The Marine Inquiry was expedited very quickly, one month after the Koombana went missing. Was there enough time for preparation and collation of all the facts and witness accounts, never mind getting witnesses from Northwest Australia to Fremantle ??
The West Australian, Perth, Saturday 11 May, 1912.
KOOMBANA INQUIRY.
FINDING OF THE COURT OF
MARINE.
"VESSEL'S STABILITY UNASSAILABLE".
"CAPTAIN'S CAREFULNESS AND
COMPETENCY BEYOND QUESTION"
"A MYSTERY OF THE SEA."
The Court of Marine Inquiry gave their decision
at the Fremantle Courthouse yesterday regarding
the loss at sea of the s. Koombana on or about
March 20,1912, between Port Hedland and Broome.
Mr M. L. Moss, K.C., who watched the proceedings
on behalf of the Adelaide Steamship Co., and
Mr. W. R. Moxon, attorney and manager for the
company in this State, were the only persons who
sat in the body of the Court.
In delivering the decision the President said: In
conformity with the request of the Hon., the
Colonial Secretary, the Court of Marine Inquiry
investigated at Fremantle the 25th, 26th, and
29th days of April, 1912, the circumstances
surrounding the loss at sea of the S S Koombana.
The difficulties attendant on doing so were
exceptional, because though in many inquiries
under the Navigation Act of 1904, the Act under
which an inquiry is held, evidence can be adduced
from persons who were on board - and who
can depose to the circumstances immediately
attendant on a disaster to a ship, no such
evidence is obtainable in this case owing to
the fact that the ill-fated vessel has totally
disappeared at sea, with all on board of her.
In order, therefore, to account for such a
total disappearance, the inquiry for the most
part must be directed to considerations of
the: Ship's Stability; Equipment; and Sea
worthiness; together with Captain Allen's
efficiency and carefulness as a shipmaster.
During the inquiry Mr. Parker, the Crown
Prosecutor, appeared on behalf of the Chief
Harbourmaster, and Mr. M. L. Moss, K.C.,
appeared on behalf of the Adelaide S.S. Co., the
owners of the s.s. Koombana. The Court was
considerably assisted also by the presence
throughout the inquiry of a large model of the
Koombana, complete in minute detail, as also
by various plans, etc., readily produced.
The SS Koombana was a steel screw steamer of
3,668 tons gross and 2,182 tons net. - Her length
was 340ft., breadth 48ft. 2in., and depth 25ft. 8in.
Her indicated h.p. was 4,000 (3,000), and her
nominal h.p. 423. She was built by Messrs. Alex.
Stephen and Son, Ltd., Glasgow, in the year 1908
from specifications to the Highest Class of British
Corporation Requirements, which in many
instances she exceeded. She also held a Marine
Certificate to August,1912, issued by the Department
of Navigation of New South Wales, and was last
docked in Sydney on August 15, 1911.
Interesting to note that Koombana had a depth of hold of 25 ft. 8 in. and a depth of hull of 29.5 ft., which gives us a double bottom containing water ballast tanks of 3.75 ft. slightly more than the equivalently sized Yongala - 3.5 ft.. Yongala had a ballast tank capacity of 400 tons, whereas Koombana had a capacity of 900 tons, which appears to have been contributed to by considerable fore and after peak tanks. At this early juncture it is important to note that Koombana needed a greater ballast to steady her towering decks and relatively low maximum draft. This had significant implications for the sequence of events 20 March, 1912.
The Court heard evidence from Mr. S. R. P.
Stevens, an officer of the Commonwealth
Weather Bureau, Perth; Captain Upjohn,
who is master of the ss. Bullarra, and who
was chief officer of the s.s. Koombana for 12
months; Mr. James Crossley, chief officer of
the s.s. Bullarra; Captain James F. Morrison,
Inspector of Shipping at the Port of Fremantle,
who had official knowledge of the s.s. Koombana;
Captain Matthew John Williams, Marine
Superintendent of the Adelaide Steamship Co
in Western Australia, Henry John Clarke, assistant
wharf manager for the Port of Fremantle, and
formerly chief officer of the ss. Koombana
for fifteen months on the North-West coast
of Western Australia, and also on her maiden
voyage to Australia from Glasgow; Mr. Alex. Craig,
the chief engineer of the s.s. Bullarra; Captain
J. A. Rankin, Acting-Marine Superintendent for
the Adelaide Steamship Company for Australasia -
who produced to the Court and explained by actual
test a Ralston stability and trim indicator
specially made for the s.s Koombana and
which was not on board the vessel owing
to its only having recently arrived in Australia.
The Ralston stability and trim indicator was NOT ON BOARD. True GM could not have been established when Koombana departed Port Hedland, 20 March. How convenient for the owners. Bringing up the 'indicator' irrelevant.
Mr. A.C. Butcher engineer-surveyor for the
Harbour and Light Department at Fremantle,
Mr. W.E. Moxon, attorney and manager in
Western Australia for the Adelaide Steamship
Company; Captain Irvine, the Chief Harbour
master for Western Australia ; the Rev. William
Patrick, who saw the S S Koombana leave Port
Hedland on her last voyage, and Captain G.
Cumming, being the only person who
volunteered evidence in response to an
invitation from the Court publicly announced
and published in the daily press.
It is very interesting that the summary referenced Captain Cumming, quoted as the only person to respond to an 'invitation' issued from the Court via the Press. The fact that logistics prevented the majority of residents of Port Hedland (associated with Koombana) from attending, was disingenuous to say the least.
It is very interesting that the summary referenced Captain Cumming, quoted as the only person to respond to an 'invitation' issued from the Court via the Press. The fact that logistics prevented the majority of residents of Port Hedland (associated with Koombana) from attending, was disingenuous to say the least.
The Court Finds
that the S S Koombana, official number
122,725, registered in Adelaide, Captain
Thomas Allen master, and owned by the
Adelaide Steamship Company, Ltd., was
on a voyage from. Fremantle to Derby,via
ports. She sailed from Port Hedland on
March 20, 1912, at about 10.20 o'clock
a.m, drawing 19ft. aft and about 12ft.
forward in excellent trim, with her propeller
well submerged, and shaped a course to round
Bedout Island on her way to Broome.
Koombana was widely quoted as having a maximum draft of 20 ft. 8 in.. 19 ft. aft is a mere 1 ft. 8 in. short of max. load. This is plain nonsense; Koombana carrying 260 tons of cargo forward (14% max) and empty tanks. The harbour master, accurately, claimed that Koombana was drawing 16 ft. aft and 11 ft. forward, verifying her astonishingly tender condition! Like Yongala, Koombana was notably lighter forward, a factor adjusted in Yongala's case by adding 164 tons of pig iron in hold 2 to increase the draft forward by 6 in.. These two tender steamers required additional ballasting, particularly if cargo component was limited. In fact Captain Rees, 1910, held onto 150 tons of rails in Koombana's bottom to see him through some unsettled, late summer weather.
It was claimed in a press report that Koombana's 'propeller was beating out of the water' when she departed Hedland. The upper limit of the propeller was in fact 16.5 ft. which proves the Harbourmaster's point. The Inquiry claim sharply contradicted all logic on the matter. The simple fact was this; Captain Allen needed Koombana to be in this condition to clear the inner bar with a heavy ground swell and choppy seas making the crossing dangerous to say the least - bar, 19 ft.. deep at the time.
At last clarity about the route, shaped round Bedout Island - Captain Allen was on course when Koombana foundered.
It was claimed in a press report that Koombana's 'propeller was beating out of the water' when she departed Hedland. The upper limit of the propeller was in fact 16.5 ft. which proves the Harbourmaster's point. The Inquiry claim sharply contradicted all logic on the matter. The simple fact was this; Captain Allen needed Koombana to be in this condition to clear the inner bar with a heavy ground swell and choppy seas making the crossing dangerous to say the least - bar, 19 ft.. deep at the time.
At last clarity about the route, shaped round Bedout Island - Captain Allen was on course when Koombana foundered.
The voyage from Port Hedland to Broome is
usually accomplished in about 24 hours. The
Bullarra was at Port Hediand at the same time
as the s.s. Koombana, and left that port, bound
southwards, about half an hour or so after the
S S Koombana left Bullarra had the Koombana
in sight until noon.
This confirms that Koombana was delayed after clearing the bar at Hedland (+/- two hours) due to attempts to fill all her ballast tanks. I do not believe Koombana's tanks could have been adequately pressed up during this time (needed three hours), creating a free surface effect, further destabilising the already top heavy vessel.
At about 6.30 p.m. that day the wind
increased until it blew a violent hurricane,
which lasted for several hours, and the
ill-fated Koombana has never been
seen or heard of since. During the day
of March 20 last, the wind was blowing a
fresh breeze from the north-east, and
weather was a bit overcast and dirty,
The Inquiry blatantly defied earlier reports, signalling early in its course, the likelihood of a whitewash:
"It started on Tuesday night (before the
steamers departed Hedland) with a strong
easterly wind, and the waves thundered on
the beach with indications of heavier and
deadlier surges out at sea. Wednesday
morning saw about forty luggers running
to shelter off Port Hedland, where they
were soon safely anchored. These luggers
had a rough time on Tuesday night near
Turtle Island, and the cutting away of masts
in some cases was seriously contemplated."
'The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port
Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on
March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered
a strong north-east gale on leaving the
harbor.'
'The steamer Bullarra sailed from Port
Hedland for Cossack via Balla Balla on
March 20, at 11 a.m., and encountered
a strong north-east gale on leaving the
harbor.'
but Captain Upjohn and Captain Allen in
conversation decided there was nothing
in it, and neither of them expected to
encounter such a blow as is described
in the S S Bullarra's logbook as a howling
hurricane,
Compare this statement with an earlier press report:
"Captain Allen, of the Koombana, seemed
disinclined to go out, and when he decided
to do so he said, "I am going straight out to
sea, and will be lucky if I get to Broome on
Saturday."
a hurricane which apparently has totally
engulfed the S S Koombana, and which,
according to Captain Upjohn's evidence,
the S S Bullarra only survived through a
miracle. There was an unattended light
house on Bedout Island, the light in which,
however, was not burning on March 20.
The S S Koombana should, however, in
the ordinary course of things, have been
clear of the inland before the wind became
a hurricane, i.e., before it was dark that day.
A strange thing for Captain Upjohn to have said. He made it clear that Bullarra steamed into the fringe of the cyclone 22 miles from Balla Balla, roughly 4 p.m. that day. The 'hurricane' was to the southwest, not northeast, in which direction Koombana was headed. Koombana could only clear Bedout Island during daylight hours (Bedout light not functioning) if not more than two hours were allocated to filling tanks.
A strange thing for Captain Upjohn to have said. He made it clear that Bullarra steamed into the fringe of the cyclone 22 miles from Balla Balla, roughly 4 p.m. that day. The 'hurricane' was to the southwest, not northeast, in which direction Koombana was headed. Koombana could only clear Bedout Island during daylight hours (Bedout light not functioning) if not more than two hours were allocated to filling tanks.
The only wreckage discovered was picked
up a distance varying from 20 to 70 miles
from Bedout Island, and with the exception
of some air tanks it was all picked up at sea,
the air tanks alone having been found on the
mainland.
This confirms that the disaster occurred in the vicinity of Bedout Island with wreckage, naturally, drifting from Koombana's final position somewhere northeast of Bedout Island.
This confirms that the disaster occurred in the vicinity of Bedout Island with wreckage, naturally, drifting from Koombana's final position somewhere northeast of Bedout Island.
The wreckage consisted of a part of a starboard
bow planking of a motor launch; a state-room
door, and panel from the promenade deck,
two planks for covering tanks of lifeboats, and
some air tanks .
Not one word mentioned of the patch of oily water. It's as though the Court, intentionally, did not invite the finality of that particular discovery. Why? Perhaps there was a reluctance to commit to dragging the area of sea for the wreck in the vicinity of the oily water. It would also not have allowed the Court to come to the conclusion outlined in the following paragraph.
The Court cannot say What actually happened
to the S S Koombana, but it seems reasonably
clear that the hurricane of the night of the 20-21
March last was responsible for her total loss at sea.
And what if it hadn't???
And what if it hadn't???
With regard to her stability, it is known what cargo,
coal, etc., she had on board when leaving Port
Hedland, and where it was stowed; also the
condition of her ballast tanks:
She carried a load of 260 tons of cargo; properly
stowed; 480 tons of coal, 871 tons of water in her
tanks, and of stores she had some 60 tons.
260 tons of cargo was about 14 % of her average, full cargo capacity. Koombana, just on the basis of this component of dead weight was very light indeed (top heavy). I do not for one moment believe the figure of 871 tons of ballast water. She could not clear the outer bank with almost full ballast tank capacity (900 tons) and Captain Upjohn referred in a statement to Captain Allen intending to fill all his ballast tanks once out at sea.
Such a blatant untruth did not bode at all well for the credibility of this Marine Inquiry. No one could have known to what extent Captain Allen filled his ballast tanks at sea after departing Port Hedland.
Such a blatant untruth did not bode at all well for the credibility of this Marine Inquiry. No one could have known to what extent Captain Allen filled his ballast tanks at sea after departing Port Hedland.
She also had on board 76 passengers and a
crew of 74.
The stability of the vessel with that load was
tested with Ralston's stability indicator; which
showed she had a G.M. of 2 ft. 71/2 in. plus.
Having examined in detail GM with regard to the SS Waratah, I find this result almost ridiculous in a steamer whose propeller was beating out of the water as she exited Port Hedland and carrying 14 % of total cargo capacity. The testing quoted, was hypothetical, as Koombana did not have this instrument on board, final voyage. What the GM might have been is unanswerable and to what extent Captain Allen was able to fill his tanks at sea, must remain a mystery as strong as the disappearance itself. This did the Court no credit, taking those with an interest in the case, for fools!
Seven other tests were made with
the indicator under varying conditions
of load, and in each of them her
stability was shown to be entirely
satisfactory.
Whitewash satisfactory.
If further affirmation of the ship's stability
and seaworthiness be required it is to be
found in the career of the vessel since
1908 on the Australian coast.
As in the case of the top heavy Yongala. It took a cyclone to demonstrate in the harshest of terms the limitations of these tender steamers. In the case of Koombana she did not even have to steam into the cyclone to be found wanting.
All the witnesses who have had experience
in her deposed to her very excellent seagoing
qualities.
An insistence which belied the true facts.
An insistence which belied the true facts.
With regard to the personnel of the vessel, it
was of the highest quality, and both Capt. Allen
and the chief officer held extra masters'
certificates and both were men of great
experience on the Australian coast.
Marine Inquiry Yongala de javu.
The Court is satisfied that the S S Koombana,
in construction, stability, and seaworthiness,
was equal to any vessel of her class in the
Australian coastal trade.
She wasn't equal to the humble Bullarra which survived the full onslaught of the cyclone.
The Court thinks it desirable that telegrams
regarding the weather should be exchanged
every day between stations where observations
are made along the'north-west coast, that the
information so obtained should be posted for
general information, and that storm signals
should be shown at all ports.
I shall return to this subject in detail, suffice to say that nothing, and I mean nothing, had been learned from the Yongala disaster one year prior.
In conclusion, the Court simply finds, without
indulging in useless speculation, that the Stability
and Seaworthiness of the s.s. Koombana were
unassailable, and the competency and
carefulness of her master, Capt. Allen, beyond
question and that after being lost sight of at
sea on the 20th March, 1912, her fate passes
beyond human knowledge and remains' a mystery
of the sea.
Compare this closing statement with that for the Yongala:
merely conjectures, it is not possible to allow them any consideration; and while it is both gratifying and reassuring that the vessel's stability and seaworthiness remain unassailable, and the competency and carefulness of Captain Knight unimpeachable, the Board, with no desire to indulge in idle speculation, simply find that, after becoming lost to view by the lightkeeper at Dent Island, the fate of the "Yongala" passes beyond human ken into the realms of conjecture, to add one more to the long roll of mysteries of the sea.
Another whitewash wrapped in a conclusion of cliched repetition.
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| SS Koombana (courtesy Wikimedia Commons) |
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| SS Yongala (courtesy Michael McFadyen's scuba diving website) |
