COMPREHENSIVE PRESS INQUIRY OVERVIEW.

courtesy Trove

Daily Commercial News, 14 May, 1912.

KOOMBANA INQUIRY.

The Verdict.

At the inquiry into the loss of the

ill-fated steamer Koombana held at

Fremantle, Mr. E. P. Dowley presided,

and with him as assessors were 

Captains J. W. W. Yates and F. L. Parkes.

Mr. Frank Parker (Crown Prosecutor)

appeared on behalf of the Chief Harbor

Master, whilst Mr. M. L. Moss, K.C.,

watched the proceedings on behalf of

the Adelaide S.S. Company, owners of .

the Koombana.

After explaining that the usual Marine 

Court Inquiry was held to decide

some set out charge made by the Chief

Harbor Master against a captain and

or officers of a vessel and that at the

preliminary Inquiry held on the 22nd

April no such charges had been made,

Mr. Parker remarked that, in view of

the serious loss of life that had occur-

red through the loss of the Koombana

the Court had been called upon to

publicly investigate the loss of the ship,

and to decide whether any blame could

be attributed to any of the Company's

officials ashore.

Mr. Moss was alleged to have 'commended' Mr. Parker 'for bringing about a public investigation'. A devious move given that the emphasis on the public inquiry would be looking for fault with the owners, whom he represented. Mr. Moss, in effect hinted that the Adelaide Steamship Company would be exonerated; an outcome foretold.

Mr. Stevens, Acting Divisional Officer of 

the Commonwealth Weather Bureau from 

March 15th to 25th, during which time the 

Koombana disappeared, was the first witness 

examined.

He said that each morning he received

reports from Wyndham, Hall's Creek,

Broome, Derby, Cossack, Onslow, and

other places in' the North-West. Duplicate 

reports were sent to the Melbourne Bureau, 

and from that office the forecasts, based 

on barometer and thermometer readings, 

were issued at noon, Eastern time. 

These forecasts were received in Perth 

between 11.30 and 12 noon (Western time). 

If they were not received by noon each day 

the forecast was issued by the local bureau. 

If storms were approaching warnings

were issued to all stations in the vicinity 

of the storm centre. Later, on in the afternoon 

forecasts based upon more recent data were 

issued by the local bureau. 

No special forecast was issued from the 

Melbourne office of any storm from March 

16th to 21st, inclusive. On March 15th there 

was a monsoonal depression which had worked

S.S.W. to Port Darwin. By the 18th the storm 

had reached the neighbourhood of Derby, but 

in no cases were high winds recorded, and the 

lowest point the barometer recorded was 29.70.

This was an embarrassing admission given the scale of the Balla Balla blow.

Monday, 18 March, Captain Richardson of the steamer Paroo anchored at Depuch Island, noted that there was a heavy swell coming in from the NE, associated with an increase in ambient temperature and falling barometer readings. There could be no doubt in mariners' minds that a cyclone was brewing somewhere in the NE. Surely the data submitted from Cossack, 30 miles away, should have alerted the Bureau to the possibility of a storm developing?

A report from Port Hedland on the

20th stated that the wind force was

four miles an hour, with threatening

weather and smooth seas, and Cossack

reported a barometer of 29.69 with wind

each blowing at the rate of 19 miles an

hour. 

It is hard to reconcile the Port Hedland report with a half to full gale from the NE and a ground swell from the NW when Bullarra departed port, 20th March. 'Smooth seas' suggests misinformation or miscommunication. Either way the reporting system was flawed.

On the 20th at 1 p.m. Cossack

advised that a fresh gale was blowing,

with high seas and weather threatening. 

On the 21st, next morning, the barometer 

recorded 29.56, wind 37 miles an hour, 

and there were very heavy seas. 

So why then were 'no storm' warnings issued for this location and date, given the acknowledged data?

By the 21st, there was 'a howling hurricane' 30 miles away at Balla Balla.

The storm, from 15th to 21st March, 

went in a south-west direction,

and evidently struck the coast at Cossack 

and curved. The centre of the storm 

passed north of Cossack. There

was nothing to indicate that a cyclone

was approaching.

Captain Richardson of the Paroo reported otherwise. 

To Mr. Moss: The forecasts were thoroughly 

satisfactory, and the only delay in getting 

them from Melbourne was the time it took to

transmit the telegrams, which had precedence 

over all other matters. 

Pressed by Mr. Moss he admitted there would

be a saving of time if the reports were

made by the local bureau. 

This statement does not make sense. Time delay was minimal given the speed of telegram transmissions. The local bureaus were the agencies submitting the data in the first place. Perhaps the problem lay in collation of data and compiling forecasts?  

Very strange that the forecasting system was claimed to be 'thoroughly satisfactory' when a cyclone battered Balla Balla and surrounds and no storm was predicted or reported for this time period!

Continuing, he stated that apparently: the 

depression struck the coast somewhere 

near Cossack, and, being interrupted by the

coastline, and the width of the depression 

being narrowed, it resulted in a sudden storm. 

It would help if the various officers of the coast 

exchanged information direct, provided they 

understood what it conveyed. Postmasters, 

speaking generally, were very reliable in the 

matter of weather reports.

Postmasters were certainly better than the existing system which failed to forecast and acknowledge a full blown cyclone during the time period, 20 and 21 March. Referring to a 'sudden storm' does not correlate with the Paroo account; Moira and Bullarra logs.

 

There had been cases of delay in issuing 

forecasts from Melbourne. He could not 

form any ideas as to the velocity of the 

cyclone which wrecked the Koombana.

The diameter, he thought, would extend 

from Port Hedland on the north and Cossack 

on the south, or about 90 miles north-east by .

south-west.

courtesy Google Earth

Captain Upjohn, who had charge of

s.s. Bullarra, one of the vessels that

had a trying time in the hurricane, was

next called. 

Examined by Mr. Parker, he stated his 

vessel arrived at Port. Hedland on the 

18th March, and the Koombana entered 

port next day. Both vessels left on the 20th. 

About 8 a.m. on the 20th Captain Allen 

boarded the Bullarra, and in the course 

of a general conversation, said 

'What do you think of the, weather?' 

He replied that it would be dirty; but he didn't 

know if there would be anything in it. He

expected similar weather, or even finer,

on the voyage. 

The 'dirty weather' reference is intriguing. Dirty weather, generally, refers to storm conditions. Captain Upjohn hedged his bets by claiming that he did not know if the anticipated storm would be severe - 'anything in it' - or not. Adding a gambling element to the statement he suggested that the weather could be better than anticipated, thus justifying departure. A passing squall is a possible explanation for weather improving, but does not account for the groundswell from the northwest.

My feeling is that both captains, given all the indicators, suspected there was a cyclone brewing along the coast, but where, how extensive and in what direction it was heading, were the unknown factors. Part of the cyclone-gamble equation must surely have included discussions whether it would be better to confront such a system in port or out at sea?

It is said that the trend was to 'evacuate' the port ahead of a cyclone, which makes sense in the context of a vessel being wrecked on shore, in port. However, and this is important, Captain Allen expressed reservations about departing, stating that 24 hours would not make much difference. He was disinclined to put out to sea and with good reason - lives vs. material ship.

It is interesting to note that rule 4 for captains employed by the Adelaide Steamship Company referred to not 'endangering the ship', which staying in port might imply. Nothing in said rule book about lives.

It is also interesting to note that Captain Upjohn could simply have acknowledged the indicators heralding a cyclone, but justified departure on the grounds that it would be safer to confront a cyclone at sea than in port. 

Why didn't he opt for the more accepted approach?

Koombana was inherently top heavy and vulnerable in storm (cyclone) conditions; far wiser to remain in port - they all knew it and Captain Upjohn did everything to mitigate responsibility for encouraging Captain Allen to depart.

He had no discussion on the question of 

leaving port or otherwise. 

In this one sentence Captain Upjohn defied common sense, the most important issue requiring discussion and in so doing, telegraphed to the Court that he was not going to give up the truth easily. 

The Koombana sailed between 20 and 30 

minutes earlier than the Bullarra. When the 

latter left port the Koombana was in sight 

and was to be observed for about two hours. 

This statement was confirmed by a cattleman on board Bullarra who claimed that the two steamers were 5 miles distant, stern on to each other, at midday and Bert Clarke who watched the steamer from a tower near the port entrance. This also confirms that Koombana must have been relatively stationary, bow heading into the gale, while tanks were being filled, for this scenario to have been fulfilled.

He noticed how well the Koombana

behaved, and either he or the chief officer, 

who was on the bridge with him, remarked 

that she appeared in good trim. The propeller 

was well submerged, and she did not roll at 

all in crossing the bar. 

Captain Upjohn made his position clear to the Court that he was willing to abandon the truth to protect the reputation of the owners' top heavy steamer. The upper limit of the propeller was 16.5 ft. (as per plans) and with a draft aft. of 16 ft. (Port Hedland Harbour Master's claim), the propeller could not have been fully submerged. 

Even if one generously uses the erroneous claim by Captain Upjohn that Koombana's aft. draft was 17 ft. and the incorrect figure quoted for the upper limit of the propeller, 18 ft. plus, one still gets an exposed blade. Either way the propeller could not have been fully submerged.

It would have been an impossibility for a top heavy steamer not to roll crossing the bar with a ground swell coming in from the NW and a gale from the NE.

When they parted the Koombana was 

proceeding on her ordinary course for 

Broome. Between 2 and 4 p.m. the wind 

changed from northeast to east-north-east. 

A cattleman on board Bullarra observed that the inky, dark cloud mass indicating the position of the cyclone lay on the western horizon, in which direction they were headed. What is interesting about the changing wind directions is that it strongly suggests Bullarra steamed into the inferior aspect of the cyclone tracking towards Balla Balla from the north-northwest. 

At 4.20 the engines were slowed, and at 5 p.m. 

he altered the Bullarra's course and stood out 

to sea. 

And in so doing steamed into the centre of the system.

At 6 a.m. the barometer had been at 

29.50, and it then began to fall gradually, 

though it did not flicker. Between 8 and 

10 p.m. a heavy gale was blowing and 

the sea running high. The ship began to 

labour heavily, and things were getting 

serious. He did not take, any particular 

notice of the barometer until about 10 p.m. 

He did not have to consult the barometer to know what was happening.

He had been chief officer of the Koombana

for about 12 months, and during that time 

had experienced some very heavy weather 

when she was lightly laden. She was a magnificent

ship, and a splendid seaboat. 

What is most interesting about this statement is protesting Koombana's virtues and stressing that 'when lightly laden' Koombana was stable in 'very heavy weather'. This, after all, was the very core of contention and the most likely cause of the disaster; an issue that this employee of the Adelaide Steamship Company was determined to protest and defend in order to avoid reparations.

He had searched for the Koombana and 

found portion of a motor launch, etc., which

he was certain belonged to her. All the 

Bullarra's boats had been damaged.

The only explanation of the loss of the

Koombana he could offer was that she

was smashed up by the force of the

cyclone. He considered it impossible

for her to have 'turned turtle.' 

And there we have it. Impossible to 'turn turtle' was the very thing most likely to explain the steamer's loss. Using the word 'impossible' was ridiculous. The fact that Koombana steamed away from the cyclone, not into it, was neatly dodged by all participants of this farce.

It was the worst cyclone he had 

experienced, and it was a miracle that the

Bullarra lived through it.

But the ageing steamer had survived the cyclone.

Mr. Moss now handed in a telegram

sent from Port Hedland on March 20th,

and was signed 'Upjohn' and 'Allen.'

It referred to the painting of buoys,

the matter Captains Upjohn and Allen

had under discussion. Proceeding,

Captain Upjohn stated it was untrue

that he and Captain Allen had had a

conference about the weather. 

What was taboo about discussing the weather and changes already observed? It was the most likely topic of discussion, in addition to the buoys of course. Denying the obvious did not make sense and confirmed that Captain Upjohn was not a reliable witness.

He was sure Captain Allen did not state he

'would be lucky to get to Broome,'

which he was credited with saying.

Omitting the word 'by' Saturday, convenient to introduce an element of doubt in Hedland Advocate reporting. How could be be sure about a statement if he was not, at all times, in Captain Allen's company?

Going back to the question of the

search for the Koombana the witness

remarked that in latitude 19.11, longitude 

119.25, about 27 to 37 miles from

Bedout Island, one evening they saw

what looked like a portion of the deck

of a vessel, but it proved to be the

shape of a ship outlined by an oily

substance such as would rise from a

sunken vessel, floating on the sea. They

had taken the specimens produced in

court as this spot. An awning spar

and one of the planks exhibited in

Court had also been discovered in close

proximity. Other article were picked

up about 20 miles from that spot.

Extraordinary that the 'oily substance such as would rise from a sunken vessel' was never pursued then and now. 27 to 37 miles was an error - 27 to 28 miles.

Chief officer James Crossley, of the

Bullarra, corroborated Captain Upjohn's 

evidence, and to Mr. Parker stated that 

when the Koombana went on her course 

he didn't see her propeller rising out of the 

water. 

Closing ranks. 

Answering Mr. Moss, Crossley stated that

the light on Bedout Island was out

when he went there. 

An issue and implication which should have been fleshed out in cross-examination.

It was the worst storm he had experienced 

in 15 years at sea, and he should have, 

thought it impossible for any ship to live in such

weather.

Except an old steamer like the Bullarra...

J. F. Morrison, a pilot, then gave

evidence as to the Koombana's 

equipment. Her boats and appliances 

were examined in January, and were in

good order and condition. He had

known Captain Allen 25 years. He

was a sound and careful navigator,

who took-no risks. 

This character reference was crucial testimony. Captain Allen was experienced, good at what he did, and careful. He echoed this judgment when stating that he 'was disinclined to go out due to the glass' (barometer). We know that he adopted a very cautious approach to keeping ballast tanks full when crossing the bar - stability vs. bar strikes. He, therefore, must have been extremely unhappy about departing Port Hedland that day with all tanks empty; but if he were to depart, he had no choice. A damaging bar strike could have been catastrophic. 

Why was Captain Allen then coerced by Captain Upjohn to depart Port Hedland, 20 March, when it went against his better judgment? 

One can only surmise that there was a degree of schedule pressure, but perhaps more significantly, Captain Upjohn had challenged Captain Allen by claiming that Koombana was the far better steamer and he had decided to depart in the more inferior Bullarra. It was directly after this that Captain Allen decided to go:

Captain Allen Koombana: "I do

not like the look of the weather. 

Captain Upjohn; what do you intend 

doing?"

Captain Upjohn (Bullarra): "I have

made up my mind to go out and your

boat is a far better one than mine."

Captain Allen: "Well, if you intend

going out, I do not suppose it will do

for me to stop here."

On her first, trip from the North-West 

she came into port with a list. Speaking 

to Captain Rees, the then master, he 

learned that the cattle deck was filled with

cattle, and one of the tanks was

empty, the latter being due to the fact

that the engineers had not the proper

'hang' of the tanks. 

One could almost view this statement as breaking ranks and cheekily confirming that Koombana had top heaviness issues when all ballast tanks were not filled and weight concentrated high up in the hull - i.e. the cattle deck.

The Koombana was a well-built ship, 

and such weather might never be 

experienced again in a lifetime.

Cyclones / willy willies were well known on the Nor'West coast in the summer season. It was a bizarre implication that Koombana was not designed to survive significant cyclonic events - occurring  'once in a lifetime'.

M. J. Williams, Marine Superintendent 

for the Adelaide S.S. Company

in Western Australia, gave evidence

as to the loading of the Koombana,

and all particulars of cargo shipped.

He was of the opinion that the cargo

had not shifted.

H. J. Clarke, one of the Company's

wharf managers at Fremantle, in 

answer to Mr. Parker, stated that for

fifteen months he occupied the position 

of chief officer of the Koombana.

He came out from Glasgow with her,

and had gone in her from Fremantle

to Geraldton in the teeth of a howling

gale, and she behaved very well indeed. 

He had also been in her on the New 

South Wales coast when the wind

was right on her beam, and only her

ballast tanks were full. They drove

right through it, but it was blowing

so hard that they could not go up to

the wharf and had to lay in stream at

Watson's Bay with both anchors down.

As to her end, he was pf the belief that

she had been battered to pieces. He

believed that she went through the

storm but was so knocked about that

she foundered. He didn't think it was

possible for the vessel to be blown 

absolutely over. 

A common theme among Adelaide Steamship Company employees denying the obvious and protesting the steamer's virtues.

Answering Mr. Moss, witness said the 

stability and trim indicator in Court was 

the invention of Mr. Ralston, the head 

draughtsman at the yards where the 

Koombana was built, and a man with 

one of the best reputations in such 

matters in the United Kingdom.

Praising a designer and design which was not present on board when Koombana departed Port Hedland for the last time. Irrelevant to the case.

To Mr. Parker: Sometimes he had

been asked to empty one of the tanks

so as to produce a list in order that

that coaling could be facilitated.

And in this one statement the truth revealed. The inherently top heavy steamer could be induced into a list by the simple act of emptying just one of her tanks. There you have it!

Chief Engineer Craig, of the s.s.

Bullarra, under cross-examination by

Mr. Moss, stated the Koombana's 

propeller was under water fully six or

eight inches at Port Hedland, and he

had heard nothing about the propeller

'flogging the air.'

A pointless exercise interviewing biased employees. In this case one can deduce that the Chief Engineer was referring to a draft aft. of 17 ft. or marginally greater - which was the incorrect figure supplied by Captain Upjohn.  Note that this would not have applied to the erroneous propeller figure of 18 inches.

 

Captain Upjohn and Mr. Crossley,

of the Bullarra, were now recalled to

explain a statement of the former 

regarding the barometer reading at noon

on March 21st. The Captain had said

the reading was 29.80, while the entry

in the log was 28.83. It was explained

that the latter reading was from the

chart-room glass, which was a low-set

instrument, with a 'fine weather' reading 

of 28.90, and the captain's reading

was taken from the commander's

glass, which was hung in his own

cabin. 

In reply to a question by Mr. Dowley, 

he said he did not know if the light 

on Bedout Island had failed prior

to the cyclone.

The Bedout Light was out from a week prior to the disaster. To say that these men did not know about it either speaks of gross negligence on the part of the Port Hedland port authority not notifying such; or a lapse in the chain of communication between Mr. Moxon, Adelaide Steamship Co, who acknowledged he had received the notification 1 week prior, and the Chief Harbour Master at Fremantle, Captain Irvine, who was then in turn obligated to issue a warning to all shipping in the region.

In fact Captain Irvine was disingenuous as regards the Bedout light and published this statement in the March Gazette:

 'Western Australia—North-West Coast. NOTICE is hereby given that the hurricane which passed over Bedout Island—lat. 19.35 S. 119.6 E.—on the 22nd inst., extinguished the unattended light established on this island in December, 1909. Further notice will be issued as soon as the lamp has been re-lighted. Charts affected. No. 1055—Bedout Island to Cape Cuvier. No. 1048—Buccaneer Archipelago to Bedout. C. J. IRVINE, Chief Harbour Master. Harbour and Light Department, Fremantle, 30th March, 1912.'  

The cyclone was NOT responsible for extinguishing the light!

Mr. Clark was now recalled and

questioned by Mr. Parker regarding

rumours 'prevalent in Fremantle.' and

deposed that no rails had been put

into the vessel as ballast, a reply which

elicited from Mr. Moss: ''Another

pavement expert's opinion exploded.'

In February 1910 Koombana heeled over to an alarming degree in a squall and took a long time to straighten up. Captain Rees decided that he would keep 150 tons of rails in the hold to assist ballasting and stability. These rails were not 'put in' but rather 'kept in'. Semantics exploited by the dramatic Mr. Moss.

The Court now had the evidence

given at the preliminary inquiry by

R. H. Arundel, Surveyor to Lloyd's

Register and the Marine Underwriters,

read. In effect the witness had come

to the conclusion that after leaving

Port Hedland making for Bedout, the

captain of the Koombana met the wind

northerly so strong that it prevented

him from getting to the north to go

round about; then finding it impossible 

to heave-to on his port tack, which was 

the proper tack, he must have adopted 

one of two courses: either to heave-to 

on the starboard tack or attempt to run 

across to the open water to the westward 

in the face of the disturbance. Witness was

of opinion that the disturbance came

over from a S.S.E. direction, and that

the Koombana before she reached 

Bedout, experiencing a wind direction N.

and E., was obliged to heave-to on

the starboard tack on the westward,

and in running west would get into the

centre of the cyclone. The finding of

wreckage to the westward confirmed

his opinion that she ran out to westward. 

A large portion of wreckage was found to the north of Bedout Island, not to the west. The cyclone coming in from the SSE was a crazy claim. The entire statement was intensely flawed.

He had formed the opinion the

Koombana was a 'tender' ship when

light, but perfectly seaworthy. 

At least one of the 'experts' had the decency to state the obvious. 'Perfectly seaworthy' was pushing it, though.

On the question of top-hamper he thought if

cargo was properly stowed and distributed it 

would not interfere with a vessel's stability.

Captain J. A. Rankin, Acting Marine

Superintendent for the Adelaide S.S.

Company, deposed he was stationed at

Adelaide, and referring to the Ralston

stability and trim indicator in Court,

he said it was used for, among other

things, determining the 'G.M.' the

generally accepted term for denoting

the stability of a vessel. The instrument 

could only be used for the vessel

it was designed for, and he had, when

he received it, tested the Koombana

on information supplied by Captain

Rees, when the vessel was in the lightest 

possible condition. The test gave

a result of plus 1ft. 6in., which was 

exceptionally good. If the vessel were

fully loaded with cargo, and coal and

all tanks were full, she could heel over

to an angle of 90 per cent, and even

then have a margin for recovery. 

Like the cyclone coming in from the SSE, there is an element of fantasy. 1 ft. 6 inches was simply not possible in the 'lightest condition possible'.

Before Captain Allen's departure from

Fremantle on his last trip he had sent

him (witness) a report showing the

distribution of a load of 712 tons, and

showing also particulars of draught

and trim. He asked the Court to make

the test from these particulars on the

stability and trim indicator in Court.

Captain Rankin then gave a 

demonstration with the indicator, which 

was closely watched by the Court and 

Counsel. He distributed the weights over

the plan in the indicator. The 'G.M.'

was plus 2ft. 1 1/2 in., and the result of

the second process almost exactly

agreed with the late captain's figures

for the draught and trim arrived at

by ordinary means. 

Answering Mr. Moss, the witness stated 

the Koombana was in many respects in 

excess of British requirements.

No other experts called to challenge the wildly optimistic GM figure.

Mr. A. C. Butcher, engineer for

harbour and lights in Western Australia, 

was next examined, and he said

that, in conjunction with Captain Rankin, 

he carried out tests, and the

curves of stability were particularly

good. The stability curves supplied

by the builders did not show such 

severe tests as those carried out by 

witness.

These curves should have been submitted to the Court as evidence as was done at the Inquiry into the loss of the Waratah and which could have been open to scrutiny.

 

The President of the Court then 

announced that he would be pleased to

take any evidence anybody might wish

to bring forward. Mr. Moss thereupon

remarked the Company was pleased at

the general invitation extended to the

public, as it would give any person who

had been circulating rumours concerning 

the ship a chance to show just what they 

knew of the matter.

Mr. Moss was a shrewd operator. Potential witnesses presented as 'circulating rumours' rather than making valid contributions; and 'showing just what they knew of the matter' implying that it was not likely to amount to much once he was done with them. The residents of Port Hedland must have been incensed at his attitude, and rightly so.

Before the proceedings commenced

on the second day Mr. Moss drew 

attention to the fact that Captain 

Upjohn had, in his evidence, stated the

Koombana's propeller was well 

submerged when leaving Port Hedland,

instead of 'not' submerged, as had

been reported and published.

A Freudian slip?

Mr. W. E. Moxon, Manager in Western 

Australia for the Adelaide S.S. Company, 

was then examined by Mr. Moss. He said 

the Koombana came under his supervision, 

and no special instructions were given to 

the late Captain Allen to push on, as the 

vessel ran on a time-table. 

Referring to the previous post was not Mr. Moxon embarrassed to make this statement to the Court? The 'time-table' was grueling and tide-dependent. Any delays had serious knock-on effects.

She carried a particularly small cargo up 

to Port Hedland, and the captain had plenty

of time to discharge cargo and do any other 

work necessary. 

A 'particularly small cargo' and empty ballast tanks reinforces the fact that Koombana departed Port Hedland, 20 March, in very light condition, drawing 16 ft. aft and 11 ft. forward. What 'other work' did Mr. Moxon have in mind? 

In the North-West trade the captains were 

'peculiarly responsible,' the company left

matters very largely in their hands.

In other words, Mr. Moxon washed his hands of any direct responsibility for decisions, good or bad, taken by Captain Allen.

 

His company's rule No. 4 stated that

'No order will be held to excuse the

endangering of the ship.'  

Again distancing himself from any form of culpability. Because the ship had disappeared without trace and known cause, a catch-22 situation was created. Neither Captain Allen posthumously nor the Company could be held accountable for the disaster. No reparations. 

If Koombana had been wrecked in Port Hedland due to a direct hit by the cyclone, there would have been no 'excuse' and the main reason why Captain Allen decided to go out. Damned either way but honouring his commitment to the Company rules.

Everything humanly possible had been 

done, by the company to find traces of 

the vessel and for succouring of any 

possible survivors. 

An empty echo of humanitarianism.

With reference to the report

published - in the 'West Australian'

from its Port Hedland correspondent

on April 4, he had received a letter

from the company's manager denying

that the ship rolled as she crossed the

bar, that the propeller was out of the

water, and that Captain Allen had said

he would ' be lucky if he got to

Broome.'   ...by Saturday.

Given the employees' collective testimony, the Company manager would say that, wouldn't he. 

He (the local manager) was

on board the Koombana in the last

hour before she left Port Hedland, and

he was not aware that Captains Upjohn 

and Allen had any conversation

with reference to the weather. The

glass was not more than 10 points 

below normal. 

A fortnight before there had been a fall 

of 60 points and nothing followed. 

Captain Allen wrote a letter home, a date coinciding with the above statement:

"It was dated March 8, and in it Captain Allen

said that he had got through the worst of

the season as far as the climate was concerned. 

"I just kept clear of a blow last trip,"

he added, "but as soon as I got round the

North-West Cape it started, so my luck was

in that time."

'Nothing followed' is not consistent with 'kept clear of a blow' (blow = storm)

They had discussed the question of the vessel 

leaving port on the top of the equinoctial 

spring tides, but the question of 'willy willies' 

did not arise during the conversation. 

This was the very crux of the Koombana dilemma. She was too large for ready access to Port Hedland; unless during the narrow window of opportunity provided by high water springs.

Captain Allen had remarked that with 

the stiff head wind blowing he would 

have no hope of reaching Broome in 

time to catch the following day's tide, 

and he would not be surprised if he 

were a day late, as he was not 

particularly keen on going into Broome 

at night time. 

What a gem. Finally we have a senior employee of the Adelaide Steamship Company admitting to the Court that Captain Allen did not believe that he would make Broome by the next day for no other reason than weather-related conditions - 'a stiff head wind'. Koombana was a very powerful steamer and capable of more than 14 knots. This statement acknowledged that she would not be making 10 knots or less.

Why?

Because the headwind in question was a gale not a 'fresh breeze', as claimed by Captain Upjohn at this Inquiry; a gale buffeting the significant top hamper (resistance) of a top heavy steamer; a gale from the NE associated with a groundswell from the northwest, signaling the presence of a cyclone.

Proof acknowledged!

Reference to a 'day late' refers back to the pressure of the tight tide-dependent schedule and a narrow window of access to these ports.

'Not particularly keen on going into Broome at night time' confirms that Captain Allen was cautious and not a risk taker. There should have been port pilots in ideal circumstances which the Nor-West certainly was not!  

The pearling luggers had come into port, 

but only on account of the dirty water caused

by the north-easterly blowing. 

Disingenuous and flouting the truth and risk presented. If it were simply a matter of dirty water surely some would have remained at sea until the sea cleared?

The pearlers said that by doing so they

had escaped the greatest disaster in

their history, as they did not expect

any hurricane. 

The man was shameless in his misrepresentations of the truth.

Captain Challoner, a pearler in the 

North-West, had reported that on March 

19 he was six miles from Bezout in a 

dead calm sea and glorious sunshine.

Bezout is not Bedout; two islands a considerable distance apart - 124 n miles. Again, taking the Court for fools.

From midnight the wind increased, and 

at 5 a.m. there was a big sea. From 2.30 

to 6 p.m. on the 21st there was a fierce 

hurricane, which was worse than the 'willy 

willies' of 1908 and 1910. From other 

reports received from the North-West

witness continued, it appeared that the

hurricane was one of the worst that had

ever been experienced. 

And yet it escaped the attention of the Meteorological Bureau.

Captain Dingle made a special trip in 

the Koombana in connection with his 

duties as marine superintendent, and 

said to witness on his return that he 

never wished to step on a better 

seaboat in his life, and he (Captain Dingle) 

considered on that trip she had been 

tested up to an extreme limit. 

The biased protests became quite boring in the scheme of things... How could Koombana have been tested to the 'extreme limit' if an extreme weather event was not encountered on that particular voyage?

The company had received a report 

from a magistrate at Broome that a 

statement had been made by a drover 

named Olive, that on the night of March 

20, when he was at Boyer's Camp, 

30 miles north of Condon, at about 

8 or 9 p.m. he saw two rockets go up 

in the direction of N.W. There was a 

hurricane blowing at the time. 

This was 82 miles to the northeast of Port Hedland which did not sustain any hurricane-force damage; the cyclone targeting Balla Balla 60 miles further to the southwest. Therefore it was unlikely that a 'hurricane was blowing'. It is an interesting report, though, and one that strongly suggested, if true, that either the disaster took place between Bedout Island and the coast or a lifeboat made it to this location. 

A report had also been received from 

a cattle station near Condon that copper 

air chambers had been picked up on the 

beach at Solitary Island.

These were from one of the lifeboats and Solitary Island is near Condon.

When a ship went to the North-West she 

generally took a very large supply of fresh 

water in her tanks, as well as salt water, as 

the former was very expensive at ports.

By deduction one can assume that this factor could have contributed to a free surface effect in incompletely filled fresh water tanks; in turn contributing to a 'dangerous' list.

 

The Koombana was last spoken to by

wireless on the night of March 19.

Actually it was the morning of 20 March, and the communication was with the Gneisenau, some 800 miles distant. This implies that had the communication system and operator been functional during the disaster, a distress call could theoretically have been picked up by the Gneisenau. This not being the case, points strongly to a sudden catastrophic event.

So far as he knew none of the internal

fittings had been found. All the wreckage 

found so far had been from the upper 

deck, and debris of boats. 

The surprising thing is that no cargo was discovered. If the ship had been battered to pieces as had Yongala a year before, one would expect contents from the holds to have formed part of the wreckage discovered.

The ship would be reported 'missing' by

Lloyd's. He would not like to express

any opinion as to whether there was

any material difference in the construction 

of the Bullarra, and Koombana.

Naturally he wouldn't. The new one foundered and the old workhorse survived. Bullarra did not have towering superstructure and ballast issues accessing Port Hedland.

Witness then referred to the importance 

of an efficient system of signalling being 

instituted on the Nor'-West coast, and was 

of the opinion that postmasters should 

exchange information every morning, and 

it should be available for shipmasters. 

A sensible suggestion, given the failings of the centralised meteorological bureau. 

He then stated that the Company had 

been informed that the Bedout light was 

extinguished on March 13, and was 

observed to be still extinguished on the 

14th and 15th. It was hard to say what 

bearing the absence of this light would 

have on the disaster. Their experience was that

self-attended lights were not to be

depended on.

Extraordinary statement! 'Bearing'? The ship striking the reef at night, which jutted 3 miles out from the island, for starters...Koombana would have to have averaged more than 10 knots to clear Bedout by dusk. With the headwind described this might not have been possible.

The Chief Harbormaster (Captain

Irvine) said inquiries had been made

in England and America as to the best

unattended light available, and eventually 

a Birmingham firm supplied the Bedout 

light, which was arranged to burn for 

12 months without attention, compressed 

acetylene being used. It started on December 

10, 1909, and up to the time of the recent failure 

had given entire satisfaction. It had never

been left for 12 months without attention, 

and when visited was always

found to be burning satisfactorily. The

first intimation he had of its failure

was on March 26, and telegrams were

sent to all ports advising them that

the light was out. 

As I have remarked, Moxon knew of the light being out from 13 March, but Captain Irvine only heard of it a fortnight later? Not likely. As I see it the problem was not with the unattended light but the monitoring of such. 

The notices to ship masters stated that 

the light was unwatched, and they were 

warned not to place too much reliance upon 

it. 

Then why bother to have it there in the first place if masters couldn't rely upon it? Ridiculous!

Continuing, Mr. Moxon said that in

his opinion the vessel did not strike

Bedout Island, as, if she did, wreckage

would be found. It was possible that

she struck it and foundered elsewhere.

I agree with this statement.

Mr. Parker hereupon asked for an

adjournment in order to secure a 

witness from Port Hedland. After some

discussion, during which Mr. Moss 

referred to the necessity for a limitation

being placed on the adjournments; but

stated the Company was not desirous

of shutting out any material facts, Mr.

Dowley adjourned the Court till the

following afternoon.

Nice try Mr. Moxon. If there was nothing to fear and the alleged 'busybodies' just that, there should have been no objection at all.

When the inquiry was resumed Mr.

Moxon; who was recalled by Mr. Moss,

read extracts from Interviews with

Messrs. McDonald and Fisher. Mr. Mc

Donald was for a time the chief engineer 

of the Koombana, and was sent to 

England to superintend the erection

of her engines, after which he came to

Australia in her, and Mr. Fisher was

for a time her third officer. Both gentlemen 

referred to her stability in laudatory terms. 

Mr. Moxon handed in to the Court a chart 

showing the location of the wreckage from 

the Koombana picked up by steamers and 

luggers.

Parading Company 'yes' men.

 

The witness from Port Hedland, William 

Patrick, clerk in holy orders, and

a member of the Church of England,

was then called by Mr. Parker. Witness 

stated that he was at Port Hedland from 

March 18 to March 25. He saw the 

Koombana arrive in Port Hedland on 

March 19, which was a very clear day 

and exceptionally hot. He saw the 

vessel leave Port Hedland on the 20th, 

but did not take particular notice of her 

propeller. The sky was very cloudy, the 

clouds were low, and there was a fairly 

strong breeze blowing. It was an easterly 

wind blowing, just a little stronger than 

usual. At the post office he heard people 

remark that the glass was steady and not 

too low. He had a conversation with Captain 

Pearson, who was a passenger for

Derby, and who did not expect any

thing in the shape of abnormal weather.

Witness did not think there was the

slightest truth in the statement that

Captain Allen had discussed the weather. 

Was the clerk of the church psychic as well? How could he attest to the fact that 'there was not the slightest truth in the statement that Captain Allen had discussed the weather'? He proved, without a fraction of doubt, that he was biased in favour of the Company, for whatever reason. But he did give important clues in the form of notable heat and wind from the east.

Captain Allen appeared to be a

little anxious, and seemed unwell, as

he was suffering from the heat.

Again, the clerk was not a doctor. How could he know if Captain Allen's anxiety and look of 'unwell' was heat or other related?

Witness regarded Mr. Gardener, Manager 

of the Adelaide S.S. Company at Port Hedland, 

as a very honourable man, whose reports 

could be thoroughly relied upon.

Again, bias confirmed and strengthened.

 

Mr. Moss then addressed the Court. 

He said that it had been shown

that the Koombana left Port Hedland

at half-past ten in the morning on the

top of the equinoxial spring tides. She

had her loading of 1,671 tons well 

distributed, a fact which had been well

proved.

What proof?

The evidence showed that she

was in good trim, and that the propeller 

was submerged. 

There was no 'evidence' to this effect.

It had also been clearly demonstrated 

that there was neither coal nor cattle on 

deck, 

Again, what evidence....

Chief officer Crossley, of the s.s. Bullarra

had said that, from the barometer,

there was no indication of a storm 

until it was upon them. 

Not likely.

Towards midnight the cyclonic conditions 

developed, the Bullarra then being on the 

way to Balla Balla. 

Balla Balla was a mere 55 miles from Port Hedland. Bullarra was 22 miles from Balla Balla at 4.30 p.m., 20 March. Midnight was another 7 1/2 hours later. What was this man thinking! I know what he was trying to suggest, though.

Mr. Crossley had expressed the opinion 

that it was a miracle that the 

Bullarra had come though at all, but 

then the Bullarra did not experience the 

same force of the cyclone as the 

Koombana must have encountered. 

Bullarra went through the blooming middle of the cyclone; how much more force was he talking about? Koombana was steaming away from the cyclone. There were no limits to the extremes this man was prepared to go to protect the Company.

It was stated that neither Captain Upjohn 

nor Mr. Crossley had experienced in the 

course of their lives such a gale. He thought 

that, in the interests of the public, something

should be said regarding the system of

forecasting the weather. It could be

improved on in a simple and inexpensive 

way. What was the use of sending out 

messages of warning to ship masters who 

had sailed the previous day? He would 

agree, however, that it was quite probable 

that it would have been impossible to send 

out warning on this particular occasion, 

because the storm broke so soon. It 

developed suddenly with an altogether

unexpected energy. 

A useful suggestion spoiled by references to a storm 'which developed suddenly with an altogether unexpected energy.' There were plenty of indicators.

He ventured to say that there could be 

no doubt in the mind of the Court but that 

the Koombana was a strongly-built ship.

The evidence showed that she was

superstrong. The Koombana had been

subjected to seven severe tests, and it

had been demonstrated that, had she

heeled over to an angle of 90 degrees,

she must have righted herself (water 

pouring in via every orifice). The

tests proved that even in extraordinary 

weather she was a vessel as stable

as any that had been built. They had

had evidence to the effect that it was

impossible to capsize the vessel. There

was the testimony of the witnesses 

Upjohn, Crosley, Clarke, Rankin, Craig,

and Butcher. He wished to direct special

attention to the evidence of Mr. Clarke,

who had travelled from Glasgow in the

Koombana and who was free from all .

bias. 

'Free from all bias' says two things; he was aware of the accusation and that there was in fact bias. 'Impossible to capsize the vessel' says it all - whitewash!

Mr. Clarke had said that he was

on board the steamer during a trip to

Geraldton in the teeth of a strong

north-westerly gale. She behaved

splendidly. What caused the disaster? 

In his opinion, the cause of the disaster

would be as great a mystery at the end

of the inquiry as it was at the beginning. 

Convenient.

There were many surmises which 

might be put forward, such as, Did she

graze Bedout Island or strike some hidden 

danger? In this connection, he would 

direct attention to the fact that the chart 

was not reliable, because that part of the 

coast had been imperfectly surveyed. 

Clutching at excuses.

He contended that the wreckage found 

negatived the idea that the

Koombana had been suddenly over

whelmed, but it did suggest that the

vessel had been subjected to a fearful

battering. 

Devoid of common sense.

It was also stated in the evidence that 

the Bedout light was out from March 13, 

and the question that suggested itself 

was that, in view of the condition of the 

coast, should an unattended light be so 

far from supervision? He cast no reflection 

on the Harbour and Lights Department, 

but were the port authorities satisfied that

the unattended light at Bedout was

safe? Should it not be attended to

more frequently?

Brave criticizing his strongest ally in this farce, Captain Irvine. 

The firm who supplied the light said that it 

was necessary.  It was possible that the vessel 

might have lost her rudder or propeller; but he 

was not inclined to that belief, seeing that evidence 

disclosed that they were 20 per cent, above 

requirements. 

Had a breakdown occurred in the engine-room, 

then there would have been very little chance of

the vessel surviving such terrible conditions as 

the Koombana must have experienced. 

It was the duty of the Court, from a public point 

of view, to see whether all that was possible had

been done by those directly concerned to trace 

any wreckage and succour any people who 

might be out on the sea.

It was the 'duty of the Court, from a public point of view' to establish that Koombana needed to be in too tender a condition to clear the bar at Port Hedland that day and that filling tanks at sea in gale force conditions was less than ideal, verging on dangerous.

 

He did not think such a charge could

be made against the Adelaide S S

Company. They had made almost superhuman 

efforts, and the Government was deserving 

of the greatest commendation for the part 

it had taken in the search for the missing 

vessel, and in which not only the Bullarra, 

but the Una, Gorgon, Moonta, Minderoo, and

four luggers were engaged. He did not

know what the finding would be, but

his suggestion was that the Koombana was

a steamer of the highest class and of

proved stability, encountered a hurricane of 

phenomenal violence, of which no warning 

was given, in a dangerous position, and was 

totally lost. The Admiralty said that no reliance 

was to be placed on the chart, and, in the 

circumstances, it was impossible to say

what caused the loss of the vessel.

Self congratulation on a scale such as this surely could not have gone down well with those who had lost loved ones with the ship.

On Friday, the Court delivered its

finding, which stated, inter alia with

regard to the personnel of the vessel,

that it was of the highest quality, and

both Captain Allen and the chief officer 

held extra masters' certificates, and

both were men of great experience on

the Australian cost. The Court was

satisfied that the Koombana in 

construction, stability, and seaworthiness

was equal to any vessel of her class in 

the Australian coastal trade.

The Court thinks it desirable that

telegrams regarding the weather should

be exchanged every day between stations 

while observations are made along the 

north-west coast; that information so 

obtained should be posted for general 

information; and that storm signals should 

be shown at all ports.

The Court simply finds, without indulging 

in useless speculation, that the stability 

and seaworthiness of the s.s. Koombana

were unassailable, and the

competency and carefulness of her master 

(Capt. Allen) beyond question; that after 

being lost sight of at sea on March 20, 

1912, her fate passes beyond human 

knowledge, and remains a mystery of

the sea.

Whitewash complete!!

courtesy Trove and

https://www.slp.wa.gov.au/gazette/gazette.nsf/gazlist/6205E4E859C7A3E548257C1D0015457F/$file/gg023.pdf