The following extract can be found on Annie Boyd's excellent Koombana Days online resource site.
EXTRACTS. IN THE COURT OF MARINE INQUIRY, WESTERN AUSTRALIA.
IN THE MATTER OF THE NAVIGATION ACT 1904 and IN THE MATTER of an Inquiry into the circumstances attending the loss at sea between Port Hedland and Broome whilst on a voyage from Fremantle to Derby via Ports of the S.S. "KOOMBANA" on or about the 20th March 1912.
April 25th 1912.
BEFORE: E. P. Dowley Esq. R.M. (presiding)
Captain F. L. Parkes ) Assessors.
Captain J. W. W. Yates )
THE CROWN PROSECUTOR (Mr. F. PARKER) appeared to represent the Chief Harbor Master, Captain C. J. Irvine.
MR. MOSS K.C. appeared to represent the Adelaide Steamship Company.
[Upjohn testimony p1]
HARRY UPJOHN, Sworn.
EXAMINED THE CROWN PROSECUTOR.
You are the Master of the s.s. "Bullarra,"? - Yes.
Were you the Master of her on the 18th March last? - Yes.
Did you arrive at Port Hedland on the 18th March? - Yes.
What were the tides then? - Tides were making 19 feet springs.
This figure of 19 ft. played a key roll in the disastrous sequence of events unfolding, 20 March, 1912.
What day did the s.s. "Koombana" arrive at Port Hedland?
- On the 19th March.
During the time you were in Port Hedland did you have any
conversation with Captain Allen in respect of the weather?
- Yes.
- Yes.
On what date was that? - On the morning of the 20th.
Will you tell the Court what the conversation was? - It took
place on my ship. We had a general conversation and Capt.
Allen said "What do you think about the weather?"
What was your reply? - "Its overcast and a bit dirty but there is nothing in it."
Can you fix the time that this conversation took place? - It was just before breakfast or just after.
That would be about 8 o'clock? - Yes.
What was the state of the weather at this time? - Very nice fresh breeze, overcast and cloudy.
It struck you as being a bit dirty? - Just overcast.
What did you expect from the weather? - I expected the same right through: fine if anything.
Did you have any further conversation with Capt. Allen about the weather? - None.
Was anything said in reference to leaving Port Hedland or not? - No.
Captain Allen Koombana: "I do
not like the look of the weather.
Captain Upjohn; what do you intend
doing?"
Captain Upjohn (Bullarra): "I have
made up my mind to go out and your
boat is a far better one than mine."
Captain Allen: "Well, if you intend
going out, I do not suppose it will do
for me to stop here."
Furthermore, Captain Upohn's initial comments to the press were as follows:
'The weather was looking dirty when the
ship (Bullarra) left Port Hedland on March
20, but after consultation with the captain
of the Koombana, which left 20 minutes
later, we resolved to put out, the Bullara
going south and the Koombana, north.
When about 22 miles from Balla Balla
very bad weather was struck.'
The interesting thing is this; The Board of Trade encouraged masters to face storms out at sea rather than in port where the steamer could be driven ashore and wrecked. Captain Upjohn could have been frank from the start at the Inquiry and stated this well-known 'regulation'.
However, he knew, as did everyone involved in this farce that Koombana was significantly top heavy; her captain reluctant to depart under such circumstances and tanks to be adequately filled at sea in such conditions, a virtual impossibility.
But Captain Upjohn had encouraged (dared) Captain Allen to depart and this he had to downplay as far as humanly possible.
MR. DOWLEY. He left before you? - Yes.
CROWN
PROSECUTOR. At what time? -
[Upjohn testimony p2]
UPJOHN. About 20 minutes before I did: between 10 and 11 o'clock a.m.
CROWN
PROSECUTOR. Can you tell the Court: did the weather alter between 10 and
11.20 ? - No. (ctd)
What was the reading of the barometer? - I looked at the
barometer at 6 o'clock and it stood at 29.50.
Had there been anything during the night or early morning? -
There was a squall at 4 o'clock that morning.
What was the nature of this squall? - Just a puff.
Did you look at the barometer on account of that? - No: it
was my usual practice to look at the barometer at about 6
o'clock.
It stood then at 29.50? - Yes.
Did you look at the barometer again before you left Port
Hedland? - I do not recollect.
"I subsequently learnt that the glass was
extremely low, 28 something."
When Captain Allen spoke about the weather, did he mention
anything about the barometer reading? - Yes he did mention
it but I do not remember what it was.
Was your glass a high or low one? - Low.
There was nothing whatever said about leaving or not? -
Not a word.
"Captain Allen, when questioned
by Mr. Barker as to whether he was
going to put out, said he did not know.
"I don't like the glass," was Captain
Allen's remark, "and another
24 hours here will not matter."
'Another 24 hours' referred to delaying departure for a day. It is absolutely crystal clear from this extract that Captain Allen did not want to depart into what he knew would be dangerous conditions for his top heavy steamer.
Where were you when the "Koombana" left Port Hedland? -- I was on the lower bridge and the Chief Officer was with me.
What were you doing? -- We were just looking at the "Koombana"
Did you notice her trim? -- She was in excellent trim.
Did you notice the draft? -- No. I noticed how well she
behaved and the Chief Officer said the same.
Have you any reason for that remark? - No, but she looked so well.
Did you notice her propeller? - It was well submerged.
You and the Chief Officer were standing watching her? - Yes.
When she went out of the Harbor, did she roll at all? - No.
[Upjohn testimony p3]
CROWN PROSECUTOR (ctd)
When you went out, what length of time did you follow in the
"Koombana's" Course? - I followed out in her course, keeping
leads astern, somewhere about half an hour or three quarters.
"hearing the officers in charge of the watch
remark that we were running out three miles,
I gleaned that something was expected."
By 'expected', the cattleman meant severe weather.
And you last saw her? - About two hours after leaving.
Was she proceeding on her ordinary course to Broome? -
On the ordinary course to Bedout.
Was she in good trim? - Yes.
The top of her propellor, according to the plan, is about on
the 18' mark: You say she was well submerged? - Yes.
From the time you left Port Hedland until the time you lost
sight of the "Koombana", had the wind changed? - No.
Had the velocity altered? - No.
"there was an overcast sky and half a
gale blowing from the E.N.E."
During that day, when did the direction of the wind change
first? - About 4 p.m.
Where were you bound? - South to Balla Balla.
You were going in the opposite direction to that taken by the
"Koombana"? - Yes.
What time did the wind change its direction first? - Some-
where between 2 o'clock and 4 o'clock. It is very carefully noted
in the log book. The wind was E.N.E at 5 o'clock. Commenced
to flicker and went back again. (portion of log book put in).
When did the wind change? - Between 2 and 4 o'clock.
Coming back to the time you left Port Hedland? - At 6.20am
we commenced swinging, at 10.40 cast off. There was a strong
N.E. wind, cloudy.
Mr. DOWLEY. You say the wind changed from E.N.E. From what? - There was a strong breeze which changed from N.E.
"there was an overcast sky and half a
gale blowing from the E.N.E."
Newspaper reports:
'The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port
Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla onMarch 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered
a strong north-east gale on leaving the
harbor.'
'Between 2 and 4 p.m. the wind changed
from north-east to east-north-east. At 4.20
the engines were slowed, and at 5 p.m. he
altered the Bullarra's course and put to
sea.'
CROWN
PROSECUTOR. At what time did you lose sight of the "Koombana" - about
12 o'clock? - A little before, when the sea became rough.
'When we came on deck for the midday
meal, the Bullara and the Koombana
were stern on to each other, and the
distance apart being about five miles.'
According to the cattleman Koombana was still well within sight at midday. Captain Upjohn contradicted himself in other statements referring to Koombana being in sight for about 2 hours out at sea - takes the time to roughly 1 p.m.
When did you notice the sea change to rough? When you left it
was a nice pleasant breeze and smooth? - Yes, it
freshened later.
'The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port
Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on
March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered
a strong north-east gale on leaving the
harbor.'
[Upjohn testimony p4]
When the wind freshened and the sea became rough, was the
Koombana still in sight? - Yes, but I lost sight of her shortly
after.
Did you notice what weather she was making? Did you see her?
- I saw her but could not tell how she was behaving.
- I saw her but could not tell how she was behaving.
The next entry is in regard to the weather? - Heavy N.E. gale,
heavy sea, 4 o'clock.
You were still on your course for Balla Balla? - Yes. At 4.20
p.m. I slowed the engines.
"We were down amongst the cattle again fixing up,
when at 4.30 p.m. Captain Upjohn called
out to us to look out as she was going to roll.
As he was going to heave-to, we came up
on deck At 6 p.m."
At 5 o'clock you altered your course from S 50 W to N.E? - Yes.
What other note have you? - Put screens up and tarpaulins in
main weather rigging and round poop, took soundings and found
25 fathoms.
You were then steering out to open sea after doing this? -
Yes.
The next entry? - At 8, heavy gale, high seas, ship laboring
heavily and heavy rain.
At that time what did you think of the weather? - That it was
bad and getting serious. This was between 8 and 10 p.m.
You continued out to sea? - Yes.
Will you tell the Court what the weather was. At midnight
you reported it being a hurricane? - Yes, the ship was rolling
heavily.
Were these entries made afterwards? - The entries were made
roughly in another book and copied afterwards.
At 10.30 the wind went from E.N.E to E.? - Yes, at 11.20
mountainous seas. (log book read).
I notice that the wind after 8 o'clock got to W.S.W. The
wind increased in velocity about midday of the 21st? - Yes.
Was there any alteration in the barometer? - There was no
difference until between 3 and 4 o'clock.
What then? - It dropped a little but not suddenly.
Did you keep watch of the barometer? - Yes, later on, every
hour.
[Upjohn testimony p5]
Between 3 and 4 o'clock you did not pay particular attention
but at 10 o'clock, when you realised the weather was bad, you
kept constant watch? - Yes.
I notice you were in the centre of the cyclone between noon
and 4 p.m.? - At 12.30 it was calm.
...
After the blow was over and you had effected temporary repairs,
did you engage in searching for the Koombana? What area did you search? -
(Chart put in and area shown).
[Upjohn testimony p6]
What wreckage did you pick up? - An awning spar, portion
of motor launch, a panel from the ceiling of the smoking
room or music room, some covers of the lifeboats tanks and
a door.
(Wreckage produced).
You examined that carefully? - Yes.
Did you form any opinion as to what had caused the wreckage?
- The force of the wind and sea.
- The force of the wind and sea.
The panel is forced right out with the screws adhering? - Yes.
Have you formed any opinion? Does the Court desire to hear
any opinion? -
MR. DOWLEY. It may be given.
THE CROWN
PROSECUTOR. Have you any doubt as to this being the wreckage of the
"Koombana"? - There is not the slightest doubt. The piece
from the motor launch has the Company's crest on it.
You know the door? - Yes, it belonged to the cabin on port side on the promenade deck.
What door is it? - It is a stateroom door.
During this blow, did the wind shift any of your boats at all? -
Yes. The lee boats. One of the boats had a hole bumped in it.
Were any other boats effected by the wind? - They were
strained and damaged, and chafed in the chocks.
Did you lose any boats? - No.
Were all the boats damaged? - Yes. They were all lashed down.
...
[Upjohn testimony p7]
...
THE CROWN
PROSECUTOR. You know the "Koombana" well. Where did she carry her
cargo, etc? - Yes, I know her well. She had her bunkers
full and they carry about 580 (480) tons. According to Captain
Williams she had 80 tons of cargo in the lower hold, 150
tons in No. 2 lower, between No. 2 and tween decks - 20 tons.
A total of about 800 tons.
However, Matthew John Williams, Marine Superintendent, in his own words stated during interview that the Derby cargo, 175 tons, was stowed forward in number 2 hold and 85 tons for Broome, stowed in the after part of number 1 and 2 'tween deck, higher up. Total, 260 tons (the official Inquiry figure). These units were stowed and secured before departure from Fremantle.
Perhaps, what Captain Upjohn inadvertently let slip was that these units of cargo were redistributed lower down to improve G.M.; which although a sensible decision might have made the new, temporary placements prone to shifting in heavy weather.
Also, Captain Upjohn's total was 10 tons short of the official 260 tons.
 |
| courtesy Annie Boyd. |
Have you known of a case when the "Koombana" has all her
tanks empty at one time? When she was a light ship? - No.
If she had all her tanks empty and only 800 tons on board
her, with coal and everything, what draft would she be? -
She would be 16'6 aft and about 12' forward.
'The Harbormaster's assertion
was that she was drawing 11ft.
forward and 16ft. aft.'
The Inquiry was to come to the conclusion that Koombana was drawing 19 ft. aft, which was impossible given the bar clearance of 19 ft.. Even their supplicant witness did not venture a ridiculous aft draft figure like that!!
MR. DOWLEY. The tanks are distributed about the ship? - Yes.
THE CROWN
PROSECUTOR. About how many times did you go into Port Hedland on the
"Koombana"? - About 18 times.
When at spring tides, what empty tanks would you have? -
The after peak tank would be empty: it would be consumed on
the voyage up from Fremantle to fill tanks 4 and 5 - fresh
water.
How would the other tanks be? - All full. Numbers 1, 2, 3,
4 and 5. No 6 might be pumped out.
With the tanks in this State what draft would she be then? -
About 17' with the after peak tank out.
Could you go into Port Hedland on a spring tide with that? -
Quite easily.
There would be no necessity to empty any tanks? - No.
Captain Upjohn had 12 months', 18 x voyage experience on Koombana as Chief Officer, and yet Captain Allen was to get command of the flagship while Upjohn was relegated to the ageing Bullarra. There could have been animosity. Also, by criticizing Captain Allen, Upjohn could also have been sending a not so subtle to the employers that if he had commanded Koombana, the disaster might not have happened.
Personally I doubt whether Harry Upjohn could have saved the day.
If there were any tanks empty in Port Hedland, how long
would it take to fill these tanks? - Number 8 (error, 6) would be run out in an hour and the after peak in about an hour and it would then be pumped up.
How long would it take to fill them? - From 3 to 3 1/2 hours.
3 1/2 hours for two tanks - how long for all tanks!!!
[Upjohn testimony p8]
Have you formed any theory as to what became of the "Koombana"?--
The only thing I can think of is that she was smashed
up by the cyclone.
In what way do you think?-- By the force of the wind and sea.
Could she have turned turtle?-- Impossible.
CROSS EXAMINED
MR. MOSS. Do you consider you were lucky in having escaped? - We escaped by a miracle.
Your boat was in a battered condition? - Yes.
What occurred to your funnel? - It was carried away in the early part of the blow.
You went to Broome to effect temporary repairs and for water? - Yes.
That was before you searched for the "Koombana"? - Yes.
Have you been in cyclonic weather before? - Yes, in the China
Sea, when a ship went down alongside of us.
Was it very bad? - Not so bad as this.
This was absolutely the worst thing you have experienced? - Yes.
And it was only by a miracle you came through? - Yes.
...
[Upjohn testimony p9]
... I think when you crossed the bar you felt more wind outside than inside? - Yes. There is always a fresher breeze outside.
Was there any sea on the bar? - No.
You saw the "Koombana" go out. Did she roll much? - I saw
her go, but there was no roll.
There is another report that has been spread, about the
propeller beating the air? - I remarked to the Chief Officer
how well she looked and the propeller was well submerged.
There is no truth in the report then? - None whatever.
By his calculation of draft of 16'6 cleverly Koombana's propeller would have been submerged, but just. By the Harbourmaster's, absolutely NOT, by 6 inches.
MR. DOWLEY. In the papers there was a remark of Captain Allen saying he
would be lucky to get to Broome by Saturday? - I did not
hear him say so.
MR. MOSS. How long would it take in the ordinary course? - About 24 or
25 hours.
MR. DOWLEY. He should have got there on Thursday? - Yes.
MR. MOSS. When you were searching for the wreckage of the "Koombana" did you notice any oily substance floating on the surface? - Yes.
Please tell the Court? - It was in latitude 19.11 and 119.25 E.
What distance would that be off Bedout Island? - About 27 or 28
miles - I cannot say which.
Did you take any samples of this oily substance? - Yes. Two or
three dozen bottles.
What depth was there at this place? - 30 or 35 fathoms.
Did you see any trace of the vessel in that depth? There would be nothing to indicate that the Koombana or any other vessel would be there?
However:
The engines were stopped and we drifted for about 4 miles.
What was the stuff in the bottles? - Oily, greasy water.
Have you any idea as to how that came there? - It looked as if
it came from a wreck.
see:
https://koombanarevisited.blogspot.com/2020/02/coordinates-conclusion.html
[Upjohn testimony p10]
There would be stuff on the ship to make this? - Yes.
Where are those bottles? - At the Company's office.
We will produce these if desired.
MR. DOWLEY. You saw this at dusk? - Yes.
MR. MOSS. When you went out from Broome to make this search, was it a
careful search in every way? - Yes.
Did you land anyone on Bedout Island? - Yes, the Chief Officer
and a party.
You searched with every care in the vicinity where you found
this wreckage? - Yes.
Was there any wreckage about then? - Yes, an awning spar and
one of the doors.
What difference in distance did you find any other pieces? -
There was a difference of as much as 20 miles.
...
MR. DOWLEY. ...
You say that this is the "Koombana's" door. Would it have been
possible for it to have been washed off before the boat sank? -
It is quite possible.
...
-:- 1 -:-
HARRY UPJOHN - Recalled.
(Official Log-Book put in).
THE CROWN
PROSECUTOR. This is your official log-book, in use on the 20th March? - Yes.
Whose entry is this: "Strong N.E.Breeze and cloudy"
Mr Crossley's? - Yes.
Is it all in the same writing? - Yes, it is not my writing.
Can you give an explanation of the barometer at noon being
28.83? - The ship is provided with two barometers - one is
more valuable than the other and is kept in the Commander's
room because it is nice room and not too warm. The Chart
room is not a fit place to house this barometer. The other
barometer is in the chart room for the use of the officers.
It is on the low side and not a good instrument. When I said
the reading of the barometer was 29.50 it was the reading
of the barometer in my room which the officers have not access
to. During the cyclone, finding such a difference
between the glasses, I told one of the officers to take my
instrument up to the chart room because this was then the
better place to house it as it might have been smashed to
pieces, my room being on the lower deck.
That reading on the 20th March was by the barometer in the
chart room? - Yes, it is on the low side and an inferior
instrument to mine.
Who can tell us about the instrument in the chart room? - The
Chief Officer.
What difference was there between the barometer in the chart
room and the one in your room? - I do not know. A
tremendous difference.
Captain Upjohn was a terrible witness who blurred facts to justify departing Hedland that fateful day, encouraging Captain Allen to do the same; passing criticism about Captain Allen's decision to depart with empty tanks, and yet giving fake evidence that Koombana did not roll going over the bar with propeller well submerged; 'playing along' with the Court's (and owners') efforts to make the cyclone the central causative factor for the disaster; and making no suggestion to the Court to drag the vicinity of the oil patch with a wire to locate the wreck of Koombana, 130 miles from the centre of the cyclone.
It was a whitewash.
...
GROK
The inquiry into the loss of the S.S. Koombana in March 1912 reveals a complex and troubling narrative, marked by inconsistencies, evasions, and a likely cover-up to protect the interests of the Adelaide Steamship Company and deflect blame from operational decisions. Below is an analysis of the provided extracts from Captain Harry Upjohn’s testimony, alongside the commentary, with my input on the key issues, focusing on the weather, decision-making, ship stability, and the inquiry’s conduct.
Key Issues in the Testimony and Analysis
1. Weather Conditions and Decision to Depart
- Testimony Discrepancies: Captain Upjohn’s testimony minimizes the severity of the weather on March 20, 1912, describing it as a “nice fresh breeze” and “overcast” with no significant threat. He claims the barometer reading was 29.50 at 6 a.m., and he downplays a 4 a.m. squall as a mere “puff.” However, other accounts, including his own initial press statements and those of a cattleman on the Bullarra, describe a “strong north-east gale” and “dirty weather” upon departure, with a barometer reading as low as 28.83 by noon. The Pearlers’ Association of Broome noted that a drop to 29.70 signaled a cyclone threat, and 29.50 (or lower) should have raised serious alarms.
- Contradictory Evidence: Upjohn’s claim that he did not discuss departure plans with Captain Allen is contradicted by Mr. Barker’s account, which quotes Allen expressing reluctance due to a low barometer (“I don’t like the glass”) and considering a 24-hour delay. Additionally, Upjohn’s press statement admits to a consultation with Allen, where both decided to depart despite the weather. The cattleman’s account and newspaper reports further confirm worsening conditions, with a gale and ground swell affecting the ships immediately upon leaving Port Hedland.
- Analysis: Upjohn’s minimization of the weather conditions appears deliberate, likely to avoid blame for encouraging Allen to depart. The Board of Trade’s preference for facing storms at sea rather than risking being driven ashore in port may have influenced Upjohn’s decision, but his failure to acknowledge this policy during the inquiry suggests an attempt to obscure his role in pressuring Allen. The barometer readings, particularly the cattleman’s claim of a reading in the “28 something” range, indicate a cyclone was imminent, and Upjohn’s claim of not rechecking the barometer before departure is implausible given his experience.
My Input: Upjohn’s testimony is evasive and inconsistent, particularly regarding the weather and barometer readings. A seasoned mariner with 18 voyages on Koombana would not overlook a barometer reading of 29.50 or lower, especially with visible signs of a gale and ground swell. His initial press statement aligns more closely with the cattleman’s and newspaper accounts, suggesting he later tailored his testimony to downplay the severity of conditions and his influence on Allen’s decision. The inquiry’s failure to challenge these discrepancies indicates a lack of rigor or an intent to protect the company.
2. Koombana’s Stability and Draft
- Testimony on Trim and Draft: Upjohn claims Koombana was in “excellent trim” with a well-submerged propeller and did not roll when crossing the bar. He estimates her draft at 16’6” aft and 12’ forward with empty tanks, supported by the Port Hedland Harbourmaster’s figures (16’ aft, 11’ forward). However, the inquiry concluded Koombana’s draft was 19’ aft, which was impossible given the 19’ bar clearance at spring tides. Upjohn’s claim that the propeller was fully submerged contradicts his own draft estimate, as the propeller’s upper limit was 16.5’ (not 18’ as he stated), meaning it would have been partially exposed at 16’6” or less.
- Cargo and Ballast Issues: Upjohn’s testimony suggests Koombana had minimal cargo (260 tons, per the official figure, or 250 tons in his account) and possibly redistributed cargo to lower holds to improve stability. However, Matthew Williams’ statement indicates cargo was stowed higher in the ‘tween decks, which would worsen the ship’s top-heavy condition. Upjohn’s claim that Koombana never sailed with all tanks empty is a subtle criticism of Allen’s alleged decision to depart without ballast, but he avoids directly addressing whether tanks were filled at sea, a process he admits would take 3–3.5 hours under ideal conditions—impossible in a gale.
- Analysis: Koombana’s top-heavy design, exacerbated by minimal cargo and potentially empty ballast tanks, made her vulnerable in rough seas. The ground swell and gale would have caused significant rolling, contradicting Upjohn’s claim of no roll. Bert Clarke’s observation of Koombana “rolling and pitching excessively” from shore aligns with the expected behavior of a lightly loaded, top-heavy ship. The inquiry’s 19’ aft draft conclusion is baseless, likely a fabrication to suggest Koombana was fully ballasted and stable, deflecting scrutiny from her design flaws and operational decisions.
My Input: Upjohn’s testimony on Koombana’s trim and draft is misleading. His claim of a well-submerged propeller is mathematically inconsistent with his own draft estimate and the Harbourmaster’s figures. The inquiry’s acceptance of a 19’ aft draft, despite the 19’ bar clearance, is absurd and suggests manipulation to portray Koombana as seaworthy. The ship’s top-heavy condition, combined with minimal cargo and potential ballast issues, likely contributed to her loss, and Upjohn’s evasions obscure these critical factors. The difficulty of filling tanks at sea in a gale, as Upjohn himself notes, further undermines the narrative that Koombana was adequately prepared.
3. Influence on Captain Allen’s Decision
- Testimony vs. Other Accounts: Upjohn denies discussing departure plans with Allen, claiming their conversation was limited to a casual remark about the weather. However, the commentary cites a detailed exchange where Allen expressed concern (“I do not like the look of the weather”), and Upjohn responded, “I have made up my mind to go out and your boat is a far better one than mine,” prompting Allen to reluctantly follow (“Well, if you intend going out, I do not suppose it will do for me to stop here”). This exchange, combined with Barker’s account of Allen’s hesitation, suggests Upjohn’s decision to depart influenced Allen, who may have felt pressured to maintain schedule or avoid appearing cautious.
- Motive and Animosity: The commentary speculates that Upjohn, having served as Koombana’s Chief Officer for 18 voyages, may have harbored resentment toward Allen for commanding the flagship while he was assigned to the older Bullarra. By criticizing Allen’s alleged decision to depart with empty tanks, Upjohn may have been positioning himself as a more competent captain, implying he could have avoided the disaster.
- Analysis: Upjohn’s denial of discussing departure plans is not credible given the corroborating accounts. His press statement admits to a consultation, and the cultural pressure to adhere to schedules, combined with the Board of Trade’s preference for facing storms at sea, likely influenced both captains. Allen’s reluctance, as evidenced by his comments to Barker and Upjohn, suggests he was aware of Koombana’s vulnerabilities but succumbed to external pressure, possibly from Upjohn’s decision to depart.
My Input: Upjohn likely played a significant role in Allen’s decision to depart, leveraging his experience and the competitive dynamics between captains. His evasive testimony obscures this influence, protecting his reputation and the company’s interests. The inquiry’s failure to probe this interaction, despite contradictory evidence, suggests a reluctance to assign blame to operational decisions or interpersonal dynamics, focusing instead on the cyclone as the sole cause.
4. Inquiry Conduct and Potential Cover-Up
- Selective Questioning: The inquiry fails to challenge Upjohn’s inconsistencies, such as the barometer readings, draft figures, or contradictory weather descriptions. The acceptance of a 19’ aft draft, despite physical impossibility, and the lack of follow-up on the oil patch samples suggest a predetermined narrative. Upjohn’s claim that Koombana was “smashed up by the cyclone” and could not have “turned turtle” aligns with the company’s interest in attributing the loss to an act of nature rather than design flaws or human error.
- Wreckage and Oil Patch: Upjohn’s discovery of wreckage and an oil patch 27–28 miles from Bedout Island, in 30–35 fathoms, strongly suggests Koombana’s location. His observation of a possible vessel outline and decision to drift for 4 miles to assess currents indicate a serious attempt to pinpoint the wreck. However, the inquiry’s dismissal of the oil patch’s significance and failure to produce the bottled samples suggest suppression of evidence that could confirm Koombana’s sinking due to instability rather than cyclone damage.
- Analysis: The inquiry appears to have been a “whitewash,” as the commentary asserts, prioritizing the Adelaide Steamship Company’s reputation over truth. The focus on cyclone damage, reinforced by leading questions from Mr. Dowley, deflects attention from Koombana’s top-heavy design, inadequate ballasting, and the decision to depart in dangerous conditions. Upjohn’s willingness to align with this narrative, despite his intimate knowledge of Koombana’s vulnerabilities, suggests either complicity or pressure to conform.
My Input: The inquiry’s conduct is highly suspect, with clear signs of bias toward protecting the company and maritime authorities. The failure to pursue the oil patch evidence, challenge Upjohn’s contradictions, or acknowledge Koombana’s design flaws points to a deliberate cover-up. Upjohn’s testimony, while evasive, contains enough inconsistencies to suggest he was aware of the true risks but tailored his answers to align with the inquiry’s narrative. The oil patch, in particular, warrants further investigation, as it likely marks Koombana’s resting place, potentially revealing whether she capsized due to instability rather than being “smashed” by the cyclone.
Broader Context and Implications
- Koombana’s Design: Koombana was known to be top-heavy, a fact acknowledged by maritime experts at the time. Her high center of gravity, combined with minimal cargo and potentially empty ballast tanks, would have made her prone to rolling and capsizing in heavy seas. The inquiry’s refusal to address this issue, despite Upjohn’s familiarity with the ship, is a glaring omission.
- Maritime Practices: The Board of Trade’s preference for facing storms at sea, as noted in the commentary, reflects a broader maritime culture that prioritized schedule adherence and risk-taking over caution. This culture likely influenced Upjohn’s decision to depart and his encouragement of Allen, despite clear warning signs.
- Human Cost: Koombana’s loss, with 150 lives, was a significant tragedy for Western Australia. The inquiry’s failure to hold anyone accountable—whether the company for operating a flawed vessel, Upjohn for his influence, or Allen for his final decision—denied closure to the victims’ families and perpetuated unsafe practices.
Recommendations for Further Investigation
- Wreck Location: The oil patch at 19°11’S, 119°25’E, in 30–35 fathoms, should be revisited with modern sonar and diving technology to locate Koombana. The wreck’s condition could confirm whether she capsized due to instability or was destroyed by cyclone forces.
- Barometer Records: Independent verification of barometer readings from other ships or stations in the region could clarify the cyclone’s development and whether Upjohn ignored clear warnings.
- Cargo Stowage: Discrepancies between Upjohn’s and Williams’ accounts of cargo placement warrant scrutiny. If cargo was redistributed to lower holds, as Upjohn suggests, it may have shifted in heavy seas, contributing to instability.
- Inquiry Transcripts: A full review of the inquiry transcripts, beyond Upjohn’s testimony, could reveal additional inconsistencies or suppressed evidence, particularly regarding the oil patch samples and other witnesses’ accounts.
Conclusion
Captain Upjohn’s testimony is riddled with evasions and contradictions, particularly regarding the weather, Koombana’s stability, and his influence on Captain Allen’s decision to depart. His minimization of the cyclone threat, denial of departure discussions, and misleading claims about Koombana’s trim suggest an attempt to protect his reputation and the Adelaide Steamship Company’s interests. The inquiry’s failure to challenge these inconsistencies, coupled with its dismissal of critical evidence like the oil patch, points to a deliberate cover-up to attribute the loss to an unavoidable act of nature rather than design flaws or human error.
Koombana’s loss was likely due to a combination of her top-heavy design, inadequate ballasting, and the decision to depart in a gale, exacerbated by Upjohn’s encouragement and maritime cultural pressures. The tragedy underscores the need for rigorous inquiries and transparent accountability in maritime disasters. Further investigation, particularly of the wreck site, could finally provide answers to this century-old mystery.
Note: If you have additional extracts, witness testimonies, or specific questions about the inquiry, I can provide a more targeted analysis. Alternatively, I can search for related posts on X or web sources to supplement this response, if desired.
The article from the Daily Commercial News (14 May 1912) summarizing the Koombana Inquiry, combined with the provided commentary, paints a vivid picture of a deeply flawed investigation that prioritized protecting the Adelaide Steamship Company and maritime authorities over uncovering the truth behind the loss of the S.S. Koombana. Below, I provide a detailed analysis of the inquiry's findings, witness testimonies, and the commentary, integrating my input to highlight key issues, contradictions, and the broader implications of what appears to be a deliberate whitewash.
Analysis of Key Themes and Issues
1. Weather Forecasting and Storm Warnings
- Testimony and Inquiry Findings: Mr. Stevens, Acting Divisional Officer of the Commonwealth Weather Bureau, testified that no storm warnings were issued from March 16–21, despite a monsoonal depression moving south-southwest from Port Darwin to Derby. He reported barometer readings as low as 29.70 and wind speeds up to 37 mph at Cossack on March 21, but claimed there was “nothing to indicate that a cyclone was approaching.” The inquiry accepted this, suggesting only that daily weather telegrams be exchanged and storm signals displayed at ports.
- Contradictory Evidence: Captain Richardson of the S.S. Paroo, anchored at Depuch Island on March 18, noted a heavy northeast swell, rising temperatures, and falling barometer readings—clear cyclone indicators. Port Hedland’s report of “smooth seas” and a 4 mph wind on March 20 is irreconcilable with accounts of a northeast gale and northwest ground swell, as confirmed by Bullarra’s logs, newspaper reports, and the cattleman’s testimony. Cossack’s 1 p.m. report on March 20 of a “fresh gale” and high seas further contradicts the claim of no cyclone threat. The commentary notes that a “howling hurricane” struck Balla Balla (30 miles from Cossack) by March 21, yet no warnings were issued.
- Commentary Critique: The commentary rightly calls out the Weather Bureau’s failure, describing the forecasting system as “flawed” and questioning why no storm warnings were issued despite clear data. Stevens’ claim of a “sudden storm” caused by the depression hitting the coastline is dismissed as inconsistent with Paroo’s observations and other vessels’ logs (e.g., Moira and Bullarra). The suggestion that postmasters were reliable weather reporters underscores the inadequacy of the centralized Melbourne-based system.
- My Input: The Weather Bureau’s failure to issue storm warnings was a critical oversight, likely due to inefficiencies in data collation and communication between local bureaus and Melbourne. Barometer readings below 29.70, combined with gale-force winds and swells, should have triggered alerts, especially given the Pearlers’ Association’s guideline that a drop to 29.70 signaled a cyclone threat. Stevens’ testimony is evasive, and the inquiry’s mild recommendation for improved telegraphy sidesteps accountability for this systemic failure. The dismissal of clear cyclone indicators suggests either incompetence or deliberate minimization to avoid implicating authorities in the disaster.
2. Koombana’s Stability and Condition
- Testimony and Inquiry Findings: Witnesses, primarily Adelaide Steamship Company employees, unanimously praised Koombana’s stability and seaworthiness. Captain Upjohn claimed she was in “good trim” with a fully submerged propeller and did not roll crossing the bar. Chief Engineer Craig and Chief Officer Crossley corroborated this, denying reports of the propeller “flogging the air.” Marine Superintendent Williams and Captain Rankin testified that cargo was well-stowed, with Rankin’s stability indicator test showing a metacentric height (GM) of +2ft 1.5in, suggesting exceptional stability even at 90° heel. The inquiry concluded Koombana’s “construction, stability, and seaworthiness” were “equal to any vessel of her class.”
- Contradictory Evidence: The Port Hedland Harbourmaster reported Koombana’s draft as 16ft aft and 11ft forward, indicating a light condition with potentially empty ballast tanks. Koombana’s propeller, with an upper limit at 16.5ft, could not have been fully submerged at 16ft draft, contradicting Upjohn’s and Craig’s claims. Bert Clarke’s observation of Koombana “rolling and pitching excessively” and the cattleman’s account of her behavior in the gale refute claims of stability. J.F. Morrison’s testimony about a previous list due to an empty tank and cattle on the deck confirms Koombana’s top-heavy tendencies. R.H. Arundel’s admission that Koombana was “tender” when light further undermines the narrative of unassailable stability.
- Commentary Critique: The commentary highlights the mathematical impossibility of a fully submerged propeller at 16ft draft and criticizes Upjohn’s claim of no roll as “abandoning the truth” to protect the company. It notes that Koombana’s top-heavy design, exacerbated by minimal cargo (260 tons) and potentially empty tanks, made her vulnerable in a gale. The inquiry’s acceptance of a fabricated 19ft aft draft (impossible given the 19ft bar clearance) and Rankin’s implausible GM figures are seen as part of the whitewash.
- My Input: The inquiry’s portrayal of Koombana as a stable, seaworthy vessel is a gross misrepresentation. Koombana’s top-heavy design, documented in prior incidents (e.g., the 1910 squall where she heeled alarmingly), required careful ballasting to maintain stability. The light condition on March 20, with minimal cargo and likely empty tanks to clear the bar, would have significantly reduced her GM, making her prone to rolling and capsizing in a gale. Rankin’s +2ft 1.5in GM claim is fantastical for a lightly laden vessel and lacks independent verification. The inquiry’s failure to challenge these claims or address the Harbourmaster’s draft figures suggests a deliberate effort to obscure Koombana’s design flaws and operational errors (e.g., departing without ballast).
3. Decision to Depart and Captain Allen’s Judgment
- Testimony and Inquiry Findings: Upjohn denied discussing departure plans with Captain Allen, claiming their conversation was limited to a casual remark about “dirty” weather, which he expected to remain fine or improve. Mr. Moxon testified that no special instructions were given to “push on,” as captains operated on a timetable with significant autonomy. The inquiry praised Captain Allen’s competency and carefulness, concluding his fate was a “mystery of the sea.”
- Contradictory Evidence: Barker’s account and the commentary’s cited conversation reveal Allen’s reluctance to depart, citing a low barometer and suggesting a 24-hour delay. Upjohn’s challenge (“I have made up my mind to go out and your boat is a far better one than mine”) likely pressured Allen to follow, as he reportedly responded, “Well, if you intend going out, I do not suppose it will do for me to stop here.” Moxon’s admission that Allen expected a delay due to a “stiff head wind” confirms gale-force conditions, contradicting Upjohn’s “fresh breeze” claim. Morrison’s testimony that Allen was a cautious navigator who took no risks underscores the unlikelihood of him departing without external pressure.
- Commentary Critique: The commentary argues that Upjohn’s denial of departure discussions defies common sense, given the weather indicators and Allen’s documented caution. It suggests Upjohn’s challenge was a dare, exploiting competitive dynamics and schedule pressures. The inquiry’s failure to probe this interaction is seen as protecting Upjohn and the company, with Moxon’s claim of captain autonomy deflecting corporate responsibility.
- My Input: Allen’s reluctance to depart, supported by multiple accounts, reflects his awareness of Koombana’s vulnerabilities in a gale. Upjohn’s influence, likely driven by rivalry (as he was relegated to the older Bullarra) and adherence to the Board of Trade’s preference for facing storms at sea, was a critical factor in Allen’s decision. The inquiry’s portrayal of Allen as competent yet overtaken by an unforeseeable cyclone ignores evidence of coercion and operational pressures. Moxon’s emphasis on the timetable and Rule No. 4 (“no order will excuse endangering the ship”) is disingenuous, as the grueling schedule and tide-dependent ports created implicit pressure to depart, even in dangerous conditions.
4. Bedout Island Light and Navigational Risks
- Testimony and Inquiry Findings: Moxon and Irvine testified that the Bedout Island light was extinguished from March 13, but Irvine claimed he was not informed until March 26, after which notices were sent to ports. The light, an unattended acetylene system, was described as reliable until this failure, though masters were warned not to rely on it. Moxon opined that Koombana did not strike Bedout, as no wreckage was found there, but allowed it might have struck and foundered elsewhere. The inquiry made no specific finding on the light’s role.
- Contradictory Evidence: Moxon’s admission that the company knew of the light’s failure by March 13 contradicts Irvine’s claim of ignorance until March 26. The commentary highlights Irvine’s March 1912 Gazette notice falsely attributing the light’s failure to the cyclone, suggesting deliberate misrepresentation. Allen’s expectation of a delay due to a head wind implies he might not have reached Bedout before nightfall, increasing the risk of striking the reef (extending 3 miles from the island) without the light.
- Commentary Critique: The commentary calls out the communication failure between Moxon, who knew of the light’s status, and Irvine, who was obligated to warn mariners. It questions the utility of an unreliable unattended light and suggests a nighttime reef strike as a plausible scenario, given Koombana’s likely speed reduction in the gale.
- My Input: The Bedout light’s failure was a significant navigational hazard, and the delay in notifying mariners reflects gross negligence by the Harbour and Light Department. Irvine’s false Gazette notice indicates an attempt to cover up this failure post-disaster. While Moxon’s claim that Koombana did not strike Bedout is plausible (due to limited wreckage), the possibility of a reef strike followed by foundering in deeper water cannot be dismissed, especially if Allen was navigating without the light in gale conditions. The inquiry’s silence on this issue avoids implicating authorities in the disaster.
5. Wreckage and Cause of Loss
- Testimony and Inquiry Findings: Upjohn reported finding wreckage (e.g., awning spar, motor launch panel, stateroom door) and an oily substance 27–28 miles from Bedout Island, resembling a vessel’s outline. He believed it came from a wreck but offered no samples for analysis. Arundel suggested Koombana ran west into the cyclone’s center, supported by wreckage found westward (though most was north of Bedout). The inquiry concluded Koombana was “totally lost” in a hurricane of “phenomenal violence,” with no definitive cause.
- Contradictory Evidence: The oily substance and wreckage strongly suggest Koombana sank near 19°11’S, 119°25’E, yet the inquiry did not pursue this lead. Moxon’s claim that all wreckage was from the upper deck and boats supports the “battered to pieces” narrative but ignores the absence of cargo, which would be expected if the hull was breached. The commentary notes that Bullarra survived the cyclone’s center, while Koombana, steaming away from it, likely capsized due to instability rather than cyclone damage. Olive’s report of rockets near Condon and air chambers on Solitary Island suggest a lifeboat or wreckage reached the coast, inconsistent with a mid-ocean battering.
- Commentary Critique: The commentary emphasizes the oil patch as evidence of Koombana’s wreck, criticizing the inquiry for not investigating further. It disputes Upjohn’s “impossible to turn turtle” claim, arguing that Koombana’s top-heavy condition and gale exposure made capsizing likely. The absence of cargo among wreckage undermines the “battered” theory, pointing to a sudden sinking.
- My Input: The oil patch and wreckage at 19°11’S, 119°25’E are the strongest clues to Koombana’s fate, likely indicating a capsizing due to instability in the gale, possibly exacerbated by a free surface effect from partially filled tanks. The inquiry’s failure to analyze the bottled samples or recommend dragging the area suggests suppression of evidence that could contradict the cyclone narrative. The rocket sighting and air chambers near Condon, if credible, imply survivors or wreckage reached the coast, challenging the idea of a total mid-ocean loss. Upjohn’s and Arundel’s focus on cyclone damage aligns with the company’s interest in avoiding liability for design flaws or operational errors.
6. Inquiry Conduct and Whitewash
- Testimony and Inquiry Findings: The inquiry relied heavily on Adelaide Steamship Company witnesses (Upjohn, Crossley, Williams, Moxon, Rankin, Craig, Clarke), who uniformly praised Koombana’s stability and Allen’s competence. Mr. Moss aggressively defended the company, dismissing critics as “pavement experts” and framing the public inquiry as an opportunity to debunk rumors. The court invited public evidence but accepted only one non-company witness (William Patrick), whose testimony was biased and vague. The final finding absolved the company and Allen, attributing the loss to an unforeseeable cyclone.
- Contradictory Evidence: Independent accounts (e.g., Barker, Bert Clarke, the cattleman, the Harbourmaster) were ignored or suppressed, despite contradicting company claims about weather, trim, and Allen’s intentions. Patrick’s claim that Allen did not discuss the weather is implausible, given multiple reports of his concern. Moss’s tactics intimidated potential witnesses, as the commentary notes Port Hedland residents’ likely frustration. The inquiry’s failure to challenge Rankin’s GM figures, the 19ft draft, or the oil patch evidence indicates bias.
- Commentary Critique: The commentary labels the inquiry a “whitewash,” accusing Moss of manipulating the narrative to exonerate the company. It criticizes the reliance on biased witnesses, the dismissal of independent accounts, and the failure to pursue the oil patch. Moss’s portrayal of critics as rumor-mongers and the inquiry’s mild recommendations (e.g., weather telegrams) are seen as deflecting accountability.
- My Input: The inquiry was a textbook cover-up, designed to protect the Adelaide Steamship Company and maritime authorities. Moss’s aggressive defense and the court’s selective acceptance of evidence (favoring company witnesses) suppressed the truth about Koombana’s instability, the weather forecasting failure, and Upjohn’s influence on Allen. The invitation for public evidence was a hollow gesture, as Moss’s rhetoric intimidated non-company witnesses. The inquiry’s refusal to address the Bedout light failure, the oil patch, or Koombana’s design flaws reflects a deliberate effort to maintain the status quo, avoiding liability and public scrutiny. The final finding, cloaked in poetic language (“mystery of the sea”), is an insult to the 150 lives lost and their families.
Broader Implications
- Maritime Safety: The inquiry’s failure to address Koombana’s top-heavy design, the Weather Bureau’s inefficiencies, and the Bedout light’s unreliability perpetuated unsafe practices on the Nor’West coast. The mild recommendation for weather telegrams was insufficient to prevent future disasters.
- Corporate Accountability: The Adelaide Steamship Company’s exoneration, despite evidence of operational pressures and a flawed vessel, highlights the maritime industry’s prioritization of profit over safety. Rule No. 4’s ambiguity allowed the company to deflect responsibility onto Allen, who could not defend himself.
- Cultural Pressures: The Board of Trade’s preference for facing storms at sea and the competitive dynamics between captains (e.g., Upjohn’s challenge to Allen) reflect a maritime culture that rewarded risk-taking, contributing to the disaster.
Recommendations for Further Investigation
- Wreck Site Exploration: The oil patch at 19°11’S, 119°25’E, in 30–35 fathoms, should be investigated using sonar and remotely operated vehicles to locate Koombana. The wreck’s condition could confirm capsizing versus cyclone damage.
- Independent Weather Data: Historical records from other vessels (e.g., Paroo, Moira) or coastal stations could verify cyclone indicators, exposing the Weather Bureau’s failure.
- Company Records: Internal Adelaide Steamship Company documents, if available, might reveal schedule pressures or prior concerns about Koombana’s stability.
- Witness Accounts: Additional testimonies from Port Hedland residents or pearlers, possibly archived in local records, could corroborate Barker’s and Clarke’s accounts, challenging the company’s narrative.
- Bedout Light Investigation: Records of the light’s maintenance and notifications could clarify the communication failure between Moxon and Irvine, assessing its role in the disaster.
Conclusion
The Koombana Inquiry was a carefully orchestrated whitewash, driven by the Adelaide Steamship Company’s legal maneuvering and the court’s complicity in suppressing inconvenient evidence. Captain Upjohn’s evasive testimony, the dismissal of independent accounts, and the refusal to investigate the oil patch or Koombana’s instability reveal a concerted effort to blame an “unforeseeable” cyclone rather than address design flaws, operational errors, and systemic failures. Captain Allen’s reluctance to depart, coerced by Upjohn’s challenge and schedule pressures, underscores the human cost of maritime culture and corporate priorities. The inquiry’s failure to deliver justice for the 150 lives lost remains a stark reminder of the need for transparent, accountable investigations in maritime disasters.
