Thursday, 15 April 2021

CAPTAIN ALLEN EXONERATED.

The Geraldton Express, 2 March, 1910. 


A COMPLAINT,

CONCERNING THE KOOMBANA'S

SAILING.


(To the Editor.)

I suppose the agents of the Koombana
are forced, by their contract, to
run their vessel on time, but even this
restriction does not justify the extra
ordinary state of affairs which prevailed 
this morning. The vessel was first 
announced to arrive here on Saturday. 
That arrangement was cancelled. Next 
there was a notice put up yesterday on 
the Post Office board
(surely an official announcement) stating 
that the Koombana would arrive
at 1 o'clock in the afternoon and sail
an hour later. Next we were told
that she could not get here till 2 this
morning. What then happened will
scarcely be credited.  About half-a-dozen 
ladies, several children, and a number 
of men, had to camp all night on
the jetty. Some of the men lent the
ladies their rugs to cover them, and
others made shift with tarpaulins. Several 
swagmen had taken up their
quarters in the shelter shed earlier in
the evening, therefore the ladies and
children had to camp in the open air.
The Koombana did not arrive till half
past six this morning. These are
surely shocking arrangements. Could
intending passengers not have been 
notified the evening before that the
Koombana would not sail till morning. 
Or if that could not be done,
why do the agents, as is done else
where, not take the addresses of all
who have booked passages, and send
them word as soon as the vessel is
sighted. Supporting last night had
been wet or cold what an experience it
would have proved for those women
and children. — Yours, etc.,

RELATIVE.

Geraldton, Feb. 28th, 1910

(Mr. Faulkner, manager at Gerald-
ton for the Adelaide Steamship Company, 
on being seen by a representative of this 
paper, said that according to the A.S.S. Co's. 
contract with the Government,
the Koombana should have arrived at 
Fremantle on Sunday evening. As it had not 
even reached Geraldton on that evening, it 
would be seen that the vessel was considerably 
behind time. The conveyance of mails was the 
steamer's most important duty. Passengers and 
cargo had to give way to the necessity of 
delivering the mails on time. He did not
mean by that that passengers should
not look for consideration. He simply meant 
that, as dispatch was the essence of the contract, 
the vessel could not, if she arrived during the
night, be detained till the morning
for the convenience of passengers. Personally 
he tried his best to meet the convenience of 
passengers. Regarding the notices of sailing it 
was true that the Koombana was first announced 
to sail on Saturday. That notice was altered in 
Friday night's "Express," when Sunday afternoon 
was given as the time. On Saturday a wire from
Captain Rees intimated that, provided he could get 
in and out of Shark's Bay without difficulty, he 
would arrive at Geraldton on Sunday afternoon. 
He failed to do so, consequently he again wired 
that he would reach Geraldton at about 2 a.m. on 
Monday, weather permitting. On the run down
however, he encountered a strong headwind, while 
the thick haze also retarded progress. There is no 
need for passengers to camp on the jetty as
there is good accommodation in Geraldton at the 
hotels and boardinghouses, who make it their 
business to keep in touch with steamers' movements 
and call their lodgers in time to catch them.

Let there never be a moment's doubt in our minds about the pressure Captain Allen was under to depart Port Hedland that fateful Wednesday morning. 
As we well know, steamers the size of Koombana could end up 'neaped' for up to a week at Port Hedland if they missed the spring tide. In addition, Captain Rees' difficulties getting in and out of Shark Bay highlighted the navigational challenges of Nor'West coastal ports and the knock-on delays incurred. 
Irrespective of publicized and vehement passenger complaints, the officious tone of the Adelaide Steamship Company's response, cargo delivery obligations, R.M.S. (Royal Mail Steamship) Koombana was subsidised and obligated to deliver mails on time - £5 fined for every hour delayed.  
To say that Captain Allen was reckless to depart Port Hedland after consultation with Captain Upjohn 20 March, is both disingenuous and unwarranted from the vantage point of comfortable historical-review armchairs.

Final word:

"If Captain Allen had remained at anchor at 
Port Hedland and the Koombana had been 
driven ashore there and wrecked, the 
probabilities are that he would have lost his 
certificate, having acted against the Board of 
Trade regulations or instructions, which, I believe, 
require a captain under certain circumstances
(threat of a storm) to make with all speed for the 
open sea."


Tom Allen.




A LAYMAN'S VIEW.

 The West Australian, 4 June, 1912.


The barometer is the seaman's
guide as to the state of the weather. All 
we have is that during the day of March 
20 last the wind was blowing a fresh 
breeze from the northeast, and the weather 
was a bit overcast and dirty, but Captain 
Upjohn and Captain Allen in conversation 
decided there was nothing in it and neither 
of them expected to encounter such a blow 
as is described in the s.s. Bullarra's log book 
as a howling hurricane, a hurricane which 
apparently has totally engulfed the 
s.s. Koombana and which, according to Captain 
Upjohn's evidence, the s.s. Bullarra only 
survived through a miracle.

From past experience I can say that the 
barometer must have indicated the approach
of this cyclone, and that being so, I consider 
it was wrong to put to sea under these 
circumstances. If the captain was prepared
to face the storm I think it would have been
simple humanity to give the passengers
warning of the danger and the opportunity
of landing at Port Hedland. I noticed in
one of the reports from Port Hedland it
said: "Captain Allen seemed very anxious.."
He said that when he crossed the outer
bank he would fill the ballast tanks. I do
not think he ever got the chance to do that.

The next point is, we are told that her
"stability was shown to be entirely 
satisfactory." under ordinary circumstances 
I readily agree with that, but from past 
experiences it must be remembered that 
abnormal conditions of cyclones may he 
expected at any time between December and
April on the Nor'-West coast. What is 
perfectly safe under normal conditions becomes
absolutely unsafe when a vessel has to 
encounter the full force of a terrific hurricane,
with the top hamper of some of our modern
steamers. In a sailing vessel one has a
chance even if light, they can run before
the wind under bare poles, and be safe. Not
so with the new steamers. Deck cabins can
not be reefed. If they take the full force
of the wind on their broadsides it is all over
in a few minutes. Their only chance is to
run before the gale, but we find that the
Koombana when last seen was steaming
right into the north-east gale.

Referring again to the report from Port
Hedland, of April 3, "The Koombana left
the port at half-past 10 o'clock on March 20,
with propeller beating out of the water.
When passing the entrance to the harbour
she rolled deeply. That item taken in
conjunction with the statement of the Court.
"She sailed from Port Hedland on March
20, at about 10.20 o'clock a.m., drawing 19ft.
aft and about 12ft. forward in excellent trim,
with her propeller well submerged," does not
agree, but probably what the report from
Port Hedland intended to convey is that the
propeller was occasionally out of water. That 
might be accounted for as the steamer was 
evidently light, and would pitch, as she
was drawing only 12ft. forward and 19ft.
aft. (incorrect) 

If with that draught she had 
50ft of top hamper, in other words, a wall 
resistance to the wind, roughly about 300ft. 
long and 50ft. deep, with only an average 
hold on the water of, say, 15ft. 6in., I do not 
see how she could possibly stand up against 
the terrific force of a wind blowing at front
75 to 100 miles an hour, if it caught her on
her beam. In such circumstances a vessel
like that would simply roll over, as we see
toy boats roll over, and sink. I am very
much afraid that is what really happened to
the Koombana.

A very dear old friend of mine, Mr. Fred.
W. B. Clinch, who leaves a wife and six
young children, and who was lost in this
vessel, told his brother Alfred, in Fremantle.
prior to the sailing of the Koombana, that
he did not like the vessel he thought there
was too much top hamper, too much 
resistance in the event of meeting a willy-willy.
Poor fellow, it, is very sad that he, and so
many others, should be taken thus suddenly
from their friends and relations. It is evident 
poor Fred Clinch's fears have been justified.

The past cannot be rectified, but I think
we should profit by the sad experience of the
loss of the Koombana for the future, and I
give the points of my view of the matter
with all due deference:--(1) That vessels for
the Nor'-West with much top hamper are
unfitted for the work; (2) that closer attention 
is required of master mariners to the warnings 
by the barometer: (3) that with a low barometer, 
especially between December and April, a 
steamer should not attempt to face a gale or 
hurricane on the North West coast; (4) it is 
better to remain in port, anchored and steaming 
up to the anchor than to face the gale; (5) that a 
light vessel has no chance in a willy-willy except 
she can run before the wind: a well-ballasted
vessel stands the best chance of surviving
in a hurricane.-Yours, etc.,

Guildford, May 18. P. A. GUGERI.

Apart from the fact that Koombana was drawing 16 ft. aft., 11 ft. forward, in exceptionally light condition, with the propeller clearly beating out of the water (16.5 ft.) and no proof whatsoever that she was caught in the centre of the cyclone, this commentary was insightful. 

Ballasting was essential in steamers such as Koombana, and the writer referred to the unlikelihood of the ballast tanks having been (adequately) filled ----> disaster.

Late March is the time of year when cyclones are anticipated along the Nor'West coast, and the writer raised the important point that steamers with significant top hampers (i.e. inherently top heavy) were not appropriate for such a coast and in particular during late summer. One could extend the argument to the simple fact that a large steamer such as Koombana, struggling to clear the outer bar under the best of spring tide circumstances, was definitely not appropriate for servicing Port Hedland - period! 





courtesy Trove.

Sunday, 11 April 2021

EXTENT OF FRUITLESS SEARCHES.

The most powerful argument against the Koombana being destroyed by the cyclone must surely relate to the discovery of wreckage more than 10 days after the disaster. If the cyclone had been responsible for the destruction of the steamer, surely there would have been plenty of wreckage and cargo immediately apparent after 20 March? As the following post outlines, searches during the initial 10 days were extensive, but FRUITLESS.


The West Australian, 01 April, 1912. 


THE FAILURE OF THE

SHORE SEARCH.

A DEEP SEA MATTER.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. W. E. MOXON.


Mr. Moxon made the following statement:
"Captain Mills has reported that the s.s.
Minderoo from Thursday to Saturday last,
shaped a course taking her on the western
and eastern side of Barrow Island, and the
Montebello Group, and then went round 
Ritchie reef searching thoroughly there. 
Shell and Stewart Islands were visited before 
she proceeded to Cossack via the Dampier 
Archipelago, taking in Mermaid, Rosemary, 
Eaglehawk, Legendre, and Delamori Islands 
en route, without finding any trace of the 
Koombana after a most exhaustive and thorough 
search.




The Bullarra from Sampson to Hedland, 
commencing on Tuesday last, searched the 
Turtle Islands, thence to Bedout Island, where she
landed a search party. Here I might men-
tion they found that the new automatic light
had been extinguished. This is a matter
to which the authorities will give careful con-
sideration. The Amphinome Shoals were
visited, and a course shaped along the Eighty
Mile Beach, taking in La Grange Bay and
Roebuck Bay. This also produced no trace of
the missing liner. Close and wide the
luggers have been searching from Roebuck
Bay round the Amphinone Shoals to Port
Hedland, and we understand that Captain
Parkes' luggers have been searching from
Monte Bellos to Cossack. In addition, lug-
gers have searched Depuch Island, in the
neighbourhood of Cossack and Hedland
without avail. There is no report at present
from the lugger that visited Rowley Shoals,
but this, in view of the Gorgon's report, is
negligible. The Gorgon arrived at Broome
this morning, her instructions having been
to search the Rowley Shoals with Impereiuse,
Clark, and Mermaid reefs. She signalled this
morning that her search had been thorough,
but no trace of the Koombana had been
seen. It will, therefore, be seen that the
whole of the coast from Barrow and Monte
Bello Islands has been searched to Broome
and across from Broome to Rowley Shoals
inclusive. 



The Moira should have passed
down by this time on her trip to Fremantle,
taking in the Lacepede Islands, Rowley
Shoals, and west of Ritchie Reef, but no
report will be received from her, it may be
assumed, unless she has something of an
urgent nature to communicate before her
arrival at Fremantle. It will be remembered
that the Moira encountered the cyclone a
hundred miles to the north-west of Port 
Hedland bound to Wyndham. 

An important reminder that the Moira encountered the cyclone 100 miles NW of Port Hedland at 8 a.m. 20 March. This illustrates that the cyclone, 90 miles in diameter (Inquiry), was to the northwest, not north of Port Hedland on the day of the disaster, and from this position the cyclone moved in a 'southerly' direction (having curved round) towards Balla Balla.




The coast search, it will be seen, has been 
absolutely fruitless, except in so far as the 
reports that no trace of the vessel can be found.


Harbour and Light Department, Western Australia (Fremantle)

Broome: 12 April, 1912.

Addressed to The Chief Harbour Master, Fremantle

Sir,

Report on search for R.M.S. Koombana (note official Royal Mail Ship title). 

At the request of the District Magistrate and in accordance with your cablegram I organised a search for the R.M.S. Koombana.

I chartered the lugger McLlennan and put Captain White in charge with orders to proceed along the coast, searching the 80 Mile Beach and the shoals up to Bedout Island and thence into Port Hedland. I also got the lugger Mina, which with Captain Bennie in charge was ordered to proceed to a point 60 miles north of Bedout Island, then down to the east of the island and into Port Hedland.

I took the schooner Muriel and proceeded to Rowley Shoals and then zigzagged into Port Hedland.

We got away on the evening of March 25th and I reached Mermaid Reef (Rowley Shoals) on March 29th. I proceeded along the south of the Reef and up the East side to the North End and then down to Sandy Island Clarke Reef. Same date I spoke S.S. Gorgon, who reported having searched Impereuse Reef and saw nothing.

I then proceeded across the North of Clarke Reef and down the East side of Impereuse Reef. 

At 2.30 pm on March 31st I spoke S.S. Moira who reported having also searched the shoals and sighted nothing.

I zigzagged down marking 16 mile tacks and picked up Bedout Lighthouse on the forenoon of April 3rd.

I had a flat calm all day and at 4 pm sighted smoke to the N.E.. This turned out to be S.S. Bullarra. I boarded her at 6 pm and Captain Upjohn reported as per my wire from Port Hedland.

I then proceeded to the South of Bedout Island and searched round Turtle Island and thence into Port Hedland arriving there at 9 pm on April 4th.

Captains White and Bennie were in Port Hedland, and being satisfied that we could do nothing further, I instructed them to return to Broome........


Oswald Dalziel.










series 2357, cons 066







series 2357, cons 066



series 2357, cons 066


30th March

"Bedout, Amphinome thoroughly scoured luggers resultless."
"Luggers searching coast close and wide. Nothing reported."

SS Bullarra:

"Wednesday (27th) circumnavigation Little Turtle. No trace Koombana."
"Second Officer and party landed Big Turtle. No trace."
"After dark arrive Bedout position by observation."

Thursday:

"Chief Officer and party searched the island and adjacent rocks. No trace whatever."
"Made a detour course to Broome via the beach. Spoke several luggers. No trace whatever."



By 30 March the vast bulk of Koombana wreckage had yet to materialize.



series 2357, cons 066


and the Minderoo's initial comprehensive search as per document:

Report, March 30th (Saturday)

"...anchored at 9 pm (28th, Thursday) at entrance Mary Anne Passage waiting daylight, weighed and proceeded at 5.50 am, 29th and searched the whole of the East side of Barrow Shoals and Island also Monte Bellos Islands and Richie Reef; from there steered 25 miles east and when south to Sholl Island, examined the neighbourhood of Sholl Island and then on to Stewart and Steamboa Islands, around the McLennand bank and anchored for the night off Cape Preston, weighted and proceeded at daylight 30th, and examined all the islands and passages from Cape Preston to Cossack where arrival at 1.45 pm, 30th. During the whole of our search we saw nothing and from the looks of the islands the storm does not appear to have reached that far west."


series 2357, cons 066






Once wreckage became evident, more than 10 days after the disaster, the Bedout Island vicinity was extensively awash with flotsam - some distance from the track and extent of the Balla Balla Cyclone.

Note Captain Mills, Minderoo:

'examined all the islands and passages from Cape Preston to Cossack where arrival at 1.45 pm, 30th. "During the whole of our search we saw nothing and from the looks of the islands the storm does not appear to have reached that far west."

This supports meteorological report that the Balla Balla Cyclone was only about 90 miles in diameter.


The following document outlines in more detail the lugger Mina search:



series 2357, cons 066



The following document outlines in more detail the lugger McLlennan search:




series 2357, cons 066




series 2357, cons 066




series 2357. cons 066


27 March, winds were light NW. By 31 March, winds had shifted to SSW; 6 April, SSE and 7 April SE, persisting into 8 April.

Amphinome Shoals surrounded by 'banks' in 2 to 2.5 fathoms - 12-15 ft.; 3.6-4.5 m. Koombana drew 16 ft. aft which means that she would have run aground in this vicinity.

There can be no denying the extent of initial discoveries - NOTHING! 

A 'delayed' release of flotsam from a wreck 'breaking up in deep water', rather than battered to pieces by the cyclone.




courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia; Google Earth.