosted to as much as 40 ft. during high water springs.

The Bar, 2 miles from the harbor mouth, consisting of rock thinly overlaid with sand, has a least depth of 1 foot at springs, and then generally breaks. There is also an inner bar with 1 fathom (6 ft.) water, 1,500 yards northeastward of Hunt Point. Vessels of 18 feet draft may cross at high water springs, subject to the tide signals shown.

Koombana was reported to have had an aft draft of 19 ft. which, theoretically, would have disqualified her from crossing the bar. As it was, draft did not exceed 16 ft. aft, and for very good reason considering there was a big sea, gale and turbulence over the bar.

Middle Bank Buoy - The Middle Bank, southward of Hunt Point, divides the entrance into two channels, that to the westward being the deeper but more tortuous. Middle Bank is about 800 yards in length, and it dries over a length of about 700 yards and northward and westward of the buoy. Sand and mud flats extend a considerable distance from both shores, reducing the fairways to narrow limits.

An extremely challenging port to negotiate.

Occasional Light - A black spar buoy, with staff and cage, from which an occasional fixed red light is exhibited, is moored on the Middle Bank at about 100 yards within its northern drying edge.

Beacons and Range marks - The channel is marked by red beacons on the starboard hand, black beacons on the port hand.

Tidal signals - tidal signals are shown from the tidal flagstaff, as follows:

A ball is hoisted at the head of the staff when the tide is rising, and a red burgee when the tide falling. One ball on the western yardarm (steel tower) indicates 19 feet or more (over the bar).

Tides - High water interval at Port Hedland is 10 h. 50 m.; mean range 12 feet 3 inches, springs rise 19 feet 3 inches. Equinoctial springs rise 22 to 24 feet.

Tidal currents in the harbor run 3 to 4 knots. The ebb is the strongest and at the highest tides may attain 6 knots. At the anchorage the flood runs westward, ebb eastward, from 2 to 2 1/2 knots an hour.

It is not surprising that Captain Allen insisted that a lugger be removed from the channel before he made his run for open sea. In such light condition with the propeller and rudder not fully submerged (decreased thrust and manoeuverability), contending with a powerful (up to) 6 knot current and narrow channel, this was a dangerous time for the large steamer. 

Jetty - At Mangrove Point there is a jetty about 700 feet long, where two steamers can berth; there are cattle yards within it. Vessels can discharge into railway trucks. At spring tides the currents run strongly past and vessels should securely moor with anchors as well as by shorefasts to the jetty.

Anchorages - Anchorage outside the bar, to await tide for entering, may be had in 3 fathoms (18 ft.), about 3 miles from shore near the line of the range marks. Small vessels may anchor 1/2 mile nearer shore in 2 1/2 fathoms.

It was at this position 3 miles out that Captain Allen attempted to fill ballast tanks. Again, 3 fathoms, 18 ft., translated into as much as 40 ft. during high water springs.

The best anchorage in the harbour is about 800 yards northward of Harriet Point, in 6 fathoms (not possible today), sand; the holding ground is not good above this. Vessels over 200 feet in length should moor head and stern, there being insufficient room to swing. Two vessels can berth alongside the jetty, as before mentioned.

Directions - Within 1/2 hour on either side of high water is the best time to enter or leave; in narrow parts, at half tide, the currents may run 6 knots. An anchor should always be ready. Southward of Hunt Point, the western point of the entrance, the channel westward of Middle Bank has not less than 4 fathoms at low water, and is deep and well marked by the range beacons.

High water was at 10 h 50. Koombana departed at 10 h 20, half an hour before, exactly as instructed.

When there is sufficient water to cross the bar, the passage eastward of Middle Bank, also well marked, may be taken, thus avoiding the sharp turns and oblique tidal currents of the western channel.

The two range beacons for the bar, namely, the tidal signal staff and Lumsden Beacon, in range bearing 203 degrees, lead over the bar, and the conspicuous dark mangrove clump westward of Harriet Point should be steered for when bearing 220 degrees. 

Vessels can only enter at night with thorough local knowledge; a red light is shown from the buoy on Middle Bank when required.  

The following images are an attempt to transpose the instructions onto present day Port Hedland, with limitations acknowledged.

The black circle represents the position of the inner bar as per the extract.
Note the position coincides with the apex of the sand bank as marked and is slightly west of the present day narrow shipping channel.

The black circle indicates the position 3 miles out where Koombana would have filled tanks. The present day shipping channel bears initially northwestward, whereas Koombana would initially have sailed due north.

Western Mail, 20 September, 1902.

A PORT HEDLAND HARBOUR

OBSTRUCTION.

Port Hedland, September 16.

If Port Hedland is to remain a port

for steamers to take shelter in, the sand-

bar at the entrance to the channel will

have to be dredged. The bar is 200yds.

long and 30yds. wide, and it is extending 

rapidly. It is a common occurrence

for steamers to strike on the bar and 

remain aground for 12 hours, or until the

next tide. The s.s. Minilya, on her last

visit here, was fast on the bar for an

hour coming in, and for 12 hours on her

way out. Every vessel that is in the Nor'-

West trade has been aground here. The

dredge Priestman would, in the opinion

of visiting ship masters, do all the work

that would be necessary to make the bar

navigable. The expense of the dredging 

would, it is believed, be of small account 

in proportion to the advantages to

be derived.

The 'bar' as described above.

Kalgoorlie Miner, 21 July, 1908

PORT HEDLAND HARBOUR.

July 20.

The passage into Port Hedland

Harbour is in need of serious 

attention. Every ship captained 

by a man new to the coast or 

unused to local conditions of 

tide, etc., sticks on the inner bar. 

The last boat, the Dilkera, suffered 

some damage on the bar, and had 

to have Lloyds' surveyors to 

report before leaving the harbour.6 ft.; beam 45.3 ft.; draft 21 ft. 8 inches.

SS Dilkera - courtesy Flotilla Australia.
Built 1902
2667 gross tons
length 326 ft.
beam 45 ft. 3 inches
draft 21 ft. 8 inches - excessive for Port Hedland!

14 July, 1912, the following discovery was made:

 'Bullara, on passage from Cossack to Port Hedland, 

passed derelict, appeared to be submerged bilge

of vessel, 15Oft. or 200ft. long, in latitude 20 deg. 

10 min. south and 118 deg. 3 min. east.'

It was thought that the bilge section came from the wrecked Koombana and if so, there is an important inference to be made. Had Koombana sustained significant latent damage to her hull subsequent to the documented bar strikes within the 6 months leading up to the disaster? And if so, had she suffered some form of catastrophic hull failure in the rough seas? Or was it simply a case of damage sustained striking the seabed? Only time will tell if the wreck, once found, gives up her secrets. 

The Pilbarra Goldfields News, Saturday 30 May, 1903.

PORT HEDLAND BAR

Perth, May: 25,

Captain Frank Pitts, of the steamer

Sultan, warmly supports, Mr. Isdell in

his efforts to have the bar at Port 

Hedland removed.

In a conversation with a Herald

reporter, Captain Pitts stated that the

bar was absolutely dangerous and at

ebb tide it was some feet out of the

water. There was a channel alongside

the bar which was less than 60 feet

wide. It was of rock and should a

vessel strike it she would undoubtedly

be lost. None of the shipmasters trading

to Port Hedland cared about using

the channel, and only did so because

they were compelled to. For his part,

he always used another channel, which

was more difficult, but in which there

was a sandy spit and not so much

rock. Now that larger boats were being

employed in the trade, the work of 

removing the bar was rendered more

necessary.

The West Australia, 26 May, 1920.

PORT HEDLAND.

Port Hedland, May 25.

Passengers by the Bambra say that

they had to wait about four hours on

the Broome jetty. When the vessel 

arrived off Port Hedland in the early hours

of this morning there was some difficulty

in getting into the lifeboats to come

ashore. A stiff easterly wind was blowing

and when the boats were returning to the

vessel there was a fair sea. One boat

was able to get within a few hundred

yards of the Bambra when the steamer

lifted her anchor and picked the boat up.

The other boat was picked up by the

steamer about a couple of miles away.

The simple fact of the matter. Missing the spring tide window prevented steamers such as Bambra accessing Port Hedland. 

 this textnecessary.

The West Australian, 10 April, 1918.

A PORT HEDLAND COMPLAINT.

Port Hedland, April 9.

Owing to the steamer Charon not calling

here on her next southward trip, a period

of about seven weeks will elapse between

the last mail and the next. If the Charon

called at Broome, letters could be posted

here to catch the Minderoo on her next

trip north and they could then be sent

on. But it is said that the Charon's first

port of call is Carnarvon.

Enormous pressure!

The Phillips River Times, 3 March, 1906.

Port Hedland

(From our own Correspondent.) .

Our Port Hedland correspondent

writes, under date February 19, as

follows :—

Several very unpleasant dust storms

swept over the town last week, and

another this morning. Eighteen

points of rain were registered.

Last Friday the mail boat Tyrian

arrived in the roads and refused to

approach the jetty, notwithstanding

the tide gauge registered 19ft. of water,

which was signalled to the steamer.

The captain, however, preferred the

delay of sending in two of the ship's 

boats with the passengers and mails.

One boat leaked to such an extent that

on arriving at the jetty it was nearly

half full of water. Much indignation

was shown by the passengers and

shippers towards the action adopted by

the captain without a reasonable cause

as the steamer was only drawing 

15ft. 3in.

There can be no denying the simple fact that Port Hedland was a challenging port to access even if the steamer in question had a comfortable, 3 ft. 9 in. clearance. 

Koombana had a 3 ft. clearance 20 March, 1912.  

This was not comfortable. 

It never was....

courtesy Flotilla Australia

SQUALLS vs. CYCLONES.

Koombana, fully ballasted, was to reveal her weakness during a Nor'West squall, February, 1910.

 'Just before reaching Hedland we struck a squall and the ship lay over at an angle of 45 degrees and was quite a long time before straightening up.'  (Koombana Days - Annie Boyd).

The following extract courtesy the Hathi Trust, Australia Pilot, 1920, describes such squalls:

During the Northwest monsoon, however, strong gales from the northwestward at times blow upon the coast but do not appear to be frequent. The strongest winds at this season are what may be properly termed as hurricane squalls, from between east-southeastward and northeastward; they mostly occur between sunset and sunrise, and rarely last more than a few hours, nor extend over a large area, and generally give ample warning of their approach by a heavy bank of clouds, with much lightening, between northeastward and southeastward. The breeze comes on almost immediately and with considerable violence, accompanied with rain in torrents and a short chopping sea. The rate of progress of these storms on the northwestern coast of Australia is estimated to be from 11 to 14 miles per hour, travelling from northeastward to southwestward, approximately following the coastline. They are always accompanied by abundant rain, with low dense clouds, and electrical discharge. As a rule their approach are indicated by sultry weather and a falling barometer. These signs are followed by the usual ugly and threatening appearance of the weather, which forebodes most storms. The best and surest of all warnings, however, will be found in the barometer. 

If the barometer falls rapidly, or even if the regularity of its diurnal variation be interrupted, danger may be apprehended. 

And so the truth of the matter for squalls or cyclones. 

It might have been that Captain Allen anticipated such a squall and which, theoretically, should have passed in a few hours. His suspicions might even have been confirmed when observing a dense, inky mass of low lying clouds on the western horizon.

In this case, however, it was a cyclone strengthening as it made landfall, Balla Balla. 

7 December, 1908 a cyclone struck Broome, lasted for three days and caused widespread damage with the loss of 20 lives. 250 miles away at Port Hedland the following report reads like a prelude to 20 March, 1912:

Kalgoorlie Miner, 16 December, 1908. 

ANXIETY AT PORT HEDLAND.

FEARS FOR THE STEAMER

SULTAN.

Port Hedland, Dec. 15.

The pearling disaster reported

from Wallal is causing considerable

anxiety here. The steamer Minnie,

well known in Port Hedland, in

charge of her owner (Harry

O'Grady), who had with him two

other white, men and a coloured

cook, left here for Broome, via 

Condon, Wallal, and La Grange Bay,

on the 3rd inst., and was off Condon

the following Monday. This was

the day before the hurricane came,

since when no tidings of her have

been received.

Much anxiety is experienced here

concerning the fate of the steamer

Sultan, which left Port Hedland at

10 a.m. on the 8th inst. in the face

of a strong easterly gale, with a

falling barometer. She was almost

hidden by clouds of dust when 

leaving the harbour. Port Hedland 

was apparently on the edge of the 

disturbance. 

The morning of Tuesday,

the 8th inst., saw the sky overcast,

with heavy clouds. There was a

strong wind from the south-east,

which by 8 o'clock was from the

east, and at 11 o'clock from the

north-east. It was then almost 

impossible for pedestrians to make

headway against it. At 6 p.m. the

wind had gone back to the east, and

lulled somewhat. The lowest 

barometrical record was 29.28 deg.

at 5 p.m. on the 8th. This,

curiously enough, is identical

with the point reached by the

barometer at the Port Hedland

post office during the Wallal blow

last April. No damage was done

at Port Hedland. The rainfall 

locally was 12 points (3mm)

It is extraordinarily similar to the pattern of 20 March and what's more the captain of the Sultan had no hesitation in putting to sea. This was clearly the approach to such conditions along the Nor'West coast!

SS Sultan - courtesy Flotilla Australia

courtesy Google Earth; Hathi Trust, Australia Pilot, 1920, volume 4 and

http://fishing-app.gpsnauticalcharts.com/i-boating-fishing-web-app/fishing-marine-charts-navigation.html?title=Western+Australia+-+Solitary+Island+to+Bedout+Island+boating+app#11/-19.1354/119.4410

https://mooncalendar.astro-seek.com/moon-phases-calendar-april-2021

https://www.tide-forecast.com/locations/Port-Hedland-Australia/tides/latest#:~:text=The%20predicted%20tide%20times%20today,sunset%20is%20at%205%3A48pm.

https://www.tide-forecast.com/locations/Broome-Australia/tides/latest

Squall vs. Cyclone:

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2021/04/squalls.html

Projections for levels of water over the bar were made by correlating with present day data for both Port Hedland and Broome, April, 2021 - see links above. There is variability, but not significant enough to alter the overall pattern and challenges presented to Captain Allen.

A CLOSER LOOK AT NAVIGATION.

The following extracts are drawn courtesy the Hathi Trust, Australia Pilot, Volume 4, published 1920.

Spit point, 8 miles southwestward from Larrey Point, has a sand spit extending about 8 miles in a northwestward direction toward Turtle Isles; it dries off for a distance of miles at low water springs and at one spot 3 miles beyond.

Turtle Isles - The Northern Turtle Isle is about 10 miles 329 degrees from Spit Point; it is a mere heap of sand, about 1 mile in circumference and 35 feet high; and covered with course grass and some shrubs. A reef about 3 miles in extent, steep-to, and dry at low water surrounds North Turtle Island.

Little Turtle, 10 miles to the southward, is just above high water springs, and surrounded by a reef 1 1/4 miles in extent, with rocks on the outer edge above high water. 

Anchorage - between North Turtle Island Reef and shoals extending from Spit Point, there is a space of nearly 1 mile, with anchorage in 5 fathoms, with the southeastern extremity of the island, bearing about 0 degrees. This is considered the most convenient anchorage for communicating with the shore.

Tides - it is high water, full and change, at the Northern Turtle Isle at 11 h; ordinary springs rise 18 feet, neaps 12 feet. The current of rising tide sets southeastward, toward the shore, at the rate of 1 to 2 knots. 

Amphinome Shoals are numerous dangerous shoals, some dry at low water, with long lines of breakers, irregular soundings, and tide ripplings between; these front the coast between Mount Blaze and Spit Point, to the distance of about 20 miles.

From the De Grey River mouth, (these) sands and flats extend northward nearly to Amphinome Shoals, forming lines of breakers at low water, and from the outer edge the coast was not visible from the deck. 

Bedout Island (lat. 19 35, long. 119 6) situated about 24 miles northward of Poissonnier Point at the mouth of the De Grey river, is a coral sand islet, 1/2 mile in length northward and southward, 1/4 of a mile in breadth, 20 feet high, and covered with course grass. A reef, surrounds the island, and extends 1.500 yards from the northwestern side; 3 miles from the western side. where patches of rocks are uncovered at low water ; nearly 1/2 a mile from the southeastern end; and 1/3 of a mile from the northeastern end, with apparently shoal water beyond, as charted.

Light - A flashing white light 66 feet above high water, visible 13 miles, is exhibited from a white steel framework tower, 55 feet high, at the centre of the island. The light is unwatched.

Heavy breakers have been reported at about 6 miles southeastward of the island, as charted.

Anchorage - There is said to be good anchorage in 6 fathoms, 3 miles southward of Bedout Island, or between it and the breakers mentioned.

Tidal currents - the current of rising tide sets to the south eastward, and the falling tide to the northwestward, from 1 to 2 knots. The rise and fall observed was about 14 feet, but see paragraph on Turtle Isles previously given. 

Strong tide-rips were seen northeastward and southwestward of the island, indicating rocky and uneven ground.

Caution - A depth of 10 fathoms will be found close to most of the outer dangers between Lacepede Islands and Bedout Island, and also southwestward of Bedout Island westward of Turtle Isles. 

Vessels are recommended to pass northward of Bedout, as before mentioned. 

A picture of formidable barriers to large steamers between the coast and Bedout Island. It is extremely unlikely Captain Allen would voluntarily have ventured into this 'mine field'. In fact Mr. Moxon had this to say:

'Mr. Moxon in an interview stated

that nautical experts affirm that the

Koombana, to avoid certain destruction

near the Amphimone Shoals, had only

one alternative before her'.... to attempt

'to pass northward of Bedout'.

It makes sense that the steamer track, as represented, 'passed northward of Bedout Island.'

However,

In thick weather, it is advisable to keep seaward of the depth of 20 fathoms.  

To maintain 20 fathoms clearance of Bedout would have placed steamers some 30 miles to the westward of the island - a considerable detour. When Captain Allen charted his course the dense mass of clouds heralding a cyclone was on the western horizon, not to the north or northeast in which directions he was steaming. Curtailing the filling of tanks prematurely strongly suggests that he was aiming to pass Bedout within visual range of the structure before dusk (10 miles distant) due to the Light being out !

40 miles due north of position filling tanks in 'thick weather'.

Detour route in 'thick weather' would have given a 14 mile clearance of Bedout passing to the north of the island.

The detour route in 'thick weather' would still take the steamer directly between the two given positions marked on image, the one being Upjohn's coordinates. 

It cannot be overemphasised that the bulk of flotsam was discovered to the north of Bedout Island, a signicant amount between here and the vicinity of the so-called oil patch.

By deduction, whichever route Captain Allen tackled that infamous Wednesday, Koombana did pass north of Bedout Island.

Post repeat: 

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2020/05/the-bedout-light-controversy.html

The Advertiser, Adelaide, 8 April, 1912.

UNWATCHED LIGHTS.

To the Editor.

Sir--In our childhood we have heard or

read more or less mythical stories of ships

lured to their doom in the bad old days of

smugglers and wreckers by misleading

lights. At the present time we have, or

may have, somewhat parallel cases. I refer

to the latest innovation in coast lights, the

so-called "long-burning, un-watched A.G.A.

lights." These lights are supposed to be

absolutely reliable; but can that be said

of, or can it be true of, anything human

or made by human hands? I write you,

to point out that they constitute a very

grave menace to life and property. Such

a light exists on Bedout Island, where the

ill-fated Koombana appears to have gone

to her doom, and who will say how much

this light, or its absence, may have contributed

to the terrible disaster which we are at present 

lamenting? Some time back this Bedout Island 

light was reported to be out. About two years 

ago the Sydney owned barque Hippolas was 

lost in Cook's Strait, the loss being attributed 

to a similar light on Jackson's Head being 

extinguished. On the 11th ultimo, in Spencer

Gulf, being close to Middle Bank light, and

not being able to see it, I anchored rather

than proceed, through this "reliable un-watched 

light" being out. It is proposed to place a similar 

light on Citadel Island. at Wilson's Promontory, 

a locality where fogs and bad weather are very 

prevalent. These lights, in my opinion, and in 

that of other shipmasters with whom I have 

conversed, are not reliable, and should not be 

placed in important and dangerous positions, 

such as Bedout Island, for example. Economy

against human lives that is what it amounts to, 

and which is to obtain. In calling attention to this 

matter I trust that some abler pen than mine will 

take the matter up and ventilate it thoroughly. 

I venture to say that no Light should be un-

watched. Better no light at all, far better, than 

an unreliable one, which may cause disaster

and the loss of precious human lives,

I am etc..

G. PROVO,

Master S.S. Dilkera.

Newcastle, April 3, 1912.

I don't think nearly enough attention was paid during the Inquiry to the fact that the Light at Bedout was not functioning at the time. 

Captain Irvine, Chief Harbour Master, Fremantle, in charge of Harbours and Lights, submitted a rather implausible excuse that he was not aware of the Light being out until 1 week after the disaster. 

In fact Irvine was disingenuous about the whole affair and stated in the March gazette that the cyclone was responsible for the light being 'extinguished':

 'Western Australia—North-West Coast. NOTICE is hereby given that the hurricane which passed over Bedout Island—lat. 19.35 S. 119.6 E.—on the 22nd inst., extinguished the unattended light established on this island in December, 1909. Further notice will be issued as soon as the lamp has been re-lighted. Charts affected. No. 1055—Bedout Island to Cape Cuvier. No. 1048—Buccaneer Archipelago to Bedout. C. J. IRVINE, Chief Harbour Master. Harbour and Light Department, Fremantle, 30th March, 1912.'  

Mr. Moxon, Adelaide Steamship Company, affirmed that he had been made aware of the fact that the Bedout Light was out 1 week prior to the disaster. Given that Mr. Moxon knew about the Light being out we might assume that the information was passed both to Captain Irvine and Captain Allen (via Mr. Gardiner, manager of the Adelaide Steamship Company at Port Hedland). 

Departing Port Hedland that fateful day, Koombana would likely have arrived at a holding position to fill tanks 3 miles (ref. cattleman on board Bullarra) north of Port Hedland by about 11 a.m.. Being aware that the Light was out, Captain Allen had to reach Bedout Island before nightfall - dusk at this time of the year is 6.38 p.m.. To cover the distance of  '50 miles' would have taken the steamer, averaging 13.5 knots (operating speed) 3.5 hours, which was well within Koombana's capability in normal conditions. This would have allowed for a more reasonable 4 hours to fill tanks.

However, the gale-force headwind and a periodically racing propeller, had potential to slow the steamer's progress to about 10 knots. Why 10 knots? Captain Allen claimed that he was unlikely to make the spring tide access into Broome by the following morning, which translates into a 10 knot or less, average speed. This would have increased the time frame to 4.5 + hours and Koombana to have completed the filling of tanks by 2 p.m. = 3 hours. This is barely the time quoted by Captain Upjohn for filling two after tanks, under ideal conditions - and certainly not in heavy seas.

Captain Upjohn:

'How long would it take to fill them (tanks) ? - From 3 to 3 1/2 hours.'

Koombana was only in sight for approximately 2 hours, suggesting that Captain Allen was particularly anxious to clear Bedout before dusk, and in so doing could not have allowed adequate time to press up all the tanks. 

“Normally,” he (Bert Clarke) recalled, “ships going northbound were out of sight within 30 or 45 minutes, but this day as the storm was getting stronger I stayed up there in the tower watching the Koombana pitching and rolling for nearly two hours.”

Boyd, Annie. Koombana Days.

Captain Upjohn:

 

'And you last saw her? - About two hours after leaving.'

I believe the incomplete filling of ballast tanks and a shortfall in the fresh water tanks (not replenished at Port Hedland) created what is known as a free surface effect which could have disastrous effects on the stability of a vessel, particularly a lightly laden, top heavy one.

"Free surface effect. When a tank is partially filled, the liquid's centre of gravity position will change as the ship is inclined. Liquid in partially filled tank always decreases the initial metacentric height GM, righting lever GZ, and angle of vanishing stability."

Not only would this scenario have contributed to a reduced GM; reduced righting lever (ability to return to the upright after heeling) and reduced vanishing stability (the angle at which the steamer was likely to roll over), but would also contribute to a persistent list, such as that described when Koombana departed Port Hedland 

The scene was set for disaster.

There is some speculation as to the exact steamer route taken by Koombana, 'shaping a course' around the northern aspect of Bedout Island. 

How can it be assumed that the steamer track to Bedout Island from Hedland would follow that which I have presented on the Google Earth image? Firstly let's take another look at a period newspaper representation of the course taken:

Although not substantiated by evidence, Koombana might 'last (have been) seen here'.

We know from Captain Upjohn's statements (and other period sources) that after filling tanks 3 miles north of Port Hedland, Koombana initially headed due north. The reason? To clear obstructions such as that marked on the image below (SS Minilya grounded, 1901)and to create a clear trajectory past the Turtle islands. 

To achieve this clearance would have taken Koombana 10 miles north of Port Hedland at which point the course could have been altered to one bearing 30 degrees towards Bedout Island and which would theoretically bring the steamer to a position 10 miles off the island. 

Why 10 miles?

"and on a clear day the structure is visible from a distance of 10 miles."

Under normal circumstances (when the Bedout light was functioning) the light and 'structure' could be seen for at least 10 miles = nominal range of the light; but up to 14 miles (see Irvine notification below), depending on conditions. This would achieve two things:

- provide adequate clearance from the reef extending out from Bedout Island for 3 miles.

- the light and 'structure' reference points for 'shaping a course' around the island - especially at dusk and into the evening. 

It would, therefore, not have been practical or safe to approach the island closer than 10 miles or beyond visibility of the 'structure', testing the limited range of Light visibility, i.e. 14 miles.

It seems highly probable that this would have been the steamer track for Broome; a simple 30 degrees bearing, steaming 45 miles to a second turning point; final bearing adjustment, 65 degrees, directly for Gantheaume Point and Broome (203.5 miles) = safe clearance, 'shaping a course' around the northern aspect of Bedout Island as per images and references.

NOTICE TO MARINERS. Western Australia-North-West Coast. NOTICE is hereby given that on and after the 13th December, 1909, an Unattended, Dioptric, Fixed, Occulting Light of the Fourth Order will be exhibited from a steel tower (open braced) erected on centre of Bedout Island, Latitude 19deg. 35min. South, Longitude 119deg. 6min, East, the height of the focal plane above high water being 66 feet, and visible in clear weather about 14 miles. Special attention is drawn to the fact that the Light is unwatched, and therefore Shipmasters are cautioned against placing too much reliance on same. Charts affected. No. 1055-Bedout Island to Cape Cuvier. No. 1048-Buccaneer Archipelago to Bedout. C. J. IRVINE, Chief Harbour Master. Department of Harbour and Lights, Frcmantle, 14th December, 1909.

note the minimal deviation, less than 0.3 of a mile, between Irvine's coordinates and the actual coordinates.

The present day vessel course is different. The vessels follow a specific channel course resembling a gentle 'S' out of and into Port Hedland with anchorage positions as marked, abutting the 1912 presumed steamer track.

Koombana would have followed a specific beacon-marked course to arrive at the 3 mile position north of Port Hedland, for filling tanks. From there, as referenced, Koombana headed due north which would be problematic today due to patches of 'shallows' - unless of course during a spring tide, an additional 24 ft. gained ----> clear run north. The current shipping channel heads initially northwestward, not northward. 

"To the visitor for the first time it seems almost impossible that the steamer could negotiate the turns that are necessary to dodge the mud banks before reaching the jetty, and as the entrance has to be made whilst the tide is flowing, the tremendous run of the tide is seen."

If my assumed steamer course between Port Hedland and Broome is accurate, it would have brought Koombana to the vicinity of the 27.5 mile position (oil patch) and which would, if confirmed, prove that Koombana was on course for Broome when she foundered.

The Broome to Hedland 'sailing instructions' - see below - were nothing more than 'directions' to Bedout Island from Broome and from Bedout to Hedland; NOT the steamer course around Bedout!!  

courtesy Annie Boyd

Experiments were made at Fremantle,

and demonstrated that once the gas 

had been lighted, it would burn for 

months at a time, and so the lamp

was sent up as a Christmas gift to

the penguins and other sea birds who

inhabit Bedout Island. It resembled

an ordinary light-house, in that it

appears and disappears, but it burns

on for months at a time. The wonderful 

thing about the lamp is that there

is attached to it a sun valve, and every

time the sun sets it automatically ignites 

the gas, and upon rising temporarily 

extinguishes it.

And therein lay potential for the light to malfunction. 

courtesy Google Earth; Trove and

http://fishing-app.gpsnauticalcharts.com/i-boating-fishing-web-app/fishing-marine-charts-navigation.html?title=Western+Australia+-+Solitary+Island+to+Bedout+Island+boating+app#11/-19.1354/119.4410

Wartsila.

Koombana Days online resource - Annie Boyd.

Government Gazette, WA

courtesy Google Earth.