CONFIRMATION OF DRAUGHT.

Two sets of draughts were presented; one by the Inquiry and the other by the harbour master of Port Hedland. The Inquiry came to the conclusion that Koombana was drawing 19 ft. aft and 12 ft. forward when she departed Port Hedland for the last time. Immediately there is a problem with these figures. The outer bar, 20 March, 1912, was only 19 ft. deep which means that Koombana could not have cleared it without incident drawing 19 ft. aft. The harbour master's figures were far more realistic, confirmed by Captain Upjohn's synopsis of Koombana draught readings relative to ballast tank status. Departing Port Hedland Koombana carried generally minimal cargo, stowed forward (eg 260 tons) and all ballast tanks forward filled = 12 to 13 ft.. Generally the after peak could be emptied allowing an aft draught of 17 ft. and if an additional tank, number 6 was emptied, the aft draught could be reduced to 16.5 ft.. In order to clear the outer bar (19 ft. deep) 20 March with a ground swell coming in from the NW and gale from the NE, Captain Allen had no choice but to empty all ballast tanks to clear the bar without mishap. Emptying all tanks would have reduced the forward draught from 12 to 11 ft. which makes sense and the empty aft tanks from 16.5 ft. to 16 ft., given the overall reduction. We can confidently come to the conclusion that the harbour master figures were correct and the Inquiry figures wildly off.

Hedland Advocate, 25 May, 1912:

"Several can be found to prove 

the ship drew no more than

16ft 6in aft and 11ft for'ard as she

lay at anchor at the Hedland jetty."

"The ship's propeller was showing

when anchored at the jetty"

For Koombana's propeller to be 'showing' confirms that the aft draught was less than 16 ft. 6 in. --> 16 ft. 

GETTING TO GRIPS WITH THE TANKS.

This is a complicated, confusing subject and it helps a little to review Captain Upjohn's fuller inquiry transcript at:

https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2019/09/revelations-and-contradictions.html

The Inquiry transcript extracts below reinforce Captain Upjohn's decision not to defend Captain Allen's decision to depart Port Hedland with 'empty tanks'. Captain Upjohn disingenuously suggested that Koombana, with her tanks pressed up, would have had a draught aft of 17 ft. which should have cleared the outer bar, 19 ft. deep, 20 March, 1912. In other words he suggested that Captain Allen could have departed Port Hedland that morning without ANY tanks empty.

But this was NOT the full picture by any stretch of the imagination.

Captain Upjohn contradicted himself and in the course of his session on the witness stand gave draught figures for when Koombana's aft tanks were empty; 16 ft. 6 in. and 13 -14 ft. forward, representing these forward tanks filled.

The above post link fleshes this out in more detail: 

17 ft. (referenced above) equated with just the after peak empty and 16'6 ft. (16.5 ft.) with both after peak and number 6 tank, empty.

Compare these figures with alleged claims made by the Port Hedland harbour master that Koombana departed that fateful morning with draught figures: 16 ft. aft (further reduced from 16.5 ft.) and 11 ft. forward (normally 13.5 ft.). These figures confirm that most, if not all, of Koombana's tanks were empty; further enhanced by minimal cargo (14%) stowed forward. 

It appears that before Captain Allen's tenure the practice was to empty either the after peak or the after peak and number 6 tank for clearing the bar at Port Hedland, leaving the remaining forward tanks full.

In fact Captain Allen copied this trend exactly on Christmas Day, 1911.

Captain Allen was a cautious master who understood Koombana's inherent top heaviness and when he took command, initially preferred to keep all tanks full accessing Port Hedland. However, on numerous occasions Koombana suffered damaging bar strikes in the process.

It stood to reason that by 20 March, Captain Allen had learned lessons too well, deciding to opt for empty tanks, i.e. 16 ft. aft, 11 ft. forward to ensure uncomplicated clearance of the outer bar (19 ft.) during a significant groundswell and gale from the NE, when his tender vessel would be pitching and rolling, requiring at least 3 ft. clearance. But this decision forced him to fill all tanks at sea.

In previous posts I have drawn attention to the fresh water component which was not replenished at ports and potentially created a free surface effect (loose water) in demarcated fresh water tanks. Captain Upjohn explained that in order to reduce the free surface effect (increasing heeling instability) in selected fresh water tanks midships 4 and 5, longitudinally sub-divided (voyage from Geraldton to Port Hedland) this water could be replaced / topped up by water from the after peak tank (see image - most rear tank) which consequently would be 'empty' on arrival at the outer bar reducing aft draught to 17 ft., facilitating clearance of the bar and solving two problems simultaneously. Subsequent to this the afterpeak could be filled with salt water for the remainder of the voyage north.

Captain Upjohn alluded to the 'routine' filling of tanks at sea in the following extract and thus confirmed my assumption that Koombana's aft tanks were routinely empty for departure from Port Hedland.

"As a rule the Engineer would run them (tanks) hard up outside (at sea after departure). When plenty of water inside he may have run the fresh water tanks hard up" presumably consolidating from other partially filled sub-divisions and reducing the free surface effect.

Therefore, it does appear that filling Koombana's tanks at sea was not as uncommon as Captain Upjohn initially tried to implicate.

The tanks were numbered 1 through 6 from front to back (see image below). 

Number 1 did not have a central water tight division and thus had to be either completely full or completely empty, in this instance allegedly completely filled with fresh water.

Number 2 tank had a central water tight division (effectively dividing these tanks into port and starboard separate tanks) and on this occasion was filled with salt water.

Number 3; 4 and 5 had central divisions.

Number 3 contained salt water.

Numbers 4 and 5 contained fresh water.

Number 6 tank did not have a central division and like number 1 either had to be completely full or completely empty. This tank, it is assumed was filled with salt water.

The allegation was therefore true that Koombana's draught was indeed in the region of 16 ft. aft 20 March, all remaining cargo forward in the ship and all tanks empty. With the upper limit of the propeller more accurately approximating 16.5 ft., it makes sense that with an aft draught of 16 ft. it would have been partially exposed i.e. 'flogging the air'. Under normal circumstances with just the after peak empty, drawing 17 ft. (forward tanks full), the propeller would have been submerged.  

Captain Upjohn confirmed that it would take at least 3 hours (usually 3 1/2 hours) to fill the after peak and number 6 tank at sea. But if all tanks required filling and it took 3 hours plus just to fill the after peak and number 6, I do strongly wonder if there were empty or partially empty tanks when Koombana made her run for the north of Bedout Island. Furthermore, we know that Koombana was seen by two sets of witnesses only filling tanks for about 2 hours.

courtesy Annie Boyd.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia, series 2357, cons 066

The following document illustrates the subdivisions of tanks being used as required for trimming; e.g. fresh water port side subdivision and sea water starboard subdivision. What combinations and how Captain Allen ultimately achieved his goal remains in the realm of speculation.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia; series 2357, cons 006

THE EXTENT OF INITIAL SEARCHES.

If Koombana was battered to pieces by a cyclone one would expect wreckage to have been discovered shortly after the disaster and certainly during the detailed searches carried out by various vessels one week later. The following detailed summary gives us an idea of the extent of searches which were initially fruitless. 

I have transcribed Dalziel's report as follows, the originals attached below:

Harbour and Light Department, Western Australia (Fremantle)

Broome: 12 April, 1912.

Addressed to The Chief Harbour Master, Fremantle

Sir,

Report on search for R.M.S. Koombana (note official Royal Mail Ship title). 

At the request of the District Magistrate and in accordance with your cablegram I organised a search for the R.M.S. Koombana.

I chartered the lugger McLlennan and put Captain White in charge with orders to proceed along the coast, searching the 80 Mile Beach and the shoals up to Bedout Island and thence into Port Hedland. I also got the lugger Mina, which with Captain Bennie in charge was ordered to proceed to a point 60 miles north of Bedout Island, then down to the east of the island and into Port Hedland.

I took the schooner Muriel and proceeded to Rowley Shoals and then zigzagged into Port Hedland.

We got away on the evening of March 25th and I reached Mermaid Reef (Rowley Shoals) on March 29th. I proceeded along the south of the Reef and up the East side to the North End and then down to Sandy Island Clarke Reef. Same date I spoke S.S. Gorgon, who reported having searched Impereuse Reef and saw nothing.

I then proceeded across the North of Clarke Reef and down the East side of Impereuse Reef. 

At 2.30 pm on March 31st I spoke S.S. Moira who reported having also searched the shoals and sighted nothing.

I zigzagged down marking 16 mile tacks and picked up Bedout Lighthouse on the forenoon of April 3rd.

I had a flat calm all day and at 4 pm sighted smoke to the N.E.. This turned out to be S.S. Bullarra. I boarded her at 6 pm and Captain Upjohn reported as per my wire from Port Hedland.

I then proceeded to the South of Bedout Island and searched round Turtle Island and thence into Port Hedland arriving there at 9 pm on April 4th.

Captains White and Bennie were in Port Hedland, and being satisfied that we could do nothing further, I instructed them to return to Broome.

After wiring report to you, I left Port Hedland at 2 pm on April 5th and proceeded to Bedout Island.

I landed on the island at noon on April 6th and found the light extinguished, but evidently in good order.

To gain admittance, I had to remove one of the larger panes of glass in the outer lantern. The lamp inside was apparently in thorough order and the automatic gear working satisfactorily. I put a match to the jets and they lit immediately (fortunately without explosion). I then replaced the pane of glass and made a thorough search of the island but found no trace of wreckage of any description. (no reference to maimed or dead birds)

I then got under weigh and at 8 pm I was about 16 miles distant from the island and the light was plainly visible and working well. In removing the glass I disturbed as little as possible and ....
tight as I could and I think it will be air tight.

I arrived at Broome at 3.30 am on April 9th and reported myself by wire to you.

Enclosed are copies of reports by Captains White and Bennie,

Oswald Dalziel.




  

ultimately wreckage was discovered.

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357, cons 066

30th March

"Bedout, Amphinome thoroughly scoured luggers resultless."
"Luggers searching coast close and wide. Nothing reported."

SS Bullarra:

"Wednesday (27th) circumnavigation Little Turtle. No trace Koombana."
"Second Officer and party landed Big Turtle. No trace."
"After dark arrive Bedout position by observation."

Thursday:

"Chief Officer and party searched the island and adjacent rocks. No trace whatever."
"Made a detour course to Broome via the beach. Spoke several luggers. No trace whatever."

By 30 March the vast bulk of Koombana wreckage had yet to be discovered.

series 2357, cons 066

and the Minderoo's initial comprehensive search as per document:

Report, March 30th (Saturday)

"...anchored at 9 pm (28th, Thursday) at entrance Mary Anne Passage waiting daylight, weighed and proceeded at 5.50 am, 29th and searched the whole of the East side of Barrow Shoals and Island also Monte Bellos Islands and Richie Reef; from there steered 25 miles east and when south to Sholl Island, examined the neighbourhood of Sholl Island and then on to Stewart and Steamboa Islands, around the McLennand bank and anchored for the night off Cape Preston, weighted and proceeded at daylight 30th, and examined all the islands and passages from Cape Preston to Cossack where arrival at 1.45 pm, 30th. During the whole of our search we saw nothing and from the looks of the islands the storm does not appear to have reached that far west."

series 2357, cons 066

The following document outlines in more detail the lugger Mina search:

series 2357, cons 066

The following document outlines in more detail the lugger McLlennan search:

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357, cons 066

series 2357. cons 066

Note that 27 March, winds were light NW. By 31 March, winds had shifted to SSW; 6 April, SSE and 7 April SE, persisting into 8 April.

Amphinome Shoals surrounded by 'banks' in 2 to 2.5 fathoms - 12-15 ft.; 3.6-4.5 m. Koombana drew 16 ft. aft which means that she would have run aground in this vicinity.

There can be no denying the extent of initial discoveries - NOTHING! A 'delayed' release of flotsam from the sunken wreck.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia; Google Earth.

THE MYSTERY OF BEDOUT LIGHT.

We know from posts to date that the Bedout light was out from between 13 and 15 March until it was 're-lit' by wharfinger Dalziel, 6 April, as many as 24 days later. In the interim Koombana had foundered. Captain Upjohn noted 27 March that the light was out. However, a cryptic telegram (see below) has come to hand which implies that Bedout light was burning 25 March. This does not make sense!!!! Had there been an unrecorded attempt to relight Bedout after 15 March, but which failed again by 27 March?? The implication, if the details of the telegram are true, that Bedout could have been lit when Koombana made her run for Broome. It does, however, seem improbable.

courtesy State Records Office, Western Australia. Series 2357, cons 066

  

KOOMBANA AND THE SEER'S WEIRD STORY.

Darling Downs Gazette, 16 April, 1912.

THE LOST KOOMBANA

CHINESE SEER'S WEIRD STORY.

OF 'BIG SHIP GO DOWN.'

Is there, among the Chinese an occultist

—a student of .things hidden. Many

European residents in China think

there is. Whatever may be the power

of this Chinaman, the following incident 

can at least be classed as a weird

happening.

While the Blue Funnel steamer Gorgon 

was berthed at Singapore preparatory 

to her usual trip to Australia, one of the 

ship's Chinese boys accosted Mr.

W. E. Collins, the purser. That was

on March 22. 'Mr. Collins,' said the

boy, 'big blow has happened off Balla

Balla and Port Hedland. Big ship go

down,' added the boy, pointing 

significantly down with his finger.

Mr. Collins was inclined to be amused. 

'What ship was it?' he asked. 'Don't 

know,' replied the ? boy, 'perhaps it was 

the Mindoroo.'

Mr. Collins soon convinced the Chinese 

that it could not be the Minderoo as she 

had not even sailed from Fremantle.

'How do you know?' asked the purser. 

The boy was evasive in his reply,

and said nothing, beyond that all the

Chinese in Singapore knew about the

event. This story soon got round 

Singapore, but when it was found that no

news had come from Australia, the

agents for the Minderoo, not having

any information, the storm yarn wore

itself out.

Next day the Gorgon sailed for Australia, 

via Java, arriving at the latter country three 

days later. On her arrival Captain Townley 

received a cable from Australia, asking him 

to look out for any signs of the missing steamer

Koombana on his way down to Broome

It was then that the ship heard the news 

of the great storm on. the N.W. coast. 

This story is all the more remarkable owing 

to the fact that the loss of the steamer was 

reported by the boy on March. 22. And yet 

there was no real uneasiness on the coast 

as to the whereabouts of the Koombana until

March 25. The Koombana sailed from Port 

Hedland on her last trip on March 20.

SS Gorgon - courtesy flotilla Australia

courtesy Trove.

CAPTAIN IRVINE AND THE UNATTENDED LIGHT AT BEDOUT.

Daily Commercial News, 14 May, 1912.

The Chief Harbormaster (Captain

Irvine) said inquiries had been made

in England and America as to the best

unattended light available, and 

eventually a Birmingham firm supplied 

the Bedout light, which was arranged to

burn for 12 months without attention,

compressed acetylene being used. It

started on December 10, 1909, and up to

the time of the recent failure had given 

entire satisfaction. It had never been 

left for 12 months without attention, and 

when visited was always found to be burning 

satisfactorily. The first intimation he had of 

its failure was on March 26, and telegrams 

were sent to all ports advising them that

the light was out. The notices to ship

masters stated that the light was un-

wached, and they were warned not to

place too much reliance upon it.

Passing the buck...

Kalgoorie Miner, 27 April, 1912

Mr. Moxon also read a number of

reports from pearlers and others in

the Nor'-West on the state of the

weather. In the reports it was stated

by some (referring to Bedout Island) 

that the light on the island, which

was, a self-attended one, was not

alight on March 13 and 15.

The report received by Mr. Moxon 

from Port Hedland that the light was 

out on March 13 had never reached him

(Captain Irvine). The first advice

concerning the light having been 

extinguished on that date was 

brought under his notice on 

March 26. Immediately on receipt 

of that advice he had wired to all 

the ports a warning regarding the 

light. 'I am of opinion that the ship 

did not  touch Bedout Island, as 

wreckage  would have been found 

there.'

Did Captain Irvine really expect the Court to swallow the story that Mr. Moxon had received the report but not he - a light which had not been working for 13 days (ultimately 24 days), during which time Koombana had foundered????

The following report fleshes out Captain Irvine's disingenuous approach to this serious matter:

Daily Herald, 12 April, 1912.

THE KOOMBANA

FAILURE OF ISLAND LIGHTS.

Considerable comment has been made

as to the efficacy of the self-tended lights,

such as are used at Bedout Island and

elsewhere, and the opinion has been 

expressed that owing to the.fact that the

light was found to be out when the island 

was visited recently they are not reliable 

(says the "West Australian" of April 5). 

When spoken to in this connection yesterday 

afternoon, the Chief Harbor Master (Captain 

Irvine) stated that when the light was first 

installed on Bedout, instructions were issued 

to mariners giving particulars as to installation. 

and a particular warning was on that occasion 

conveyed to them that, as the light was a 

self-tended one, too much reliance should not 

be placed upon it. The light, had everything gone 

right, should have remained alight until June

next, but, as it was, it had remained in good 

working order, day and night, from December, 

1909, till last month. It could hardly be wondered 

at that a cyclone which could bring disaster to a

steamer like the Koombana should have the effect

of extinguishing a light like that at Bedout. He 

doubted if, in the event of a cyclone striking 

Fremantle, difficulties would not be experienced 

in keeping the lights at Rottness burning properly. 

The Government steamer Penguin would be

leaving, however, towards the end of the

present month for the north-west to overhaul 

the lights along the coast, and in the meantime 

word had been passed to all master mariners on 

the coast acquainting them with the fact that the 

light was extinguished.

The purpose of having a light on a low-lying island was to protect shipping. Warning masters not to rely upon it was in effect a contradiction in terms. Furthermore, Captain Irvine knew full well that the light was extinguished from 1 week prior to the cyclone. It was untruthful to suggest that the cyclone had been responsible for the light 'going out'.

Captain Irvine had no qualms about placing this untruth in the march gazette:

 'Western Australia—North-West Coast. NOTICE is hereby given that the hurricane which passed over Bedout Island—lat. 19.35 S. 119.6 E.—on the 22nd inst., extinguished the unattended light established on this island in December, 1909. Further notice will be issued as soon as the lamp has been re-lighted. Charts affected. No. 1055—Bedout Island to Cape Cuvier. No. 1048—Buccaneer Archipelago to Bedout. C. J. IRVINE, Chief Harbour Master. Harbour and Light Department, Fremantle, 30th March, 1912.'  

https://www.slp.wa.gov.au/gazette/gazette.nsf/gazlist/6205E4E859C7A3E548257C1D0015457F/$file/gg023.pdf

And then finally:

NOTICE TO MARINERS. Western Australia-North-West Coast. 1516/12. NOTICE is hereby given that the Bedout Island Light, lat. 19.35 S., long. 119.6 E., has been relighted. Description of light as follows:-Unattended, white, flashing every 10 seconds, thus: Flash 2 secs., eclipse 8 secs.; height of focal plane, 66 feet; visible 14 miles in clear weather. Charts affected. No. 1055,-Bedout Island. to Cape Cuvier. No. 1048.-Buccaneer Archipelago to Bedout. C. J. IRVINE, Chief Harbour Master. Harbour and Light Department, Fremantle, 22nd May, 1912.

Present day Bedout Light, courtesy Lighthouses of Western Australia

Fix this text