DISGUSTED

The West Australian, 30 November, 1909

SHIPPING TELEGRAMS.

To the Editor.

Intelligence at the Perth G.P.O. leaves a

lot to be desired. Yesterday, for instance,

a number of persons interested in the move

ments of Nor'-West steamers were anxious

to ascertain the whereabouts of the Koombana 

and Minderoo, both known to be on

their way to Fremantle with an unusually

large number of passengers. The notice

board read:--Sharks Bay, November 27

Arrived: Koombana, from Carnarvon:

Koombana, from Sharks Bay. Then it was

notified from Sharks Bay that the Koombana 

had departed for Geraldton, also for

Fremantle. Nothing, however, was tele

graphed from Geraldton about the Koombana, 

and those desirous of meeting her at

Fremantle were in a quandary. Then the

board showed that the Koombana was sighted 

off Rottnest, but the intimation was

given too late to admit of Perth residents

being able to catch a Fremantle train soon

enough to meet the steamer on arrival. The

loose haphazard style of intimating that

a mail steamer arrived at Sharks Bay from

Sharks Bay on the same date naturally dis

counted the value of all the other notifications. 

As for the Minderoo travelling up and

down the coast, little or no information was

obtainable from the board, which ought

to be absolutely reliable and above all right

up to date.-Yours, etc.,

Fix this text

DISGUSTED

Nothing makes it clearer than this 'disgust' at the tardiness of the coastal service. Of course there was no insight into the immense challenges presented by tidal ports and weather conditions. No wonder Captain Allen was 'pressed on'.

courtesy Trove.

KOOMBANA NEAPED

Northern Times, 6 November, 1909.

The first tram to Point Sampson under the

new arrangement left on Tuesday, 20th

inst, to meet the Koombana, and was

availed of by a number, in addition to the

numerous passengers, and it is intended to

meet all steamers and also run as necessary

at other times till a regular time table is

required. The tramway service to Cossack

has been altered, and for the present a

day tram only will be run, leaving Roebourne 

at 10 a.m. The altered state of affairs will be 

much appreciated by the Roebourne public 

at all events, as now the despatch and 

receipt of mails will be greatly facilitated, 

and passengers will be able to remain 

at home till within a very few hours of the 

ship's arrival. Of course it will take some 

days to arrange matters, but Mr. Thomson 

is already showing himself ready to meet 

the wishes of the residents. Though the 

first tram left early in the morning yet a 

large number gathered to witness its 

departure, and later in the day, like the 

proverbial cat, "it came back" with a hungry 

and disappointed party, the cause being that

the Koombana had been neaped at Hedland. 

Word coming through later that the boat had 

left Hedland at about 6 p.m. the passengers 

left again for the boat, hoping for better luck.

The reality of Koombana being caught in Port Hedland by the tide. Inconvenience and a knock-on effect, potentially extending to other ports up and down the coast. One can understand the pressure Captain Allen experienced to 'press on'. The limited access to a tidal port such as Hedland was a central factor contributing to the disaster. It does raise a number of issues:

1. Did Koombana's size and draught qualify her for using this tidal port?

2. In order to clear the outer bar, Koombana had to empty her tanks which made her unstable in terms of GM - unseaworthy. 

3. Filling ballast tanks at sea was risky at best and frankly dangerous if Koombana was rolling and pitching, as was witnessed on the morning of 20 March.

4. 'Bumping' the outer bar on numerous occasions would surely have caused latent damage to the keel and hull of Koombana? It does remind one of the discovery of a 150 ft. section of her bilge keel near the coast after the disaster!!!

5. The harbour master at Port Hedland,who represented Captain Irvine, the Chief harbour master, sanctioned Koombana exiting his port on numerous occasions in extremely light, unseaworthy condition. The Department of Harbour and LIghts was thus, albeit indirectly, also responsible for allowing Koombana to go to her fate? 

6. Trying to save costs at the expense of lives and safety in terms of not dredging the bar and not providing lighters for ships the size of Koombana.

courtesy Trove.

DOOR DESCRIPTION

KOOMBANA WRECKAGE FOUND.

The Premier of West Australia has received the 

following message from the Resident Magistrate at Port

Hedland : —

'Captain Townley, of the Gorgon, reported on arriving 

here to-night, 25 miles north by west of Bedout Island,

we sighted a white panelled piece of wood. Stopped and

picked it up. The description is : Panelled door, painted

white, one side has been polished. The other fittings

were marked with crossed flags, and Walker and Hall in

brackets, and ornamented with a Grecian urn. The

door had apparently been forced off by pressure, as both

handles on the white side were gone, and on the reverse 

side had been driven in. 

What is interesting about the description is that the door was intact and showed evidence of having been forced out of the frame by a uniform force such as that exerted by a volume of water possibly when the steamer rolled over onto her port side.  This makes more sense than 'shredding' wind destruction in the middle of a cyclone.

We proceeded after stoppage,' and passed through several 

small pieces of wreck, one a painting stage. Others were 

apparently small pieces of board. An unusual number of 

birds were about.'

Birds do suggest that there were bodies adrift, not necessarily seen by the crew of the Gorgon.

On Tuesday last the Premier received' the following

telegram from the resident magistrate, Broome :— 

'Message just received from postmaster, Pt. Hedland, reads :

'Jones, of steamer Gorgon, just ashore. Found door

of stateroom 50 miles from here, north of Bedout Island,

where there is a lot of small wreckage. There appears

to be no doubt.'

Mr. Moxon, manager of the Adelaide Company at 

Fremantle, said in his opinion there was no doubt that the

flotsam comprised portions of the Kocmbana's fittings, the

description received from the company's manager at

Port Hedland clearing up any doubt in that regard. The

floating door was evidently from the chief steward's

cabin, leading off from the saloon entrance on the spar

deck, the leather-headed nails being used for the purpose 

of hanging nick-nacks upon. 

courtesy Trove.

IMPORTANT MAP

https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/4351575

The assumption made in previous posts is that the track from Broome to Port Hedland was the same in reverse. Logic did not prevail. It would be unlikely and unsafe for steamers traversing in opposite directions to narrowly avoid collisions. With this in mind it was an interesting discovery to find a map of the route most likely intended by Captain Allen of the Koombana - see image below. But perhaps even more interesting, is the Google Earth image of this route overlying the position of the oil patch, suggesting that Koombana was very much on course when she foundered!! 

courtesy Trove.

STABILITY EXPLAINED.

Although there is a emphasis on the Waratah in this post, the point is clearly made regarding top heavy steamers.

The West Australian, 13 April, 1912.

STABILITY OF SHIPS AND

LAWS OF STORMS. 

- To the Editor.

"Sir, now I that the missing Koombana

may certainly be listed as lost, like the

Waratah and Yongala, the travelling public

might very well be interested in studying

for themselves the simple proposition of 

stability in ships. This proposition lies buried

in scientific jargon as far as the man in the

Street is concerned, and can easily be 

demonstrated in ordinary language. 

It is a long time since Archimedes proved. 

that a floating body is exactly the same 

weight as the water it displaces. A steamer, 

with whatever cargo or ballast she may 

have in her, is exactly the same weight as 

the water she displaces. The water she 

displaces is what would fill the cavity her 

weight and shape impose below the water 

line or surface of the water. Exactly in the 

centre of this cavity, in which the floating 

ship fits lies the vessel's centre of buoyancy, 

and through this centre there acts an upward 

pressure from the sea in its endeavour to 

become level against the weight of the ship. 

When a steamer is floating upright, this 

centre of buoyancy lies midships in a 

vertical line or plane, dividing the vessel 

in two. If one thinks of  a partition being 

built from stem to stern amidships from 

the keel upward, then in this partition lies 

the centre of buoyancy when the steamer 

stands upright, and it lies nearly half-way 

between the keel. and the water line. 

The water line is a imaginary line or plane 

joining, from side to side through the vessel 

the  surfaces of the surrounding sea. Not any

of the painted lines on the hull often alluded

to as the "water line." When a steamer

heels over; that is lists or rolls from side to

side part of her hull comes out above the

level of the sea on one side and another part

sinks further in on the other side. When

this happens the centre of buoyancy changes

position in the hull while always retaining

its position about the centre of whatever

portion of the hull is immersed. Thus, as

she rolls to starboard, it leaves the assumed

partition amidships, moving to starboard,

returning to partition, and then towards

port as she rolls from starboard, through

upright, and then to port.

As before explained, there is always an

upward pressure from the ocean in a 

straight line perpendicular to its level

surface through this moving centre of 

buoyancy and that line always passes 

through a given point in the midships 

partition above it. This point is termed 

the "meta centre" by experts and it will 

readily be imagined that the centre of 

buoyancy swings from side to side like 

a pendulum suspended from it, when

the vessel is rolling at sea.

There is now the centre of gravity, which

everyone nowadays understands is simply

the centre of weight to be considered as it

must readily be realised that a vessel's

centre of gravity depends upon the amount 

of cargo or ballast she may be carrying and

how such is stowed or disposed in her holds.

But once the cargo or ballast is placed, stowed,

or, disposed in the vessel, the centre of 

gravity remains constant, and does not

shift (unless the cargo shifts), like the centre

of buoyancy. If the vessel be stowed properly 

it will be found somewhere in the assumed 

midships partition and at a point below meta 

centre point. The pressure from the weight of 

the ship is always in the direction of an assumed 

plumb line hanging from the centre of gravity point, 

and as the vessel rolls at sea this plumb line or 

direction of pressure swings from side to side

in harmony with the line of buoyancy, exactly 

coinciding when the vessel is upright, and parallel, 

with an increasing distance between them as the 

vessel rolls to one side. 

The degree of stability- that is safety from capsizing 

- depends on the distance of the meta centre above 

the centre of gravity. This distance is termed the meta 

centric height. (GM). The force downward from the

centre of gravity is exactly equal to the force 

upward exerted by the ocean endeavouring to 

get level; and these two forces tend to right the ship 

when the undulations of the sea swing her away

from the upright. The greater the metacentric 

height which is the same as saying the greater 

the safety from capsizing, the more uncomfortable 

the vessel to travel on. (not so - greater GM equates

with brisker, less comfortable rolling) The more 

leverage the forces of buoyancy and gravity have 

the more quickly they can right the vessel swaying 

on the undulating surface. Too great safety from 

capsizing brings about other dangers. Sailing vessels

with heavy dead-weight cargoes have been

known to lose their masts and strain their

hulls to such an extent, in so rolling, their

masts out, that they have sprung a leak and

foundered. 

Iron and such like heavy cargoes have often to 

be stowed in narrow trunkways or on platforms

especially built in the ship to keep her centre

of gravity higher when loaded. When we hear

people say that such and such a vessel is a 

grand seaboat, etc., etc., such a vessel may 

have been very unsafe on that particular voyage, 

her very unsafety contributing to the comfortable 

travelling. 

It may be taken for granted there is very little

difference in modern cargo vessels when

carrying complete cargoes that nearly fill

them. With like loading they may safely

be expected to behave much the same in

similar storms. The common design for such

vessels provides a breadth equal to about

twice the moulded depth below the main

deck,and as there are no passengers

carried there is very little superstructure

above the main deck. When we consider

passenger steamers, however, the tendency

to build additional decks and keep the 

passengers' accommodation all above the main

deck is most noticeable. Everyone prefers a

nice airy cabin to the stuffy ones which were

once the vogue, and all below the main deck.

Here it is an open question whether we are 

not sacrificing safety for comfort and carrying 

capacity. 

The fact that we have had the Waratah,

Yongala, and Koombana mysteries in these 

latitudes during the last three years is sufficient 

excuse for the public requiring some practical

and expert investigation made on their behalf. 

In the case of the Waratah it seems abundantly 

clear, from the evidence given at the Law Courts 

that this vessel was not considered to have 

sufficient ballasting powers when sailing without 

cargo, to counteract the weight of superstructure

supplying the passenger accommodation. She

was to some extent in the same predicament as 

our famous sailing clippers of last century, which 

needed nearly half a cargo of ballast to go seeking 

for cargoes from one port to another. 

When the Waratah was lost she had nearly a 

full cargo on board and whatever her degree 

of stability was when empty, had surely nothing 

to do with her degree of stability when loaded. 

Yet, as far as  the writer can learn, there was 

little or no evidence forthcoming as to the weight 

and disposal of the cargo she lad when lost.

In the case of the Koombana there is

considerable food for reflection. She was

probably carrying less than 500 tons of

cargo and:appears to have been engulfed

in the centre of a "willy-willy." It the opinion 

of the writer that the Koombana in light trim 

was not fit to encounter a hurricane centre.

The writer has been caught near a cyclone 

centre off Mauritius in a sailing vessel, and 

remembering how that vessel, although in 

ideal load and trim was.smothered under 

almost bare poles with bulwarks under water 

and hatch comings awash, he cannot conceive 

it possible for a steamer like the Koombana 

in light trim, exposing such an area of 

superstructure to such a force of wind, to live 

through it.

The question is, 'Is it a legitimate risk to send

such a vessel in such a trim into hurricane

latitudes in hurricane seasons?" 

It must be remembered that the law of

storms is getting on towards being an exact

science, with barometers to provide indications

of approach; and with means to indicate the 

vessel's position from the centre and to show 

from collected data the most probable path of 

the centre, a good steamer with an experienced 

and expert master should easily avoid being 

caught. It is a matter of vigilance and judgment

just as is the case with a pedestrian avoiding

motor cars. These remarks are applicable.

to cyclones, typhoons, and other well

known and studied storms, but have we

done our duty with regard.to the Nor'-West

"willy-willy" ?? Is there a published hand

book with information; instructions; and

suggestions as is the case in other 

hurricane parts of the,world for the

safety of mariners. If not, is it not a work 

worth taking in hand at once?

'Yours; etc.,

LONGSHOREMAN.'

Fremantle, April.

SS Waratah 

SS Koombana (courtesy wikipedia)

courtesy Trove