COORDINATES CONCLUSION.

I believe Koombana lies somewhere within the illustrated radius from central, given coordinates.

Oil patches were used to localise steamer wrecks.

An example is the Clan Ranald:

https://waratahrevisited.blogspot.com/2016/03/clan-ranald-fascinating-account-and.html

"direct me to the spot where the wreck was sunk, 

which he said he knew exactly, having seen 

streams of oil rising from her."

Daily Commercial News, 14 May, 1912.

Going back to the question of the

search for the Koombana the witness

(captain Upjohn) remarked that in 

latitude 19.11, longitude 119.25, about 

27 to 37 miles from Bedout Island, one 

evening they saw what looked like a 

portion of the deck of a vessel, but it 

proved to be the shape of a ship outlined 

by an oily substance such as would rise 

from a sunken vessel, floating on the sea.

I firmly believe that the above oil patch represented the final resting place of RMS Koombana. Of course the difficulty has been working out exactly where that spot is. There are many examples of historical coordinates notorious for inaccuracies.

Captain Upjohn, according to this press report, was unsure of this exact position, quoting a huge range of 10 miles; 27 - 37 miles.

The 1864 James Martin chart showed a 10.5 mile deviation between the true and charted positions of Bedout Island (see image), which approximates captain Upjohn's 10 mile uncertainty. 

This phenomenon, in part, could be due to:

 "a number of highly magnetic undersea iron ore bodies."

"These ore bodies are of such magnitude that when the survey vessel HMS Penguin reexamined 19th-century survey reports from HMS Meda, it experienced compass variation of up to 55° and dip to 33° (Lecky, 1920: 30)."

(The Searches for SS Koombana, Kerry Thom) 

There is a different way of looking at this conundrum and an important correction to be made.

Captain Upjohn informed the Inquiry that his crew found a section of starboard motor launch bow planking with Adelaide Steamship Co insignia the following day at a position, 19 15 S, 119 06 E. He referred to this discovery being about 20 miles from the 'oil patch'. In reality it was 18.4 miles from his given coordinates, which in turn were 30 n miles (30.67 degrees) from Bedout Island.

"The other articles were picked up 

about 20 miles from there."

HOWEVER

'the captain of the s.s. Bullarra had 

arrived at Cossack and reported that 

he had picked up, about 20 miles to the 

north of Bedout Island, one of the Koombana's 

boats with the company's crest on it and a

quantity of smaller wreckage." Mr. Moxon 

says that the Bullarra did not pick up a 

ship's boat, at all, but only the bow of a 

boat.'

In reality the launch bow plank was 20 miles north of Bedout Island, correlating with Captain Upjohn's log coordinates (19 15 S, 119 06 E)

Therefore, Captain Upjohn had a far better idea where Bedout Island was in relation to his ship and the various wreckage discoveries than is implied by the quoted "27 to 37 miles".

Why would Captain Upjohn have created confusion by claiming the oil patch was 27 to 37 miles from Bedout Island when clearly it was '30 miles', and yet demonstrate that he was capable of establishing coordinates positions with minimal, if no, deviation?

The answer to this, in part, can be derived from the Inquiry transcript which in turn illustrates the potential inaccuracies in newspaper reporting. The following extract is drawn from the Koombana Days online site, a truly helpful resource:

IN THE MATTER OF THE NAVIGATION ACT 1904.

and IN THE MATTER of an Inquiry into the circumstances attending the loss at sea between Port Hedland and Broome whilst on a voyage from Fremantle to Derby via Ports of the S.S. "KOOMBANA" on or about the 20th March 1912.

April 25th 1912.

BEFORE: E. P. Dowley Esq. R.M. (presiding)

Captain F. L. Parkes ) Assessors.

Captain J. W. W. Yates )

THE CROWN PROSECUTOR (Mr. F. PARKER) appeared to represent the Chief Harbor Master, Captain C. J. Irvine.

MR. MOSS K.C. appeared to represent the Adelaide Steamship Company.

[Upjohn testimony p1]

Mr. MOSS. When you were searching for the wreckage of the "Koombana" did you notice any oily substance floating on the surface?

- Yes.

Please tell the Court?

- It was in latitude 19.11 and 119.25 E.

What distance would that be off Bedout Island?

- About 27 or 28 miles - I cannot say which.

Did you take any samples of this oily substance?

- Yes, two or three dozen bottles.

What depth was there at this place?

- 30 or 35 fathoms. 55 m - 64 m (mean 59.5 m / 195 ft.)

Did you see any trace of the vessel at that depth? There would be nothing to indicate that the Koombana or any other vessel would be there?

- It was getting dark and it looked like the outline of a vessel. The Chief Officer said "It must be one of her decks," I said "No, the decks would not look like that." I could see no more. The engines were stopped and we drifted about 4 miles."

What was the stuff in the bottles?

- Oily, greasy water.

Have you any idea as to how that came there?

- It looked as if it came from a wreck.

There would be stuff on a ship to make this?

- Yes.

Where are these bottles?

- At the Company's office.

We will produce these if desired.

Mr. Dowley. You saw this at dusk?

- Yes.

'It looked like the outline of a vessel' does not come any more graphic or compelling than this!!

Captain Upjohn referred to the oil patch being 27 to 28 miles (not 37 miles). His coordinates, however, indicate a position 30 miles from Bedout island, a greater 2 to 3 mile uncertainty factor. 

Why? 

Reluctance to be the one pin pointing the site of the wreck of Koombana? Magnetic ore in bedrock interfering with compass readings and dead reckoning?

But Captain Upjohn goes on to answer the most telling question of all, 

"what depth was there at this place?"

"30 or 35 fathoms."

If one examines the navigation chart for Bedout Island (see link below), only when plotting a position to the northward of the coordinates, 1.85 miles, bearing 2.55 degrees, does one get an average depth between 30 and 35 fathoms = 33 fathoms; 200 ft.; 61 m.

This region of seabed is predominated by sand.

But the conundrum does not end there...

The navigation chart lists minimum depths (tidal variation, 30 to 35 fathoms) which suggests that we must look for Captain Upjohn's 30 fathom mark in the vicinity of his coordinates. This stretch of sea experiences tidal variations of up to 10 m (+/- 5 fathoms). 

When Upjohn made his discovery of the oil patch, dusk 2 April, this was one day after the full moon, i.e. high water springs, which in turn reinforces sounding fluctuations, 30 - 35 fathoms. 

30 fathoms is 180 ft (54.8 m).

Referring to the image below we see that there are 3 options for this depth in the vicinity of the original oil patch coordinates, the depth of which is 164 ft. (50 m; 27.3 fathoms).

The far bottom right figure of 180.4 ft. (55m) is 27.5 miles, bearing 45.38 degrees from Bedout Island, which is the closest we get to Captain Upjohn's estimate of 27 to 28 miles from Bedout Island.

The upper 187 ft. mark is 30.9 miles from Bedout Island, which is well beyond Captain Upjohn's 27 to 28 miles estimate and 7 ft. deeper.

The 180.4 ft. mark to the left is only 25 miles from Bedout, short of the 27-28 miles.

courtesy i-boating

courtesy i-boating, navigation charts.

27.5 miles = 19 15 51 S, 119 26 48 E
25 miles = 19 12 19 S, 119 17 22 E

If we are to nitpick given that Captain Upjohn's coordinates are basic in terms of omitting 'seconds' we can extrapolate an outer range for the original coordinates with a bias towards the 27.5 mile mark = 1.25 miles deviation. 

Therefore, the 27.5 mile mark can be considered to be either 4 or 5 miles from the original coordinates.

"The engines were stopped and we drifted about 4 miles."

What is fascinating is that the bow plank etc discovered '20 miles' north of Bedout Island is 19.7 miles from the 27.5 miles position as per image below, rather than the 18.4 miles to the original coordinates. Captain Upjohn referred to it being 20 miles. He also referred to the bow plank etc. being 20 miles north of Bedout, which it WAS!! 

How close can one get!!!!

It does seem progressively compelling that the position marked 27.5 miles could very well be our target of interest - a resting place for the steamer Koombana; a section of seabed predominated by sand rather than coral and shells (not a target for pearlers or incidental discovery).

Also note that the bow plank etc is almost due west of the 27.5 mile mark - within the parameters of the post-cyclone westward trending current. 

It is interesting that Captain Upjohn decided to collect as many bottles as 'two to three dozen' stressing the importance of the find and that the bottles, according to the outcome of the Inquiry, stayed at the Company's offices.

No guesses as to why this site, 130 + miles from the centre of the cyclone (90 miles diameter) was not actively pursued by sweeping the vicinity with a 'wire' to confirm the presence of the wreck.


If we take a closer look at the distribution of wreckage discovered (1 - 11), there is further compelling reason to pursue this potential site of the wreck of the lost RMS Koombana:

Important to note that Captain Upjohn discovered a spar awning and plank close to the oil patch coordinates, in effect the true starting point.

Recent vessel activity in the 'zone of interest' has attracted my attention and could, potentially, ultimately, reveal the final resting place of RMS Koombana.

During March (2024) there was a great deal of vessel activity in the zone of interest surrounding Captain Upjohn's coordinates (marked one to thirteen on image). According to 'vesselfinder' these were reported as fishing vessels but after some investigation it appears that these vessels were in fact allegedly connected with the gas and oil industry. One hopes that during these activities any sonar anomaly(ies) discovered on the seabed would be shared and possibly, ultimately indicate the final resting place of Koombana.

courtesy:

https://3denergi.com.au/projects/offshore-bedout-wa/

There is a further option depending on the 'steamer track':

The steamer Albany, 1898:

"At noon on Friday Bedout Island was passed about 6 miles out."

If we are to return to speculation, it is generally assumed that if Captain Allen had decided to follow the standard course rounding the northern aspect of Bedout Island, given the gale force winds and long rolling seas coming up from the southwest, he would likely have given the island a sensible 10 mile plus clearance (some say about 9.5 miles).

But what if visibility was still good and the worst of the cyclone was bearing down towards Balla Balla some 100 miles to the southwest, he might have done what was described by the extract above, passing Bedout Island '6 miles' out. The risk factor vs. getting as far away from the cyclone conditions as fast as possible, if you will...

If this hypothetical case is true we might need to review the trajectory from a 6 mile clearance point heading towards Gantheaume Light (Broome). An interesting picture emerges of the steamer track Koombana would have followed before disaster suddenly overtook her.

The revised Upjohn quote "27 or 28 miles" could be a significant, 8 miles 'south' of his given coordinates. This is a bearing of 52.26 degrees from Bedout and equates with 53m as per navigation chart.

If this hypothesis has merit, we are looking at a potential search block significantly further south of the original coordinates - some 8 miles, in 53-63m water, depending on tidal variations.

In fact, the wreck might lie significantly to the south of the presumed track and should be factored into future searches.

In the quest to find Koombana NE of Bedout one must also not lose sight of the possible coordinates deviation factor (James Martin, 10.5 miles further out).

All factors considered one hopes that ultimately a broad airborne magnetometer survey will reveal Koombana's final resting place whether she be intact or a significant debris field.

Courtesy Trove; Google Earth.

http://fishing-app.gpsnauticalcharts.com/i-boating-fishing-web-app/fishing-marine-charts-navigation.html?title=Western+Australia+-+Solitary+Island+to+Bedout+Island+boating+app#11/-19.1354/119.4410

DECREE NISI.

The Herald, Melbourne, 9 April, 1912.

Made Absolute By Death.

One of the passengers by the

steamer Koombana which is supposed

to have foundered, with all on board,

during a hurricane on the northern

coast of West Australia, was the 

petitioner in a divorce suit heard in 

Melbourne early this year. He alleged

that his wife had been unfaithful to

him, and he based his allegations on

certain letters which he found in his

wife's desk, and on certain oral 

evidence. A decree nisi was 

pronounced.

The petitioner, who was a traveller,

after spending some weeks In 

Melbourne went to West Australia to 

resume a rather extensive business

connection which he had established

in the northern ports of that State.

He took passage in the Koombana, 

and when there were only a few days 

to run for the making of the decree 

nisi absolute for the dissolution of the

marriage the first wreckage from the

Koombana was discovered. The law,

however, will still take its course, and

when the necessary time expires the

order nisi will be made absolute in

the same way as if the petitioner were

still alive.

Sobering.

WHAT WAS CAPTAIN ALLEN TO DO?

Much has been written about the commander of Koombana, Thomas Allen, none more so than in Annie Boyd's outstanding Koombana Days. One comfortably comes to the conclusion that the man was competent and well respected. He was also cautious, an asset considering the challenges posed by the schedule and port-access along the Nor'West coast. 

These remarks were made in the newspapers of the time:

"It speaks well for the personal qualities of Captain 

Allen that he is generally recognised as the most

popular master that has ever traded to the 

north-west coast." 

Captain Allen took up the challenge of the 'jinxed' flagship just 7 months prior to the disaster and immediately made himself popular among regular passengers, who in turn referred to 'travelling by Tom Allen's boat' rather than Koombana by name.

"Captain Allen is a native of  South Australia, 

and is about 48 years of age.  He is a single man, 

and when on his holiday  resides with his mother 

at Port Adelaide."

On the day of the disaster:

"Captain Allen, of the Koombana, seemed

disinclined to go out, and when he decided

to do so he said, "I am going straight out to

sea, and will be lucky if I get to Broome on

Saturday." 

But perhaps the most telling of all newspaper extracts referred to a letter written two weeks prior to the disaster by Tom Allen, as follows:

 "It was dated March 8, and in it Captain Allen

said that he had got through the worst of

the season as far as the climate was concerned. 

"I just kept clear of a blow last trip,"

he added, "but as soon as I got round the

North-West Cape it started, so my luck was

in that time."

We may infer from Captain Allen's comments 'so my luck was in that time' that he had deep concerns about Koombana's stability in a 'blow'.

Reminds me of:

'Just before reaching Hedland we struck a squall and the ship lay over at an angle of 45 degrees and was quite a long time before straightening up.'  (ref. Annie Boyd)

Let's return to the primary factor which precipitated the disaster of 20 March, 1912. No, not the cyclone, but the outer bar at Port Hedland, 19 ft. deep on a spring tide, Wednesday morning.

Annie Boyd offers us one of the most important collections of information relating to this tidal port in the form of 6 log entries of Koombana's draft figures departing Port Hedland, September through December, 1911.

These are sequential and give us important clues into Captain Allen's approach to the inherently top heavy steamer. 

The entries immediately tell us that Koombana's return trip to Derby to and from Port Hedland took one week and on the occasions that Koombana went up as far as Wyndham, this round trip took two weeks.

The more important information comes in the details of the draft figures themselves and understanding the contentious issue of emptying ballast tanks to clear the outer bar.

This is a complex subject, the details of which best reminded by reviewing previous posts:

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/09/getting-to-grips-with-tanks.html

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/09/revelations-and-contradictions.html

  

Let's start with the draft figures for the first departure from Port Hedland, 22 September, 1911:

14'8"forward                                9.30 a.m.

18'6"aft

What is immediately clear is that Captain Allen departed Port Hedland with all tanks full and a sizable consignment of cargo. 

Captain Upjohn, referring to his lengthy tenure on Koombana, claimed  forward draft figures of 12 - 13 ft., all forward tanks full and 17 ft. aft with one tank empty, when exiting Port Hedland. This implied the routine filling of at least one tank out at sea. 

Captain Allen, clearly, was not following this tried and tested recipe, but displayed a cautious approach to the inherently top heavy steamer by maintaining markedly greater, more stable, draft figures. However, such an approach significantly increased the risk of damaging bar strikes.

Also note time of departure, close to the 10 a.m. peak, allowing plenty time to get to Broome by the following day's spring tide access and clearing Bedout Island during daylight hours. With greater draft figures Captain Allen had to depart as close to 10 a.m. as possible.

The schedule for this voyage included one stop at Port Hedland, which allowed the arrival and departure to made as close to the peak of the spring tide as possible.

The second departure, dated 5 October, 1911, is as follows:

13'0"forward                              8.40 a.m.

17'8"aft 

In this instance the forward reading is within Upjohn's 13 - 14 ft. range, forward tanks full, which in large part could have been due to the significantly reduced cargo consignment compared with the previous trip. The aft figure is still greater than 17 ft. which suggests that the aft tanks were full on this occasion as well.

The cautious master is reluctant to give up his ballast stability and one imagines that he assumes the reduced cargo component factor has sufficiently reduced the draft to clear the bar.

Again he departs early, in fact earlier than the maximum spring tide, allowing for more than adequate time to make Broome by the next day spring tide and clearing Bedout during daylight.

By 25 October, 1911, captain Allen has another go:

14'3"forward                             11.25 a.m.

18'0"aft

These figures suggest that Captain Allen was still determined to maintain Koombana's ballast stability at the expense of bar strikes and on this occasion the forward loading has increased compared to the previous trip out of Port Hedland. The later departure time of 11.25 a.m., well after 10 a.m., suggests running 'late' but leaves enough time to clear Bedout in daylight hours, as there are no tanks to fill at sea.

By 1 November, 1911, it looks as though Captain Allen is gaining in confidence keeping all tanks filled, attempting to exit the tidal port with minimal clearance and quite late in the day. What is remarkable is that this departure 1 week after his initial visit to Port Hedland must have been on a relatively low tide volume over the bar. The departure later in the day is because the steamer was heading south and did not have to clear Bedout.

 12'2"forward                           2.10 p.m.

18'8"aft 

From these figures one gets an impression that Captain Allen's luck must have run out, particularly with regard to the aft figure of 18 ft. 8 in. and the very late departure. It is almost certain that he 'bumped' going out. The relatively low forward draft reflects that the bulk of cargo had been discharged on the trip up the coast.

By 10 December we get another perspective on departing the dreaded tidal port: 

15'3"forward                             12.50 p.m.

17'9"aft

The aft figure of 17 ft. 9 in. reduced almost a foot compared with the previous departure suggests that the bulk of cargo was assigned forward in the ship, increasing forward draft significantly to 15'3". The man is, however, still determined to keep his tanks full and ensure stability at the expense of 'bumping' the bar.

He departs again late well beyond 10 a.m., making the 3.5 hour run to Bedout well within daylight hours. No tanks to fill at sea.

Final voyage for the year, Christmas Day, 1911, he departs Port Hedland at ten to one in the early, dark hours of the morning, 2 hours after the 10 p.m. peak. Remember, the steamer was heading south and did not have to clear Bedout. Although this date is two weeks after his first visit (Wyndham terminus) and should have coincided with a peak spring tide, there is a significant change in Captain Allen's approach to the bar and it's as though the tried and tested recipe referred to by Captain Upjohn is finally winning the day:

13'6"forward                             00.50 a.m.

16'9"aft

It is clear from these figures that Captain Allen had finally conceded to that which had gone before him, i.e. emptying at least one tank aft. (after peak or number 6) and keeping forward tanks full, precisely as Captain Upjohn informed the Inquiry had been the approach for 17 of his voyages in and out of Port Hedland aboard Koombana.

We do not have any further entries between the end of December 1911 and the disaster. One assumes that Captain Allen maintained this more judicious approach to exiting Port Hedland with at least one aft tank empty, compromising stability somewhat and incurring the challenge of filling tanks at sea, but a necessity demanded to avoid damaging bar strikes.

Finally, we arrive at the figures on departure from Port Hedland for the last time. I unequivocally accept the figures offered in the Hedland Advocate by Mr. Barker after discussions with Port Hedland's harbour master: 

16 ft. aft.                    10.20 a.m.

11 ft. forward

Captain Allen leaves as close to 10 a.m. as possible to make the most of the spring tide.

The draft figures illustrate very light condition, which is what we would expect with all tanks empty and the minimal cargo component of 260 tons, forward. Tom Allen said so himself that he would fill all tanks out at sea. Why are these figures so much lower than those above, and in particular, the last entry?

20 March, 1912, 10.20 a.m. there was a gale blowing from the NE and a 'broad, rolling sea'; a ground swell from the NW. Generally conditions off Port Hedland are remarkably calm. But 20 March the beast had been awakened. Some pearlers out on luggers referred to swells of up to 50 ft..

Captain Allen knew that he would need a healthy margin of clearance over the bar (19 ft.) in order not to bump, and bump hard. A violent bar strike could potentially have caused the loss of rudder and subsequently the steamer. Captain Allen knew that his top heavy charge would pitch and roll violently as she broached the outer bar. There could be no room for error; clearance had to be guaranteed.

Naturally, once this feat had been achieved, a new and more deadly challenge arose - the filling of all tanks in gale conditions with a 'big sea'. It is my opinion that the successful pressing up of all tanks in these conditions within a 3 hour time frame window, was not going to be possible.

Captain Allen could not win that day; checkmated by circumstances.


Many years later the following appeared in a newspaper, summing up the truth about Koombana:

The West Australian, Perth, 5 October, 1946

"Although I greatly admired the ship's 

(Koombana) appointments. I never 

liked her, considering her too top-heavy.

She always had a list, even when tied 

up at jetties.

The loss of this fine vessel, and a

the inauguration of the State Shipping 

Service, apparently discouraged our 

old friends (Adelaide Steamship Co)

and their passenger vessels were shortly

afterwards withdrawn from our 

North-West coast."

Fix this text

Courtesy Boyd, Annie. Koombana Days (p. 246). Fremantle Press. Kindle Edition; Trove 

R.M.S. KOOMBANA.

courtesy: Trove - Chronicle Adelaide, 30 March, 1912

TURNER RIVER.

The Advertiser, Adelaide, 28 March, 1912.

The Deputy Postmaster-General received

telegrams from Roebourne and Port 

Hedland this afternoon. Roebourne reported

that a telegraph line repairing party were

20 miles out and making slow progress, and

it was impossible to travel the line road

with horses, the country being very boggy.

A message from Port Hedland states that

a repairing party were on the south line,

which was believed to be badly damaged at

Turner River.

What is interesting to note is that the Turner River is adjacent to Cossack and Roebourne, 31 miles to the southwest of Balla Balla, within the most conservative estimation of the cyclone's diameter (90 miles). 

Port Hedland was not as is clear from the image - extract from the same newspaper report as follows:

"Scarcely any damage

was caused by the 

hurricane at Port Hedland."

courtesy Google Earth